Analysis
34 The applicant's case in relation to Grounds 1 and 2 proceeds on the basis that, notwithstanding the Trust Deed's silence on the matter, there is only one way to annualise his Superannuation Salary. The difficulty for the applicant is that, in support of his own case, he has advanced two different methods of calculation.
35 The first method of calculation is to adopt the fixed reference point of 365.25 days to determine the factor (26.0893) that is to be applied to his fortnightly salary, as advised by Qantas, to calculate the annual amount. This is the way the applicant put his case to AFCA and, initially, the way he put his case in this appeal.
36 The second method of calculation, and the one ultimately advocated by the applicant, is to take his fortnightly salary, as advised by Qantas, divide that salary by 14 to arrive at a daily rate, and then apply that daily rate to the number of days in the calendar year, depending on whether the year is a 365 day year or a 366 day year.
37 Another method is, of course, the method that QSL adopted, which is to recognise that the applicant's base pay structure was fortnightly payments, and then recognise that there are 26 fortnights in a 52 week year.
38 A further method would be to simply use the actual number of calendar days in each Financial Year or each year for which the annual Superannuation Salary is to be calculated, and annualise based on these days (365 ÷ 14 = 26.071 fortnights or 366 ÷ 14 = 26.143 fortnights (in a leap year)).
39 A still further method would be to use the actual number of calendar days in each Financial Year or each year for which the annual Superannuation Salary is to be calculated, derive an average number of days for these years (either 365 days or 365.333 days if a leap year is included), and then annualise based on these days (365 ÷ 14 = 26.071 fortnights or 365.333 ÷ 14 = 26.095 fortnights).
40 The first question that arises in this appeal is whether the method adopted by QSL (i.e., to use an annualising factor of 26 fortnights) was a determination of the applicant's annual Superannuation Salary for the relevant three year period that was contrary to the terms of the Trust Deed? I am not persuaded that it was.
41 The Trust Deed is silent on the method to be used in performing this calculation. The method of calculating a Member's annual Superannuation Salary is a matter that falls within the trustee's decisional freedom. That freedom is constrained by the requirement that the method yields what, properly, can be described as the Member's "annual Superannuation Salary" for each year in the applicable three year period referred to in the definition of Final Average Salary. However, there is nothing in the Trust Deed that indicates that there is only one method of calculation available to the trustee. Further, there is nothing in the Trust Deed that requires the trustee to perform a calculation that takes the step of calculating a daily amount from the Superannuation Salary that is notified to it before proceeding to calculate an annual amount. In the case of a Member in the applicant's position, any of the methods noted above is a method that answers the description of the Member's "annual Superannuation Salary".
42 The method that QSL adopted is supported by para (b)(v) of the definition of Superannuation Salary which specifically refers to a 56-day base pay structure, being 4 fortnights (it being borne in mind that, under the relevant agreements covered by para (b)(v), the Member is paid fortnightly). As QSL put the matter in its written submissions:
The annual conversion method applied by QSL reflects the reality of how the Applicant was paid (on a fortnightly basis) and how his work was scheduled (over 56-day bid periods). Those pay and work cycles are not amenable to analysis in terms of fraction of a week (or day).
43 In its submissions, QSL also referred to provisions in:
(a) the IAPA where certain allowances are based on 364 days;
(b) the Enterprise Agreement in which pilots allocated to certain positions are paid a salary that includes a component based on 364 days;
(c) the Air Pilots Award 2020 in which certain monetary allowances are based on the minimum salary for a Captain of a certain type of aircraft divided by 52 weeks; and
(d) the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) in which the definition of "annual rate of salary" for employees entitled to a weekly rate of pay is the weekly rate multiplied by the factor of 52 (the equivalent of 364 days).
44 These provisions were relied on as exemplifications of where, in calculating annual sums, whole figures are used, based on the notion that a year is 52 weeks or 364 days. QSL submits, and I accept, that these examples support the contention that the approach adopted in relation to calculating the applicant's annual Superannuation Salary is a practical one that is recognised in an industrial context.
45 In his submissions, the applicant placed particular emphasis on the use in the definition of "Final Average Salary" of the word "annual", and the word "complete" in relation to the defined term "Financial Years", to support his contention that the Trust Deed requires a calculation based on a daily rate applied across the relevant three year period.
46 I am not persuaded that these expressions have the significance which the applicant attributes to them. The word "annual" simply begs the question of how the annual amount is to be calculated. It does not direct how that is to be done. The word "complete" adds nothing other than to emphasise that a partial year is not in contemplation. The definition of "Financial Year" (see above) simply defines the yearly period by reference to which the Member's annual Superannuation Salary is to be calculated but does not prescribe how the "annual" amount is to be calculated.
47 In oral submissions, the applicant took the Court to provisions of the IAPA and the Enterprise Agreement in an endeavour to illustrate that each agreement contemplates that daily amounts might need to be calculated. However, these provisions only refer to calculating a daily amount when there is a need to do so (i.e., because a pay or allowance calculation has to be made for part of a 56-day pay period). This does not detract from the significance of the fact that under the IAPA and the Enterprise Agreement the base pay is fortnightly pay based on 56-day pay periods.
