Li v Minister for Home Affairs

Li v Minister for Home Affairs - [2018] FCA 1759 - FCA 2018 case summary — Zoe

[4]

The Circuit Court 3 On 30 October 2015, the applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. On 31 March 2016, a Registrar of the Circuit Court set down the application for final hearing on 17 June 2016. The applicant did not appear on that date and his application was dismissed pursuant to r 13.03C(1)(c) FCC Rules. 4 On 16 March 2018, the applicant filed an application in a case pursuant to r 16.05 FCC Rules seeking to set aside the order of 17 June 2016, a period of some 21 months after the dismissal order had been made. The primary judge was not persuaded that such an order should be made. 5 First, his Honour found that the delay of 21 months was significant. The applicant provided no explanation or evidence explaining the delay, despite being given the opportunity to do so. The primary judge reasoned that this alone was sufficient to dismiss the application in the case. 6 Secondly, the primary judge found that the applicant's explanation for his non-attendance at the hearing listed on 17 June 2016 was not satisfactory. In this connection, the applicant's explanation was that he had "mistakenly remembered the wrong date". The applicant proffered this explanation even though he was on notice that the hearing had been listed for 17 June 2016. 7 Thirdly, the primary judge noted that, in the period between 17 June 2016 and 16 March 2018, the applicant had been in regular contact with the Minister's Department and had received various bridging visas on the basis that he was making acceptable arrangements to depart Australia. The primary judge further noted that there was nothing from the applicant to indicate that he continued to require medical treatment some 36 months after he applied for the medical treatment visa, it being remembered that the applicant had only sought the visa until 14 November 2015. 8 Fourthly, the primary judge was not satisfied that there was any merit in the applicant's substantive application for judicial review. The primary judge noted that the Tribunal's decision was inevitably correct. The applicant simply could not satisfy the criteria that applied to his application, specifically the requirement of cl 3001(1). 9 Fifthly, the primary judge noted that the Tribunal had no discretion in relation to the application of the relevant criteria. This was not a case where compelling or compassionate circumstances were relevant. 10 In the result, the primary judge concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to set aside the order made on 17 June 2016. It would be futile to do so because the applicant's substantive application could not succeed. 11 The primary judge concluded as follows: 47 In all therefore, the delay is significant. No explanation let alone a reasonable or satisfactory one has been provided for Mr Li's non-attendance at the hearing of the substantive application, nor importantly, to explain the subsequent 21 month delay in making his AIC [application in a case]. While it is the case that the Minister does not press any prejudice if the application to reinstate were granted, the lack of any reasonable prospects of success in the grounds of the substantive application, and indeed the futility in granting the AIC, given the relevant regulatory and statutory scheme, means that the AIC must be refused. I will make that order.

[5]

The present application 12 The legal principles relevant to determining whether to grant an extension of time are reflected in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349. Translated to the present application, those principles can be summarised as follows: the applicant must show an acceptable explanation for the delay; action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for extension, is relevant to considering whether an acceptable explanation has been given; any prejudice to the respondent caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension; the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension; and the merits of the application are to be taken into account when considering whether an extension of time should be granted. 13 With regard to granting leave to appeal from interlocutory decisions, the relevant principles are identified in Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397. In this connection, the Court must consider whether the judgment of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused, supposing the primary decision to be wrong. 14 The applicant's application for an extension of time and leave to appeal states the following grounds: 1. AAT and Federal Circuit Court failed to Consider my explanation fort my appeal which I believe there is a legal error. 2. I am a Malaysia Chinese who will be facing persecution by my government due to my believes 3. AAT member and the Federal court did not well consider of my fears and persecution if return to my home country. 4. My appeal application for Federal Circuit Court has been dismissed and I disagree with its decision since I did explained to the court and I believe it was not well considered. 15 The application is supported by an affidavit made by the applicant on 25 May 2018. In that affidavit, the applicant says that he does not agree with the Circuit Court decision which dismissed his application for judicial review and that he wants a "review" by this Court to "get a more fair decision". He says that his delay has been caused by his financial difficulties. He says that he was unable to pay the relevant filing fee and could not get help in "filling out all the forms required" because of his limited grasp of English. 16 The Minister accepts that, other than for the public interest in the finality of administrative decision-making, there would be little prejudice to him if the Court were to grant an extension of time. He also accepts that a 14-day delay is not lengthy. Nonetheless, the Minister opposes the extension that is sought. First, the Minister submits that the applicant's explanation for his delay is unsatisfactory. Secondly, in relation to both extending time and granting leave to appeal, the Minister submits that the proposed appeal is without merit. 17 In this connection, the applicant's draft notice of appeal simply alleges that the applicant provided the Minister's Department, the Tribunal and the Circuit Court with "compelling reasons" (which are not identified) and that the Tribunal and the Circuit Court failed to consider the applicant's "explanation" (which is not identified) and "supporting documents" (which are not identified) to support his "appeal" which, according to the applicant, is a legal error. The draft notice of appeal seeks orders that the Court accept his "compelling reasons" for not holding a substantive visa at the time of his application for the medical treatment visa. The form of the orders also asserts that the Minster's Department and the Tribunal committed a legal error by not considering his "compelling circumstances". Expressed in these terms, the draft notice of appeal is uninformative. The Minister submits that it fails to identify any arguable case for relief. 18 Perhaps more fundamentally, the Minister submits that cl 3001(1) of Sch 3 to the Regulations imposes a mandatory requirement. At the time he made his application for the medical treatment visa, the applicant did not and could not satisfy that requirement. The Minister submits that nothing that the applicant has asserted in his application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, or deposed to in his affidavit, or asserted in his draft notice of appeal, can overcome that obstacle.

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