A solicitor, Adrian Walmsley, seeks summary judgment against, or alternatively strikeout of the Amended Statement of Claim of, his former client, James Liascos.
Mr Liascos has commenced proceedings against Mr Walmsley. He seeks damages for negligence, breach of agreement and breach of fiduciary duties. The circumstances of the alleged negligence and breaches occurred in connection with litigation against Mr Liascos as one of four defendants for whom Mr Walmsley acted. Although 27 separate items of conduct constituting negligence and breach of agreement and three items of breach of fiduciary duty are alleged against Mr Walmsley in the Amended Statement of Claim, 13 were abandoned before me. Mr Liascos has summarised the 17 remaining items of conduct as representing two principal areas of complaint:
1. Mr Walmsley failed to advise Mr Liascos that he should be separately represented; and
2. Mr Walmsley failed to maintain or commence cross‑claims in the proceedings.
While there appear to be challenges that Mr Liascos faces in relation to both of these complaints on a number of grounds, for the purposes of this application Mr Walmsley relies principally on the advocate's immunity doctrine.
The principal authorities governing advocate's immunity include Giannarelli & Shulkes v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543, D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1 and Donnellan v Woodland [2012] NSWCA 433. I considered these decisions and others in Kendirjian v Lepore [2014] NSWDC 66 and stated, omitting references, that the immunity:
"includes work done out of court which leads to a decision affecting the conduct of a case in court…
[6] Controversies once resolved are not to be reopened except in a few narrowly defined circumstances…The principle of finality, although the rationale for the immunity, does not mean that the immunity only applies when there is a challenge to a judicial order. The immunity extends to claims for wasted costs in cases resolved by judicial order…Beazley JA [Donnellan v Woodland [2012] NSWCA 433 at [198]] stated:
'If the giving of advice, or the omission to give advice, led to a decision to continue with the case, or meant that the case was continued because of that omission, such conduct would lead to a decision affecting the conduct of the case in court, namely, its continuance by way of full argument before a judge.'
…
[18] It is not easy to identify any operative negligence by legal representatives in litigation that does not fall within the immunity as explained in Donnellan v Woodland.
[19] The very matter that establishes causation enlivens the immunity. If the negligence did not impact upon the decision of the court, then it was not causative of loss, so the immunity is unnecessary. But if it impacted upon the decision (whether by consent or after a trial), then it is also likely to have led 'to a decision affecting the conduct of the case in court', and is therefore within the immunity."
A recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Young v Hones [2014] NSWCA 337 does not alter the law established by the authorities above.
Advice about the need for separate representation and cross‑claims are matters leading to decisions affecting the conduct of a case in court and, accordingly, are within the immunity. Further, the immunity is from suit, not from negligence and, thus, is not avoided by the pleading of a breach of fiduciary duty; see D'Orta-Ekenaike at [26], Kendirjian at [32] to [34]. In my view, the complaints of Mr Liascos are intimately connected with the conduct of a case in court and fall comfortably within the immunity established by the authorities referred to above. It follows that the current claim cannot be maintained.
Mr Liascos, part way through the hearing of the notice of motion, made an application to adjourn the proceedings to enable him to amend his claim to plead a cause of action relying upon s 99 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. Section 99 provides:
"99 Liability of legal practitioner for unnecessary costs
(cf Act No 52 1970, section 76C; SCR Part 52A, rules 43 and 43A)
(1) This section applies if it appears to the court that costs have been incurred:
(a) by the serious neglect, serious incompetence or serious misconduct of a legal practitioner, or
(b) improperly, or without reasonable cause, in circumstances for which a legal practitioner is responsible.
(2) After giving the legal practitioner a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the court may do any one or more of the following:
(a) it may, by order, disallow the whole or any part of the costs in the proceedings:
(i) in the case of a barrister, as between the barrister and the instructing solicitor, or as between the barrister and the client, as the case requires, or
(ii) in the case of a solicitor, as between the solicitor and the client,
(b) it may, by order, direct the legal practitioner:
(i) in the case of a barrister, to pay to the instructing solicitor or client, or both, the whole or any part of any costs that the instructing solicitor or client, or both, have been ordered to pay to any other person, whether or not the solicitor or client has paid those costs, or
(ii) in the case of a solicitor, to pay to the client the whole or any part of any costs that the client has been ordered to pay to any other person, whether or not the client has paid those costs,
(c) it may, by order, direct the legal practitioner to indemnify any party (other than the client) against costs payable by that party.
