Is the proposed equitable claim untenable?
11In simplified terms, the proposed equitable claim is to the effect that (1) the Owners Corporation holds the common property upon trust for the lot owners, including Ms McDonough; (2) in breach of trust the Owners Corporation, (a) preferred its own interests to those of the lot owners (including Ms McDonough), or allowed its own interests to come into conflict with those of the lot owners, by failing to perform repairs to the common property adjacent to her lot, until it had recovered damages from the builder with which it could fund the repairs without having to raise funds from lot owners by levy, and (b) departed from the terms of the trust by failing to perform its obligation, imposed by s 62, to maintain and repair the common property.
12The proposed equitable claim has its genesis in the following passage in judgment of Tobias AJA in Thoo:
135 The interest of a lot owner as an equitable tenant in common is a product of the statutory provisions concerning the relationship of the owners corporation to the common property. Because it holds the common property as "agent" in the manner specified in s 20(b) of the 1973 Act, the owners corporation holds it upon trust for the several lot owners from time to time in proportion to their unit entitlements - albeit on the footing that a lot owner's equitable interest cannot be dealt with except in conjunction with the lot: s 24(2).
136 It is because the owners corporation holds the common property as trustee under a statutory trust that it is possible to identify the equitable interests of the lot owners in the common property. And it is the owners corporation's status as trustee that may be regarded as the source of general law duties additional to the statutory duties to which it is subject: cf The Owners -Strata Plan No 43551 v Walter Construction Group Limited [2004] NSWCA 429; (2004) 62 NSWLR 169 at [42]-[48] per Spigelman CJ, with whom Ipp and McColl JJA agreed.
137 However, those general law duties do not include positive duties or, more precisely, duties to act in any positive way. They are negative duties not to profit or benefit from the trust, not to prefer one's own interests, not to allow one's own interests to come into conflict with those of the beneficiaries, not to impeach the title of the beneficiaries, not to depart from the terms of the trust and not to delegate the trust except as permitted by its terms.
138 Thus the general law duties are necessarily confined so that they do not conflict with any of the statutory duties of the owners corporation. To put this another way, the general law duties complement the statutory duties but cannot modify them.
139 The statutory duties of an owners corporation are, by and large, concomitants of its statutory functions. The general nature of the functions is suggested by s 61 of the 1996 Act, which I have recorded at [45] above. As they relate to the common property, the functions defined by the 1996 Act are principally to manage and control that property for the benefit of the owners (s 61(1)(a)); to repair and maintain the property (s 62); to add to or alter the property (or erect a new structure on it) if so authorized under s 65A; to license a lot owner to use common property in a particular manner if so authorized under s 65B; and to grant access to the common property for fire safety inspection purposes (s 65C).
140 Some of the functions necessarily imply concomitant duties. The functions under ss 61(1)(a), 62 and 65C are of this kind. Others, such as those under ss 65A and 65B, entail a discretion exercisable if and when the necessary authorization has been given. Functions of the latter kind are also created by the 1973 Act (see, for example, ss 25, 26 and 27). These statutory functions and duties with respect to the common property are concerned with that property as it exists from time to time. The duty to repair, for example, will become exercisable periodically as deterioration occurs or defects arise.
141 The negative quality of such general law duties as arise from the trustee status of the owners corporation with respect to common property is emphasized by s 21 of the 1973 Act:
"Common property shall not be capable of being dealt with except in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996."
142 The expression "deal with", used in relation to property, is wide. It would clearly include any action required to be taken by the owners corporation pursuant to ss 62(1) and (2), subject to the passing of a special resolution pursuant to s 62(3). In that respect any equitable right of a lot owner to require the owners corporation to replace the MEVS, as Dr Thoo seeks, would be trumped by a valid special resolution passed pursuant to s 62(3). The purpose of s 21 is clearly to preclude any form of action by the owners corporation in relation to the common property that is not contemplated and expressly permitted by the strata titles legislation.
143 Thus, the circumstance that the lot owners have equitable interests as tenants in common of the common property does not of itself impose any duty upon the owners corporation. Rather, it has significance as among the owners themselves. It is their status as equitable tenants in common that gives them rights of enjoyment of the common property. In Bull v Bull at 237, Denning LJ suggested that the rights of equitable tenants in common are the same as those of legal owners in common so that
"[e]ach of them is entitled to the possession of the land and to the use and enjoyment of it in a proper manner. Neither can turn out the other; but if one of them should take more than his proper share the injured party can bring an action for an account."
...
145 The important point for present purposes is that the rights and obligations of equitable tenants in common as regards the use and enjoyment of land exist only among themselves. Their status as equitable owners is not the source of any right against or obligation of the trustee who holds the land upon trust for them. The rights that they have against the trustee and the obligations the trustee owes to them derive from the trust and the relationship of trustee and beneficiary. It follows that if the owners corporation, duly and faithfully performing the terms of the trust as embodied in the 1973 and 1996 Acts, acknowledges the interests of the lot owners as a body in the common property and performs the functions otherwise imposed upon it by statute, any complaint that the activities of one owner impair another owner's enjoyment of the common property is a dispute to which the owners corporation, as trustee, is a stranger.
