Mann v Mann

Mann v Mann - [1957] HCA 68 - HCA 1957 case summary — Zoe

[5]

The husband was discharged from the Navy in February 1955. He and his wife were then still living at the Eight Mile. He started to work for Allmich in order to learn the trade of an auto-electrician. The plaintiff went south for a holiday of about a month in June 1955. While she was away her husband boarded with the Allmichs, sleeping in a bed in their kitchen. When she returned her husband suggested that she should live with her parents while he continued to live with the Allmichs. But she would not agree and her husband returned to the hut at the Eight Mile. It seems apparent enough from the evidence that before the plaintiff went south their marriage was drifting towards the rocks due to the fact that her husband neglected her and preferred to spend most of his time with the Allmichs. Rumours were rife and were reaching her as to his relations with Mrs. Allmich. After the plaintiff returned to Darwin her husband promised to mend his ways and spend his spare time at home. He spent the first three evenings with her but after that resumed his old habits. In October 1955, the Manns returned to live at Winnellie, this time in a hut not forming part of the row of three huts already mentioned but situated only about one hundred and fifty yards away. In March 1956 the Valentine McGuinness incident occurred of which more will be said later. On the evening of 17th April 1956 the plaintiff, who was becoming more and more disturbed by the manner in which her husband was neglecting her and spending his time with the Allmichs, walked across to the Allmichs' hut on three occasions. On the first two occasions she heard her husband quarrelling with Mrs. Allmich in the kitchen and returned to her home. But her husband did not return and about 10.00 p.m. she went back a third time. Finding that the kitchen door was locked, she peeped through the hole in the wall into the bedroom and saw her husband embracing Mrs. Allmich. After an unpleasant scene between the three of them, in which the husband said he had only patted Mrs. Allmich on the back to stop her coughing, the plaintiff returned to her hut and her husband returned a little later. She told him that he would have to stop going over to the Allmichs' and that if he did she would try to make a go of the marriage and he promised that he would stop doing so. But he continued to go there nevertheless and she told him that if it continued she would leave him. About this time she took a job at the Star Milk Bar in Darwin. On 29th April she returned from work somewhat late, having been to a party on the way home, and there was a row in the course of which her husband, besides insulting her by accusing her "of lying in bed with the Greeks" and frightening her by what he described as a display of black magic, twisted her arm and would not let her get into their bed. As a result she started packing her things, later slept in another bed and left next morning with the children. She had at this time two children and was expecting another child in the following January.

[6]

The plaintiff and both the defendants gave evidence. The defendants denied that adultery or any lesser acts of familiarity or any kissing or embracing had ever occurred between them. His Honour said that he regarded the plaintiff as an honest and truthful witness but that neither of the defendants made a favourable impression upon him. The plaintiff's evidence does not take the case very far. It is to the effect that at least from the time of the defendant's discharge from the Navy he was neglecting her, never taking her out, spending most of his time away from home, and only returning late at night. His Honour said that the plaintiff believed, probably correctly, that most of the evenings he spent away from home were spent with the co-defendant. But the plaintiff's case does not rest on her own evidence. It rests mainly on the evidence of neighbours of the Allmichs. His Honour thought that these witnesses, except Mrs. Vincent McGuinness (a white woman married to the brother of Valentine McGuinness who is a half-caste), were obviously biassed against the Allmichs because they were Germans. It is also clear that Valentine McGuinness is a youth of very low character and that Mrs. Saxby has not the best of reputations. But his Honour took all these matters into account before deciding, as he did, to accept the evidence of these witnesses to a very substantial extent. And, whatever their repute may be, it is difficult to understand why these witnesses should want to give false evidence just to vent their spite upon the Allmichs. Their evidence, if it can be fully accepted, is quite decisive. The witness Valentine McGuinness swore that at about 9.00 p.m. one night in March 1956 he peeped through the hole in Mrs. Allmich's bedroom and witnessed Mann and Mrs. Allmich in the very act of adultery of which he gave details. He was at the time living in the same hut as Mr. and Mrs. Vincent McGuinness and Mrs. McGuinness said that she saw him looking through the hole. His Honour must have been satisfied that he was doing so because he said, speaking of this incident, "I believe that he did see something when he looked through a hole in the wall, but I do not believe that he was witness to an act of adultery". At least McGuinness must have seen Mann and Mrs. Allmich in the bedroom together and the "something" that he saw must have been very suggestive because he promptly went to the Eight Mile to tell Mrs. Mann and he must have been confident that Mann would not be home for some time because, when he found her in bed, he tried to get into bed with her but was repulsed and was subsequently summoned for indecent assault.

