The frauds
18 The facts were not in dispute and were the subject of an agreed statement that was tendered in the District Court. The following account is largely taken from the learned sentencing judge's reasons for sentence.
19 The fraudulent scheme comprised, in general terms, the following elements. The applicant, operating with a number of other members of a syndicate situated in various overseas countries, created various fraudulent transactions that culminated in the intended victim being manipulated into making contact with the applicant who was "the Australian clearing house" for the processing of funds. The applicant used the business identity NM Finance Network. By the time the victims were asked to contact the applicant they had usually been supplied with false Nigerian government documents, emails and faxes and other information from fictitious security companies, in effect undertaking to make substantial payments to the victims by secure means. Of course, the proposed payments were fictitious and simply provided the bait by which the victims were induced to pay moneys for fictitious services or certificates claimed by the fraudsters to be necessary before the very substantial promised funds could be forwarded. The victims were supplied with details of the moneys that they were to receive or which the company "identity" wished them to invest. Most of the victims were international business people for whom offshore business dealings would not be unusual.
20 Before being contacted by the victims, the applicant typically spoke by telephone with his African accomplices and discussed the amounts to be extracted from each victim and the false names the applicant would use to identify himself to each particular victim. The applicant then, in his own words, "sizzles the mugu's minds" (mugu being a term used by the syndicate to refer to victims), leading them to believe that NM Finance Network was a legitimate money handling company and that, in order to receive the substantial sum to be paid to them, the victims must pay fees into the applicant's personal or business accounts for various preliminary services or documents. When the funds were paid, the account would be cleared by the applicant and part of the proceeds of the fraud returned to the applicant's accomplice or accomplices. The victim would then be informed that the money he was expecting was no longer available.
21 The scale of the applicant's involvement in the various frauds can be gauged by observing that, between early September 2003 and mid October 2003, about 4700 call activations were intercepted from the applicant's mobile, fax and landlines, most of which involved communications with unknown African males aspiring to defraud prospective victims.
22 A number of the offences did not go far because of the intervention of police and two of them were a result of altogether different dishonest acts. Thus, charge 9 arose from the provision by a financier of $720,000 to purchase a home for the applicant and his wife in Cecil Hills for $900,000. The loan application falsely asserted that the applicant was lawfully employed, the incomes stipulated in the attached tax returns considerably overstated his income and were in fact never submitted to the Australian Tax Office, the tax agent details on the returns were fictional and NM Finance Network, the assets and liabilities statement for which was relied on, had as its the business the undertaking of frauds. The property was sold some time after the applicant's arrest (although the date of sale was not disclosed) and realised only $610,000, resulting in a substantial loss for the financier.
23 Charge 8 concerned the provision of a telephone account and internet services at the Cecil Hills property using a false name. Considered as an offence under s178BB of the Crimes Act 1900, this was relatively trivial.
24 Although a number of the potential victims of the main fraudulent scheme conducted by the applicant were contacted by police and informed of the true nature of the proposed transaction before any monies were passed to the fraudsters, some of the victims lost substantial amounts of money. For example, the victim in one of the conspiracy to cheat and defraud offences (referred to as KJ by the learned sentencing judge) spent substantial funds travelling to South Africa to meet with one of the applicant's accomplices to discuss a proposed investment. That accomplice did not go to the meeting: it was of the essence of the scheme that none of the fraudsters actually met any of the victims. The victim in charge 7 was a Japanese resident, YS, who paid NM Finance Network a total of $3,375 for "clearance charges", and "anti terrorist certificate" and "a processing fee". All these requirements were of course entirely fictitious.
25 One of the most successful of the scams was that which comprised charge 6 under s178BA. The victim, L, was an owner and director of a trading company in the Middle East. In early January 2003 L received a fax from a Mr Tito Mboweni, purporting to be the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, stating that he had been advised by the President of Nigeria to appoint payment contracts for the amount of $28 million for the maintenance and supply of equipment to oil refineries in Nigeria. The fax indicated that L was to be appointed one such contract and that he should contact Mboweni. When L did so, he was advised that he should open an account with the Reserve Bank of South Africa at a cost of $3,000. This was confirmed by a fax from a person purporting to be a Mr Jones from the National Australia Bank in Australia. Jones was in fact the applicant. Jones also instructed L that the funds would be cleared through his bank to L's bank account in Spain and told him to deposit the $3,000 into an account with the St George Bank under the applicant's real name, Nick Marinellis. L did so. Further conversations occurred in April and L was induced to pay "an account validation charge" of $1,000 to one Kingsly Ukasognya in South Africa. L was now on the hook. In a further conversation with Mboweni occurring shortly afterwards, L was induced to pay a further $13,550 in various fees and charges to Ukasognya. A few weeks later Mboweni told L that the contract payment was now transferred to "the South African Reserve Bank Clearing House in Australia", said to be the National Australia Bank. Of course all of this was a fiction. L then contacted Jones who, as I have mentioned, pretended to be an employee of the bank. Jones induced L to pay a transfer fee of $3,000, again to his real name account, telling L that Marinellis was the St George Bank's agent for Nigerian contracts. On 4, 6, 11 and 12 June the applicant, posing as Jones, sent L faxes requesting respectively $28,000, $56,000, $71,000 and $60,000 for various transfers, orders and processing requirements. L accordingly made these payments. On 17 June L received a further fax from "the Presidential Panel of the Federal Republic of Nigeria" requesting a further payment of $35,000. L contacted the applicant (Jones) about this payment and was told it was necessary and arranged to transfer the funds to the applicant's St George Bank account. On 19 June, L received a fax from NM Finance seeking the further payment of $120,000 and lastly applicable for the release of the contract payment. The fee was said to be for a "payment release pin code" to be used for accessing relevant bank accounts. L duly deposited the money into the bank account of NM Finance with the Wespac Bank. On 26 June 2003, pursuant to another fax (this time from the "Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation"), a further payment of $85,000 was sought for a fund transfer clearance to be made to a bank in Hong Kong. L contacted the applicant (Jones) about the payment and was told that the account belonged to Marinellis and L then arranged for the transfer of the money as requested. Eventually, on 4 September L contacted the applicant and asked about the $28 million. The applicant informed him that the money could not be received unless a further payment of $280,000 was made. L at last refused to pay any further money. He had been defrauded of over of $475,000.
26 Charge 11 under s178BA again had its inception in an approach to the victim purporting to be made on behalf of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. Again the applicant, using a false name (Smith), pretended to be an employee of the National Australia Bank in charge of overseas payments with particular reference to the Central Bank of Nigeria. The victim was called by one of the applicant's accomplices seeking $215,000 for transferring a promised $21.5 million into the victim's account. Various successive discussions occurred, plainly with the connivance of the applicant, which in the result caused the victim to provide documentation concerning a property owned by him. This documentation enabled the applicant to induce UK solicitors to arrange for the management of the property and provide the applicant with a rent of about 1,000 pounds a week.
27 Because of timely warnings by the police, none of the victims of the conspiracy charges paid over any money (with the exception of KJ who incurred travel costs). Nevertheless, the true criminality of these offences is shown by the frauds which the applicant successfully (to some extent or other) undertook.