146 Furthermore, it is not the case in any event that the lot owners as tenants in common of the common property would be entitled at any time to enjoy the use of that property equally or in the proportion of their unit entitlements or to the extent necessary for them to carry out a particular use of their lot: Platt v Ciriello [1998] 2 Qd R 417 at 432 per Ambrose J. As indicated above, a lot owner cannot be excluded from the common property, but the owner is not entitled to require the owners corporation in its capacity as a trustee to provide the owners with any particular share of the common property (subject only to the owner's ability to obtain exclusive use rights pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of ss 51 and 52 of the 1996 Act).
147 For the foregoing reasons, Dr Thoo's case stands or falls on the application of s 62(2) of the 1996 Act. It gains no foothold against the Owners Corporation outside its statutory remit. In any case, as stated at [142] above, in my view Dr Thoo's case based on his alleged equitable right to access the MEVS and to require the Owners Corporation to upgrade the system to meet his reasonable needs would be trumped by a valid resolution passed pursuant to s 62(3). It is to that issue that I now turn.
13Barrett JA concurred with Tobias AJA, but added:
20 A statute may cause property to be held upon trust, including "trusts unlike any previously known" and which "cannot be held invalid on the ground of perpetuity or any other ground": Re Christchurch Inclosure Act (1888) 38 Ch D 520 at 530. In the present context, it is the statutory designation of the owners corporation as an "agent" holding the common property "on behalf of" the lot owners that leads to the conclusion that an owners corporation is a trustee.
21 That designation is made in a statute that imposes positive duties with respect to the trust property but says little about prohibitions. The prohibitions are left to be derived mainly from the fiduciary quality of the relationship that the Act creates between the corporation and the lot owners. The relationship imports, by necessary implication, the proscriptive duties of fiduciaries but creates no basis for the imposition of prescriptive duties independent of those the legislation creates.
14From the above can be distilled the following relevant propositions. (1) An owners corporation holds the common property upon trust for the lot owners as equitable tenants-in-common pro rata to their unit holdings. (2) As a trustee, the owners corporation has, as well as its statutory duties, certain general law duties of a trustee, which complement and do not modify its statutory duties. (3) Those general law duties do not include duties to act in any positive way, but are negative duties: not to profit or benefit from the trust, not to prefer its own interests, not to allow its own interests to come into conflict with those of the beneficiaries, not to impeach the title of the beneficiaries, not to depart from the terms of the trust and not to delegate the trust except as permitted by its terms. (4) The circumstance that the lot owners have equitable interests as tenants in common of the common property does not of itself impose any duty upon the owners corporation, but has significance only as among the owners themselves; their rights against the trustee and the obligations the trustee owes to them derive from the trust and the relationship of trustee and beneficiary.
15What Tobias AJA explains, in substance, is that while the owners corporation is a trustee of the common property, it is a bare trustee, without active duties to perform in that capacity. While it would be a breach of trust for it to deal with the trust property inconsistently with its trust status, qua trustee it has no positive obligations in respect of the property. The statutory obligation to maintain common property under s 62 is not a term of the trust, and no breach of trust is involved in breaching that duty.
16It follows that no departure from the terms of the trust is involved in failing to maintain the common property as required by s 62. That way of putting the proposed equitable claim amounts to no more than a contention, irreconcilable with the proposition in Thoo that the statutory trust imposes no positive duties and cannot modify the statutory duties, that s 62 is a term of the trust. Insofar as the proposed equitable claim relies on departure from the terms of the trust by failing to maintain the common property, it is untenable.
17Moreover, the proposed "preference of its own interest" and "conflict of interest" cases confuse the limited trustee obligations of an owners corporation with its statutory obligations. Its purely negative trustee obligations, such as they are, are concerned with its function as legal owner of the common property, and do not extend to its maintenance (which is a non-trust, statutory obligation). By way of illustration, it would be a breach of trust for an owners corporation to sell - or mortgage - common property for its own benefit and contrary to the interests of the lot owners. But the lot owners have no equitable right to enforce s 62. As no breach of trust is involved in failing to maintain trust property (although in breach of s 62), it cannot be a breach of trust to delay or defer such maintenance, and in deciding to do so - for whatever reason - the owners corporation does not prefer its own interest to those of the lot holders qua beneficiaries. Because maintenance of the property is not an aspect of the owners corporation's trust obligations, there is no conflict of interest, in its trustee capacity, in deferring doing so.
18The proposed equitable claim seeks to erect a claim for equitable compensation on a breach of s 62 by colouring it as a breach of trust, either simpliciter (insofar as the claim relies on a departure from the trust), or as a conflict of interest. But s 62 is not a term of the (purely negative) trust; it is not a trust obligation and gives rise to no corresponding equitable right in Ms McDonough. The proposed claim identifies no conflict with any equitable interest of Ms McDonough (the s 62 obligation not being an equitable obligation), or with the owners corporation's duty as trustee.
19The proposed equitable claim is untenable, and an amendment to add it claim would therefore be refused.