facts
4 Merrill Lynch had three bonus schemes relevant to this case for the benefit of its staff: a "Variable Incentive Compensation Plan" ("VICP"), a "Key Employees Incentive Compensation Plan" ("KEICP") and an "Employees Incentive Plan" ("EIP"). The VICP applied to traders, management and professional staff whose work generated income directly. Senior administrative employees were entitled to participate in the KEICP, which was treated as part of the VICP. Non-executive employees were entitled to participate in the EIP. The terms of appointment of employees stipulated that payment of a bonus was at the discretion of the employer. Several letters of engagement were in evidence. Their terms relating to bonus were not identical. The following letter from MLA to Christopher P Marshall dated 3 November 1987 stated, relevantly, as follows:
"Remuneration
You will receive a salary package of A$50,000 per annum.
You will be entitled to participate in the Company's Variable Incentive Compensation Plan ('VICP') which is a discretionary bonus scheme based on your performance. All payments to you under the VICP Plan are at the complete discretion of the Company and there can be no assurance of any payment. Payment under the VICP scheme will usually be made in February each year."
The letters of engagement in evidence all described the VICP as "a discretionary bonus scheme based on your performance", although some of them stipulated that the employee was guaranteed a minimum bonus of a certain amount for the first year. (Apparently the promise of a specified minimum bonus in the first year was made only in cases where the employee was being engaged towards the end of a year and would, by accepting Merrill Lynch's offer, forfeit the possibility of receiving a bonus associated with his or her existing employment.)
5 In addition to a provision for termination for cause, the letters of engagement provided that each party had a right to terminate the employment by giving not less than 30 days' notice in writing to the other. The letters allowed the employer to pay base salary in lieu of notice and at least some of them stipulated expressly that the employee would "not be entitled to any further compensation, costs or damages resulting from such termination".
6 The applicants accept that, based on the letters of engagement alone, an employee did not have, by the end of the 1994 year, an entitlement at law to be paid a bonus.
7 Merrill Lynch's head office was in New York. The world wide operations of Merrill Lynch were divided into regions. There was varying evidence that the region relevant to this case was the "Asia Pacific" or "Australian" or "Australasian" region. Merrill Lynch's operations were also divided into "business groups" or "business units" (the terms are interchangeable). As well, there were sub-groups. In Sydney in 1994 there were four business groups and a support group known as the "Corporate Support Group" ("CSG"). The business groups were:
· Debt Markets
· Investment Banking
· Equity Markets
· Private Client Broking
8 For the 1994 year a "Bonus Pool" for the VICP and KEICP was determined by reference to a formula related to the financial performance of Merrill Lynch. A committee of the Board of Directors, known as the "Management Development and Compensation Committee" ("MDCC"), approved the allocation of the global pool for the VICP and KEICP as between the respective global business units. The head of each global business unit decided how much of the amount allocated to his or her unit would be allocated to each region.
9 The amount of the bonus for each employee in a business group was determined by the regional head of that business group, in consultation with the heads of the relevant business sub-groups in the region and the Chief Executive Officer for the region. An identical procedure was followed for the CSG.
10 In the result, the amount of the bonus received by an individual employed in, say, the Debt Markets unit in a region, would depend on four decisions:
· a decision as to the amount of the VICP bonus pool world wide;
· a decision of the MDCC allocating a part of that VICP bonus pool to the global Debt Markets unit;
· a decision of the head of the global Debt Markets unit as to how much was to be allocated to the relevant region;
· a decision by the regional head of the Debt Markets unit as to the amount of bonus to be paid to the particular employee.
11 The VICP and KEICP operated in relation to the three applicants. The arrangements for both schemes were, in substance, the same, except that they applied to different personnel. In the 1994 year, every employee who was a "producer", that is, whose work generated income directly for Merrill Lynch, such as employees in the Debt Markets, Investment Banking and Equity Markets business groups, participated in the VICP, whereas persons employed in human resources or administrative positions participated in the KEICP.
12 The allocation of a reserve among companies in different countries occurred on a progressive basis throughout the year, by a process of "accrual accounting". However, the allocation was subject to a final review and confirmation by the MDCC in early January of the following year. Allocation of the bonus pool available for each business group among qualifying employees in that group was made by the regional head of the group, based on, inter alia, an assessment of the employee's performance.
