Legal Services Commissioner v Wen

Applicable Law

1. 'Unsatisfactory professional conduct' is defined non-exhaustively by the LPA, s 496, as follows: unsatisfactory professional conduct includes conduct of an Australian legal practitioner occurring in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent legal practitioner: s 497.
2. 'Professional misconduct' is also defined non-exhaustively by the LPA, s 497, as follows: 497 Professional misconduct (1) For the purposes of this Act: professional misconduct includes: (a) unsatisfactory professional conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence, and (b) conduct of an Australian legal practitioner whether occurring in connection with the practice of law or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice. (2) For finding that an Australian legal practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice as mentioned in subsection (1), regard may be had to the matters that would be considered under section 25 or 42 if the practitioner were an applicant for admission to the legal profession under this Act or for the grant or renewal of a local practising certificate and any other relevant matters. At the conclusion of the hearing on 19 October 2015, the Tribunal entered a finding of professional misconduct.
3. In addition specified types of conduct are declared by the LPA to be 'capable of being unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct', see s 498. We will not set them out in detail here. Category (a) in sub-section (1) is relevant to this case: '(a) conduct consisting of a contravention of this Act, the regulations or the legal profession rules'.
4. Section 562 deals with the disciplinary orders that the Tribunal may make in respect of a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. There are, broadly speaking, two classes of orders: those that affect the practising certificate or registration of the practitioner, and require official implementation (s 562(2)(a)) and those that do not bear on the practising certificate directly, but are directed to the practitioner personally and require personal compliance (s 562(4)). Disciplinary orders have as their objective the protection of the public. In this case the applicant's primary submission is that the protection of the public requires the making of the most severe order, an order under s 562(2) (a) that the name of the practitioner be removed from the local roll.

Material before Tribunal: First Day of Hearing

1. Our hearing commenced on 19 October 2015.
2. In support of its application, the Commissioner relied on: affidavit from the Commissioner setting out the history of its investigation of the allegations (filed 10 June 2015); and submissions handed up at the hearing. Ms Muston appeared for the Commissioner. The respondent appeared in person.
3. In addition to his formal Reply to the application, the respondent filed in advance of the hearing one short affidavit prepared by him. Its main purpose was to enter into evidence criminal record checks showing no offence history in Australia or in his country of origin, the People's Republic of China; and to enter into evidence efforts he had made to improve his understanding of professional ethics, taking the form of an enrolment in March 2015 in an on-line ethics course run by the Law Society; and to enter into evidence two character references, one from a Mr Bui, solicitor, the other from his employer at the relevant time, Mr Wang.

The Conduct under Notice, and its Context

1. Mr Xie had engaged WB Legal to assist in him in a dispute with a co-director of a retail business over Mr Xie's entitlement to share of income received and not accounted for by the co-director, and similar matters. WB Legal had issued proceedings on his behalf in the local court. Following the filing of the defence, Mr Xie accepted advice that he pursue a motion to strike out part of the defence. The court made directions on 14 April 2014 for the filing of a notice of motion and supporting material, including evidence. The directions gave, it would seem inadvertently, a Sunday date, 25 May 2014, as the final date for the filing of evidence. As courts are closed on Sundays, as a practical matter the last opportunity to meet the deadline became the first business day after that date, Monday 26 May 2014, and arguably the first available time on that day for filing.
2. Over the previous four weeks, there had been intermittent contact between the respondent, as the solicitor in the firm handling the matter, and Mr Xie in relation to obtaining material for the affidavit and settling the affidavit. On 22 April 2014 the respondent emailed Mr Xie with a draft motion, and a draft affidavit in support, seeking further information for inclusion in the affidavit as set out in the email. Mr Xie forwarded a document to him by email on 19 May 2014, and informed him that he would be in China from 21-31 May 2014. Mr Xie had gone to China to receive traditional Chinese treatment for a health condition.
3. The respondent emailed Mr Xie on Thursday 22 May 2014, noting that he had not received any documents since the email of 19 May 2014. Mr Xie replied that he had posted documents on 12 May 2014 (which we take to be while he was still in Australia before going to China). Later on Thursday Mr Xie gave him a contact telephone number in China.
4. The next events occur on Sunday 25 May 2014. At 7.29pm the respondent emailed the affidavit to Mr Xie, requesting he sign it and return it by email. At 8.00pm he telephoned him. At 10.16pm Mr Xie sent the respondent a business document, namely a tax invoice for goods imported from 'Victor', related, it would seem, to one of the transactions in dispute in the proceedings. At 10.46pm, the respondent again emailed Mr Xie the affidavit requesting that he print it out and send the scanned copy, together with specified documents. Between 12.26am and 12.32am on 26 May 2014, Mr Xie sent further documents, including a profit and loss statement. In an email sent at 5.20am on 25 May 2014 the respondent asked Mr Xie whether he had signed and returned the affidavit.
5. The respondent received no reply. Later that morning he filled in the draft affidavit by forging his client's signature, making the false attestation and then lodged it with the court.
6. The motion to strike out part of the defence was unsuccessful (22 June 2014). Dissatisfied with the way the matter had been handled, on 26 June 2014, Mr Xie sought advice from another lawyer about his case. He also went to the court and inspected the court files. He then discovered the filing of the affidavit in his name, containing the false elements.
7. On 22 August 2014, Mr Xie complained to the Commissioner over the way WB Legal had managed his case. His complaint referred to several matters of concern, including the lodgment of the forged affidavit.
8. On 28 August 2014 Commissioner sought a response from the principal of WB Legal, Mr Wang. Mr Wang's reply (12 September 2014) referred to several matters of complaint, including the matter now before us. He gave an account of the respondent's conduct, admitting the matters alleged in that regard. The Commissioner sought a response from the respondent (provided 17 October 2014), and he confirmed Mr Wang's account. The Commissioner sought comments on these replies from Mr Xie (reply provided 10 December 2014). These letters formed part of the annexures to the Commissioner's principal affidavit dated 5 June 2015 accompanying the disciplinary application.

