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[2001] FCA 1127
Federal Court of Australia
1984-03-26
Lindgren J
Original judgment source is linked above.
INTRODUCTION 1 In each of these three proceedings, the applicant appeals against the disallowance by the respondent Commissioner of an objection to an assessment to income tax for the year ended 31 December 1994 ("the 1994 year" - the calendar year was the applicants' substituted accounting period). Each applicant claimed a deduction under subs 51(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ("the Act") being the amount of employee bonuses paid by it in respect of the 1994 year. The bonuses were not paid until late January 1995. It is not in dispute that each applicant is entitled to the benefit of a deduction for the amount then paid: the dispute is as to whether it is entitled to that benefit in its return of income for the 1994 year. That is, the issue is one of timing. The Commissioner concedes that the outgoing constituted by the bonuses paid was referable to the 1994 year. 2 On 10 March 2000 the Court ordered that the three proceedings be heard together and that evidence in each proceeding be evidence in the others. I will refer to the applicant in proceeding N 87 of 2000 as "MLIA", to the applicant in proceeding N 88 of 2000 as "MLAF", and to the applicant in proceeding N 89 of 2000 "MLA". I will use the expression "Merrill Lynch" in a general way to refer to the international and world wide Merrill Lynch group of companies and, on occasions, to each and all of the applicants as distinct from a particular one of them. 3 The case raises a distinction between what was referred to as a "jurisprudential" or "legal" approach to the concept of the "incurring" of an outgoing not paid during the year of income ("the tax year") for the purposes of subs 51(1) of the Act and a "commercial" approach to that concept. The Commissioner submits that the former is required by authority and that an outgoing is incurred only if and when a taxpayer becomes liable at law to pay it. According to the commercial approach, something less will suffice. The "something less" has been referred to as "commercial certainty". The applicants submit that the "commercial" approach is applicable and that it was not necessary in order for the bonuses to represent an outgoing incurred in the 1994 year that the applicants became liable by the end of that year to pay them. The applicants submit that it sufficed that by that time it was certain that the bonuses would be paid, and that in fact it was certain by then that they would be. But they submit, in the alternative, that they had in fact become liable by 31 December 1994 to pay the bonuses.
facts 4 Merrill Lynch had three bonus schemes relevant to this case for the benefit of its staff: a "Variable Incentive Compensation Plan" ("VICP"), a "Key Employees Incentive Compensation Plan" ("KEICP") and an "Employees Incentive Plan" ("EIP"). The VICP applied to traders, management and professional staff whose work generated income directly. Senior administrative employees were entitled to participate in the KEICP, which was treated as part of the VICP. Non-executive employees were entitled to participate in the EIP. The terms of appointment of employees stipulated that payment of a bonus was at the discretion of the employer. Several letters of engagement were in evidence. Their terms relating to bonus were not identical. The following letter from MLA to Christopher P Marshall dated 3 November 1987 stated, relevantly, as follows: "Remuneration You will receive a salary package of A$50,000 per annum. You will be entitled to participate in the Company's Variable Incentive Compensation Plan ('VICP') which is a discretionary bonus scheme based on your performance. All payments to you under the VICP Plan are at the complete discretion of the Company and there can be no assurance of any payment. Payment under the VICP scheme will usually be made in February each year." The letters of engagement in evidence all described the VICP as "a discretionary bonus scheme based on your performance", although some of them stipulated that the employee was guaranteed a minimum bonus of a certain amount for the first year. (Apparently the promise of a specified minimum bonus in the first year was made only in cases where the employee was being engaged towards the end of a year and would, by accepting Merrill Lynch's offer, forfeit the possibility of receiving a bonus associated with his or her existing employment.) 5 In addition to a provision for termination for cause, the letters of engagement provided that each party had a right to terminate the employment by giving not less than 30 days' notice in writing to the other. The letters allowed the employer to pay base salary in lieu of notice and at least some of them stipulated expressly that the employee would "not be entitled to any further compensation, costs or damages resulting from such termination". 