N. V. Beaulieu Real v Minister for Justice and Customs

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This is an appeal from a judgment of Conti J of 16 April 2002. N.V. Beaulieu Real ("the appellant") is a Belgian manufacturer of primary carpet backing fabric which sells that product in the Australian market. There is one Australian manufacturer of the same product, Amoco Chemicals Pty Limited ("Amoco") which initiated the inquiry alleging dumping of carpet backing fabric on the Australian market by the appellant and others. On 12 January 1999, the Minister for Justice and Customs ("the Minister") signed instruments under the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), declaring that s 8 of the Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975 (Cth) applied to goods exported into Australia by the appellant because, in short, the appellant's carpet backing fabric was being dumped and causing material injury to Amoco. 2 In its application for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) the appellant contended that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision by the Minister and that the making of the decision amounted to an improper exercise of power. The focus of this challenge was whether the material before the Minister supported a conclusion that the dumping of the carpet backing fabric caused material injury to Amoco. This, in turn, raised a question about the reason why Amoco has recently been able to obtain only a depressed price for its carpet backing fabric in the Australian market. The application was dismissed with costs. 3 During the hearing of this appeal, and after extensive discussions with the members of the Court, counsel for the appellant conceded, correctly in our view, that the inference was open on the material before the Minister that the two large carpet manufacturers in Australia, Godfrey Hirst Pty Ltd and Shaw Industries Pty Ltd, were directing themselves to the lowest price available in Australia, when demanding a low price from Amoco, which included the dumped price offered by the appellant. Counsel also conceded that if we accepted this concession as correct the appropriate order was to dismiss the appeal. As we have accepted this concession it follows that the appeal should be dismissed. Counsel for the appellant indicated it was sufficient that we express these views and that it was not necessary for us to publish comprehensive reasons. We propose to order that time to lodge the notice of appeal be extended but the appeal be dismissed.