Residential lands, opinion of Minister
56 In the Land and Environment Court, the Minister, in reliance upon s 36(1)(b1) needed to establish that the claimed lands (or part thereof) comprised lands which "in the opinion of a Crown Lands Minister, are needed or likely to be needed as residential lands", as at the date of claim. The primary judge found as a fact that the Crown Lands Minister of the day was not involved in relation to the lands until after the land claims were made and did not personally hold any relevant opinion: at [141]. The Minister's case was run, both in the Court below and on appeal in this Court, on the basis that Mr O'Toole, the Managing Director of Landcom, held the relevant opinion as to the need for certain lands, as at the time of the claim, and that his opinion was properly attributable to the Crown Lands Minister. There was no suggestion that Mr O'Toole was a delegate of the Minister appointed pursuant to any statutory power, for the purpose of forming an opinion under the Land Rights Act. Rather, the Minister relied upon the proposition that Mr O'Toole was an authorised agent.
57 Whether a person is an authorised agent may involve issues of fact and law. In the present case, there was no specific act or conduct relied upon to confer authority on Mr O'Toole. Rather the question was whether the existence of authority for a statutory purpose arose by implication from the governmental arrangements and the proper construction of the statute. It may be accepted for present purposes that his Honour's decision that it did not, constituted a decision on a point of law.
58 In support of the argument that Mr O'Toole had an implied authority to act on behalf of the Minister in this regard, the Minister relied upon what is known as the "Carltona principle" after the English case of Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560. In Carltona, Lord Greene MR stated at 563:
"It cannot be supposed that this regulation meant that, in each case, the minister in person should direct his mind to the matter. The duties imposed upon ministers and the powers given to ministers are normally exercised under the authority of the ministers by responsible officials of the department. Public business could not be carried on if that were not the case. Constitutionally, the decision of such an official is, of course, the decision of the minister. The minister is responsible."
59 The principle itself has been accepted in Australia and has been applied not merely to a Minister, but to a statutory officeholder, namely the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation: see O'Reilly v The Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria [1983] HCA 47; 153 CLR 1.
60 The principle may operate in different ways in different contexts. For example, in the present case there was no suggestion that, in issuing the conclusive certificates under s 36(8), the Minister read any material beyond that provided in the briefing note. In practical terms, the Minister made the final decision, but had delegated to officers within his department the function of reviewing the relevant material and presenting matters to him in an appropriate form. That course may have involved a de facto delegation of aspects of the obligation to take matters into account and to accord procedural fairness to the Land Councils. No issue was taken with that approach. Indeed, as will be seen below, the Land Councils relied upon the circumstance to support the factual inference that the Minister had not taken into account any matters other than those presented in the briefing note (discussed further below). A similar approach is referred to in Peko-Wallsend, 162 CLR at 37-38 (Mason J). After referring to Carltona and O'Reilly, Mason J stated at 38:
"The cases in which the principle has been applied are cases in which the nature, scope and purpose of the function vested in the repository made it unlikely that Parliament intended that it was to be exercised by the repository personally because administrative necessity indicated that it was impractical for him to act otherwise than through his officers or officers responsible to him."
61 As appears from the passage from Peko-Wallsend and from similar statements in O'Reilly in relation to a statutory function, the legitimacy of a Minister or head of department acting through officers or other agents will depend upon a question of statutory construction. Matters such as "administrative necessity" will inform that exercise.
62 As noted by Macfarlan JA below at [129], the cases to which this Court was referred did not involve situations in which any person who was not an officer within the Minister's department had been found to have implied authority to act for the Minister. Furthermore, where an express statutory power of delegation is provided, as is common in modern legislation, the implication that some broader informal delegation of authority is permitted will less readily be drawn, though it "does not necessarily exclude the existence of an implied power of a Minister to act through the agency of others": Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor [2001] HCA 51; 207 CLR 391 at [176] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). Furthermore, there may well be circumstances in which a Minister may authorise inquiries to be made by external consultants, whether with or without statutory authority to take such a step: Minister for Local Government v South Sydney City Council [2002] NSWCA 288; 55 NSWLR 381 at [211] (Mason P, Spigelman CJ and Ipp JA agreeing).
63 There are two factors which might be thought to militate against the conclusion reached in the Court below. The first is that it has been accepted in other cases that the Minister did not need to hold the opinion personally: it would be sufficient if a relevant officer within the Minister's department, having an appropriate degree of seniority, held the relevant opinion: see NSW Aboriginal Land Council v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act (No 2) [2008] NSWLEC 13 (Jagot J) ("the Nambucca Land Claim case"), at [65]. Accepting that to be correct in law, that approach does not diminish the proposition that, as a matter of statutory construction, it should not be inferred that the Minister can act through the agency of persons outside his or her own department. This is not, of course, a question of the Minister obtaining advice; it is a question of the identification of a lawful agent through whom the Minister acts.
