The Council's application
22 The Council's application under r 7.23 of the Federal Court Rules, as pressed before me, related to service agreements between JLT and MAV in respect of the LMI scheme.
23 Rule 7.23 is in the following form:
7.23 Discovery from prospective respondent
(1) A prospective applicant may apply to the Court for an order under subrule (2) if the prospective applicant:
(a) reasonably believes that the prospective applicant may have the right to obtain relief in the Court from a prospective respondent whose description has been ascertained; and
(b) after making reasonable inquiries, does not have sufficient information to decide whether to start a proceeding in the Court to obtain that relief; and
(c) reasonably believes that:
(i) the prospective respondent has or is likely to have or has had or is likely to have had in the prospective respondent's control documents directly relevant to the question whether the prospective applicant has a right to obtain the relief; and
(ii) inspection of the documents by the prospective applicant would assist in making the decision.
(2) If the Court is satisfied about matters mentioned in subrule (1), the Court may order the prospective respondent to give discovery to the prospective applicant of the documents of the kind mentioned in subparagraph (1)(c)(i).
24 As was emphasised in Pfizer [2017] FCAFC 193 at [8], the foundation of r 7.23(1)(a) is that the prospective applicant reasonably believes that it may have a right to relief; "it is about something that may be the case, not is the case". See also [101] and [108]. The rule is directed to the existence of a reasonable belief as to the possible existence of a right to obtain relief. It is not necessary for a party to establish a prima facie case. It is about whether there are reasonable grounds for the prospective applicant believing there may be a right to relief.
25 The key issue in contention before me in relation to the category 7 documents was whether the Council had demonstrated reasonable grounds for a belief that it may have a right to relief based on breach of fiduciary duties that may be owed by JLT to the Council.
26 The Council relied on an affidavit of its corporate counsel, Mr David Carrington, affirmed on 15 November 2017 as evidence of the Council having a reasonable belief that it may have a right to relief against JLT in respect of the LMI scheme. Mr Carrington stated that he had reasonable cause to believe that the Council may have the right to obtain relief, in the form of disgorgement of profits or equitable compensation, against JLT for breach of fiduciary duty in relation to the LMI scheme for:
(a) commission, fees or remuneration received by JLT that were not disclosed to the Council, including commission, fees or remuneration of a type that was not disclosed in MAV's Annual Report or elsewhere; and
(b) commission, fees or remuneration received by JLT or its related entities in connection with the LMI scheme that may have been excessive or unreasonable.
27 It was submitted that the category 7 documents sought by the Council related to enabling the Council to decide the anterior question of whether JLT owed a fiduciary duty to it as a member of the LMI scheme. This, of course, would be a necessary prerequisite to determining whether to commence a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. It was submitted that on the information available to it, the Council had reasonable grounds for believing it may have a right to such relief.
28 Ms Harris SC, who appeared for the respondent, JLT, submitted that the LMI scheme was not a trust, and so the Council was not owed fiduciary duties by JLT as if it were a beneficiary of a trust (such as the JMAPP scheme). She submitted that there was no basis on the evidence for the Council to believe that there was or may be any fiduciary duty owed by JLT to the Council. Ms Gory, who appeared for the Council, submitted that there were two bases upon which JLT may have owed a fiduciary duty to the Council as a member of the LMI scheme. First, the Council asserted that JLT was its broker or at least its advisor in relation to the LMI scheme. Secondly, it was submitted that JLT may have owed a fiduciary duty to the Council on the basis of its alleged role as a scheme manager and administrator of the LMI scheme.
29 In relation to the first potential basis for a fiduciary duty, this was contested on the evidence. It was not in dispute that JLT was the Council's broker in relation to a number of lines of insurance. In relation to public liability and professional indemnity insurance, the Council relied upon a letter sent in similar form in each of the relevant years to the Council by JLT. The letter in evidence was dated 19 March 2013. The relevant parts were as follows:
Contracts of Insurance and Compliance with Section 186
With your Council's insurance renewal fast approaching, it is time to ensure that the purchase of your insurance programme is compliant with Section 186 of the Local Government Act 1989 (LGA).
…
The following points are still relevant today as they were 12 months ago and are repeated for your reference.
In summary:
• You are not required to undertake a public tender for your LMI liability policy. LMI is exempt from s. 186.