The Respondent's Explanation

1. In his formal Reply to the application dated 12 August 2015, the respondent said that he believed that he was acting in the best interests of his client in filing the affidavit, and felt that his case would have been severely jeopardised if he had not acted as he did. He now recognised the gravity and seriousness of his behaviour, and promised never to offend against the professional rules again. He referred to having purchased a Rule 57 video podcast and a Rule 42 online course on ethics for litigators. His affidavit filed on 25 August 2015, to which we have referred, corroborated this statement, and included the two character references we have mentioned.
2. The respondent's evidence at hearing on day one of the Tribunal's hearing, consistently with the written statements that he provided to the applicant during its investigation and the Reply, was that he had been pressed by Mr Xie to lodge the affidavit and to forge his signature. He said he had been pressed to do this because of the difficulties that faced Mr Xie in organising those steps from China on a Sunday, and getting the material back to him in time. In his written statement to the Commissioner (17 October 2014) he gave the following account of what Mr Xie said:: Xie: I am currently in China and I cannot sign the document. Respondent: You have to sign it, it is a affidavit and you need to sign before me. Xie: Just sign for me please, I would not tell anyone. Respondent: No, the affidavit is too serious and you need to sign yourself. Xie: I begged you [sic], I am currently in China and the due date is tomorrow. I swear I will not tell anyone; please help me just for once. Otherwise my case will be ruined.
3. Mr Xie commented on this matter in his reply (10 December 2014) to the Commissioner's request for comments, Mr Xie confirmed that on 22 May the respondent asked him to supply documents like a profit and loss statement. The next contact was at '12am' [sic] on Sunday 25 May when the respondent, told him that he had not been able to obtain an extension of time to file the affidavit. He reported the respondent as saying he needed urgently the profit and loss statement. Mr Xie said that he sent him the profit and loss statement, but he disagreed with him over what to include in the affidavit. He said he instructed the respondent to make specific amendments before he would sign it. He strongly denied that the placed any pressure on the respondent to forge his signature.
4. The material contains two versions of the events of that evening. The differing account of Mr Xie does not constitute evidence, in the strict sense. In this class of proceedings in the Tribunal, the rules of evidence strictly apply to 'a question of professional misconduct': Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, Sched 5, cl 20.
5. We make no finding as to whether Mr Xie did or did not say what the respondent attributed to him. We accept, however, that the respondent did feel that he had to have an affidavit filed, come what may, not later than Monday 26 May 2013 so as to ensure that the strike out application remained alive. We accept his evidence that he felt the need to this so as to keep faith with his client. We also accept that up until this point he had tried to handle the matter in a way that was compliant with professional standards.
6. As noted earlier, the respondent appeared at the hearing on 19 October 2015 on his own. He did not dispute the particulars.