48 With reference to Grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal, I do not accept that AFCA misconstrued the Trust Deed. I do not accept that it made a determination that was contrary to law or acted contrary to s 1055(7), as the applicant contends. While AFCA used the word "discretion" to describe the manner of exercise of QSL's obligation to determine the applicant's annual Superannuation Salary, it is clear that AFCA was not using "discretion" in any sense other than to explain that an exercise of business judgment was involved in order for QSL to arrive at an amount that yielded the applicant's "annual Superannuation Salary" for the purposes of, and in accordance with, the Trust Deed.
49 These conclusions dispose of Grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal.
50 As to Ground 3, I am not persuaded that AFCA's determination (that QSL's decision was fair and reasonable) involved an error of law on the basis that AFCA's determination was "manifestly unreasonable" or "not supported by relevant evidence", or because QSL's calculation of the applicant's annual Superannuation Salary was "incorrect" or "obviously wrong".
51 It is appropriate to commence by noting that, in light of the matters discussed above, QSL's calculation of the applicant's annual Superannuation Salary was not "incorrect" or "obviously wrong". It follows that AFCA's determination is not, itself, tainted by any such error.
52 As to AFCA's determination of the fairness and reasonableness of QSL's decision in all the circumstances, a number of matters should be borne in mind.
53 First, in determining a superannuation complaint, AFCA's task is not simply to supplant the decision under review with its own decision. The actions available to it under s 1055(6) of the Act (for example, to vary a decision or to set aside and substitute a decision) only become available if it decides, positively, that the decision the subject of the complaint is, in its operation in relation to the complainant, unfair or unreasonable or both.
54 Secondly, the inquiry as to whether a decision is fair and reasonable or, alternatively, unfair or unreasonable or both, does not commence from any presumption about fairness or reasonableness.
55 Thirdly, "fair and reasonable" for the purposes of s 1055(2) of the Act posits no technical standard beyond that conveyed by the ordinary meaning of those words considered in the context of the decision under consideration: Reeves v Nulis Nominees (Australia) Ltd (Trustee) [2022] FCA 627 (Nulis) at [64]. The same can be said of "unfair" and "unreasonable" in s 1055(4) of the Act.
56 Fourthly, fairness and reasonableness in all the circumstances do not entail a decision that is the optimum or most advantageous or most beneficial decision for the person whose interests are affected by the decision. To hold otherwise would be to distort the ordinary meaning of "fair" and "reasonable".
57 Fifthly, as Nicholas J observed in Nulis at [65], in an appeal from AFCA's determination to this Court, the Court does not embark on any consideration of whether the decision that was before AFCA was fair and reasonable. The appeal to the Court is "on a question of law". Therefore, so far as reasonableness is concerned, the only question that could be before the Court in that regard is whether AFCA's determination of the complaint was legally unreasonable, and therefore beyond AFCA's power.
58 The applicant seeks to enliven legal unreasonableness by arguing that there was "no evidence" before AFCA that would justify its determination that QSL's decision was fair and reasonable in its operation in relation to the applicant, in all the circumstances.
59 This ground cannot succeed when two matters are understood. The first is that, as I have emphasised, QSL's calculation was not contrary to the Trust Deed. It was an appropriate calculation of the applicant's annual Superannuation Salary for the purpose of determining his Final Average Salary. For this reason alone, it is difficult to conceive of QSL's decision to calculate the applicant's annual Superannuation Salary by applying a factor of 26 to his notified fortnightly salary - which, as I have said, was a business rule that QSL applied to all Members' salaries supplied to it as fortnightly salaries - as being, of itself, unfair or unreasonable in its operation in relation to the applicant.
60 The second is that the nub of the applicant's "no evidence" argument is that QSL's calculation of his annual Superannuation Salary was disadvantageous to him because a more favourable calculation could have been performed. Therefore, according to the applicant, AFCA could only regard QSL's decision to calculate his annual Superannuation Salary in the way it did as unfair and unreasonable, there being "no evidence" to the contrary (i.e., there being no evidence that QSL's decision was fair and reasonable).
61 I do not accept that this is the correct way of approaching the issue. In substance, there is no "no evidence" ground. As I have said, in considering whether QSL's decision was fair and reasonable, AFCA did not need to be satisfied that the calculation that QSL was entrusted to perform yielded an optimal or the most advantageous or most beneficial outcome for the applicant. The only question for AFCA was whether QSL's decision to adopt the methodology it did was fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. AFCA was satisfied that it was because of the matters I have recorded at [28] above. These are rational justifications for arriving at that conclusion. Beyond disputing that QSL's decision to use a factor of 26 was fair and reasonable, the applicant does not suggest that these considerations are factually inaccurate.
62 Whilst I have some sympathy for the applicant's position, I am not satisfied that AFCA's determination was legally unreasonable or otherwise affected by error.
63 For these reasons, I am not satisfied that Ground 3 of the appeal is established.