THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES
12 The Liquidators sought orders under ss 90-15 and 60-10 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) (the IPS) appointing Mr Clout as a special purpose liquidator and approving his remuneration.
13 Section 90-15 of the IPS confers power on the Court to "make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the external administration of a company". It relevantly provides:
Court may make orders
(1) The Court may make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the external administration of a company.
Orders on own initiative or on application
(2) The Court may exercise the power under subsection (1):
(a) on its own initiative, during proceedings before the Court; or
(b) on application under section 90-20.
Examples of orders that may be made
(3) Without limiting subsection (1), those orders may include any one or more of the following:
(a) an order determining any question arising in the external administration of the company;
(b) an order that a person cease to be the external administrator of the company;
(c) an order that another registered liquidator be appointed as the external administrator of the company;
(d) an order in relation to the costs of an action (including court action) taken by the external administrator of the company or another person in relation to the external administration of the company;
(e) an order in relation to any loss that the company has sustained because of a breach of duty by the external administrator;
(f) an order in relation to remuneration, including an order requiring a person to repay to a company, or the creditors of a company, remuneration paid to the person as external administrator of the company.
14 A company is taken to be under "external administration" if a liquidator has been appointed to it (s 5-15(c)). Under s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), an "officer of the company" includes a liquidator. The Liquidators therefore had standing to apply under s 90-20(1)(d) of the IPS.
15 The breadth of the power in s 90-15 and some of its constraints were explained by Farrell J in GDK Projects Pty Ltd, Re Umberto Pty Ltd (in liq) v Umberto Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] FCA 541 (GDK) as follows (at [33]):
Despite the breadth of the power conferred by s 90-15(1), it is difficult to envisage circumstances where the power would be exercised if the Court could not be satisfied that it would be just and unless the applicant had demonstrated sufficient utility to the external administration.
16 Special purpose liquidators are most commonly appointed where a liquidator is prevented from undertaking investigations due to an actual, or perceived, conflict and where it is useful and just that certain matters be investigated by a different liquidator (see In the matter of Aus Streaming (In Liq) [2020] VSC 313 at [44]). This application falls into the former category.
17 As liquidators of both companies, the Liquidators would be required to submit the Wynyard Proof of Debt and adjudicate on its merits and priority in determining whether it ought to be admitted. In adjudicating on a proof of debt, liquidators act in a quasi-judicial capacity according to standards no less than that of a court (see Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O'Brien (1990) 169 CLR 332 at 338-339 per Brennan and Dawson JJ). Adjudicating the Wynyard Proof of Debt would therefore be inconsistent with the Liquidators' obligations to act in that capacity, as well as their fiduciary duties to each defendant company.
18 The three options available to the Court to resolve that conflict are summarised at [4] above.
19 The first option is for the Court to appoint a special purpose liquidator for the sole purpose of determining the issue which has given rise to the conflict. In doing so, the Court ought to have regard to the utility of that course. Where the appointment is sought by a creditor for the purpose of pursuing a claim that the existing liquidator is unwilling to pursue, the courts have identified several factors to be considered. While this proceeding has not been brought by a creditor, I consider the factors identified provide useful guidance in this instance. Those factors are:
(a) whether the plaintiff has identified with specificity the "special purpose" for which the appointment is sought;
(b) whether the appointment of a special purpose liquidator would ensure that "confidence in the integrity, objectivity and impartiality of the administration is maintained";
(c) whether the special purpose is "substantial and serious"; and
(d) the public interest.
See variously Melhelm Pty Ltd, in the matter of Boka Beverages Pty Ltd (in liq) v Boka Beverages Pty Ltd (in liq) (2019) 138 ACSR 95; [2019] FCA 1184 at [58]; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, in the matter of Italian Prestige Jewellery Pty Ltd (In Liq) ACN 116 031 022 v Italian Prestige Jewellery Pty Limited (2018) 129 ACSR 115; [2018] FCA 983 (Italian Prestige) at [39]; Williams & Kersten Pty Ltd v Walton Construction (Qld) Pty Ltd (in liq), in the matter of Walton Construction (Qld) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2019] FCA 1201 at [22] and [27]; and GDK.
20 The second option requires the Court to make a declaration that it is proper for the liquidator to determine the issue notwithstanding any conflict. In Sakr, Griffiths J made orders declaring the existing liquidator would be acting properly in admitting a contentious proof of debt, observing (at [19]):
I accept the plaintiff's submission that the relief he seeks does not concern a merely business or commercial decision, and it is plainly to the advantage to the liquidation of Sakr Family. There is no suggestion in the material available to Mr Warner that the Sakr Family Debt is anything other than a legitimate transaction nor has any creditor of Sakr Family objected to the proposed orders. The Court is satisfied that the appointment of a special purpose liquidator would generate an unwarranted additional burden on creditors. For this reason, the Court accepts the plaintiff's submission that that alternative option of appointing a special purpose liquidator is not to be preferred.
21 The third option is for the Court to replace the conflicted liquidator with another liquidator who would not be subject to the same conflict. However, this option is not without difficulties. In McGrath & Anor re HIH Insurance Ltd & Ors [2006] NSWSC 385, Barrett J decided it would be impractical and cost-ineffective to remove the existing liquidators in those circumstances. Relevantly, his Honour observed (at [11]):
… One possibility, of course, is that the existing liquidators, upon encountering such a situation of conflict, should vacate the field. But that would be highly counterproductive in a case such as the present where application and experience over a period of more than five years has put the existing liquidators in a position of special knowledge that it would be very expensive indeed to replicate in the mind of some new liquidator, assuming that replication were possible at all. The much preferable course is that there be an additional liquidator who can take charge of and administer the separate aspect of the winding up giving rise to the conflict difficulty.