The applicant's evidence was that he undressed himself in his own bedroom before going to bed. When confronted by the complainant's boyfriend about why his clothes were in their bedroom, his evidence was that he looked on the floor next to his bed as that was where he last saw his clothes.
The photographs in evidence showed that the applicant's clothes were in the complainant's bedroom at 5.34am and 5.49am. When the police arrived, those clothes were found in the applicant's bedroom. There was no evidence about who had moved the clothes.
What the Crown said in closing address on this topic was clear, precise and appropriately moderate: "One possibility is that after [the complainant] threw the shoe, the accused then picked up his clothing and took it back to his room. None of the witnesses saw that happen, although they say they weren't focussed or [paying] particular attention to the clothing at that time. There was clearly a lot going on in the apartment at that stage."
In closing, senior counsel for the applicant said:
"…But the second reason which I would suggest to you would lead you to have a doubt about the Crown case is the question of the clothes that moved themselves. The mystery of the clothes. You may think there is something odd about the evidence about what happens to the clothes and far from supporting the prosecution case it would lead you to have considerable doubts about the prosecution case."
The trial judge, in his summing up, said about this issue:
"He also then dealt with what I think was his second major point or issue was, what he referred to as "The clothes that moved themselves." That there was something odd and suspicious about these clothes, that the accused's evidence was that he undressed in his own bedroom and left them beside the bed, and between the bed and the wardrobe in his room. He again repeated if he had undressed in [the complainant and her boyfriend's] bedroom, why would he leave his clothes there?
He would have known that they were there, and you would think that if he had been in there and was discovered in the process and pushed off, that then he would have made the effort to remove his clothes because that would evidence the fact that he had been in the room. But he had not done that, because the clothes were still there - as you can see, at least at the time that [the complainant] used her phone to take the photo of them."
After dealing at some length with the photographs and making various suggestions to the jury based on those photographs which are the subject of complaints in ground 1, the trial judge returned to the subject of the movement of the clothes:
"…you would have to wonder why [the complainant's boyfriend] or Ms Rodgers or [the complainant] would have any reason to move part of the clothing from the bedroom to Mr Mulholland's room.
Was there some reason, other than to remove the evidence, to shift them? Was there something in the pants that someone wanted, and so took them in order to recover it? Was someone in need of a belt? …So, ladies and gentlemen, there are, as has been suggested to you, a number of odd aspects about the clothes.
The question is: who might have had any interest in moving them? And what you make of the partial removal, because one sock and the shirt are left in the main bedroom, and what you make of the fact that one shoe has either been disposed of in the bin liner, or alternatively has somehow made its way under Mr Mulholland's bed? However, the movement of the clothes are all matters that must, on the evidence, have occurred after the taking of the photographs by [the complainant]. You have the timing of the photographs because it is recorded by the phone and it is printed at the top of each of the photographs.
Is there any particular significance in relation to the movement of the clothes, or who moved the clothes to the extent that they were moved, in circumstances where the allegation here is that the two acts of penile-vaginal intercourse occurred before the time at which the clothes were photographed on the floor in the main bedroom? So, that is a matter for you. You have heard the submissions that have been made to you by counsel respectively in respect of that material. Mr Stratton has suggested to you that someone has moved them, and it is a mystery who that is, and someone must be not telling you the truth. Well, that is a matter for you, but if someone is not telling you the truth about moving the items, there are at least four possibilities and those are the four tenants of the premises.
…the two women were still in the unit, having apparently retreated, at least initially, to Ms Rodgers' room, and the accused was still there - and you know he was still there for some time…So you might consider whether [the complainant's boyfriend] at any time after the accused had left would have any interest in moving any of the clothes, and consider who of the four tenants may have had the opportunity to do anything in relation to moving them, or any interest in moving them?"
The applicant submitted that all four tenants gave evidence that they had not removed the clothes from the bedroom, nor had they seen anyone move them. The applicant submitted that two phrases used by the trial judge above, "you would have to wonder why [the complainant's boyfriend] or Ms Rodgers or [the complainant] would have any reason to move part of the clothing from the bedroom to Mr Mulholland's room" and "so you might consider whether [the complainant's boyfriend] at any time after the accused had left would have any interest in moving any of the clothes, and consider who of the four tenants may have had the opportunity to do anything in relation to moving them, or any interest in moving them?" were suggestions by the trial judge to the jury that the applicant had reason to move the clothing and that no one else did.
The applicant submitted that by this part of the summing up there was a real risk that the jury reasoned the applicant had removed the clothes and that he had done so in consciousness of his guilt.
The Crown submitted that the impugned sentences cannot be taken in isolation, and that the trial judge's comments raised the possibility that any one of the four flatmates might have moved the clothes and that the trial judge was not singling out the applicant. The Crown submitted that the trial judge's use of the word "odd" reflected the theme of senior counsel for the accused's submissions.
The Crown further submitted that the failure by senior counsel to take up these points with the trial judge at the time may have been a deliberate forensic decision. The Crown submitted that where there is a tactical advantage discernible it is difficult to maintain there was a miscarriage of justice: Tekely v R per Howie J at [131].
What the trial judge said on this issue ranged far beyond the Crown submission. It was an invitation, in terms, to the jury to reason that the applicant was the person who had moved the clothes as "who might have had any interest in moving them?". The rhetorical questions posed by his Honour - "Was there something in the pants that someone wanted, and so took them in order to recover it? Was someone in need of a belt?" - could only have been understood by the jury to be a reference by the trial judge to the applicant.
