consideration
35 As the expression "Amount Owing" is a defined term in cl 1.1 of the Override Deed, the analysis should commence with the text of that definition.
36 Four initial textual observations are made about the defined expression "Amount Owing". First, the expression is defined "in respect of a Financier" - that is, it is a singular and not cumulative expression. This observation is pertinent in the context of cl 3.2(d) of the Override Deed, which uses the expressions "the total Amount Owing in full" and the "total Amount Owing" which, in ordinary meaning, must be a reference to the total of all the amounts owing of all of the Financiers. Secondly, the "Amount Owing" in the words of the definition is the amount set out in the Global Commitments Register corresponding to the name of the Financier. Thirdly, the debts and claims of a Financier under a finance document are "for the purposes of calculations and distributions under [the Override Deed]" the amount set out in the Global Commitments Register. Fourthly, whilst the expression "Amount Owing" is not defined by reference to an "Amount Owing" as at a particular date, cl 6.2(a) of the Override Deed picks up that requirement in providing that the "Amount Owing of each Financier as of the Relevant Date is set forth in the Global Commitments Register…". The "Relevant Date" was defined to mean 7 April 2016 and the Global Commitments Register, contained in Sch 3 to the Override Deed, recorded the "Amount Owing" to each Financier as of 7 April 2016.
37 The parties were at issue as to the proper construction of cl 6.2(d)(i) of the Override Deed. Clause 6.2(d)(i) expressly required the Global Commitments Register to be updated on each "Record Date" "to reflect the Amount Owing as at that Record Date". "Record Date" was defined in cl 1.1 of the Override Deed to mean the last business day of each calendar month and in the case of a Proceeds Distribution Notice, the date of that Notice. The Proceeds Distribution Notice was a notice which the Global Agent was required by cl 6.1 to give to the Financiers (in the form set out in Sch 8 to the Override Deed) advising of its intention to distribute the Moly-Cop proceeds in accordance with cl 5(b)(i) as soon as possible after receipt by it of the proceeds.
38 Epic argued that it was clear from the requirement in cl 6.2(d)(i) to update the Global Commitments Register as at the date of the Proceeds Distribution Notice that the Amount Owing was to be reduced by the proceeds received by the Global Agent in respect of the Moly-Cop realisation transaction. Epic submitted that cl 6.2(e) further supported this construction. Pursuant to cl 6.2(e), the update of the Global Commitments Register amended Sch 3 "with effect on and from the most recent Record Date" thereby, it was said, superseding all previous versions of the Global Commitments Register.
39 Epic also argued that cl 5(d) was telling against the Financiers' construction. Clause 5(d) concerned "Turnover Amounts". A "Turnover Amount", in short form, was an amount received by a Financier (referred to as a "Recovering Financier") outside the framework established under the Override Deed for the realisation of the Moly-Cop entities and the payment of the proceeds to the Financiers: definition "Turnover Amount" cl 1.1. Clause 5(d)(i) relevantly provided that:
… for the purpose of determining the Recovering Financier's claims and debts against the Obligor (from whom the Recovering Financier received the Turnover Amount) under the relevant finance documents, the Recovering Financier's claims and debts against that Obligor (or those Obligors) will be taken to be reduced by the full amount of the Turnover Amount".
Under cl 5(d)(ii), for the purpose of assessing the effect of a Turnover Amount on debts novated to a particular borrower, the Turnover Amount became a debt owed to the Recovering Financier "less any amount which is subsequently determined by the Global Agent to be the Recovering Financier's share of the Turnover Amount", the effect of which it was said, was that payments made to that Financier are deducted from its overall entitlement. Epic argued that the provisions regarding the treatment of the Turnover Amount were "at odds with the scheme that the Financiers contend is established under the Override Deed, where the Obligors' remain liable for the full amount of the Debt without reduction for payments made".
40 The Financiers argued on the other hand that cl 6.2(d)(i) must be read in context with cl 6.2(c) which required the "Amount Owing" of each Financier to be updated in accordance with cl 6.2(d) "to reflect increases in accrued interest, fees, costs, and expenses in accordance with the terms of the Subject Finance Documents". It was submitted that the updating referred to in cl 6.2(d)(i) related only to the requirement in cl 6.2(c), with the effect that in the pro rata distribution of proceeds to the Financiers, the "Amount Owing" to a Financier included accrued interest and the like.
41 Reference was also made to cl 3.2(d), pursuant to which "[at] each Consent Effective Time" the remaining Moly-Cop entities (termed the "Remaining Obligors") acknowledged and agreed that notwithstanding the release of the Moly-Cop sale entities (termed the "Nominated Released Obligors") from their obligations under the finance documents:
(i) until such time as the Financiers have received the total Amount Owing in full, the total Amount Owing remains outstanding;
(ii) each such Remaining Obligor is jointly and severally liable to pay the Amount Owing in accordance with the terms of the Subject Finance Documents; and
(iii) each such Remaining Obligor's obligations under the Subject Finance Documents are not affected by the variation, waivers, releases or consents granted.
42 It was argued that cl 3.2(d) supported the Financiers' construction in that these acknowledgments and agreements were being given by the Remaining Obligors in the context of the Financiers' impending receipt of proceeds from a proposed Moly-Cop realisation transaction. Thus, it was submitted, cl 3.2(d), and specifically cl 3.2(d)(i), made it clear that the proceeds were not intended to reduce the "Amount Owing" in the defined sense of that expression.