[7]

It is difficult to understand what his Honour meant by this finding because one would have thought that he would have accepted McGuinness' evidence completely or rejected it completely. Be that as it may his evidence at least proves that Mann was in the bedroom with Mrs. Allmich in compromising circumstances. McGuinness was cross-examined to show that he was a person whose evidence could only be worthless but no effort was made in cross-examination to break down the detailed evidence he gave of what he saw or to prove that he was exaggerating. Then there is the evidence of the three witnesses Mrs. McGuinness, Mrs. Saxby and Mrs. Wright. Mrs. McGuinness lived in one of the huts next door to the Allmichs from February or March 1956 onwards. She said that she saw Mann and Mrs. Allmich kissing and embracing on many occasions, and that this often took place at night. She said that she saw them walking into the bedroom from the kitchen on many occasions. She could see this because the door of her kitchen was opposite to the door of Mrs. Allmich's kitchen. Mrs. Saxby another witness, who lived in the hut on the opposite side of the Allmichs' hut from August 1954 to November 1955, also said that she saw Mann and Mrs. Allmich kissing and embracing on many occasions. She said that she used to lie on the floor of her hut beside her baby in the afternoons whilst the baby was going to sleep and that she could see through the spaces beneath the walls of the two huts the feet of Mann and Mrs. Allmich in her bedroom and that their feet disappeared above these spaces indicating that they had got on to the bed at first with shoes and later after leaving their shoes on the floor. Of this evidence his Honour said that he doubted the correctness of the inference Mrs. Saxby drew from the disappearance of the feet because of the restricted view she had but that he did not doubt that she frequently saw male and female feet in the bedroom of the Allmich hut and that these feet were those of the defendant and co-defendant. The other witness was Mrs. Wright who lived in the hut later occupied by Mrs. McGuinness from early in 1955 or earlier until February 1956. She said that she frequently saw Mann and Mrs. Allmich kissing and embracing and that on one occasion after a passionate interlude she saw Mann carry her into the bedroom and over to the bed. Of this evidence his Honour said that he believed that Mrs. Wright saw something which might be interpreted as the defendant having picked up Mrs. Allmich but that he thought that the rest of the incident was an inference on her part and could not have been seen having regard to the position of the windows.

[8]

His Honour said that the evidence satisfied him that there was some substantial degree of affection between the defendant and the co-defendant which had reached the stage where the defendant and co-defendant kissed each other in the daytime under circumstances where they might easily be observed. His Honour also said that he was satisfied that there were many opportunities for the defendant and co-defendant to have committed adultery if they were so inclined, when the co-defendant's husband was at the pictures, as he frequently was, and the only other person in the house was a young child. His Honour also said "I believe it is quite probable that the defendant and co-defendant have committed adultery but I am not satisfied that this is the case". His Honour discussed the degree of proof required and decided that he should follow Briginshaw v. Briginshaw [1] , despite the statements in some of the English cases of which the most recent would appear to be that of the Court of Appeal in Galler v. Galler [2] (cited in Barnett v. Barnett [3] ; Knott v. Knott [4] ), that a charge of adultery had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The question of proof was recently reviewed in this Court in Watts v. Watts [5] when it was said that there was nothing in Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones [6] which required this Court to abandon the standard of proof laid down in Briginshaw v. Briginshaw [1] . To that opinion we adhere and we propose to continue to apply the standard of proof laid down in Briginshaw v. Briginshaw [1] unless and until that case is clearly overruled by the House of Lords or Privy Council. But we are unable to agree with his Honour that the evidence he accepted is insufficient to satisfy the Court that adultery had been committed. Where the question is, not what are the facts but what is the proper inference to be drawn from the facts proved, the appellate tribunal is no less competent to decide what these inferences should be than the judge who actually hears the case: Paterson v. Paterson [7] ; Benmax v. Austin Motor Co. Ltd. [8] . The evidence which his Honour accepted is clearly sufficient to establish (1) habitual neglect by Mann of his wife's company for that of Mrs. Allmich; (2) frequent kissing and embracing between Mann and Mrs. Allmich in the daytime and at night; (3) the frequent presence of Mann and Mrs. Allmich in her bedroom in the daytime and at night; (4) frequent absences from home by Allmich during the day and at night, in the course of which there was every opportunity for acts of affection and visits to the bedroom to take place. Then there is the evidence of Valentine McGuinness which it would seem impossible to accept at all without providing very strong evidence that he saw adultery being committed or acts from which it could only be inferred that it was about to be or had been committed.