I reject the Crown submission that a possible tactical advantage could have been perceived by the applicant by reason of this part of the summing up. This was made clear by the complaint, in the absence of the jury, by senior counsel for the applicant about the trial judge's statement rhetorically asking the jury "who would have an interest or opportunity to move the clothing?". In response, his Honour reminded the jury of the complainant's evidence that she heard the applicant leave the flat at a time when his clothes were still in the complainant's bedroom. That reminder partially ameliorated the damage cause by the rhetorical questions posed earlier by the trial judge.
This part of the summing up demonstrates his Honour stating a major theme of the defence case and immediately thereafter directing the jury in terms starkly inconsistent with the defence case and in a way that travelled well outside any fair summary of the Crown submissions about the issues. The trial judge speculated outside the evidence and put matters to the jury which were not part of the Crown case.
[2]
The finding of the shoe
The evidence about the applicant's shoes had a significance at the trial. It will be recalled that immediately prior to the applicant leaving the flat the complainant threw one of his shoes at him. The evidence of Ms Rodgers was that the applicant left the apartment after the shoe throwing. This was also the evidence of the complainant's boyfriend.
When the police arrived later that morning they found one of the applicant's shoes in the applicant's bedroom. The complainant's boyfriend said that he found the applicant's other shoe some time later and threw it out. There was no challenge to the evidence of Mr O'Murchu that when he went back some time later to pick up the applicant's possessions from the flat he found the other shoe under the applicant's bed. Both shoes were in evidence at the trial.
The Crown case on this issue was as follows:
"There is also conflicting evidence as to what happened with the accused's other shoe, the one that was not seized by the police. Brendan told you that he found the shoe in his wardrobe a week or so later and he threw it into a bin in order to go to the garbage.
Leading Senior Constable O'Brien said that he looked around for the other shoe, including looking underneath the bed but he didn't find it. The accused's friend, [Paul O'Murchu], he said that when he later came along to pack up the accused's bedroom he found the missing shoe underneath the bed.
How you resolve that evidence, if you can, is a matter for you. Whatever you make of that evidence about the shoe, I suggest that it is not an essential issue in this case. Even if you think that the only possible explanation is that Brendan is wrong in his evidence about what happened - and I don't suggest it is what you think - but even if you did then it doesn't affect the evidence that goes to the elements of the offences or the credibility of the witnesses that the Crown relies on to prove those elements."
The applicant's case was that the evidence about this shoe, and the cross-examination of the complainant's boyfriend on this issue, cast doubt on the evidence of the complainant's boyfriend. It was suggested to the jury that they would find his evidence to be "untruthful".
What the trial judge said about this was as follows:
"Now, you heard the evidence about the brown shoe being thrown by [the complainant] at the accused. I do not think she said it hit him. She did not know where it had ended up. You heard Mr McLaughlin's evidence that a week or so after this event, he found a brown shoe which I would suggest, on the evidence, he believed to be the accused's, in the wardrobe, and you have marked on Exhibit 1 both the bed and the position in which he said he found it in a wardrobe, being effectively opposite the bed, and in a wardrobe.
Now, you have heard his evidence. Having found that shoe, which was not his - "a brown shoe" was all he described it as - he put it in a black bin liner for the purpose of whoever next left the premises to take it and throw it out in the rubbish. That was as much as he could say about it, and you have heard evidence from Mr Paul O'Murchu that sometime after the incident, he and others attended to assist the accused to remove his property from the premises, which included packing up all of his goods including the bed, and that when they attended to moving the bed out, they found the shoe which is now Exhibit M3. That is the one in the white plastic bag under the bed, and - it is a matter for you - that appears to be a right foot shoe.
It appears to match the other shoe in that it is the same colour, appears to be the same size; although I haven't checked the size, but the appearance is that it is the same size, and is otherwise perhaps only distinguishable by the dirt that is on the left shoe that I have previously referred to, on the heel. If you look at the heel and sole of those two shoes, they appear to be relatively equal in wear. So, you have this evidence of Mr McLaughlin finding a brown shoe in the wardrobe and throwing it in the bin to later be disposed of, and also the evidence of Mr O'Murchu of finding a shoe under Mr Mulholland's bed. You have both shoes here that you can compare yourselves.
Now, you will recall Officer O'Brien's evidence was that, having attended the premises and seen the clothing in Mr Mulholland's room, they took the photograph of it, which is photograph 8 in Exhibit 5, which shows a pair of pants and a shoe and also, you might think, between the shoe and the pants, a black sock, a single sock. It also shows that the pants no longer have a brown belt. So, we have a missing shoe, a missing sock, and a missing brown belt. Well, you might find that the missing sock was still in the bedroom when the police were there and took their photos. So, that could be accounted for. But we still have the problem of the shoe.
If you look at photograph 7 and 8 and 9 in Exhibit 5, they are all photographs taken of the content of Mr Mulholland's bedroom, and you can see that he has a bed base with a mattress on it, and if you look at photograph 7 and 8 you will see that the headboard appears to be entirely up against the wall, and the side of the bed in photograph 8 and photograph 7 is clearly entirely up against the side of the wall as well. If you look at the foot of the bed in photograph 8, it appears that the foot of the bed goes from the height of the mattress entirely down to the floor. There is no space or gap through which a shoe might get under the bed. Unfortunately, you cannot tell what the state of the bed is on the side between the bed and the wardrobe - as seen in photograph 7 - because the photograph does not disclose the side of the bed.
If the bed base is the same all around, then you would have to wonder how a shoe could ever get under the bed unless it was deliberately placed there. You would have to lift the base, perhaps, to put it under, or alternatively, you would have to lift the mattress, and depending on the structure under that, whether it was slatted or solid, you might be able, particularly if it was slatted, to move the slats and put the shoe under the bed. But you would have to ask yourself why anyone would do that. But that is the evidence as to where the second shoe - that is M3 - was located by Mr O'Murchu." (emphasis added)
This is another matter of real significance. The trial judge speculated outside the evidence and put matters to the jury which were not part of the Crown case. He told them what the photographs meant, expressing his own views about the evidence. In and of itself this part of the summing up was unfair. It was a devastating attack on the defence case by the trial judge not based on a fair summary of the Crown submission. The trial judge all but suggested to the jury that the applicant had deliberately placed the shoe under his bed for some forensic purpose in the trial by the question "why anyone would do that".