(3) Before making such an order, the court may refer the matter to a costs assessor (within the meaning of Part 7 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014) for inquiry and report.
(4) The court may direct that notice of any proceedings or order under this section with respect to a legal practitioner be given:
(a) in the case of a barrister, to the instructing solicitor or client, or both, as the court may direct, or
(b) in the case of a solicitor, to the client.
(5) The court may give ancillary directions to give full effect to an order under this section, including directions to a legal practitioner to provide a bill of costs in assessable form:
(a) to the court, or
(b) to a party to the proceedings, or
(c) in the case of a barrister, to the instructing solicitor or client, or both, or
(d) in the case of a solicitor, to the client.
(6) A party's legal practitioner is not entitled to demand, recover or accept:
(a) in the case of a barrister, from the instructing solicitor or client, or
(b) in the case of a solicitor, from the client,
any part of the amount for which the legal practitioner is directed by the court to indemnify any party pursuant to an order referred to in subsection (2)(c).
(7) In this section, client includes former client."
As Mr Liascos did not abandon the basis of the currently pleaded claim, I refused the amendment as his proposed amendment did not relieve the Court of the need to determine the question raised by Mr Walmsley's notice of motion. However, the prospect of a claim under s 99 is something I have taken into account in formulating the appropriate orders.
In the misnumbered paragraph 17 on page 8 of the Amended Statement of Claim, omitting particulars, Mr Liascos alleges:
"17. By reason of the Defendants negligence, breach of the retainer and/or agreement [and/or] fiduciary duties owed to the Plaintiff the Plaintiff has suffered injury, loss and damage."
These actions cannot be maintained in the face of the immunity and I propose to make orders that paragraph 17 be struck out pursuant to r 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. I note that allegations of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty may be relevant to "serious neglect, serious incompetence or serious misconduct" referred to in s 99 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, however, many of these allegations contained in pages 6 to 8 of the Amended Statement of Claim have been abandoned informally before me and those that remain are not connected to an appropriate cause of action.
Further, some of the references in the subparagraphs still maintained adopt matters in other subparagraphs that have been abandoned; see, for example, paragraph 20(bb) at the foot of page 7. Accordingly, I also propose to strike out paragraph 20 commencing on page 6 and also the misnumbered paragraph 16 commencing on page 8. I also propose to make directions to take account of the foreshadowed claim under s 99 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005.
In respect of costs, the defendant is largely successful and should have the costs of the notice of motion. If any amendment is pursued, the costs thrown away by that amendment at that time would ordinarily be payable by the plaintiff, but it would be premature for me to make that order at this stage.
Nothing I have said in this judgment should be taken as an endorsement of the appropriateness of the remaining paragraphs in the Amended Statement of Claim for a claim under s 99 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, or a reflection of the merits of a claim under s 99, or to operate as a restriction on the plaintiff abandoning, in any proposed amended pleading, paragraphs that remain in the Amended Statement of Claim when he formulates his claim under s 99.
The orders of the Court, therefore, are:
1. Pursuant to r 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, strike out paragraph 20 on page 5 of the Amended Statement of Claim and all those paragraphs and subparagraphs on pages 6, 7, 8 and 9 up to and including paragraph 18 on page 9.
2. Direct that any proposed Further Amended Statement of Claim be served on the defendant within 14 days.
3. In the event that the defendant does not consent to the filing of any proposed Further Amended Statement of Claim so served, the plaintiff have leave by 6 March 2015 to file a notice of motion returnable before me for leave to file the Further Amended Statement of Claim in the form served.
4. In the event that no such notice of motion is filed by 6 March 2015 and no Further Amended Statement of Claim is filed by consent by that date, the defendant is at liberty to re-list the matter before me for further orders disposing of the residue of the Amended Statement of Claim.
5. Plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of the notice of motion.
[2]
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Decision last updated: 12 August 2015