Disposition
18 The principles governing the grant of interlocutory relief are well known and need not be repeated: see Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [19], [65]-[72]; Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622-623; Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 at 24; Australian Broadcasting Authority v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 at [9]-[15].
19 The applicant must show that he has a prima facie case, and that the balance of convenience favours the injunction being granted: O'Neill at [19]. Further, the claim to interlocutory relief must have sufficient connection to the final relief sought: Lenah Game Meats at [11]. I have determined the applicant does not satisfy these requirements.
20 While considering the applicant's claim for relief, I remain cognisant of his status as a self-represented litigant. However, I consider that there is no arguable case for relief before me.
21 The applicant contends that "[t]he decision by the officer of the Department not to refer the request to the Minister of 12 July 2021 in purported compliance with the Minister's guidelines on Ministerial powers (s 351, s 417 and s 501J) (11 March 2016) exceeded the executive power of the Commonwealth following Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 10". Further, the applicant seeks the substantive relief in his application to "[c]onsider applicants [sic] ministerial intervention request as per guidelines".
22 The reference to Davis is misconceived. The letter to Mr Marya dated 7 July 2021 from the Department shows that his request for ministerial intervention was personally considered by the Minister, who declined to exercise his power to intervene. As the respondent submitted both in writing and orally, no comparison to Davis can be properly made as the facts do not arise in the present case.
23 Further, the interlocutory relief sought by the applicant does not have the requisite connection to the substantive relief sought. As noted by counsel for the Minister, an outstanding application for ministerial intervention does not prohibit the Department from removing an individual pursuant to s 198(5) of the Act. Even if the substantive relief was granted by the Court at a future date, the applicant would not have a basis to avoid removal and would have no legal right to remain in Australia. The Minister's obligation under s 198(5) to remove an unlawful non-citizen persists despite any unresolved application for ministerial intervention. Regardless, there is no evidence before me that any such outstanding application exists. As such, I am not satisfied that the applicant has an arguable case to be tried.
24 Although counsel for the Minister submitted the interlocutory application should be dismissed on the strength of the Minister's submissions on the applicant's prima facie case, for completeness I now turn to considering the balance of convenience question.
25 I have carefully considered the consequences of the refusal of Mr Marya's application. His wife and two children are currently living in the community and his removal will impact them greatly. Mr Marya made oral submissions at the hearing to this effect. He also stated that he intended to make an application for a parent visa as his Australian citizen children were both minors, but was still attempting to obtain the funds for the $8000 application fee.
26 However, as noted above, Mr Marya has no right to remain in Australia even if his substantive relief was granted. He has previously made an unsuccessful application for a protection visa, which was ultimately dismissed in the Federal Circuit Court in 2011 according to the Departmental records annexed to the first affidavit of Mr Cunynghame. Mr Marya has claimed he intends to file an application for a parent visa. However, s 195(2) makes clear that a detainee, whilst detained and after 2 working days since the commencement of detention, cannot apply for any visa other than a bridging visa or a protection visa. It would appear, therefore, that any such application would be invalid.
27 There are no further avenues for relief available to the applicant. This weighs heavily in the balance of convenience, as any granting of injunctive relief would only delay the inevitable. It is in the public interest to ensure the statutory scheme is enforced.
28 Finally, the evidence shows the applicant was given notice of his impending removal on 19 April 2023, and thus was not devoid of the opportunity to seek legal advice before lodging his application on 4 May 2023: cf. ABAR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 363 at [31]-[35].
29 As such, I have determined that the balance of convenience weighs against the applicant. As I have also found that no prima facie case exists, the application for interim relief is unsuccessful.
I certify that the preceding twenty-nine (29) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Rofe.