It was no part of the Crown case that the shoe had been deliberately placed under the applicant's bed by anyone, much less for any forensic purpose in the trial. The suggestion made by his Honour to the jury was unfair and should not have been made.
The re-direction ultimately given, that the photographs may show a gap under the bed sufficient for a shoe to go under it, does not address the central issue. That is; his Honour identified a major theme of the defence case and immediately thereafter directed the jury in terms starkly inconsistent with the defence case and in a way that travelled well outside any fair summary of the Crown submissions about the issue.
[3]
The evidence about hugging and DNA transfer
It was common ground that there was DNA from the applicant found in the complainant's lower vagina. The subject of a possible indirect transfer of DNA was critical to the defence case. The applicant's case was that the Crown failed to exclude indirect transfer of DNA as an explanation for the DNA results.
The Crown case at trial was straightforward and appropriately clear. This was not the case summarised by the trial judge. The Crown told the jury:
"The Crown doesn't take issue with the possibility that there could have been some of the accused's DNA on the complainant's hands at some time. Whether that was from the hug. Whether it was from just being in the same household and the fact that they were touching the same surfaces within the apartment.
However, if the accused's DNA was on the complainant's hands wouldn't you also expect to find the other flat mates' DNA on the complainant's hands. Lauren's DNA and particularly Brendan's DNA. Brendan who wasn't only her house mate, but her partner with whom she shared the bedroom, the bed and the en suite bathroom. Wouldn't you think that if she is picking up DNA from around the place that Brendan's DNA would be there as well. You heard that the only DNA that was found on those swabs that wasn't the complainant's DNA was male DNA that matched the accused's DNA profile."
The applicant submitted the trial judge stated to the jury that the hug between the applicant and the complainant could not have led to the applicant's DNA being present in the forensic examination of the complainant's vagina, and that the trial judge did not refer to other ways by which DNA could have been transferred.
The trial judge stated:
"…Ms Friedman [the DNA expert] was taken to the question of the transfer of DNA, and particularly where there was an embrace by way of a hug, and whether you might expect there would be a transfer of some DNA to [the complainant] from the accused. Ms Friedman said, 'It's possible. Depending on the degree of contact and where the actual skin on skin contact is, yes, it is possible that some of his DNA may have ended up on her'. She was asked,
'Q: Just going back a step, in the situation where there's been a hugging of two people, is it possible that the DNA of the accused or some of it might end up on [the complainant's] hands?
A: Yes, that's possible.
Q: That would be possible, can I suggest, either from contact of her hands on his body directly, or on his clothing, either of those would be a reasonable possibility, is that fair?
A: Yes. More likely if there's direct - if her hands contacted his skin directly, there's more likely to be transfer onto her hands.
Q: If subsequently prior to her being examined by Dr Stewart if she had, for some reason, had contact with her low vaginal area, could she have transferred some of John Mulholland's DNA onto herself?
A: The only way I could see that as a reasonable scenario, would be fairly immediately, before she touches anything else, and after touching him. If she inserts her fingers into that area, there is a possibility she could transfer some of his DNA there.'
Now, I think in broad terms, ladies and gentlemen, Ms Gerhart's [the other DNA expert] evidence is to much the same effect. There does not seem to be a real dispute between the experts. But what is for you to consider is the circumstances in relation to which this transfer of DNA might occur, by way of the hugging, or it has even been suggested, by way of indirect transfer: someone picks up a cup, puts it down, leaving their DNA on it, someone else picks up the cup collecting the other person's DNA from the cup and then puts their hand on something else, leaving either the DNA of the person who put it on the cup, or their own DNA plus that person's DNA. So, you have had the evidence about the possible transfer.
What do you have here, in relation to [the complainant]? There is a dispute in the evidence as to how the hug occurred…Whichever way it occurred, the accused's evidence - and consistent also with [the complainant's] evidence - was - and I think the accused might have actually used this term, they certainly demonstrated that they put their hands around each other.
So there is no suggestion that either of them were not wearing clothes on the upper half of their body, so the hands have gone around, and you might think the part of Mr Mulholland that [the complainant's] hands would come in contact with, would be his back, his shirt. So, the question is, of course, how significant that is in terms of it being possible in those circumstances to pick his DNA up from having touched the back of his shirt. It may well be that, if you are wearing a shirt, that those parts of your skin that come in contact with the shirt will leave DNA on the shirt. So, the inside of the shirt for instance may have a considerable amount of your DNA on it.
It may well be that if you have sweaty palms or something of that nature, and you do as many people do, to dry them off you wipe them on the front of your shirt, the front of your shirt may become very much covered with your own DNA. So, there may be a possibility of the transfer of DNA in those circumstances, where you touch the front of someone's shirt or, as the expert said, where you have direct skin to skin contact. This was not skin to skin contact on either person's version of it, and it was not contact for instance, with the front of his shirt. It was contact by way of, in effect, a bear hug with the back of his shirt; that is, the outside of his shirt.
Now, as to whether [the complainant] might have collected his DNA in that manner and then transferred it to her own vaginal area and including to the area of the low vaginal swab, the expert says,
'Well, yes. The only way I could see that as a reasonable scenario would be fairly immediately, before she touches anything else after touching him. If she inserts her fingers into that area, there's a possibility she could transfer some of his DNA there.'
