RELIEF UNDER SECTION 293
40 When considering whether or not to grant relief pursuant to subs 293(1)(a) of the PPS Act, the Court must take into account the following matters prescribed by subs 293(3):
(3) In making an order to extend a period under subsection (1), the court must take into account the following:
(a) whether the need to extend the period arises as a result of an accident, inadvertence or some other sufficient cause;
(b) whether extending the period would prejudice the position of any other secured parties or other creditors;
(c) whether any person has acted, or not acted, in reliance on the period having ended.
41 In respect of what constitutes "accident" or "inadvertence" for the purposes of subs 293(3)(a) of the PPS Act, it has been recognised that the concept of accident or inadvertence for the purposes of s 588FM of the Corporations Act is the same as that for the purposes of subs 293(3)(a) of the PPS Act: see Re Accolade Wines Australia Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1023 at [26] (Brereton J); Re Duke Contracting Australia Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 767 at [12] (Brereton J); In the matter of 4 in 1 Wyoming Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 407 at [63] (Gleeson JA).
42 Having regard to the findings I have already made, I am also satisfied for the purpose of subs 293(1)(a) that time should be extended on the basis that there has been inadvertence or other sufficient cause. That is because, as noted above, there was inadvertence as to whether the interests should also be registered as against the ABN of the LEQ2 Unit Trust.
43 I am also satisfied that there is no relevant prejudice. Under the PPS Act, a PMSI holder ordinarily has the benefit of priority as against competing perfected security interests in the same collateral, in accordance with subs 62(1), irrespective of a competing security interest holder's awareness, consent or otherwise in respect of the grant of the PMSI, provided that subs 62(2) or subs 62(3), as the case may be, has been complied with.
44 The concept of prejudice was explained in Re Appleyard, in the context of an application pursuant to s 588FM of the Corporations Act, as follows by Brereton J at [30]:
… The type of prejudice that is of particular relevance is prejudice attributable to the delay in registration, rather than prejudice from making the order (which is inevitable). This is the type of prejudice contemplated the legislation (see s 588FM(2)(a)(ii), which refers to prejudice from the failure to register earlier, not from making the order), and referred to by Buckley J in Cardiff Workmen's Cottage Co; by Long Innes J in Limited Company (see also Flinders Trading Co at ACLR 225 per Bray CJ; at ACLR 234 per Mitchell J); and by McLelland J in Guardian Securities (at 98).
45 In Re Accolade Wines, Brereton J considered "prejudice" for the purpose of subs 293(3)(b) of the PPS Act and held at [27] that:
… the prejudice referred to in s 293(3)(b) is prejudice from "extending the period". This directs attention not to the impact on other secured parties or creditors of the delay in registration, but to the impact of making an order extending the period; to evaluate prejudice for that purpose, one compares the position of creditors if an extension is granted, with their position if no extension is granted, and usually there will be a difference because priorities will be disturbed.
46 In respect of potentially competing security interests taken in the form of an AllPAP security interest, in Re Accolade Wines, Brereton J held as follows at [52]:
In circumstances where:
(1) there was a registration, which was recorded on the PPSR, albeit a defective one because it was against the Grantors' ABN, not ACN;
(2) the PMSIs are each in respect only of the specific collateral to which the relevant lease relates;
(3) an AllPAP is always liable to be trumped, in respect of specific after-acquired collateral, by a PMSI in respect of that collateral;
(4) to the extent that an Earlier AllPAP holder will be prejudiced, it is only by losing a windfall arising from inadvertence;
(5) it is very likely that any Later AllPAP holder in fact had notice of the Plaintiffs' PMSI when acquiring its security interest; and in any event, notice that there was an earlier PMSI in respect of specific collateral is unlikely to have been material to its decision to provide financial accommodation and take the AllPAP security.
I am satisfied, on the material now before the Court, that it is just and equitable to make an order extending the number of business days in the period specified in paragraph 62(3)(b) for the perfection by registration of the Plaintiffs' PMSIs. Moreover, the case for an extension is sufficiently compelling that it is not unreasonable that the forensic burden of moving the Court to vary or set aside the extension be cast upon any of the AllPAP holders who might wish to contend that they will be unacceptably prejudiced by the extension.
47 In the present case, the Second to Fifth Defendants have been joined and have had the opportunity to raise and establish any prejudice. They have not done so despite having notice of the application. This being the case, I am satisfied that the "forensic burden" has not been discharged by any of the AllPAP security interest holders and there is no good reason not to grant of relief sought by the Plaintiff.
48 For the above reasons, I am satisfied that the each of the matters set out in subs 293(3) of the PPS Act are satisfied and relief pursuant to subs 293(1)(a) of the PPS Act should be granted.