Failure to have regard to relevant material
11 Mr C W McEwen SC, appearing for the applicant, submits that in refusing the application, the commissioner made no reference to a particular exhibit - Exhibit "P" - and thereby he failed to take it into account. Exhibit "P" is a letter from the Director-General of the Department of Planning to the council dated 3 January 2007. This was a letter sent to the council following the council's notification to the Director-General of its decision to prepare a draft LEP, as required by s 54(4) of the EP&A Act. The letter states that the Department of Planning does not support a restriction on floor space in the draft LEP for the Merimbula and Tura Beach centres and "does not consider there is sufficient strategic justification to support the proposed floor space caps being included in the LEP". The letter also says, however, that it is noted that the council has provided some guidance through the provision of a floor space restriction in a draft DCP. The letter states: "Council should therefore remove the floor space caps proposed for retail development in the centres".
12 The applicant submits that Exhibit "P" was thus centrally relevant to the interpretation of and weight to be accorded to the draft LEP and DCP No. 38, yet the commissioner made no reference to the opinion of the Department of Planning in his decision, leading to the conclusion that he failed to take Exhibit "P" into account and thus misdirected himself as to the weight to be given to those instruments.
13 The commissioner's decision, however, contains express reference to the fact that there were a number of subsequent events - that is, events which occurred after the date of the letter - which he describes in pars [54] and [58] of his decision. These in particular were the adoption by the State government of the "South Coast Regional Plan" [sic], the issuing of a certificate under s 65 of the EP&A Act by the Department of Planning for the draft LEP and the adoption by the council of the DCP No. 38.
14 I have previously noted that the commissioner found that the determinative issues in the case became issues 1(a), 4B and 4C, 5 and 6, which I have set out in par [9] above. The planning instruments to which the commissioner referred and the weight to be accorded to them were thus central to the determination.
15 The reference by the commissioner throughout the decision to the "South Coast Regional Plan" appears to be a misnomer. It is not referred to in any of the issues. I assume it is intended to be a reference to the South Coast Regional Strategy which appears to be a policy document issued by the Department of Planning in January 2007 and which does not have any statutory force. For example, in par [59] of the decision the commissioner refers to the "South Coast Regional Plan" and noted that "on both the South Coast Strategy map and the Biodiversity and Coastal Asset map in the plan the existing urban area of Merimbula is shown in white…". This map appears in the South Coast Regional Strategy document which, as I have noted, is not a regional environmental plan.
16 The duty to give reasons does not extend to every matter of fact or law which was or might have been raised in the proceeding: Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 at 385 per Mahoney JA. In another way, the law does not require a judicial officer to make an express finding in respect of every fact leading to, or relevant to, his final conclusion of fact: Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 271 per Mahoney JA. It is not necessary to make explicit findings on each piece of evidence, especially if the inference as to what is found is appropriately clear: Beale v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 at 443 per Meagher JA. Reasons need only be given so far as is necessary to indicate why the decision was made: Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd at 388 per Mahoney JA. Nevertheless the duty to give reasons clearly applies to findings on the principal contested issues, or on any issue that is central or critical to the case: Soulemezis at 259 per Kirby P; Misfud v Campbell (1991) 21 NSWLR 725 at 738 per Samuels JA. That is what the commissioner did in this case.
17 In the present case the commissioner's reasons clearly indicate why the decision was made. It was based upon the planning instruments to which he referred, namely the South Coast Regional Strategy (wrongly described by the commissioner as the "South Coast Regional Plan"), the draft LEP (which had been put on exhibition) and the DCP No. 38. The latter two instruments limit the floor space of new retail shops in Merimbula to 1,000 square metres. Moreover, s 79C(1)(a) of the EP&A Act expressly required consideration of the latter two instruments.
18 The letter from the Director-General, being Exhibit "P", is merely a preliminary expression of opinion by a non-party at an earlier stage of the planning process - an opinion which may well change following the public exhibition of and consideration of submissions on the draft LEP. In any event, the letter noted, "that the council has provided some guidance through the provisions of a floor space restriction in a draft DCP". By the time the commissioner came to determine the application the draft DCP had became DCP No. 38 on 23 January 2007. The DCP No. 38 thus became a fundamental element or focal point in the commissioner's determination: Zhang v Canterbury City Council (2001) NSWLR 589; (2001) 115 LGERA 373 at [75] per Spigelman CJ; and it is apparent from a reading of the commissioner's reasons that this was so.
19 The commissioner was entitled to take the view that Exhibit "P" was neither central nor critical, in which case he was not required to specifically deal with it. In the same way, he did not specifically deal with other evidence adduced in support of the proposed development. Since the commissioner found that the determinative issues were those which he identified in par [49] of his decision, namely, the planning controls that applied, then consistently with the principles to which I have referred in par [16] above, it was not necessary for him to deal with every other matter that could be averted to, including Exhibit "P". That is to say, in determining the matter in the way he did, by giving determining weight to the planning instruments, the parties were left in no doubt as to why the decision was made. The question of what weight was to be given to any relevant matter was solely a question for the commissioner. No error of law arises.