So, she has given evidence that it is a possibility; you have to see what you make of the circumstances as to what is alleged as to the contact between them, and make your own estimate, or come to an opinion yourselves as about whether this is a likely or reasonable scenario. [The complainant] was never asked any question about after she hugged the accused, whether she at any time touched herself in such a way as might have caused the transfer of any DNA of his, if there was any DNA of his on her hands. And you do know that what she did, some time [sic] after the hug, whether it be in the kitchen or the lounge room, was that she went to her bedroom and prepared herself for bed, so she changed out of her clothes and changed into her pyjama clothes, and of course she would have been using her hands to do that. So it is a matter for you to take into account, ladies and gentlemen."
The Crown submitted that the trial judge did refer to other ways in which the DNA evidence could have been transferred, including indirect transfer. The Crown further submitted that the trial judge's summation was an entirely accurate statement of the evidence on this matter.
I reject the Crown's submission.
In the trial judge's summing up, the entire passage about whether the applicant and the complainant were wearing clothes and whether there was a possibility of picking up DNA from a person's clothes was outside the Crown case and involved impermissible speculation by the trial judge.
In relation to this sixth and central part of the defence case, the trial judge identified the defence case and immediately thereafter directed the jury in terms inconsistent with that case and in a way that travelled beyond a fair summary of the Crown submissions.
[4]
Conclusion about ground 2
In the present case the trial judge's summing up did not exhibit a "judicial balance". It deprived the jury of an adequate opportunity of understanding and giving effect to the applicant's defence and the matters relied upon in support of the defence. As the above passage from B v The Queen makes clear, a recognition that the jury were the trier of facts does not address a complaint about an unbalanced summing up.
This is not a case where by reason of the defence address there was any matter which needed to be corrected by referring to matters not part of the Crown's address. There was no compelling reason for the trial judge to put an argument not advanced by counsel. The trial judge put arguments to the jury drawn from outside the Crown case in a number of respects which I have identified above.
The directions to the jury as a whole were lacking in the appropriate balance. Many of the directions about the defence case were not based on evidence but speculation, particularly in relation to issues concerning the clothes, the applicant's shoes and the indirect transfer of DNA.
The Crown, in responding to the appeal, submitted that an acceptable explanation for aspects of his Honour's summing up was that it was "a thesis only". The Crown's written submissions indicated, in relation to things the trial judge told the jury about photographs of the applicant's sock which went beyond the Crown case, that the trial judge saying that "perhaps" the second sock was still in the complainant's room, made it clear that this was "a thesis only". However, it is clear on the basis of the authorities I have cited above that it was not appropriate for the trial judge to present his "thesis" to the jury as to how the exhibits could be both interpreted and explained separate from a summary of the submissions of the Crown and the defence.
The summing up, read as a whole, urged upon the jury a particular mode of thought. His Honour took each of the six major themes of the defence case and suggested to the jury answers or an explanation for each of those defence submissions based upon a mixture of Crown submissions and separate explanations developed by his Honour. Explanations for gaps, deficiencies and inconsistencies in the evidence were offered which, to a legal mind, would appear to be in each case a logical possibility. As Spigelman CJ, Wood CJ at CL and Kirby J said of such an approach in RTB, however, "[j]uries are not required to think like that."
The fact that a number of "possibilities" were put to the jury by the trial judge, rather than by the Crown, may have directed the jury's collective mind in a particular way. Speculation, whilst perhaps appropriate for counsel, should not receive the added weight of the intervention of the trial judge. The jury could have understood the trial judge to be suggesting that, because there may have been an explanation as a matter of logic, they should reason in a particular way and reject each submission made by defence counsel.
The summing up as a whole was unbalanced and unfair to the applicant. I would uphold ground 2 of the appeal. Given this conclusion it is unnecessary separately to address ground 1.
[5]
Leave to appeal under rule 4
The restriction on appeals imposed by Rule 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules relied on by the Crown must be addressed. Rule 4 states:
"4 Exclusion of certain matters as grounds for appeal etc
No direction, omission to direct, or decision as to the admission or rejection of evidence, given by the Judge presiding at the trial, shall, without the leave of the Court, be allowed as a ground for appeal or an application for leave to appeal unless objection was taken at the trial to the direction, omission, or decision by the party appealing or applying for leave to appeal."
In Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; [1999] HCA 37, McHugh J explained that:
"[72] There is no case for the grant of leave under r 4 unless the Court of Criminal Appeal is satisfied that the appellant has an arguable case that the trial judge has made an error of law or is satisfied that the appellant's conviction is otherwise a miscarriage of justice".
Leave under Rule 4 should only be granted if the applicant can demonstrate that there has been a miscarriage of justice. By miscarriage of justice I mean that the applicant must establish that he or she has lost a real chance (or a chance fairly open) of being acquitted: ARS v R at [148].
I have formed the view that the lack of balance demonstrated in the summing up caused a miscarriage of justice. The conclusion I have reached, that the summing up as a whole was unbalanced and unfair to the accused, gave rise to a miscarriage of justice in that it has been established that the applicant lost a chance fairly open to him of being acquitted. It is fundamental to our system of justice that the trial judge should not descend into the forensic arena. Regrettably, that is what happened here. Despite the strength of the Crown case, I have concluded that the unfair summing up gave rise to a miscarriage of justice.
[6]
Conclusion and proposed orders
I propose the following orders:
1. Leave to appeal against conviction granted;
2. Appeal allowed;
3. Set aside the appellant's conviction;
4. Remitted to the District Court for re-trial.
SCHMIDT J: I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of both Payne JA and Fagan J. I agree with Payne JA, for the reasons which his Honour gives, both that the appeal must be upheld and the orders which he proposes must be made.
