MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd v Gilmour

Background 2 Mr Alberto Vinciguerra owned 30 of the 100 ordinary shares issued in MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd (MGCC). The remaining 70 ordinary shares were owned by Sola-Kleen Pty Ltd (Sola-Kleen). Prior to 18 July 2000, Mr Malcolm Gilmour, the first defendant, was the sole director of MGCC. Between 18 July 2000 and 22 April 2004, Mr Vinciguerra and Mr Gilmour were the directors of MGCC and then between 22 April 2004 and 15 January 2008 only Mr Gilmour was a director. Between 15 January 2008 and 5 May 2008, Mr Gilmour and Mr Trevor Harradine were directors of MGCC and since 5 May 2008, Mr Gilmour, Mr Harradine and Mr Kenneth Byfield were directors. 3 Mr Gilmour was the sole director and shareholder of Sola-Kleen. Mr Tony Armenti was the external accountant for MGCC. 4 In 2008 Mr Vinciguerra sought leave pursuant to s 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) to commence proceedings in the name of MGCC against Mr Gilmour, Mr Armenti and Sola-Kleen. Mr Vinciguerra claimed, in the draft statement of claim, that Mr Gilmour breached his duties to MGCC under ss 181-183 of the Corporations Act as well as his fiduciary duties. It was also alleged that Mr Armenti and Sola-Kleen were involved in those breaches or received property with notice of the breaches. The alleged breaches were that Mr Gilmour caused MGCC to incur unnecessary or inflated expenses for his benefit and/or the benefit of Sola-Kleen. The priniciple element of those expenses were large management fees that Mr Gilmour allegedly caused MGCC to pay to Sola-Kleen each year. It was accepted by MGCC that notice had been given under s 237(2)(e)(i) of the Corporations Act. 5 I granted the leave sought on 21 July 2010: Vinciguerra v MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd (2010) 79 ACSR 293. 6 Earlier, in November 2006, Mr Vinciguerra had applied for orders pursuant to s 247A of the Corporations Act to inspect the books of MGCC. In Vinciguerra v MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd (2007) 61 ACSR 583 I made orders allowing that inspection. The application was supported by a draft statement of claim. In accordance with the orders a Mr Trevor Gorey, an accountant, inspected the books of MGCC and provided Mr Vinciguerra with a report regarding the results of the investigation. MGCC instructed a Mr Ruthven to comment on paragraphs of the draft statement of claim and he produced a report. Mr Ruthven concluded that between 2003 and 2007 management fees paid by MGCC to Sola-Kleen were significantly overstated. The draft statement of claim asserted that MGCC had incurred excessive expenses in the amount of $2,057,968. The Ruthven report disagreed with this view. Mr Ruthven died on 11 January 2010. Mr Gorey never met with him to resolve the differences. In its defence to the application for leave under s 237, MGCC claimed that its two independent directors believed it would be irresponsible to commence proceedings in light of the Ruthven report. However, it transpired that Mr Harradine, said to be an independent director, and Mr Gilmour were also the directors and only shareholders of Power Savers International (Australia) Pty Ltd. 7 The asserted apprehension of bias arises from the fact that, in the leave application, I made adverse findings in respect of Mr Harradine's credit. These were that on the question of his independence from Mr Gilmour his affidavit demonstrated a lack of candour as well partisanship toward Mr Gilmour and the then defendant, MGCC. 8 I now set out paras [33]-[46] of my reasons for judgment where those findings are set out in context:

Consideration 9 The motion was supported by affidavits by each of Mr Harradine and Mr Gilmour sworn 23 November 2010. 10 I have set out below the entirety of Mr Harradine's affidavit: 1. I am a director of the Plaintiff and was the accountant of the Plaintiff for the financial years ending 30 June 2001, 30 June 2002 and until January 2003, at which time I sold my accounting practice to Mr Tony Armenti and Mr Marinko Pecotic. 2. The following facts are within my own personal knowledge save as otherwise stated. 3. I refer to the affidavit of Graham Edward Ruthven sworn 20 February 2009 in Federal Court Proceedings WAD 90 of 2008 and, in particular, the calculation of management fees owed by the Plaintiff to the Second Defendant, being for the financial year ending 30 June 2001, $171,330, and for the financial year ending 30 June 2002, $167,122. 4. During the period I July 2000 to January 2003, I was also the accountant for the Second Defendant, Sola-Kleen Pty (Sola-Kleen). 5. In or about November 2002, I met with the First Defendant, Malcolm Gilmour and Albert Vinciguerra, at the offices of Sola-Kleen, which offices were also used by the Plaintiff. 6. At that meeting, there was discussion about the fact that Sola-Kleen had paid expenses on behalf of the Plaintiff, and had provided management services, for which it was entitled to be reimbursed and paid by the Plaintiff (at that point in time), which was not then in a financial position to do so. 7. I suggested that since the Plaintiff conducted its accounts on a cash basis (not accruals) the management fees be paid and expenses recouped at such time as the Plaintiff had sufficient funds, and that when paid they would be entered in the accounts. 8. Mr Gilmour and Mr Vinciguerra said words to the effect that they accepted that advice, that the management fees and expenses would only be paid and recouped by the Plaintiff to Sola-Kleen when the Plaintiff had sufficient funds. 9. Mr Gilmour and Mr Vinciguerra then directed me to finalise the accounts on that basis, and so I did not include the fees and expenses in the Plaintiff's accounts which is the normal manner when accounts are prepared on a cash basis. 10. There was no dispute about the Plaintiff's obligation to pay them; it was simply agreed that it would do so when it had the funds. 11. I informed Mr Armenti, when he purchased my practice, that the management fees and expenses payable to Sola-Kleen should be brought to account in due course when the plaintiff could pay and we discussed the calculation of the management fee at that time. My recollection is that I provided a sample of the Phillips case management fee calculation to Mr Armenti. 12. For the period 1 July 2001 to January 2003, I had calculated the management fees (including expenses) that would be charged by Sola-Kleen to the Plaintiff during that period. I provided that information to Mr Armenti so that he could calculate the management fees and expenses for the financial year ending 30 June 2003 and for future years in the same manner as had previously been agreed between Messrs Gilmour and Vinciguerra, as deposed to earlier. 13. The Plaintiff could not function without the assistance of Sola-Kleen, as it had insufficient cash flow, and that was the reason for it being, agreed that Sola-Kleen was to be paid later by the Plaintiff. 14. The Plaintiff used the offices and storage facilities of Sola-Kleen, as well as its staff, computers, software, office furniture, telephone, even postage stamps, for all of which it was to pay to Sola-Kleen when able to do so. This was agreed between Messrs Gilmour and Vinciguerra in my presence. 11 Accordingly, the evidence of Mr Harradine is relevant to an important issue in these proceedings. The liability of the plaintiff to pay management fees and expenses, for the financial years ending 30 June 2001 and 2002 and from 1 July 2002 to January 2003 and to reimburse the second defendant for expenses paid by it on behalf of the plaintiff. 12 The test as to whether there is an apprehension of bias is whether "a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide": Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6]; Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11]; Antoun v R (2006) 224 ALR 51 at [1], [51], [82]; Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 at [110]. 13 The application of this principle requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. Second, there must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy at [8]; Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423 at [53], [56]. 14 I was referred to the following passage of the High Court in Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 294: In a case such as the present where there is no allegation of actual bias, the question whether a judge who is confident of his own ability to determine the case before him fairly and impartially on the evidence should refrain from sitting because of a suggestion that the views which he has expressed in his judgment in some previous case may result in an appearance of pre-judgment can be a difficult one involving matters "of degree and particular circumstances may strike different minds in different ways" (per Aickin J. in Shaw (1980) 55 ALJR at p 16). If a judge at first instance considers that there is any real possibility that his participation in a case might lead to a reasonable apprehension of pre-judgment or bias, he should, of course, refrain from sitting. (Emphasis added) 15 It is apparent then that the mere fact that a judge has expressed in a judgment in some previous case or, as here, a previous and related case does not give rise to an automatic requirement for recusal. It will, as the Court observed, involve matters "of degree and particular circumstances may strike different minds in different ways". 16 Later the High Court in Livesey, at 300, stated: It is, however, apparent that, in a case such as the present where it is not suggested that there is any overriding consideration of necessity, special circumstances or consent of the parties, a fair-minded observer might entertain a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of prejudgment if a judge sits to hear a case at first instance after he has, in a previous case, expressed clear views either about a question of fact which constitutes a live and significant issue in the subsequent case or about the credit of a witness whose evidence is of significance on such a question of fact. (Emphasis added) 17 Counsel for MGCC stated in the clearest of terms that the evidence of Mr Harradine in his affidavit in support had never been disclosed previously and was not only in issue but that the credit of Mr Harradine and it seems also of Mr Gilmour upon their respective allegations would be challenged at trial. 18 The findings I made concerning the credit of Mr Harradine were expressed in strong terms. His credit will be an issue at trial as indeed it seems will be that of Mr Gilmour, who in his supporting affidavit corroborates the evidence which it is said will be given by Mr Harradine. In my earlier judgment I also made an adverse finding in relation to Mr Gilmour on the same issue of Mr Harradine's asserted independence, which I described at [38], as demonstrating a lack of candour. 19 Against that background I am satisfied that what was said in Livesey (at 293-294) is apt: [The] principle is that a judge should not sit to hear a case if in all the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that [the judge] might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in it. (Emphasis added). 20 The question is not one of probability but rather the existence of a real and not remote possibility: Ebner at [7] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. There is, in this case, in my view, a real possibility that it may be perceived that I have pre-judged Mr Harradine's credit. It matters not, in those circumstances, that I have not formed any such pre-judgment. 21 For these reasons, I recused myself from further hearing of this matter. I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gilmour.

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