...
30 The Council submitted that this letter provided evidence that JLT gave advice to the Council each year in respect of liability insurance and was sufficient to give the Council a reasonable basis for its belief that the Council may have been owed a fiduciary duty by JLT on the basis that it was its broker or advisor in relation to that line of insurance. The giving of advice does not lead to a necessary conclusion that the parties are in a fiduciary relationship but it may be an aspect of the relationship that can be characterised as one of trust or fiduciary reliance: Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange [1986] HCA 25; 160 CLR 371 at 377. JLT disputed that it was the Council's broker or advisor in relation to public liability insurance and relied upon an affidavit of the Council's former Chief Executive Officer, Dr Michael Kennedy OAM affirmed on 8 November 2017, to the effect that the Council did not act in this capacity in relation to the LMI scheme. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to resolve this conflicting evidence as to JLT's role for the purposes of this application for preliminary discovery: see Pfizer [2017] FCAFC 193 at [69], and at [180]. The fact is, there is some evidence supporting the proposition that JLT's broking or at least its advisory role may have extended to public liability and professional indemnity insurance.
31 The second basis upon which the Council submitted it had reasonable grounds for believing it may have been owed a fiduciary duty by JLT was JLT's role as scheme manager and administrator. The category 7 documents, being the agreements between JLT and MAV in relation to the LMI scheme, would be relevant to establishing JLT's relationship with MAV, and through MAV the member councils. The Council made reference, as a basis for its belief, to the extracts from the Victorian Auditor-General's report referred to above which provided evidence as to JLT's role in the LMI scheme. Reference was also made to the descriptions of JLT's role in the MAV Annual Report which are also extracted above. The Council relied upon the amount paid to JLT as evidence that its services are significant and this was said to provide a reasonable ground to believe that JLT's involvement may lead to it owing fiduciary duties to scheme members.
32 The argument as to this potential basis for a possible fiduciary duty was put by Ms Gory as follows. As the LMI scheme is operated solely for the benefit of members, it is unlikely that JLT would not owe fiduciary duties to scheme members in its role as scheme administrator and manager. It was submitted that the agreements sought by way of preliminary discovery would be significant in determining whether fiduciary duties may be owed to scheme members such as the Council. As the Council has reasonable grounds to suspect fiduciary obligations to the members may exist, it was asserted that it was entitled to preliminary discovery of those documents, in order to determine whether to commence an action for relief.
33 The Council relied upon Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd [1995] FCA 915; 62 FCR 504 at 520-521 where Finn J concluded that a manager acting on behalf of a trustee could owe fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of the trust in providing management services, having regard to the awareness the manager must have been taken to have had in that case that the functions it was performing were for the benefit of the beneficiaries. In those circumstances, his Honour concluded that the beneficiaries were entitled to expect that the manager would not prefer its own interests to their own. Ms Gory submitted that the role of JLT in the LMI scheme was analogous to that of the managers in AS Nominees and so there were reasonable grounds to believe JLT may have owed fiduciary duties to the members of the LMI scheme. Whether that was the case could clearly be affected by the terms of the relationship between MAV and JLT.
34 Ms Harris submitted that JLT did not accept that it provided management services in respect of the scheme as MAV was the manager. Without resolving this factual disagreement, or preferring any aspect of the evidence, it can be said that there is evidence before me as to JLT role's in the LMI scheme, in the form of the Auditor-General's report, that renders it plausible that JLT may owe a fiduciary duty to the Council by virtue of its role in providing services to MAV. JLT provides services to MAV which acts under a statutory role for all member councils. There have been concerns cast by the Auditor-General's report as to the conduct of the LMI scheme. The conclusions reached in that report may go some way towards the Council's reasonable belief that it may have a right to relief more broadly. The relationship is potentially one in which members of the LMI scheme were vulnerable to any abuse by JLT of its position and, depending on the terms of the management agreement between MAV and JLT, it may also be one in which JLT has undertaken to act in the interests of the members of the LMI scheme: see Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64; 156 CLR 41 at 96-97 per Mason J and 68 per Gibbs CJ, respectively. These factors, together with the analogy drawn from AS Nominees, suggest that there are reasonable grounds for a belief that JLT may owe fiduciary duties to the Council as a member of the LMI scheme and a belief that it may have a right to relief.
