Direction under s 90-15
35 Section 90-15(1) of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), being Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides:
The Court may make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the external administration of a company.
36 By s 90-20(1)(a), a person with a financial interest in the external administration of the company may apply for an order under s 90-15. By s 90-15(2), the Court may also exercise the power under s 90-15(1) on its own initiative, during proceedings before the Court.
37 Manly Cabs is identified as a creditor of Sydney Taxis in the provisional liquidator's report. Accordingly, I am satisfied that Manly Cabs has a financial interest in the external administration of Sydney Taxis and may apply for an order under s 90-15.
38 In Kelly, in the matter of Halifax Investment Services Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (No 8) [2020] FCA 533 at [50] and following, I set out the following relevant principles:
[50] In Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20; Gordon J noted at [166]:
[T]he statutory framework for a liquidator to apply for directions has changed. Prior to its repeal and the enactment of the Insolvency Practice Schedule [being Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act], s 479(3) of the Corporations Act allowed a liquidator to apply to the court for directions in relation to a matter arising under a winding up. Section 90-15(1) of the Insolvency Practice Schedule now provides a source of power for the court to provide directions to liquidators, and relevantly provides that the court may make 'such orders as it thinks fit' in relation to the 'external administration' of a company.
[51] In using the language "such orders as it thinks fit", s 90-15(1) plainly confers a very broad power on the Court.
[52] In Ample Source International Ltd v Bonython Metals Group Pty Ltd (in liq), Re Bonython Metals Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 8) [2018] FCA 1614 at [88]-[92] , I set out the following matters concerning s 90-15:
[88] By s 90-20(1)(d) of the Insolvency Practice Schedule and the definition of "officer" in s 9 of the Act, a liquidator is a person who may apply for an order under s 90-15.
[89] The Court's supervisory powers under s 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule are arguably as broad, or broader than, its powers under the previous provision, being the former s 479(3) of the Act.
[90] Section 479(3) allowed a court-appointed liquidator to apply to the Court for directions in relation to a matter arising under a winding up. The function of a liquidator's application for directions under s 479(3) was to give the liquidator advice as to the proper course of action for him or her to take in the liquidation: Re MF Global Australia Ltd (in liq) [2012] NSWSC 994; (2012) 267 FLR 27 at [7].
[91] In Re Ansett Australia Ltd and Korda [2002] FCA 90; (2002) 115 FCR 409, Goldberg J explained at [44]:
When liquidators and administrators seek directions from the Court in relation to any decision they have made, or propose to make, or in relation to any conduct they have undertaken, or propose to undertake, they are not seeking to determine rights and liabilities arising out of particular transactions, but are rather seeking protection against claims that they have acted unreasonably or inappropriately or in breach of their duty in making the decision or undertaking the conduct. They can obtain that protection if they make full and fair disclosure of all relevant facts and circumstances to the Court. In Re G B Nathan & Co Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 674, McLelland J said at 679-680:
The historical antecedents of s 479(3) …, the terms of that subsection and the provisions of s 479 as a whole combine to lead to the conclusion that the only proper subject of a liquidator's application for directions is the manner in which the liquidator should act in carrying out his functions as such, and that the only binding effect of, or arising from, a direction given in pursuance of such an application (other than rendering the liquidator liable to appropriate sanctions if a direction in mandatory or prohibitory form is disobeyed) is that the liquidator, if he has made full and fair disclosure to the court of the material facts, will be protected from liability for any alleged breach of duty as liquidator to a creditor or contributory or to the company in respect of anything done by him in accordance with the direction.
…
Modern Australian authority confirms the view that s 479(3) 'does not enable the court to make binding orders in the nature of judgments' and that the function of a liquidator's application for directions 'is to give him advice as to his proper course of action in the liquidation; it is not to determine the rights and liabilities arising from the company's transactions before the liquidation': [cases cited omitted].