Characterisation of Conduct

1. The Commissioner's principal submission was that the conduct constituted professional misconduct.
2. The Commissioner referred us to a number of cases in which courts have made findings of professional misconduct in relation to the filing in court of falsified or forged documents. The fact that the solicitor may have been inexperienced, affected by stress or a health condition that may have affected the usual quality of their judgment has not been seen as enough to justify the entry of no adverse disciplinary finding or the lesser finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct. See, for example, the following cases cited by the Commissioner - Law Society of New South Wales v Young [1999] NSWADT 78, appeal dismissed, Law Society of New South Wales v Young (LSD) [2001] NSWADTAP 17 ('Young'); Law Society of New South Wales v Stanoevski [2003] NSWADT 77; Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Farran [2003] NSWCA 372; Law Society of New South Wales v Hooper [2005] NSWADT 174; Legal Services Commissioner v Walters [2007] QLPT 6.
3. It is clear, we consider, that the respondent breached in a serious way the trust that is placed in him as a legal practitioner only to file properly sworn affidavits, and not to engage in conduct which might mislead and deceive the court, opposing parties and others interested in the proceedings. Legal practitioners must never act in a way that undermines the integrity of the court system and public confidence in its processes.
4. As we have noted, his explanations to the Commissioner and before us referred to pressure and stress that he was under as an inexperienced practitioner. We have given that factor no weight in reaching our conclusion as to the appropriate disciplinary finding. Admission to practise as a lawyer carries ethical obligations that must be observed scrupulously and fearlessly from day one.
5. We made our finding of professional misconduct at the conclusion of the liability stage of the hearing on the first day.
6. At that point we raised our concern with the Commissioner's representative that, in our view, the respondent did not have a full appreciation of the seriousness of the situation he now found himself in, and the real possibility that he may be deregistered or have his practising certificate cancelled. He appeared before us alone. He did not appear to have had any assistance with the preparation of his case. We only had evidence of the most limited kind in relation to the circumstances of the conduct and his social and educational background. He had provided nothing that might assist in relation to the possibility that he should be permitted to remain on the roll, and continue to pursue a career in the law.
7. After hearing from the Commissioner's representative and from the respondent, we adjourned the next stage of the proceedings to a date to be fixed, made directions for the filing of additional material and strongly urged him to obtain professional assistance.

Material before Tribunal: Second Day of Hearing

1. The hearing resumed on 9 December 2015. Mr J T Johnson, of counsel, appeared for the respondent, instructed by Mr Bui of JB Legal. The new material filed by the respondent comprised: written submissions prepared by Mr Johnson, a much fuller affidavit from the respondent, plus a fuller testimonial in the form of an affidavit from Mr Bui, and a new testimonial in the form of an affidavit from Ms Wanxin Zhang. The respondent was called, and cross-examined by Ms Muston, appearing for the Commissioner. Mr Bui and Ms Zhang were called and were briefly cross-examined as to their testimonials.
2. Mr Wen referred in his affidavit to his personal history.
3. He spoke of his inexperience. He referred to the cultural pressure that he experienced, as a Chinese person, in seeking to do whatever was needed to please a fellow Chinese person, and especially a client of the firm. He felt that he had to ensure that the affidavit was filed by the due date. He spoke of the pressure to please his fellow-Chinese clients. He spoke of how difficult it was to say 'no' to a friend. He commented that Australian people do it, 'but in China you are expected to help'.
4. He referred in greater detail to the events of the evening of 25 May 2014. Our earlier account in the present reasons is drawn partly from that material.
5. In contrast to the proceedings on day 1, the respondent gave oral evidence, and was cross-examined. The Commissioner's cross-examination traversed the following matters: his failure to adhere to the directions timetable for the present stage of the proceedings, and what that might indicate about his competence and respect for court orders; his knowledge of the ethical duties of solicitors to their clients and to courts; his knowledge of the relevant provisions in the Solicitor's Rules; his understanding of and approach to situations where there is a conflict between the client's wishes and his duty to the court; the paucity of the material he prepared for day one of the hearing, and what that might indicate about his insight into and understanding of the legal ramifications of the application he faced; the extent of his compliance with continuing professional education obligations; and the steps he had taken in the last year or so in that regard; the adequacy of his legal education at Bond University, and the level of acumen in English that he brought to his studies there.
6. The questioning gave particular attention to the statement in his affidavit (para [28]) that in the two practices in which he had worked to date he had often seen documents signed by others and not by the clients. He said it was a common practice. He had not realised that it was improper, if you had the client's permission. He believed he had Mr Xie's permission to do what was needed to keep the strike-out motion on foot.
7. As to this part of his evidence, we need not and do not make any finding. We neither accept nor reject what he said. There are circumstances (powers of attorney, for example, in respect of formal documents and 'p.p' signatures in relation to less formal documents) where signing of this kind is permissible. Were we to venture into this part of the case, we would have to give notice to affected persons, and hold satellite hearings.
8. He was questioned about the degree of autonomy he had in his work. He said that at the first law firm (pre-admission), he barely saw clients, and all clients were seen by his superiors, usually one of the partners. At WB Legal (pre- and post-admission), on the other hand, he had regularly dealt directly with clients. Both practices had, as previously noted, served predominantly Chinese-speaking clients, and had a migration agent's arm.
9. Mr Bui is Australian born (1988) and a principal of JB and Associates, Canley Vale. He said that he had known the respondent since 2013, and they had become good friends. He was now acting as his solicitor in these proceedings. He said that he had noticed that three years ago the respondent relied on precedents in conveyancing matters, but he had now become 'very good' at them. He said further that the respondent now appreciated the seriousness of his wrongdoing, and had expressed to him his remorse and shame. He said the respondent lived alone in Australia, and had no family here. He spoke of the assistance and support that he has willing to give the respondent, including helping him to join Young Lawyers and helping him to develop a network of support.
10. Ms Zhang, an education manager, said she had also known the respondent since 2013. She had worked at WB Legal with him, and they shared an office for a year and a half. She explained that she was not a lawyer, and had worked in the migration agent side of WB Legal. They have remained in touch after she had left WB Legal.
11. She said that sometimes she saw him working really late and stressed out by the heavy load of work. She referred to the shame he felt over his conduct and the situation he now found himself in. She expressed her admiration for the educational efforts he had made, and referred to the burden the cost of the Bond University course had placed on him and his family.
12. The respondent was still working at WB Legal at the time of our hearings. While there was a short testimonial from his principal, Mr Wang, annexed to the affidavit he filed for day 1 of the hearing, Mr Wang did not attend or give evidence on either day of the hearing.

