Injunctions
7 Again, I will set out the injunctions which I consider should be made and then address the parties' submissions to the extent that they oppose these injunctions.
6. Pursuant to s 126 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), the first respondent, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents and the second and third respondents and each of them are restrained from infringing the first applicant's registered trade mark number 801717 for the word "MITOLO".
7. Pursuant to s 126 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), the first respondent, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents, and the second and third respondents and each of them, are restrained from advertising, marketing, promoting, exhibiting in public, offering for sale and selling wine in Australia using the words:
7.1 V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;
7.2 V. Mitolo & Son;
7.3 V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or
7.4 V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo
save to the minimum extent necessary to comply with any applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.
…
9. Pursuant to s 232 of the Australian Consumer Law, the first respondent, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents, is restrained from advertising, marketing, promoting, exhibiting in public, offering for sale and selling wine or wine related merchandise in Australia using the words:
9.1 V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son;
9.2 V. Mitolo & Son;
9.3 V. Mitolo and (whether or not within the ribbon device) Son within the two-heads logo; or
9.4 V. Mitolo & Son within the two-heads logo
save to the minimum extent necessary to comply with any applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.
…
12. The first respondent is restrained from offering for sale red wines:
12.1 bearing a McLaren Vale geographic indication;
12.2 from a location very near to the applicants' cellar door; and
12.3 using the name "V. Mitolo and Son" or "V. Mitolo & Son"
other than to the minimum extent necessary in order to comply with an applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument.
8 The applicants submitted that I should also make an injunction in the following terms:
8. Pursuant to s 232 of the Australian Consumer Law, the first respondent, whether itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents and the second and third respondents and each of them are restrained from engaging in conduct by which it represents that:
8.1 the first respondent and the applicants or either of them are the same person;
8.2 wines produced by the first respondent were produced by or at the direction of the applicants or either of them; or
8.3 wines produced by the first respondent have a sponsorship, approval or affiliation with the applicants or the applicants' products.
9 The respondents submitted that the injunctions in paragraphs 6 and 8 should not be made because they did not identify the particular conduct found to be infringing conduct and that injunctions in intellectual property cases should be made by reference to particular conduct.
10 There is a good deal of debate in the authorities about the appropriateness of an injunction in terms of an applicant's statutory monopoly. The English position that such an injunction is not inappropriate seems reasonably clear (Coflexip SA v Stolt Comex Seaway MS Ltd [2001] RPC 9; Sun Microsystems Inc v Airtech Computer Corp Ltd [2006] FSR 35; and Interflora Inc v Marks and Spencers plc (No 2) [2014] FSR 3).
11 In Australia, the High Court has upheld injunctions expressed in terms of an applicant's statutory monopoly in intellectual property cases (Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrel (1961) 106 CLR 588 at 611 and 622; Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1970) 122 CLR 25 (Colbeam Palmer v Stock Affiliates) at 48; Interlego AG v Toltoys Pty Ltd (1973) 130 CLR 461 at 489; Commonwealth Industrial Gases Ltd v MWA Holdings Pty Ltd (1970) 180 CLR 160 at 171). There is authority of this Court to the effect that such an order is generally not appropriate (Christian v Société Des Produits Nestlé SA (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 153; (2015) 327 ALR 630 at [181]), although I do not understand the Full Court to be saying that such an order can never be made. I did not understand the respondents to submit that that was the effect of the authorities (i.e., that such an order could never be made).
12 This proceeding involves an acrimonious and costly dispute between, in effect, private individuals. The applicants have been successful and I consider that they are entitled to all such relief as is permitted by precedent and principle. I consider it appropriate to make the orders in paragraphs 6 and 7.
13 I consider that the injunction in proposed order 8 raises different considerations because it is not in the field of intellectual property, albeit in the related field of misleading and deceptive conduct and the High Court authority to the effect that the conduct giving rise to the breach or contravention should be specified (Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Limited (2001) 205 CLR 1 at 60 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). I will not make the injunction proposed in paragraph 8.
14 The respondents submitted that the qualification in the injunctions in paragraphs 7, 9 and 12 should be (instead of "save to the minimum extent necessary to comply with any applicable written Australian law or legislative instrument"):
Save that it, whether by itself, its directors, employees, servants or agents, may advertise, market, promote, exhibit in public, offer for sale and sell wine in Australia that identifies the first respondent by its full name as the producer of that wine without further use of the word "MITOLO".
15 I consider that the applicants' qualification is appropriate. It is true that the applicants did not pursue the respondents in relation to the OZTALIA range where "V. Mitolo and Son" is only used to identify the producer of the wine product and the Oakley Road address is given (see [292]-[294] of the Substantive Reasons) and that there was a suggestion during submissions that a wine seller was required by legislation to identify the producer of the wine on the bottle. However, I was never taken to the legislation for the purposes of considering its precise terms. In my opinion, the applicants' qualification achieves the desired end, whereas the respondents' qualification is open-ended and may authorise conduct which may otherwise be an infringement of the applicants' trade mark.