[92] At [65], Goldberg J concluded:
[T]he prevailing principle adopted by the courts, when asked by liquidators and administrators to give directions, is to refrain from doing so where the direction sought relates to the making and implementation of a business or commercial decision, either committed specifically to the liquidator or administrator or well within his or her discretion, in circumstances where there is no particular legal issue raised for consideration or attack on the propriety or reasonableness of the decision in respect of which the directions are sought. There must be something more than the making of a business or commercial decision before a court will give directions in relation to, or approving of, the decision. It may be a legal issue of substance or procedure, it may be an issue of power, propriety or reasonableness, but some issue of this nature is required to be raised. It is insufficient to attract an order giving directions that the liquidator or administrator has a feeling of apprehension or unease about the business decision made and wants reassurance. There must be some issue which arises in relation to the decision. A court should not give its imprimatur to a business decision simply to alleviate a liquidator's or administrator's unease. There must be an issue calling for the exercise of legal judgment.
[53] In S & D International v MIG Property Services [2010] VSC 336; (2010) 79 ACSR 373, Warren CJ approved the liquidator's compromise of legal proceedings involving competing claims over a property held on trust, exercising the power then conferred by s 511 of the Corporations Act. At [17], her Honour described the case as one that "dealt with the risk attendant upon a conscientious liquidator in an acrimonious liquidation environment" and considered that s 511 orders may have utility to protect liquidators "where such protection would be just and beneficial to advancing the liquidation process as a whole".
[54] At [18], her Honour referred to the following observation of Mansfield J in Re Corporations Law; v Addstone Pty Ltd (in liq) [1997] FCA 1043; (1997) 25 ACSR 357 at 363:
While the court may be reluctant to give directions when purely commercial considerations are relevant to the liquidator's decision, even in relation to the conduct of litigation, there will be circumstances where it is or may be appropriate to do so. One of those circumstances may be where the liquidator's proposed decision is the subject of criticism by a particular creditor or creditors as being unreasonable or mala fides.
[55] At [23], Warren CJ concluded that the liquidator had made a reasonable commercial decision in good faith when entering into the relevant settlement deed, on the facts before her Honour. At [24], her Honour considered that something more was needed to justify an order pursuant to s 511. Her Honour concluded that the history of the dispute gave rise to a well-founded fear in the liquidator that he may be the subject of claims, and that fear may preclude the settlement money being received to the detriment of creditors. Her Honour considered that the circumstances were unusual enough to warrant the grant of the protection sought.
[56] In Re One.Tel Ltd and ors [2014] NSWSC 457; (2014) 99 ACSR 247 at [35], Brereton J noted the need for caution in making a direction, saying:
But the fact that a direction under s 511 - unlike an approval under s 477(2A) or (2B) - exonerates the liquidator from personal liability, means that a closer examination of the liquidator's decision is required than under s 477. In short, the court should not make a direction the effect of which is to exonerate the liquidator from personal liability in respect of a commercial judgment that the liquidator is concerned may prove contentious, unless satisfied that the liquidator's decision is, in all the circumstances, a proper one.
[57] In that case, the relevant direction concerned entry into a deed of settlement which, Brereton J concluded (at [49]), was a decision involving both the exercise of legal judgment and commercial judgment.
[58] In Re KSK Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2019] NSWSC 1463 at [18], Rees J explained:
The Court may give directions where it will be "of advantage in the liquidation": Dean-Wilcox v Soluble Solution Hydroponics Pty Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 209 at 212; (1997) 24 ACSR 79 at 81. The Court will not generally give a direction where the matter relates to the making or implementation of a business or commercial decision or when no legal issue is raised, or where there is no attack on the propriety or reasonableness of the liquidator's decision, but it may do so where there is the prospect of such an attack: Re Steel Distribution Pty Litd (in liq) (recs and mgrs apptd) [2013] NSWSC 669 at [20] per Black J; Re Dungowan Manly Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 1083 at [17].