6 The applicants accept that, based on the letters of engagement alone, an employee did not have, by the end of the 1994 year, an entitlement at law to be paid a bonus. 7 Merrill Lynch's head office was in New York. The world wide operations of Merrill Lynch were divided into regions. There was varying evidence that the region relevant to this case was the "Asia Pacific" or "Australian" or "Australasian" region. Merrill Lynch's operations were also divided into "business groups" or "business units" (the terms are interchangeable). As well, there were sub-groups. In Sydney in 1994 there were four business groups and a support group known as the "Corporate Support Group" ("CSG"). The business groups were: · Debt Markets · Investment Banking · Equity Markets · Private Client Broking 8 For the 1994 year a "Bonus Pool" for the VICP and KEICP was determined by reference to a formula related to the financial performance of Merrill Lynch. A committee of the Board of Directors, known as the "Management Development and Compensation Committee" ("MDCC"), approved the allocation of the global pool for the VICP and KEICP as between the respective global business units. The head of each global business unit decided how much of the amount allocated to his or her unit would be allocated to each region. 9 The amount of the bonus for each employee in a business group was determined by the regional head of that business group, in consultation with the heads of the relevant business sub-groups in the region and the Chief Executive Officer for the region. An identical procedure was followed for the CSG. 10 In the result, the amount of the bonus received by an individual employed in, say, the Debt Markets unit in a region, would depend on four decisions: · a decision as to the amount of the VICP bonus pool world wide; · a decision of the MDCC allocating a part of that VICP bonus pool to the global Debt Markets unit; · a decision of the head of the global Debt Markets unit as to how much was to be allocated to the relevant region; · a decision by the regional head of the Debt Markets unit as to the amount of bonus to be paid to the particular employee. 11 The VICP and KEICP operated in relation to the three applicants. The arrangements for both schemes were, in substance, the same, except that they applied to different personnel. In the 1994 year, every employee who was a "producer", that is, whose work generated income directly for Merrill Lynch, such as employees in the Debt Markets, Investment Banking and Equity Markets business groups, participated in the VICP, whereas persons employed in human resources or administrative positions participated in the KEICP. 12 The allocation of a reserve among companies in different countries occurred on a progressive basis throughout the year, by a process of "accrual accounting". However, the allocation was subject to a final review and confirmation by the MDCC in early January of the following year. Allocation of the bonus pool available for each business group among qualifying employees in that group was made by the regional head of the group, based on, inter alia, an assessment of the employee's performance. 13 During the first half of January 1995 there was some reallocation of bonuses among Australian employees who participated in that part of the VICP pool allocated to the Australian companies. 14 I turn now to the EIP. The amount paid as bonuses under the EIP was calculated by reference to the "return on equity" of Merrill Lynch, world wide. Each year it was calculated in respect of each participating employee as a number of days' salary of that employee. Again, there was a process of accrual accounting throughout the year in respect of the EIP. This took place month by month. Participating employees were informed during the year that, by way of the bonus, they would have the "opportunity to share in [the] company's success", and that "the size of each employee's award [would] be based on their manager's evaluation of their job performance, as well as the number of days funded for the firm-wide pool". 15 There was evidence that the base salaries of Merrill Lynch employees were at or below average for the industry. Peter Richard Stingi ("Mr Stingi"), First Vice President, Head of Human Resources for Merrill Lynch Investment Managers, who had been Head of the Executive Compensation Department of Merrill Lynch from about July 1989 to September 1995, testified that Merrill Lynch's "competitive position over the years with respect to base salaries [had] been at or below what would be deemed to be the competitive standard", but that with the "bonus element" Merrill Lynch "would be positioned either above or well above what would be the competitive standard". Similarly, Gordon Richard Towell ("Mr Towell") who was Chief Administrative Officer of MLA in Australia from October 1986 to 1996, testified that he was aware throughout the 1994 year and the preceding years that MLA and MLIA paid "below average market salaries to its employees" in comparison to its competitors, but that to compensate for this it paid bonuses which were "above market". 