While there is no question that the Crown case was a strong one, I have reached these conclusions also being satisfied that in his summing up, the trial judge impermissibly entered the arena, in order to advance a case to meet that put for the applicant. What his Honour so advanced was not confined to an explanation of the Crown's case. It is not for a trial judge either so to have, or to advance to the jury any thesis of his or her own, as to how what lies in issue between the parties should be resolved.
Here an important aspect of the defence case was the implausibility of the account which the complainant had given to police, about what she remembered the applicant having done to her and how she had reacted. On the cases which the parties each advanced, the jury was thus obliged to come to conclusions about the reliability of her evidence, as well as of her credibility. The credibility of her boyfriend and the accused were also in issue. The defence also advanced submissions about the various other themes Payne JA has discussed, in order to persuade the jury that on all of the evidence, the Crown had not met the onus falling upon it, to prove the applicant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial judge's directions as to how the jury should approach the evidence, in order to resolve these issues, went far beyond an explanation of how the jury should undertake its task, by application of the legal principles which they were bound to apply, to the point that it involved an impermissible departure from his proper role.
The result was that the applicant was denied a chance of acquittal, which may have flown from a consideration of the evidence in light of the respective cases which the parties had advanced, uninfluenced by his Honour's impermissible intervention in the trial, to advance his own views about how the jury might resolve what lay in issue between the parties. In the result, it follows that the appeal must be upheld.
FAGAN J: I am not able to agree with Payne JA and Schmidt J that the learned trial judge impermissibly expressed his own views on the evidence, or on the facts which the jury might find, or on the defence closing arguments. I do not consider that the summing up was unbalanced or that the trial miscarried as a result of the terms in which his Honour referred to the facts and counsel's arguments.
I gratefully adopt Payne JA's summary of the principles which define limits within which a trial judge may legitimately comment on the facts and arguments in a summing up. I also adopt his Honour's identification of the terms in which the Crown and defence joined issue concerning the six subjects on which the trial judge commented in a manner which is now complained of.
The first subject was the complainant's statement to police officers at Royal North Shore Hospital on the morning of the alleged incident, in these terms:
I don't know why I didn't react. I didn't know what was going on.
At trial the complainant gave evidence that she thought her sleep had been disturbed by someone with his head between her legs but she was unsure whether she really experienced this or whether it was a reliable memory. She said that after this she became fully awake to find the accused on top of her, penetrating her. She said she was "really shocked and scared" and remained still, pretending to be asleep. He withdrew, got off the bed and stood up. The complainant did not try to wake her boyfriend beside her because he slept very heavily after drinking and she doubted she could raise him. Also she was "probably scared if he did wake up of how he might react to everything".
The complainant's evidence continued that the accused then got back on the bed and resumed intercourse. She "just remained really still". She said:
I was just really scared. I just wanted it to stop. I just was, I was probably really confused as to why he had done this.
Evidence providing context to her statements about confusion included that she had drunk a considerable amount of alcohol during the preceding evening and early hours of the morning and that she and her boyfriend had shared the flat with the appellant for two years and she regarded him as a friend. In cross-examination she stated that she did not provide police with a formal statement until three weeks after the incident:
because I knew that it could potentially get [the appellant] into a lot of trouble and he was my friend.
In the passage of summing up quoted by Payne JA at [62] the part complained of is this:
You might think that if she did say, "I didn't know what was going on", that might not be a suggestion that she did not realise that the accused was having sexual intercourse with her, rather that she could not understand in the circumstances why this was happening. But that is a matter for you.
I see nothing impermissible in the trial judge having invited the jury, in those terms, to consider what the complainant might have meant by the statement "I didn't know what was going on". Defence counsel did not directly put to the jury that this should be understood as an admission, shortly after the alleged incident, that she had been at the relevant time unable to comprehend what events were occurring. Any such submission would have been far-fetched. It was quite clear that the complainant had only gone to the Hospital and was only talking to police there because she claimed that she well understood what had occurred, namely two instances of sexual intercourse without consent. Her answer quoted at [135] was a basis in the evidence upon which the jury could properly consider the possible interpretation of the statement to which his Honour invited their attention, that is, that she was confused as to why this was occurring rather than as to what was occurring.
The second subject was the defence submission in closing that the jury might consider the complainant's entire account, including the two alleged instances of full intercourse, may be an unreliable half waking, half dreaming false memory. She accepted that her recollection of being first disturbed from sleep by a person's head between her legs might be of that unreliable nature. I do not see that the learned trial judge's warning to the jury, quoted by Payne JA at [73], in any way negated or debunked the defence argument. It was appropriate to remind the jury that there was no charge based upon any allegation that the accused had his head between the complainant's legs before she fully woke. It was appropriate to point out to them that in any event the complainant was uncertain whether this had occurred and that the only relevance of the evidence was that it was "part of the surrounding circumstances as to her memory of the events".
On a fair reading of his Honour's observations I do not see that they conveyed any view for or against the defence argument that the complainant's admitted uncertainty with respect to this matter infected her reliability concerning the two acts of penetration. What his Honour said simply left the respective Crown and defence arguments matched against each other undisturbed. It would have been very clear to the jury that the Crown was saying the complainant's acknowledgement of uncertainty about anything being done to her when she was first aroused from sleep showed honesty and willingness to identify things she could not clearly recall. It would have been equally clear the defence was saying that if she was uncertain about this she was unreliable about everything. Nothing in the judge's words obscured the clarity with which these alternatives were left for the jury's consideration or tilted the choice.
The third subject was the physical improbability, as the defence put it, of the appellant's head being at the level of the complainant's shoulder whilst he was having intercourse with her. In the part of the summing up quoted by Payne JA at [80], in my view all his Honour did was to point out that the jury should take into account not only the overall height of the appellant relevant to that of the complainant but also the proportions of their bodies. That is, if their hips were in proximity, were the dimensions from hip to shoulder or from hip to head so different between the two of them that what the complainant described was impossible or improbable?
