Consideration
The Crown concession
83I cannot agree with the Crown concession that there should be intervention by this Court because of its earlier reduction of the sentences imposed upon the applicants by Robison DCJ.
84The written submissions for the Crown focussed on the extent of concurrence of the sentences imposed by King DCJ with the sentences imposed by Robison DCJ. For example, it was pointed out that for Allan Mitchell, the non-parole period imposed by Robison DCJ was 2 years and the sentences imposed by King DCJ were concurrent with that period to the extent of 18 months; but as a result of resentencing by this Court the period of concurrence was reduced to 6 months. In relation to both Michael and Paul Mitchell, the period of concurrence was reduced from 11 months to 2 months.
85Focussing on the degree of concurrence is misplaced. Attention should be directed to the degree of accumulation. In determining the sentences for the Southern Tablelands offences, King DCJ was required first to determine the appropriate individual sentences before assessing the extent to which they should be concurrent or accumulated having regard to the principle of totality: Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; 194 CLR 610 at [45]. Because the applicants were serving the sentences earlier imposed, he was also required to assess the extent to which the sentences he imposed should be concurrent or accumulated upon the earlier sentences: Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; 166 CLR 59 at 66; R v MMK [2006] NSWCCA 272; 164 A Crim R 481 at [11]; Choi v R [2007] NSWCCA 150 at [157]. In applying the principle of totality in both respects, he was required to consider questions of concurrence or accumulation in the manner described by Howie J in Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1; 168 A Crim R 41:
"[27] In any event there is no general rule that determines whether sentences ought to be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The issue is determined by the application of the principle of totality of criminality: can the sentence for one offence comprehend and reflect the criminality for the other offence? If it can, the sentences ought to be concurrent otherwise there is a risk that the combined sentences will exceed that which is warranted to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. If not, the sentences should be at least partly cumulative otherwise there is a risk that the total sentence will fail to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. This is so regardless of whether the two offences represent two discrete acts of criminality or can be regarded as part of a single episode of criminality. Of course it is more likely that, where the offences are discrete and independent criminal acts, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend the criminality of the other. Similarly, where they are part of a single episode of criminality with common factors, it is more likely that the sentence for one of the offences will reflect the criminality of both." (Emphasis added)
86King DCJ obviously considered that the sentences he was imposing could not "comprehend and reflect the criminality for the other offence", namely the Gilgandra and Narrabri matters. He determined that the additional criminality in those offences was best reflected by accumulating his sentences by 6 months, in the case of Allan Mitchell, and 4 months, in the cases of Michael and Paul Mitchell. On any view, these were very modest degrees of accumulation.
87In my view, even with the reduction of the sentences by this Court for the Gilgandra and Narrabri matters, no lesser degree of accumulation can be countenanced.
Manifest excess
88There can be no criticism of King DCJ saying that Allan Mitchell's criminal record was "an aggravating circumstance", except perhaps to say that for the sake of clarity, in order to foreclose argument on appeal there might have been an explanation for how it operated as such. The remark cannot be interpreted as the judge thinking that the criminal record aggravated the objective seriousness of the offences. Allan Mitchell's sentences for the break, enter and steal offences were only 6 months longer than those imposed upon his younger brothers. That is an appropriate differential to reflect the differences in the individual cases and is not indicative of an erroneous assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences.
89The submission advanced on behalf of Paul Mitchell that his overall sentence is too close to that imposed upon Allan Mitchell cannot be accepted. The additional break and enter offence at Tumut necessitated less difference in the overall outcome of the two cases. The operative effect of that additional offence is that 6 months was added to the overall term he was required to serve. Against a fixed term of 2 years, about which there is no complaint, that is a modest outcome in a practical sense.
90However, I am of the view that the sentences for the aggravated break and enter offences are manifestly excessive. They were offences of a lower order of seriousness than it may be inferred that King DCJ considered them to be, although certainly not at the lowest end of the range. They involved incursions into commercial premises rather than private residential homes and the property stolen was unlikely to have had sentimental value to the owners. The serious indictable offence was stealing as opposed to something more serious; and the circumstance of aggravation was constituted by the offenders being in company. Circumstances of aggravation that may be involved in offences of this type include offenders being armed; using corporal violence; inflicting bodily harm; depriving a person of their liberty; or knowing that someone is within the premises: s 105A Crimes Act. Generally speaking, those circumstances are usually of greater seriousness than when an offence is committed "in company", particularly where no victim is confronted by the offenders.
91Further, it was accepted that there were none of the aggravating factors listed in s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act such as the offences being committed in a home; the offences causing substantial loss; or the offences being part of planned or organised criminal activity. As to the latter, it may fairly be said that the offences were executed in a rather clumsy and amateurish fashion.
92All of this is not to say that the absence of aggravating factors operates as a mitigating feature; it is merely to put the offences within a context of the range of criminality that can be encountered in offences against s 112(2) of the Crimes Act. The starting points for these sentences before the 25 per cent reduction for the pleas of guilty should have been lower and the resulting sentences should have been correspondingly less.
93There can be no legitimate criticism of the degree to which King DCJ partially accumulated the sentences. For Michael Mitchell, the first sentence was accumulated by 4 months upon the Robison DCJ sentences. The second and third sentences were accumulated by 5 months and 6 months respectively. The sentences imposed upon Paul Mitchell were accumulated by 4 month, 6 months, 5 months and 6 months. The sentences imposed upon Allan Mitchell were each accumulated by 6 months. The Crown submissions on this subject should be accepted.
94The submission that King DCJ was in error in not finding that Allan Mitchell was remorseful should be rejected. His Honour only had the contents of reports; the applicant did not give evidence. Oral evidence is not a prerequisite for a finding of remorse (Butters v R [2010] NSWCCA 1 at [17]) but in the circumstances it was open to the judge not to find that there was remorse.
95Similarly, the complaint under Ground 2 of Allan Mitchell's appeal should be rejected. A finding of special circumstances might have been open, although the basis for it was tenuous. This was not a case in which there were "significant positive signs which show that if the offender is allowed a longer period on parole, rehabilitation is likely to be successful, and that this is not merely a possibility": R v Tuuta [2014] NSWCCA 40 at [57] (Bellew J). Moreover, the issue of special circumstances was not overlooked. His Honour considered it but declined to make the finding. There was no error.