16 There was expert evidence from Lynn Robert Anderson, who had experience at the relevant time in "search and recruitment" in the financial institutions sector of Russell Reynolds Associates Inc (by which he was employed) to the effect that bonus payments were widely paid by a large majority of the participants, such as Merrill Lynch, in the merchant banking and securities industry in 1994. He said that by the early 1990s, bonus payments had become "an integral part of compensation packages for almost all professional staff in the wholesale operations of commercial banks and in investment banks and securities firms". Mr Anderson further testified: "As more firms adopted performance and incentive bonuses, it became a competitive necessity for virtually all firms to adopt broadly similar schemes in order to retain key talent, who might otherwise be attracted to join the competing, bonus-paying, institutions." 17 Mr Anderson said that bonus payments exceeding 100 per cent of fixed remuneration amounts were occasionally paid to "key performers such as heads of dealing desks", and that bonuses in the range of 25 per cent to 50 per cent or more, of fixed remuneration, "were the norm for most professional staff in investment banks and securities firms when the overall competitive performance of those organisations was strong or improving significantly". 18 There was evidence that payment of bonuses was an expectation of Merrill Lynch staff. Mr Towell said that while payment of bonuses was "discretionary", it was "deemed by the business managers as being - and by the senior management team at that time as being - a certainty". However, he agreed that when people were employed they were told that bonuses were "discretionary" and "based on a number of factors". He said that new employees were told what the factors were and were "set goals and objectives ... critical objectives ...". Mr Towell claimed that paying bonuses under the schemes was essential to MLA's and MLIA's ability to retain staff because staff regarded the bonuses as "part of their total remuneration by each of MLA, MLIA and MLAF". 19 The amounts of the bonuses were fixed in US currency. The applicants rely on evidence that the exchange risk involved in the denomination of the bonus amounts in that currency was recognised and hedged against and that qualifying employees were informed of the hedge arrangements "early in the financial year so that [they might] plan their financial affairs accordingly". Progressive assessments of the amounts of bonus likely to be paid at the end of the year were made by Merrill Lynch and recognised in its accounting records by the accrual of a liability account and in variation of the currency hedge. 20 The applicants also rely upon Vincent v Merrill Lynch Australia Pty Ltd [2000] NSWIRCom 160 as showing that if Merrill Lynch had unfairly exercised the discretion referred to in the letter of engagement by refusing to pay a bonus or by paying an inadequate one, it could have been compelled, in effect, to exercise its discretion fairly. In that case, referred to in more detail later, the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales granted relief to an employee of MLA whose employment came to an end as a result of redundancy prior to the end of a tax year and prior to the payment of bonuses early in the following year.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN LATE 1994 AND EARLY 1995 21 The following were the salient events of late 1994 and early 1995 within Merrill Lynch relating to the fixing of the amounts payable under the VICP, KEICP and EIP, and the payment of those amounts. (1) In November and December 1994, those responsible in Australia reviewed the performance of employees eligible to participate in the VICP, KEICP and EIP. (2) On 3 November 1994 John Moser at Human Resources Finance in New York advised John Horn of MLA of the accrual figures as at the end of October 1994 for the bonus schemes. (3) On 4 November 1994 Mr Towell received a memorandum from Joyce K Greene at Corporate Compensation in New York advising him of the EIP procedure for 1994 and requesting information about staff eligible to participate in the EIP. (4) On 17 November 1994 all employees entitled to participate in the EIP were advised that a bonus of 15 to 20 days' pay for eligible employees was anticipated, but that the size of each employee's award would be based on his or her manager's evaluation. (5) On 25 November 1994 Lori Luis, of New York, sent Mr Towell a list of employees in Australia who were entitled to participate in the VICP and KEICP for 1994. (6) On 28 November 1994 Mr Towell advised Joanna Boon of Investment Banking in New York that a named employee had been omitted from the list. (7) In November 1994 Mr Towell had telephone conversations with Ron Strauss, the Chief Administrative Officer for the Asia Pacific Region, who was based in New York, and was, in effect, the head of Mr Towell's CSG. Mr