I do not consider that it was unfair to either party, or in particular that it was unbalanced towards the defence, to point out that in this respect the jury "need[ed] to take into account all the circumstances". What his Honour said was, in my respectful view, an aspect of the common sense and common experience which a jury is required to bring to bear upon such an issue. His Honour did not invite the jury, by taking this question of bodily proportions into account, to reach a particular conclusion. Nor did he hint to them what he thought the answer ought to be. The fact that the Crown had limited itself to stating "the exact body position is not a matter of precise mathematical precision" and that the defence had confined its argument to a simplistic comparison of overall heights did not have the result that his Honour's invitation to consider all aspects of the matter undermined a defence argument.
The fourth subject was the movement of the appellant's clothes from where they were photographed beside the complainant's bed to his own room. The Crown and defence submissions about who might have moved the clothes and what if anything could be inferred from that, as quoted by Payne JA at [87] and [88], could in my view fairly be characterised as tentative and inconclusive. Neither party urged the jury to any conclusion upon this feature of the case. I respectfully consider that the learned trial judge's summing up, extracted by Payne JA at [89] and [90], did not alter this position.
The passage quoted at [89] reiterated the defence argument that the presence of the appellant's clothes in the complainant's bedroom was inconsistent with him having done what was alleged, because surely if that had occurred he would have removed them when the complainant pushed him off the bed. The net effect of his Honour's observations at [90] was that (a) consideration of who might have had any interest in subsequently moving the clothes was relevant to any inference the jury might draw as to who might have been responsible for moving them; (b) the opportunity of any of the occupants of the flat to move the clothes was also relevant to who might have done this and (c) it was a matter for the jury to decide whether there was "any particular significance in relation to the movement of the clothes, or who moved them". I fail to see that these observations could have undermined the defence arguments or unbalanced the summing up in any other way.
The fifth subject was the location of the appellant's right shoe under the bed in his own bedroom. In the passage extracted by Payne JA at [102] the learned trial judge certainly advanced a proposition that the Crown had not put forward, namely, that the shoe could not have found its way to that location accidentally because of the lack of clearance between the underside of the bed and the floor. That possibility was initially left to the jury upon a misinterpretation of the photographs but it was in my view adequately corrected by a redirection at the request of the appellant's counsel.
Defence counsel had argued that the evidence of the complainant's boyfriend could be treated as unreliable because he said he had found a shoe in the wardrobe of the bedroom occupied by himself and the complainant, which he believed to be the appellant's shoe. That ground of attack on the credibility of the boyfriend, for such favour as it might have found with the jury, was not in my opinion affected by controversy as to whether the actual right shoe of the appellant found its way under the bed in his own room by accident or by placement. On any view the boyfriend was in error so far has he thought he had found the appellant's right shoe and thrown it out, because the right shoe was recovered by the appellant's friend, Mr O'Murchu, and was produced to the jury.
The sixth subject concerned reasonable possibilities about how the appellant's DNA might have found its way into the complainant's lower vagina. The part of the summing up extracted by Payne JA at [109] invited the jury to consider the full range of possible contacts with any part of the appellant or his clothing which might have transferred his DNA to her hands. His Honour also suggested they consider any possible contact of her hands with other items on which his DNA might have been present and any possibility of the plaintiff having touched herself, after direct or indirect contact with the appellant's DNA, in such a manner that his DNA would be transferred to her low vaginal area. I do not read this part of the summing up as suggesting to the jury what their conclusion might be or indicating any conclusion of his Honour's. Having regard to the evidence of the experts who gave evidence about DNA transfer, the possibilities to which his Honour adverted were not speculative, in my opinion.
Taken together and in the context of the whole of the summing up I do not consider that his Honour's observations to the jury on the six subjects that the appellant has agitated in the appeal gave rise to an imbalance or exceeded the bounds of legitimate comment as fixed by the authorities. I would dismiss the appeal.
[7]
Amendments
06 March 2020 - At [7], [28], [47], [49], [51], [53], [78], [118], [123] - Typographical errors corrected, cover sheet updated to match same
At [103] - Quote corrected
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Decision last updated: 06 March 2020
HEADNOTE
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
Mr Mulholland was convicted in the District Court of two counts of sexual intercourse without consent contrary to s 61I of Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The complainant was one of his housemates. The other housemates were the complainant's partner Mr McLaughlin and a Ms Rodgers. The applicant and Ms Rodgers each had separate bedrooms, while the complainant and Mr McLaughlin shared a bedroom. The complainant's evidence was that, on 20 February 2016, after a night on which all four housemates had been out socialising, Mr Mulholland sexually assaulted the complainant in her own bed, while her partner was sleeping beside her. The applicant's evidence was that he did not do this. He was woken up by Mr McLaughlin and asked to leave the apartment.
The applicant sought leave to appeal on two grounds:
(1) the trial judge impermissibly expressed his own views on the evidence and matters of fact in the trial; and
(2) the trial judge's summing up was unbalanced, as the trial judge impermissibly expressed his own views about, and responded to, submissions made in the applicant's closing address. In particular, the applicant raised six issues about which he contended the trial judge created unfairness for the applicant.
The majority (Payne JA and Schmidt J), allowing the appeal, held that:
There is a limit to the extent to which a trial judge can comment on the facts of a case. The judge's role in a criminal trial is to hold the balance between the contending parties without themselves taking part in their disputations; the judge does not exercise an inquisitorial role in which he or she seeks to remedy the deficiencies in the case on either side: [48]-[50], [127], [129].
B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599; [1992] HCA 68; R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91; Robinson v R [2006] NSWCCA 192; (2006) 162 A Crim R 88; Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657; [1983] HCA 42 applied.