35 Senior counsel for JLT quite properly sought to distinguish the LMI scheme from a trust relationship and to emphasise the role of MAV in the scheme, with JLT as a mere service provider to it. She submitted that there were no reasonable grounds to think that because JLT provided services to the manager of this mutual liability scheme it is a fiduciary to the members. This is a matter that will ultimately be resolved on the evidence. Rule 7.23 requires a reasonable belief that a prospective applicant may have a right to relief. The agreements sought in this application are significant to whether JLT owes fiduciary duties to members of the LMI Scheme. Such obligations can be affected (created or modified or excluded) by contract: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2007] FCA 963; 160 FCR 35 at 76-77 [270]-[281]. Obtaining access to the category 7 documents is thus necessary for the Council to obtain sufficient information to determine whether it has a right to relief and whether it should bring proceedings for breach of fiduciary duty. The content of the agreements will be significant as to whether it can be concluded that a fiduciary duty is owed and what the scope of that duty is or may be.
36 There is a sufficient basis for the belief held by the Council for the purposes of an application under r 7.23. JLT provides services to MAV which is responsible for providing insurance to the members of the scheme. It is entirely likely that the professional assistance given by JLT to MAV and the scheme will involve trust being resided in JLT as to its skill, competence and honesty. Whether that translates into the creation of duties of loyalty in equity by JLT to member councils or only to MAV or to no-one at all will depend in part upon the terms on which JLT provides the services it does to MAV. It would not be inconsistent with any likely operative legal principle for JLT to provide insurance related services to the scheme in a way that meant it was acting on behalf of members of the scheme, and through that owe duties of loyalty to members. Though the language of the Auditor-General's report is somewhat opaque, it provides a reasonable basis for the Council to believe that there may be a right to obtain relief from JLT concerning the levels of fees and costs if there be, as there may be, a fiduciary relationship between JLT and member councils. In all the circumstances the belief that the Council may have a right to relief is one that is reasonably held.
37 No objection was taken with the reference to, and reliance upon, the Auditor-General's report at the hearing. An issue was later raised in correspondence about the privilege afforded to a report of the Auditor-General by operation of s 16AB of the Audit Act 1994 (Vic) and ss 73 and 74 of the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic). Such privilege may mean that the report cannot be used for truth of its contents, as opposed to the fact that the words in the report were published. However, the report has not been relied upon for the truth of its contents. It is the fact that the Auditor-General said this about the LMI scheme and the prospective respondent (not the truth of what was said) that helps to found a reasonable belief on the part of the Council that it may have a right to relief: see generally, Church of Scientology of California v Johnson-Smith [1972] 1 QB 522 at 530-531; R v Jackson (1987) 8 NSWLR 116 at 118-121; Priest v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 12 at [86]; Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321; Mees v Roads Corporation [2003] FCA 306; 128 FCR 418; Laurance v Katter (1996) 141 ALR 447. Ms Harris SC on behalf of JLT did not submit that the report could not be relied upon to prove that the Auditor-General, as an apparently credible source, had said these things in a serious context. In these circumstances it is unnecessary to explore the limits and content of the privilege.
38 Rule 7.23 also requires a prospective applicant to have made reasonable inquiries. JLT submitted that the Council had not done so in respect of the category 7 documents, as it had made inadequate attempts to obtain them from MAV. The Council wrote to MAV in January 2017 and requested access to these documents. MAV did not respond. The Council submitted that it was reasonable for the Council to consider that this was MAV's considered response and it was not reasonable for the Council to continue to make requests to MAV. After MAV did not provide the documents, the Council brought the application against JLT. JLT's submission was that the Council should have followed up when it did not receive a response in January, given that, when it did so on 14 November 2017, it received a response from MAV's legal representatives on 22 November 2017. There was then correspondence between the Council's lawyers and those acting for MAV between 11 and 13 December 2017. The Council has also sought these documents from JLT prior to bringing this application. There was a proposal that the documents be supplied, but only on condition (a condition apparently proposed by MAV) that they not be available for use in any representative proceedings brought on behalf of other councils. The Council refused that limitation. Considering the circumstances as a whole, I consider that the Council has made reasonable inquiries to obtain the relevant information.