Towell made recommendations in respect of CSG staff employed in Australia. Mr Strauss told Mr Towell that he could expect the bonus pool to be "broadly the same" as it had been the preceding year. (8) On 29 November 1994 Mr Towell sent a recommendation to Sheldon Guyer in New York that a particular employee receive the same amount of bonus as for 1993. (On 21 December 1994, Ms Luis advised Mr Towel that according to the then most recent VICP file, the particular employee's proposed bonus was shown as US$21,000). (9) On 5 December 1994 the MDCC met in New York. According to the minutes of the meeting, Mr Stingi, who was at the time the Head of the Executive Compensation Department, reviewed with the Committee competitive pay levels and "the preliminary projected 1994 incentive compensation pools (both VICP and stock) for managers and producers". (10) On 8 December 1994 Mr Towell e-mailed Irene Woerner and Ms Boon in New York requesting a reply to earlier inter office memos about changes to the 1994 VCIP eligibility list and he received a reply the same day. (11) On 19 December 1994 Sharon Packer of MLA e-mailed to Elizabeth Harper in New York a list of EIP participants and a summary of their performance assessments. (12) On 22 December 1994 Mr Towell received from Ms Luis an updated list of employees eligible to participate in the VICP and KEICP. (13) On 26 December 1994 Ahmass Fakahany of New York faxed Mr Horn at MLA, advising him of accrual figures for November 1994. (14) On 30 December 1994 Mr Moser of New York faxed Mr Horn of MLA accrual figures for the 1994 year. The total for MLA was US$5,444,000. The Private Client and Futures Utility amounts were in addition and were separately advised. (15) During December 1994 the heads of the business groups worked out bonus figures for individuals under the VICP, KEICP and EIP and Mr Towell compared those figures with the accrual figures received. (16) As at 31 December 1994 the accrual figure for VICP, KEICP and EIP for MLA, MLIA and MLAF was, in effect, Aud$7,021,906 (Aud$7,752,034 less Aud$730,128 which had been pre-paid to a particular identified employee). The accrual figure was divided between the three applicants as follows: MLA $2,127,073 MLIA 4,187,900 MLAF 706,933 -------------- $7,021,906 ======== (17) In early January 1995 further updated lists of eligible employees and proposed bonuses were provided to Mr Towell by Ms Luis. (18) On 16 January 1995 the MDCC met in New York and Mr Stingi reviewed with the Committee the proposed bonus amounts for each global business group and the Committee "approved the recommendations". On the same day Ms Luis e-mailed Mr Towell the results, adding that "any future changes will be communicated to you via separate CC:Mails". (19) On 23 January 1995 Ms Greene e-mailed Mr Towell, advising that the final EIP bonuses for 1994 had been set at 18.5 days' pay per eligible employee, which represented an increase of one day's pay above the previously proposed 17.5 days' pay. (20) On 24 January 1995 Denise Benson of MLA sent a memorandum to all VICP eligible employees informing them that the 1994 VICP payments were due to be released on 27 January 1995 and enclosing a statement of the bonus to be paid to the particular employee. (21) On 27 January 1995 MLA, MLIA and MLAF accounts for the year ended 23 December 1994 were signed by the directors and they included the total amount accrued by each company under the schemes. (22) On 10 February 1995 Ms Packer of MLA e-mailed to Ms Harper of New York a final list of EIP award payments. (23) From 27 February 1995 to 23 April 1995 "accrual reconciliations" were finalised. 22 Two facts of present relevance emerge from the above chronological account. The first is that the first time an employee was advised that he or she was definitely to receive a bonus for the 1994 year and of the amount of it, was on about 24 January 1995, that is, after the end of the 1994 year. The second is that adjustments were made in January 1995 so that it cannot be said that the amounts of the bonuses or even the aggregate amount of them had been determined by 31 December 1994: the determination of the aggregate was not made by the MDCC until 16 January 1995. There is documentary evidence that for all of the VICP, the KEICP and the EIP for Merrill Lynch's operations in Australia the total amounts accrued within Merrill Lynch as at the end of December 1994 for the 1994 year, and the total of the bonuses subsequently paid for that year were as follows: Accrued Paid AUD USD AUD USD 7,752,034 5,662,500 7,456,249 5,351,445
REASONING 23 Subsection 51(1) of the Act provided as follows: "All losses and outgoings to the extent to which they are incurred in gaining or producing the assessable income, or are necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing such income, shall be allowable deductions …"
the course of authority 24 I find it convenient to address the cases to which I was referred on the meaning of the word "incurred" in chronological order.
