These matters are only factors to be weighed in the exercise of the court's discretion. They are not limits on the court's power."
28 I am satisfied that it is just that Mauviel Holdings' registration be reinstated. As I have said, Legrande Enterprises has a prima facie case against Mauviel Holdings. It will be unable to pursue any type of claim against Mauviel Holdings if the company's registration is not reinstated. The prejudice to Legrande Enterprises is obvious. Mauviel Holdings at one time had substantial assets and its operations were brought to an end, not by an orderly winding up, but by what was, in effect, administrative action by Mr Mauviel. If the evidence of Mr Mauviel is to be believed, he was not even aware that the company of which he was the controlling mind was deregistered. There is no evidence of prejudice to any third party. There is no prejudice to Mr Mauviel because, although s 601AH(5) provides that the usual consequence of a reinstatement order is that a former director becomes a director again, I will, for reasons to be given, make an order that the company be wound up.
29 I have considered whether Legrande Enterprises must establish that Mauviel Holdings had assets that will enable it to recover on any judgment it may obtain against Mauviel Holdings in the District Court action. However, I am persuaded by the submissions of counsel for Legrande Enterprises that Legrande Enterprises need not establish this. It is sufficient that there is a possibility of financial recoveries being achieved through steps taken by a liquidator against persons who may have been a party to misapplication of its assets. It is clear that Mauviel Holdings did at some stage hold substantial assets and it is clear that it has never been the subject of an orderly winding up, in the course of which the assets and liabilities of the company are identified and, if necessary, fully investigated. Mr Mauviel relied on the following observation of Goldberg J in Promnitz v ASIC (2004) 22 ACLC 108 at 111 [20]:
"Where a company has been in liquidation it will be a rare case that allows reinstatement where there are no funds available to enable the liquidators of the company to continue to supervise and monitor its operations."
30 However, the distinguishing and significant point in this case is that Mauviel Holdings was never the subject of an orderly winding up.
31 Mr Mauviel raises two matters in opposition to an order that the registration of Mauviel Holdings be reinstated. The first is that he will be prejudiced in that he will once again become a director of the company. I have already dealt with that argument. Secondly, he submits that no order should be made until the outcome of the District Court action against him is known. If he successfully defends the action, no order will be necessary. If he does not, then an order can be made and it is unlikely Mauviel Holdings will contest any findings made against Mr Mauviel. I reject this submission. It is quite unreasonable to expect Legrande Enterprises to take the risk of having to conduct two trials in relation to its purchase of the Golden Grove business.
32 Legrande Enterprises submits that it is just and equitable that Mauviel Holdings be wound up. It submits that it has standing to seek a winding up order because it is a prospective creditor of Mauviel Holdings within s 462(2)(b) of the Act. It submits that it is a prospective creditor because it has a prima facie case against the company. As I have said, I accept that it has a prima facie case, and I accept that that means that it is a prospective creditor of Mauviel Holdings: Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Simionato Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 477.
33 I am satisfied that it is just and equitable to make an order for the winding up of Mauviel Holdings. The company has not been under the effective control of any person since March 2005 and that is a sufficient ground upon which to conclude that it is just and equitable to order that the company be wound up. In Re Sparad Ltd (1993) 12 ACSR 12, McLelland CJ in Eq said (at 13-14):
"It seems to me that the fact that the registration was cancelled and has remained cancelled since 24 June 1993 and, as I would infer, no action has been taken by anyone associated with the company to remedy that situation, is clear evidence that the company is without effective control. In particular its affairs, if a dissolved company can be said to have affairs, are not under effective control and it is unlikely that there would be any person who would be concerned to revive the company at this stage. It also provides sufficient evidence to justify a winding up order on the just and equitable ground, quite apart from any question of insolvency. I would in any event draw an inference of insolvency from the evidence which is before the court and it seems to me that that evidence also clearly shows the plaintiff to have sufficient standing to proceed to apply for a winding up order.
There is nothing to suggest to me that there is the slightest likelihood of this company being revived and I conclude that the only way in which the rights of creditors can be vindicated, including particularly those of the plaintiff, is by acceding to the application that it be wound up, such winding up to be preceded by an order reinstating the company to the register. I do not consider that any useful purpose would be served by any advertisement and I dispense with the requirements of the rules relating to advertisement."
34 To similar effect are the reasons of Barrett J in Shaw v Goodsmith Industries Pty Ltd (formerly Newbold General Refractories Ltd) (2002) 41 ACSR 556 at 559 [14]-[15]:
"The plaintiff in fact seeks a winding up order in the event that the order for reinstatement is made. The fact that, by virtue of s 1408(1), the reinstatement will be effected under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) means that the company will properly be regarded as 'registered under this Act', so that it comes within the s 9 definition of 'company' and therefore within the description at the start of s 461(1). The plaintiff's standing to apply for a winding up order derives from s 462(2)(b), he being a contingent or prospective creditor. The circumstances of this case - namely, that the directors and officers, as well as the shareholders, whoever they may be (the company extract does not identify them), have been out of touch since December 1990 - may be taken to be such that the company should be regarded as practically unable to operate under the normal kind of administration so that it is just and equitable, in terms of s 461(1)(k) that it be wound up immediately. Should any of the shareholders come to think that the former administration should again become operative and that the company has become viable, they may seek the assistance of the court through s 482 by way of order terminating the winding up.
The decisions of Young J in Scott v Janniki Pty Ltd(1994) 14 ACSR 334 and McLelland CJ in Eq in Re Sparad Ltd(1993) 12 ACSR 12 show that, in cases such as this where winding up should follow immediately upon reinstatement, there is no need for formalities of advertising and the like to be undertaken. I am therefore prepared to dispense with them. The plaintiff has tendered the consent of a registered liquidator to act as liquidator in this case."