13 During the first half of January 1995 there was some reallocation of bonuses among Australian employees who participated in that part of the VICP pool allocated to the Australian companies.
14 I turn now to the EIP. The amount paid as bonuses under the EIP was calculated by reference to the "return on equity" of Merrill Lynch, world wide. Each year it was calculated in respect of each participating employee as a number of days' salary of that employee. Again, there was a process of accrual accounting throughout the year in respect of the EIP. This took place month by month. Participating employees were informed during the year that, by way of the bonus, they would have the "opportunity to share in [the] company's success", and that "the size of each employee's award [would] be based on their manager's evaluation of their job performance, as well as the number of days funded for the firm-wide pool".
15 There was evidence that the base salaries of Merrill Lynch employees were at or below average for the industry. Peter Richard Stingi ("Mr Stingi"), First Vice President, Head of Human Resources for Merrill Lynch Investment Managers, who had been Head of the Executive Compensation Department of Merrill Lynch from about July 1989 to September 1995, testified that Merrill Lynch's "competitive position over the years with respect to base salaries [had] been at or below what would be deemed to be the competitive standard", but that with the "bonus element" Merrill Lynch "would be positioned either above or well above what would be the competitive standard". Similarly, Gordon Richard Towell ("Mr Towell") who was Chief Administrative Officer of MLA in Australia from October 1986 to 1996, testified that he was aware throughout the 1994 year and the preceding years that MLA and MLIA paid "below average market salaries to its employees" in comparison to its competitors, but that to compensate for this it paid bonuses which were "above market".
16 There was expert evidence from Lynn Robert Anderson, who had experience at the relevant time in "search and recruitment" in the financial institutions sector of Russell Reynolds Associates Inc (by which he was employed) to the effect that bonus payments were widely paid by a large majority of the participants, such as Merrill Lynch, in the merchant banking and securities industry in 1994. He said that by the early 1990s, bonus payments had become "an integral part of compensation packages for almost all professional staff in the wholesale operations of commercial banks and in investment banks and securities firms". Mr Anderson further testified:
"As more firms adopted performance and incentive bonuses, it became a competitive necessity for virtually all firms to adopt broadly similar schemes in order to retain key talent, who might otherwise be attracted to join the competing, bonus-paying, institutions."
17 Mr Anderson said that bonus payments exceeding 100 per cent of fixed remuneration amounts were occasionally paid to "key performers such as heads of dealing desks", and that bonuses in the range of 25 per cent to 50 per cent or more, of fixed remuneration, "were the norm for most professional staff in investment banks and securities firms when the overall competitive performance of those organisations was strong or improving significantly".
18 There was evidence that payment of bonuses was an expectation of Merrill Lynch staff. Mr Towell said that while payment of bonuses was "discretionary", it was "deemed by the business managers as being - and by the senior management team at that time as being - a certainty". However, he agreed that when people were employed they were told that bonuses were "discretionary" and "based on a number of factors". He said that new employees were told what the factors were and were "set goals and objectives ... critical objectives ...". Mr Towell claimed that paying bonuses under the schemes was essential to MLA's and MLIA's ability to retain staff because staff regarded the bonuses as "part of their total remuneration by each of MLA, MLIA and MLAF".
19 The amounts of the bonuses were fixed in US currency. The applicants rely on evidence that the exchange risk involved in the denomination of the bonus amounts in that currency was recognised and hedged against and that qualifying employees were informed of the hedge arrangements "early in the financial year so that [they might] plan their financial affairs accordingly". Progressive assessments of the amounts of bonus likely to be paid at the end of the year were made by Merrill Lynch and recognised in its accounting records by the accrual of a liability account and in variation of the currency hedge.
20 The applicants also rely upon Vincent v Merrill Lynch Australia Pty Ltd [2000] NSWIRCom 160 as showing that if Merrill Lynch had unfairly exercised the discretion referred to in the letter of engagement by refusing to pay a bonus or by paying an inadequate one, it could have been compelled, in effect, to exercise its discretion fairly. In that case, referred to in more detail later, the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales granted relief to an employee of MLA whose employment came to an end as a result of redundancy prior to the end of a tax year and prior to the payment of bonuses early in the following year.