Conclusion - "legal liability" or "commercial certainty" 80 It is not questioned, and on the authorities could not have been questioned, that in order for the applicants to have "incurred" by 31 December 1994 the outgoing represented by payment of the bonuses: · the applicants must have completely subjected or definitively committed themselves by that time to pay bonuses to their employees; or · that in resolving this question, a "legal" or "jurisprudential" approach must be pursued. The only relevant "commitment" in this case is one to each individual employee, not, for example, a "commitment to itself" which Merrill Lynch may be suggested to have made by the progressive accrual in its accounts of the reserve to meet bonuses. The two considerations mentioned above lead to the conclusion that in order to come within subs 51(1), the applicants must, by 31 December 1994, have incurred a legal liability to the individual employees to pay bonuses to them. 81 Moreover, in my view the authorities discussed above establish that, in order for an outgoing which is in fact paid after an accounting period to have been "incurred" within it, there must, subject to certain matters, exist by the end of that period a legal liability to pay it. 82 I will not profess to state the "matters" referred to exhaustively: to do so is to run the danger, cautioned against as early as in New Zealand Flax, of assaying an exhaustive definition of "incurred" in the present context. What is important for the decision of this case is the general requirement that, "theoretical contingencies disregarded", there must be a legal liability which the taxpayer is not entitled, of its own volition, to prevent becoming enforceable by action. 83 The cases discussed show that deductibility is not denied: · only because the quantum of the outgoing is not ascertained, and can only be estimated, at the end of the tax year (RACV; Commonwealth Aluminium; Commercial Union; Coles Myer; Woolcombers; ANZ; Mercantile Mutual); · only because the taxpayer has an available defence to an action in respect of the outgoing if the defence can, and certainly would, be waived by the taxpayer (Commercial Union; and cf Coles Myer per Deane J); · only because the liability is defeasible (James Flood); or · only because the legal liability is not yet "an immediate obligation enforceable at law" (James Flood; Commercial Union).
