The transcript of the proceedings in the District Court in the present case discloses that the learned trial judge made no express reference to the provisions of s. 105 of the District Courts Act in imposing the fine of $100 "for contempt of Court". Nor did his Honour make any attempt to identify the particular statutory offence with which the appellant was charged. His Honour made clear that the conduct which, in his view, constituted contempt of court was the appellant's answer "NO, I won't", to his Honour's remark, "Will you keep quiet while I am speaking?" One can only speculate about which, if any, of the statutory offences created by s. 105 might have been identified by the learned trial judge if he had made express reference to the provisions of that section. As Carter J. pointed out in the Full Court of the Supreme Court, it is arguable that the appellant's conduct constituted the offence of wilfully insulting the learned trial judge (s. 105(1)(a)) or the offence of wilfully misbehaving himself in the District Court (s. 105(1)(b)) or the offence of disobeying, without lawful excuse, a lawful order or direction of the District Court at the hearing of any proceeding (s. 105(1)(d)). Alternatively, it may be arguable (although not suggested in the judgments in the Full Court or in argument in this Court) that the conduct did not fall within any of the particular provisions of s. 105(1) but constituted some "other" act or thing which was a contempt of the District Court and, therefore, constituted the statutory offence created by s. 105(3). It may well be that the appellant, if charged with a specific offence under s. 105(1), may have wished to submit that one or other of the elements of that specific offence was not present (e.g. that any insult to the learned trial judge was not wilful or that any refusal to obey a lawful direction was not without lawful excuse). Be that as it may, the failure of the learned trial judge to identify the particular offence alleged against the appellant had the result that the appellant was not properly charged with a particular identified offence and thus was not accorded an adequate opportunity of defending himself against a charge that he was guilty of the offence for which he was fined. Indeed, in the circumstances of the present case, the failure of the learned trial judge to specify the particular offence with which the appellant was charged has resulted in a situation where, even at this stage, it is impossible to identify what that particular offence was. It follows that the order that the appellant be fined $100 for contempt of court cannot be allowed to stand.