In order to determine whether a summing up is unfairly balanced, it is necessary for it to be considered in its entirety and in the context of the issues and the evidence led in the trial: [51], [55].
R v Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 54; Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28; [1971] HCA 55 applied.
Despite the strength of the Crown case, the lack of balance in the summing up caused a miscarriage of justice. The summing up as a whole was unbalanced and unfair to the accused, and the applicant lost a chance fairly open to him of being acquitted: [121]-[122], [130].
ARS v R [2011] NSWCCA 266 applied.
Fagan J (dissenting) held that:
In the context of the summing up as a whole, the trial judge's observations to the jury on the six subjects that the appellant has agitated do not give rise to an imbalance or exceed the bounds of legitimate comment, as fixed by the authorities: [148].
Crown submissions
The Crown submitted that the transcript of the summing up reveals that the trial judge faithfully covered almost all of the eighteen points made by senior counsel for the applicant. The trial judge correctly identified that the principal argument made by the defence was that, "There was an inherent improbability in respect of the complainant's account".
The Crown submitted that, given it is being asserted that the summing up was unbalanced in that the defence case was not fairly put, it is necessary to canvass the way in which the trial judge dealt with the eighteen points made by senior counsel.
The obligation of the trial judge was to accurately summarise the case of both parties: Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555; [1992] HCA 13; Majok v R [2015] NSWCCA 160. This obligation extended to commenting on a matter "which had not been dealt with by the Crown, where that is necessary to restore a balance to the trial, and where the Crown Prosecutor had no reason to foresee it, or any opportunity to deal with it": R v Meher [2004] NSWCCA 355 at [91]. The Crown submitted that the movement of the clothes (addressed in detail below) was a matter that warranted such intervention. The jury could have been actively misled into thinking that the applicant could not possibly have moved the clothes. The trial judge's remarks about moving the clothes simply had the effect of restoring balance.
Senior counsel for the applicant did not make any complaint about the way in which the trial judge acceded to his request for a redirection about moving the clothes.
In R v Dookheea [2017] HCA 36; (2017) 91 ALJR 960, the High Court said that where an accused is represented by competent counsel, "the reaction of defence counsel on hearing the impugned portion of the summing up is a cogent consideration". In this case, the applicant was represented by senior counsel whose reaction to this particular impugned portion of the summing up was to seek a redirection in relation to an issue (reversing the onus of proof) not the subject of this appeal. The redirection which was given was to his satisfaction.
The Crown submitted that the ultimate question in relation to ground 1 and ground 2 is whether or not the applicant has shown that a miscarriage of justice has arisen as a result of an unbalanced summing up (s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW)).
The Crown submitted that the ultimate test, as far as the fairness of a summing up is concerned, is "whether the trial judge put the case for the appellant in such a way as to allow the jury to properly consider the issues raised on his behalf": Odisho v R [2018] NSWCCA 19 at [104].
In undertaking this analysis, the summing up must be taken as a whole and with reference both to how it would have been understood by the jury: R v Dookheea; and to what issues were fought at trial: Darwiche v R; El-Zeyat v R; Aouad v R; Osman v R [2011] NSWCCA 62 at [170].
Legal principles
It is convenient to deal with the legal principles relating to both grounds together. Section 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act provides:
"6 Determination of appeals in ordinary cases
(1) The court on any appeal under section 5 (1) against conviction shall allow the appeal if it is of opinion that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable, or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence, or that the judgment of the court of trial should be set aside on the ground of the wrong decision of any question of law, or that on any other ground whatsoever there was a miscarriage of justice, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal; provided that the court may, notwithstanding that it is of opinion that the point or points raised by the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.
(2) Subject to the special provisions of this Act, the court shall, if it allows an appeal under section 5 (1) against conviction, quash the conviction and direct a judgment and verdict of acquittal to be entered.
(3) On an appeal under section 5 (1) against a sentence, the court, if it is of opinion that some other sentence, whether more or less severe is warranted in law and should have been passed, shall quash the sentence and pass such other sentence in substitution therefor, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal."
The overarching principle is that "the requirement of fairness means that ordinarily the respective cases for the prosecution and the accused must be accurately and fairly put to the jury": Domican v The Queen at 560-561. It is not part of the function of a trial judge to don the mantle of prosecution or defence counsel: Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657; [1983] HCA 42 at 682.
There is no necessary structure required for a summing up. It is the "responsibility of the trial judge to structure the summing-up in a way that he assessed would most effectively distil the issues for determination in each case and, to the extent that it was necessary to do so, to remind the jury of the evidence bearing on the determination of those issues": Huynh v The Queen [2013] HCA 6; (2013) 228 A Crim R 306 at 319. The summing up should involve "…no more and no less than a clear and manageable explanation of the issues which are left to the jurors in the particular case before them. There is no need to venture beyond a clear statement of the relevant legal principles as they affect the particular case and against which they are to apply their decisions on the factual questions which arise": R v Williams (1990) 50 A Crim R 213 at 214. Regarding directions to the jury, it is not necessary that directions "be given in a particular form…it is always the case that the directions which a trial judge gives to the jury must be related to the particular facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence and to the way in which the case has been conducted": R v Williams at 217-218.
The Crown relied on Rule 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW). A persuasive consideration in undertaking this assessment is whether or not there was any complaint by defence counsel at the trial about a lack of balance: R v Dookheea; Castle v R (2016) 92 NSWLR 17; [2016] NSWCCA 148; Castle v The Queen (2016) 259 CLR 449; [2016] HCA 46; R v Germakian (2007) 70 NSWLR 467; [2007] NSWCCA 373; Tekely v R; Nagle v R [2007] NSWCCA 75; ARS v R [2011] NSWCCA 266; Odisho v R; AP v R [2017] NSWCCA 270.