Did THE APPLICANTS BECOME SUBJECT, BY 31 December 1994, TO a legal liability to pay the bonuses? 84 In my opinion, the answer to this question is "no". 85 The gravamen of the applicants' submission in support of an affirmative answer can be understood from the first four paragraphs of the relevant part of their written submissions. Those paragraphs are as follows: "The obligation to pay the bonuses was enforceable at law 29. Although the bonus schemes reserved to the Applicants a discretion as to the amount paid to any employee, the Applicants had an obligation throughout the 1994 year to exercise that discretion both in good faith and reasonably: Carr v McDonald's Australia Ltd [(1994) 63 FCR 358 at 372-373 approving Greenberg v Meffert (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 548 (an application for special leave to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed (1985) 30 DLR (4th) 768) where an employee's entitlement to a commission was at the 'sole discretion' of his employer but it was held that the employer must exercise the discretion reasonably (by reference to objective and not subjective standards), honestly and in good faith; see also Service Station Association Limited v Berg Bennett & Associates Pty Limited (1993) 45 FCR 84 at 94; Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1990) 22 FCR 527 at 532 per Davies J and 542 per Sheppard J; on appeal The Commonwealth v Amann Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 96 per Mason CJ and Dawson J; Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Limited v Minister for Public Works (1991) 26 NSWLR 234 at 268 per Priestly JA and at 279-280 per Handley JA; Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v Carlton & United Breweries Limited (1987) 10 NSWLR 460 at 487]. Indeed, this obligation to act in good faith and reasonably in exercising the discretion can be seen as based on a fiduciary obligation arising out of the special position of vulnerability of employees in respect of the exercise of MLA's discretion [Hospital Products Limited v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 97; Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell (2000) 75 ALJR 312 paras 17, 23 and 51 (third proposition)]. 30. Further, and independently of that obligation, the employees of the Applicants in New South Wales were entitled to bring proceedings under former s 275 of the Industrial Relations Act 1991 (NSW) in the event that the Applicants administered the bonus schemes unfairly. That Act was repealed in 1996 by the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) which includes in ss 105 and 106 of that Act provisions which substantially re-enact former s 275. Former s 275(1) provided relevantly as follows: '(1) The Industrial Court may make an order declaring wholly or partly void, or varying, either from its commencement or from some other time, any contract or arrangement or any related condition or collateral arrangement under which a person performs work in any industry if the Industrial Court finds that the contract or arrangement or any related condition or collateral arrangement: (a) is unfair; or (b) is harsh or unconscionable; or (c) is against the public interest; or (d) provides or has provided a total remuneration less than a person performing the work would have received as an employee performing the work ...' 31. The evidence establishes that the bonus schemes were an integral part of the basis on which the Applicants remunerated their employees. As a consequence, participation in the relevant bonus schemes formed, at the very least, a related condition of or a collateral arrangement for the purposes of both s 106 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 and former s 275 of the Industrial Relations Act 1991: Moray Vincent v Merrill Lynch Australia Pty Ltd [[2000] NSW IRComm 160 at para 101; see also Daley v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1995) 78 IR 247 at 278-280]. 32. Unfairness may arise either from the terms of the contract or arrangement itself (or any related condition or collateral arrangement), the surrounding circumstances or the manner of performance or operation of the contract [Daley v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1995) 78 IR 247 at 287 citing Incitec v Industrial Court of New South Wales (1992) 45 IR 143 at 146]. Unfairness in this context is determined according to 'the common sense approach characteristic of the ordinary juryman ... It is a plain matter of morals not law [ibid at 287]." 86 The applicants' submissions proceeded with an account of Vincent v Merrill Lynch Australia Pty Ltd [2000] NSWIRComm 160 ("Vincent"). The applicants contended that they "were under an obligation in 1994 to exercise their discretion in relation to the bonus schemes in accordance with ordinary standards of fairness", that if they failed to do so an employee would have been entitled to bring a proceeding under the former s 275 of the Industrial Relations Act 1991 (NSW),and that the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales "would have been likely to intervene to require payment of a bonus". 87 In Vincent, Moray Vincent applied under s 106 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) for relief against MLA in respect of his contract of employment with that company. On 26 October 1995 he had signed a letter of engagement by MLA as a junior trader. He was entitled to participate in the VICP. The letter of engagement provided for payment of bonuses to be at the complete discretion of MLA and for termination of the employment by either party's giving thirty days' written notice of termination or payment in lieu of notice. 88 In January 1996 Mr Vincent was paid a bonus of US$20,000. In November 1996 he was promoted to the position of "Assistant Vice President". In January 1997 he was paid a bonus of US$120,000 in respect of the 1996 year. 89 In 1997, Mr Vincent became Head of the Credit Trading Bank. In July 1997 his salary package was increased from $83,000 to $103,000. 90 In January 1998 Mr Vincent received a bonus of US$120,000 for the 1997 year. During 1998 he was promoted from Assistant Vice President to "Vice President" and his salary was increased from $103,000 to $115,000. 91 During 1998, Mr Vincent encountered difficulties, which I need not discuss, at MLA. On 14 October 1998 he was told that he was being made redundant, was required to leave MLA's employment that day, and was offered a redundancy package of one month's pay in lieu of notice, five months' pay as a "redundancy package" (both calculated on his salary package of $115,000), and a "1998 bonus" of US$36,000, which was said to have been calculated as a percentage of his 1997 VICP bonus. 92 In the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales Marks J found the contract to be unfair because, although the bonus was an integral part of Mr Vincent's remuneration, his employment could be terminated for redundancy without his being entitled to any bonus. His Honour made the following orders: "1. I declare so much of the contract of employment between the applicant and the respondent which allowed for termination by the respondent upon giving 30 days' notice to the applicant to be void. 2. The respondent is to pay the applicant an amount calculated by reference to six months pay in lieu of notice based on an annual salary package of $115,000 and annual putative bonus for 1998 of US$100,000.