43 The Financiers also argued that the Turnover provisions in cl 5 did not advance Epic's construction because those provisions did not apply to the Moly-Cop proceeds (referring to the definition of "Turnover Amount" in cl 1.1 and cl 2(a) of the Required Consent Report) and were not part of the provisions concerned with the calculation of the "Amount Owing" as set out in the Global Commitments Register.
44 The Financiers' construction of the Override Deed is to be preferred for the following reasons.
45 First, the textual analysis of the expression "Amount Owing" as defined in cl 1.1 does not support Epic's construction. Whilst the debts and claims under the finance documents provided the source for the calculation of the amounts set out in the Global Commitments Register, it is clear from the combination of the definitions of "Amount Owing", "the Global Commitments Register" and "Relevant Date", and from cls 6.2(a) and (b) that it is the debts and claims as at 7 April 2016.
46 Secondly, a construction of the definition of "Amount Owing" as referring to the debts and claims as at 7 April 2016 is congruent with cl 6.2(c) which only makes express provision for updating the "Amount Owing" of each Financier to reflect increases in accrued interest, fees, costs and expenses. That provision would be unnecessary on Epic's construction because the terms of the finance documents would of their own force operate to require such additional amounts to be included in the calculation of the "Amount Owing", as would any repayments. The fact that express provision was made in cl 6.2(c) in relation to those amounts is a strong textual consideration favouring the Financiers' construction and gives cl 6.2(c) an internal coherence with the other provisions of cl 6.2 read as a whole.
47 Thirdly, there is considerable force in the Financiers' submission that the terms of cl 3.2(d) support its construction based on the consideration that the acknowledgment and agreement of the Remaining Obligors that "until such time as the Financiers have received the total Amount Owing in full, the total Amount Owing remains outstanding" was given in the context of the Financiers impending receipt of proceeds from a proposed Moly-Cop realisation transaction. Clause 3.2(d) is thus telling against Epic's construction that the computation of the "Amount Owing" in respect of each Financier was to be reduced by the proceeds that the Financier received from a Moly-Cop realisation transaction.
48 Fourthly, cl 5 does not assist Epic's construction because the turnover amount was not an amount forming part of the calculation of the amount set out in the Global Commitments Register and, notably, there is specific provision to the effect that any turnover amount be taken to reduce the "Amount Owing" to Financiers, relating to payments received outside of any Moly-Cop realisation transaction.
49 The Financiers' submissions on cl 5.1(a)(iii) of the Required Consent Report should also be accepted. Conformably with cl 3.2(d)(i) of the Override Deed, the effect of cl 5.1(a)(iii) was to confirm that the payment of the Moly-Cop sale proceeds to the Financiers did not consequentially reduce the quantum of the amount in respect of which the Financiers were entitled to lodge a proof of debt. Additionally, and contrary to Epic's submissions, this clause did not seek (impermissibly) to vary the Financiers' entitlements under the DOCA but, rather, was consistent with cl 19.1 of the DOCA which provided that each Arrium creditor's entitlements were to be adjudicated by the Deed Administrators "as at the Appointment Date", namely 7 April 2016 (Sch A - Dictionary, definition of "Appointment Date").
50 As the expression "Amount Owing" is also used in cl 3 of the Deed Poll in its defined sense the use of the expression in that context is also to be construed conformably with its use in the Override Deed. Moreover, as required by cl 3.2(e) of the Override Deed, cl 3 of the Deed Poll confirmed par 3.2(d) of the Override Deed.
51 In my view, read in context, there is no uncertainty or ambiguity about the meaning of "Amount Owing", as that expression is used in each of the three documents under consideration, and I accept as correct the construction advanced by the Financiers that the Moly-Cop proceeds did not reduce the "Amount Owing" to the Financiers. Epic's claim that the Financiers' contentions "involve the proposition that the parties effected a transaction that was grossly uncommercial" does not assist its argument. Such a claim, as asserted by Epic, if it may properly be made (about which I express no view at all), and if it be relevant on the construction question, does not mean that the Court should not give the text the meaning that arises on the unambiguous language but adopt a different construction to avoid giving the documents an operation which may be grossly uncommercial. In such a circumstance, the uncommerciality of the transaction would be a consequence of the deal struck, not the construction of the language. Moreover, if I am wrong and there is ambiguity or uncertainty arising on the textual analysis, reference to the surrounding circumstances and mutual knowledge of the parties does not direct any different conclusion on the construction of the documents. The administrators and various Arrium Group companies entered into the contractual acknowledgments, undertakings and commitments contained in the three documents as part of the commercial arrangements reached by the parties to enable the Moly-Cop sale entities to be sold free from the Financiers' claims and in the context where the enterprise value of the Moly-Cop business was less than the Debt owing to the Financiers and the Financiers' release of the Moly-Cop sale entities from their obligations under the guarantees was necessary for the sale of those entities. As between the parties themselves, it cannot be said that the effect of the documents, on the construction I have found, makes commercial nonsense or causes commercial inconvenience in a way that casts doubt on whether the parties intended the documents to have the meaning conveyed by the textual analysis (Mount Bruce at [51]).
52 Accordingly, the answer to both parts of the question is "yes".
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Davies.