64 The second factor arises from the power of delegation. With respect to the Crown Lands Minister, the power of delegation does not arise under the Lands Rights Act, because the Crown Lands Minister is not the Minister administering the Land Rights Act. Rather, it is to be found in the Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW), s 180. That provision allows that the Minister may delegate "to a person" the exercise of any of the Minister's functions: s 180(1). The term "person", it could be argued, extends beyond officers within the Minister's department. That being so, there is no reason to restrict the implied grant of authority to act through an agent to officers within the department.
65 This argument could give rise to a question of the construction of s 180(1) which was not debated in this Court. The question does not arise, however, because pursuant to s 180(5) the reference in the section to "functions" is a reference to functions conferred or imposed by or under the Crown Lands Act or the Crown Lands (Continued Tenures) Act 1989 (NSW). No power of delegation is conferred on the Minister with respect to the holding of an opinion under the Land Rights Act. Accordingly, the scope of s 180 does not arise in the present case and provides no basis for drawing a broader inference as to the scope of the Carltona principle in respect of the Minister.
66 Further, there were three factors which supported the conclusion that the opinion of Mr O'Toole was not a relevant opinion for the purposes of s 36(1)(b1) of the Land Rights Act. The first, noted by the primary judge, was that in accordance with a Cabinet decision made on 4 October 1977, Landcom (then apparently a division within the New South Wales Department of Urban Affairs and Planning) had been given a function, "in the interest of co-ordinated urban development and marketing strategies," identified as "the oversight of the development and production of home sites on the Government's behalf in major urban centres": at [44]. The Housing Act 1985 (NSW), s 6, established Landcom as a statutory corporation and it remained in that form until the dates on which the claims were made in 2000. (It later became a statutory state-owned corporation under the Landcom Corporation Act 2001 (NSW), which commenced on 1 January 2002.) Landcom did not come, even before its creation as a statutory corporation, within the responsibility of the Crown Lands Minister. It is therefore unlikely that Parliament expected the Crown Lands Minister to exercise his or her statutory powers under the Land Rights Act through the agency of Landcom.
67 Secondly, the establishment of Landcom as a statutory corporation under the Housing Act 1985 pre-dated the introduction of cl (b1) into the Land Rights Act by the Aboriginal Land Rights (Amendment) Act 1986 (NSW). Accordingly, the requirement based upon the opinion of a Crown Lands Minister was introduced at a time when the distinct functions of Landcom and the Crown Lands Minister were known. This circumstance weakens considerably any inference that the Parliament anticipated that the views of Landcom would be sufficient to satisfy the terms of paragraph (b1).
68 Thirdly, the form of paragraph (b1) is different, in a respect which must be taken as deliberate, from the form of the succeeding paragraph (c). If the Parliament had intended merely to replicate a need identified by the executive government of the day, it would not have expressed the need as one requiring the formulation of an opinion by the relevant Crown Lands Minister. Had the need been one of the executive government generally, an opinion held by Landcom (within the sphere of its specified functions) might have been of immediate application. The identification of a specific Minister (not being the Minister responsible for Landcom) speaks in favour of a different approach. As explained in the Nambucca Land Claim case, it is the opinion, rather than the underlying circumstances, which constitute the criterion for the exclusion of certain Crown lands: [2009] NSWCA 151 at [33].
69 The reason for adopting a constrained approach to the power of a Minister to act through the agency of someone outside his or her department derives in part from the concept of "practical administrative necessity", in part from the nature of the power and in part from the position of the Minister. In relation to the first element, where the purpose is to protect intended courses of action of the executive government taken at a policy level, the practical necessity to identify opinions as those of departmental officers is diminished. In relation to the second element, the fact that the power involves a discretionary element with a policy content limits the appropriateness of an implied agency: see O'Reilly at 18-19 (Mason J, albeit in dissent). In relation to the third element, the fact that the agent is within the Minister's department and hence in a position where the Minister can exercise a substantial degree of control provides a fundamental justification, within the system of responsible government, for permitting an agency in such circumstances, but not where that element of control is missing: see O'Reilly at 19.
70 It follows that the primary judge was correct in rejecting, as a matter of law, the availability of an opinion held by the Managing Director of Landcom as constituting the opinion of the Crown Lands Minister for the purposes of s 36(1)(b1).