CONCLUSION 102 For the above reasons the application in each of the three matters should be dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding one hundred and two (102) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Lindgren.
Counsel for the Applicants: A H Slater QC and M Richmond
Solicitor for the Applicants: Allen Allen & Hemsley
Counsel for the Respondent: D H Bloom QC, S J Gageler SC and S J McMillan
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Dates of Hearing: 18, 19 June 2001
Merrill Lynch International (Australia) Ltd
Commissioner of Taxation
Merrill Lynch International (Australia) Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 1127
Vincent v Merrill Lynch Australia Pty Ltd [2000] NSWIRCom 160 discussed New Zealand Flax Investments Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1938) 61 CLR 179 followed Federal Commissioner of Taxation v James Flood Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 492 applied RACV Insurance Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1975] VR 1 distinguished Commissioner of Taxation v Manufacturers' Mutual Insurance Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 575 distinguished Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 7 ATR 376 discussed Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 14 ALR 651 distinguished Gates v WA and RJ Jacobs Ltd [1920] 1 Ch 567 cited Body Corporate Strata Plan No 4303 v Albion Insurance Co Ltd [1982] VR 699 cited Antique House Pty Ltd v Security & General Insurance Co Ltd (1984) 3 ANZInsCas 60-556 cited Nilsen Development Laboratories Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 144 CLR 616 applied Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Nilsen Porcelains (Australia) Pty Ltd (1979) 41 FLR 36 cited Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 483 distinguished Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Lo & Lo (a firm) (Privy Council, 26 March 1984, unreported) distinguished Hooker Rex Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 79 ALR 181 discussed Ogilvy and Mather Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 95 ALR 663 discussed Coles Myer Finance Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 176 CLR 640discussed Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand Ltd [1996] 1 AC 315 cited Commissioner of Taxation v Woolcombers (WA) Pty Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 561 discussed Commissioner of Taxation v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Workers' Compensation) Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 536 discussed Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 48 FCR 268 discussed Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 434 cited Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 cited Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 76 FCR 151 cited Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 cited Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jacks Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 cited
(1938) 61 CLR 179
(1953) 88 CLR 492
(1977) 14 ALR 651
(1981) 144 CLR 616
(1979) 41 FLR 36
(1984) 2 FCR 483
(1988) 79 ALR 181
(1990) 95 ALR 663
(1993) 176 CLR 640
(1993) 47 FCR 561
(1999) 87 FCR 536
(1994) 48 FCR 268
(1993) 44 FCR 434
(1992) 26 NSWLR 234
(1997) 76 FCR 151
(1998) 44 NSWLR 349
(1930) 43 CLR 456
(1938) 61 CLR 337
(1944) 71 CLR 596
(1994) 63 FCR 358
(1993) 45 FCR 84
(1990) 22 FCR 527
(1991) 174 CLR 64
(1991) 26 NSWLR 234
(1987) 10 NSWLR 460
(1984) 156 CLR 41
(2000) 75 ALJR 312
(1995) 78 IR 247
(1992) 45 IR 143