[11]

With all respect to his Honour, neither of these factors should have prevented him from reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff had proved her case. So far as the first factor is concerned, there is no evidence that before 17th April the plaintiff, whatever her suspicions may have been, had seen any familiarity occurring between Mann and Mrs. Allmich. There had been the Valentine McGuinness incident but her husband had stoutly denied the truth of what she had been told and, if she did not accept his denial, she at least decided to give him the benefit of the doubt. They had only been married a short time, there were already two children and a third was expected, and there is no reason to believe that the plaintiff did not genuinely desire the marriage to continue if her husband would sever his relations with Mrs. Allmich. After the incident of 17th April, when the plaintiff for the first time saw the couple embracing, her attitude hardened. Sexual intercourse with her husband ceased and it was left to him to decide finally either to put an end to his relations with Mrs. Allmich or allow the marriage to break up. This reluctance on her part to act prematurely points not to her having no belief in adultery having taken place but to a desire to save the marriage if that was possible. There is no evidence that at that time she knew what Mrs. McGuinness, Mrs. Saxby and Mrs. Wright were prepared to say they had seen and indeed, in their respective cross-examinations, they each said that they were interviewed by the plaintiff's father and then only shortly before the hearing. As to the second factor, Allmich's belief or disbelief in his wife's fidelity should not have weighed with his Honour at all. His Honour was of course entitled to take into account, in weighing all the circumstances of the case, Allmich's evidence that he had not seen any familiarity between his wife and Mann. But this evidence was at most of a very negative character. Having decided, despite this evidence and the positive evidence of Mrs. Allmich and Mann to the contrary, that these familiarities were close and frequent, the fact that they were carefully hidden from Allmich tended if anything to prove that they were of a nature to which he would have strongly objected if he had known of them. The real crux of the case is to determine the degree of persuasion which should be induced by the evidence that his Honour accepted. This evidence is of a very compelling character. It is quite unequivocal. The difficulties in the way of watering down this evidence, particularly the evidence by Valentine McGuinness, have been mentioned. But even in its watered-down condition, one complexion and one complexion only can reasonably be placed upon this evidence, and that is that the defendants had a guilty passion for each other and that every opportunity existed for that passion's being consummated. The only fair and natural conclusion is that those opportunities were availed of and that adultery was committed. This conclusion derives some assistance from the rejection by his Honour of the evidence of Mrs. Allmich and Mann that they never kissed or embraced, that they were never in her bedroom together except on the one occasion when Mrs. Mann caught them there, and from Mann's hypocritical evidence that when he was boarding with the Allmichs he was always careful to go out if Allmich was not at home so that he and Mrs. Allmich would not be left alone in the hut with only the baby for a chaperon.

[12]

The learned trial judge, Kriewaldt J., has stated the evidence which he accepted in proof of the allegation of adultery; it is unnecessary for me to state it again. That evidence affords clear proof of the adultery alleged. There is nothing in the case to diminish its probative force. The judgment appealed from is, in my opinion, clearly against the evidence and the weight of evidence. In a proceeding under the ordinance of the Northern Territory relating to divorce and matrimonial causes, it is the duty of the court (where, as here, there is no absolute or discretionary bar), "upon being satisfied as to the existence of any ground" on which divorce is claimed, to grant the order. In respect of the standard of proof, the ordinance does not differentiate between adultery and any other ground. The proofs of the adultery alleged in this case, rested on a solid setting of circumstantial evidence, reinforced with direct evidence of habitual guilty association between the defendant and co-defendant. Besides, the learned judge did not believe their denials of adultery. He said in the course of the reasons for judgment that "it is quite probable they committed adultery", but that, having regard to "the gravity of the issues involved" in the allegation, he was unable to say that he was satisfied that adultery was committed. He added that with evidence of equal probative strength on an issue such as whether a small sum of money was not paid he would be satisfied that it was not. His Honour was, of course, right in making this distinction. However, the learned judge said that under the ordinance, the strict criminal standard of proof is not applicable to an allegation of adultery. I agree in that view. His Honour's ultimate conclusion is that he was not satisfied that a finding of adultery would be "true"; and for that reason he refused to make an order for divorce. With respect, I am of opinion that the satisfaction which the learned judge felt that he should have, is a higher state of certitude than being satisfied, upon the evidence, as to the existence of the ground on which divorce is claimed. It is the latter degree of certitude which s. 12 of the ordinance requires. What led the learned judge to decline to act upon the proofs of adultery which were adduced was the apparent disbelief of the present appellant and the co-defendant's husband that adultery was being committed. Such a consideration, if admissible, should not countervail to rebut the strong inferences of guilt to be drawn from the circumstantial and even more direct evidence that it had been in fact committed.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (12 paragraphs)

Parties

Cited By (1)