The Crown submitted that it has demonstrated that the trial judge faithfully and accurately put the defence case to the jury in such a way as to enable the jury properly to understand the applicant's case. The Crown submitted that the complaints raised are without substance and in any event relate to relatively insignificant matters.
In RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; [2000] HCA 3, Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ stated:
"[42] … it has long been held that a trial judge may comment (and comment strongly) on factual issues. But although a trial judge may comment on the facts, the judge is not bound to do so except to the extent that the judge's other functions require it. Often, perhaps much more often than not, the safer course for a trial judge will be to make no comment on the facts beyond reminding the jury, in the course of identifying the issues before them, of the arguments of counsel." (Footnote omitted)
A trial judge is entitled to express his or her view about the facts, provided that he or she does so with moderation and provided always that he or she makes it clear that it is the jury's function to decide the facts and that it is the jurors' duty to disregard the view which the trial judge has expressed or may appear to hold if it does not agree with their own independent assessment of the facts: R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91.
As to the permissible limits of a trial judge commenting on the facts, Brennan J in B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599; [1992] HCA 68 at 605 said:
"A trial judge has a broad discretion in commenting on the facts and in choosing the strength of the language employed in commenting on the facts, but the comment must stop short of overawing the jury …. It must exhibit a judicial balance … so that the jury is not deprived 'of an adequate opportunity of understanding and giving effect to the defence and the matters relied upon in support of the defence' …. I agree with the observations of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Reg. v. Hulse ((1971) 1 SASR 327, at p 335):
'[T]o use the words of the Privy Council in Broadhurst's Case ((1964) AC 441 at p 464), there is a danger of the jury being overawed by the judge's views, where, even though the jury are told that the decision on the facts is for them, the language of the judge is so forceful that they may be under the impression that there is really nothing for them to decide or that they would be fatuous or disrespectful if they disagreed with the judge's views.'"
The judge's role in a criminal trial is to hold the balance between the contending parties without themselves taking part in their disputations; the judge does not exercise an inquisitorial role in which he or she seeks to remedy the deficiencies in the case on either side: Robinson v R [2006] NSWCCA 192; (2006) 162 A Crim R 88 per Johnson J (Spigelman CJ and Simpson J agreeing).
Whether the trial judge went too far in deprecating the defence case depends on the impression gained by reading the summing up as a whole: Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28; [1971] HCA 55 at 34.
Trial judges should normally refrain from advancing an argument in support of the Crown case that was not put by the Crown. There are two reasons for the unacceptability of a judge using the summing up as a vehicle for strengthening the Crown case. First, it is inconsistent with judicial impartiality. Secondly, to do so denies the prosecution and the defence the opportunity either to disavow, or to meet the argument: R v Meher at [87]-[93].
In R v RTB [2002] NSWCCA 104 per Spigelman CJ, Wood CJ at CL and Kirby J, the Court stated:
"[55] In the present case, both of the issues that have arisen were of a character that could have been put by the Crown as a suggestion to the jury. In neither case was there any necessity for the trial judge to say anything to the jury. There was no suggestion of any unfairness to the Crown in the way the case was conducted. Nor was there any other reason for the trial judge to put an argument not advanced by counsel. (see e.g. R v Heuston (1995) 81 A Crim R 387 at 393).
…
[59] In each of the two respects of which complaint is now made, the intervention of the trial judge urged upon the jury a particular mode of thought. His Honour suggested that there could have been an explanation for the deficiency in the complainant's evidence, of a character which was not of itself based on any evidence but which, to a legal mind, would appear to be in each case a logical possibility. Juries are not required to think like that.
[60] The fact that each of these 'possibilities' was put to the jury by the trial judge, rather than by the Crown, may have directed that the jury's collective mind in assessing credibility in a particular way. Specifically, the thrust of the trial judge's directions, on each of the two occasions, was that, notwithstanding the appearance of inconsistency in each of the two respects, there was a possible explanation. Such matters of speculation, whilst perhaps appropriate for counsel, should not receive the added weight of the intervention of the judicial officer. In each respect the jury could have understood the trial judge to be suggesting that, because there may have been an explanation as a matter of logic, they should not take these matters into account in determining the credibility of the complainant.
[61] In the event, in our opinion, the directions to the jury were, in a critical respect, lacking in the appropriate balance."
The permissible area within which a trial judge may draw to the jury's attention an argument that was not put by counsel, was conveniently noted by Hunt CJ at CL in R v Heuston (1995) 81 A Crim R 387:
"(393) Sometimes, of course, a judge is obliged - even in what might be described as the ordinary case - to draw the attention of the jury to an argument which has not been put by counsel, if it is necessary to do so in order to ensure that the jury has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the evidence to discharge their duty to determine the case according to the evidence. Some such occasions are obvious - where, for example, the principal "defence" is one of alibi, yet there is clear evidence of intoxication which would be relevant to specific intention in the event that the alibi fails. Everyone realises that, from a tactical point of view, if counsel were to address upon such an issue of intoxication it would weaken the strength of his client's case on alibi, and trial judges should usually discuss the need to give directions as to such matters with counsel (in the absence of the jury) before the summing up commences. Other such occasions are not always so obvious, and - again, stated in very general terms in relation to the ordinary case - there will be no miscarriage of justice if arguments which may have been available on the evidence are not put by the judge in the summing up if they had not already been put by counsel. Sometimes, indeed, it may produce positive mischief if the judge raises arguments which could have been but which were not put or requested by counsel."
In order to determine whether a summing up is unfairly balanced, it is necessary for it to be considered in its entirety and in the context of the issues and the evidence led in the trial: R v Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 54 at [90] (per Wood CJ at CL, Hidden J agreeing).