Appropriate Order

1. The Commissioner's representative referred to the following matters in support of the application for a strike off order: (1) the gravity of the misconduct (2) that striking off was routinely seen as the appropriate order in cases of forgery and false filing (3) his failure to report his misconduct to the Law Society at the first opportunity (4) the misconduct only came to light because of a client complaint (5) the paucity of his initial response to the disciplinary application (6) a lack of insight shown by some of his responses under cross examination in relation to issues of professional ethics (7) the apparent inadequacy or his academic and workplace legal training.
2. In support of a less severe order, counsel for the respondent acknowledged that the respondent had made 'an abject error of judgement', and referred to the following matters in extenuation: (1) the conduct involved an isolated event (2) his youth and inexperience (3) the fact that at the time he only held the usual starting certificate for a new practitioner, a restricted practising certificate, and was an employee (4) an apparent lack of supervision, exacerbated by the absence of any detailed explanation from his principal as to the nature and extent of his supervision, oversight and mentoring (5) the doubtful quality of his legal education given the level of his facility in English at the time he commenced the course, and still seen in the relative poor quality of expression and organisation of thoughts seen in the affidavit material prepared by him for the proceedings (6) there is no suggestion he will offend again (7) his level of contrition (8) the offers of assistance from Mr Bui (9) the workload pressures he appears to have been under at the time of the conduct.
3. Counsel submitted that an appropriate order would be one that involved a period of suspension followed by conditions that ensured a proper level of supervision under a new employer. Counsel referred to the difficulty that the respondent would now face in going forward in the law with a public disciplinary decision of the present kind hanging over him.
4. Counsel drew attention to a number of cases where less severe orders had been imposed in cases with some or all of the above features. In a case involving misconduct by a new barrister, NSW Bar Association v Kalaf, unreported, 11 October 1988, BC8801429, Kirby P commenced by reiterating that the fundamental purpose of disciplinary orders is the protection of the public. His Honour continued: Isolated cases of departure from accepted rules ... will not, depending on the circumstances, warrant removal of a barrister from the roll. Especially in the case of young or inexperienced practitioners, a small degree of latitude may sometimes be allowed. This is because it may usually be expected with confidence that the trial of proceedings such as the present will have a salutary effect. The prospect of removal from the roll, the publicity (including in the profession) which often attends such proceedings and the collegiate pressures operating within the profession itself all tend to reinforce good ethical and professional standards. They may avoid, in the particular case, the need for the drastic order for the removal of the name of an otherwise qualified practitioner from the professional roll.
5. In that case, the court (by majority) elected to suspend the barrister for a year, rather than make an order of striking off. The findings of professional misconduct involved several separate events and types of misconduct, and included direct dealing clients without a solicitor, provision for formal instruction by solicitor only, misleading the court in respect of his practice arrangements, and lack of candour to the admission board on application to change from the barrister's roll to the solicitor's roll.
6. Our attention was also drawn to the following observations of Kirby P: The issue is the assessment of the seriousness of the misconduct and the consideration of what should be done about it. ... [T]o remove the name of a practitioner from the roll, it is necessary to conclude that the practitioner is permanently or indefinitely unfitted to be a member of the legal profession, with the great privileges and responsibilities that go with that membership. Ex parte Lenehan (1948) 77 CLR 403, 422; New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177, 183-4; The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Richard, unreported, CA, 31 July 1987; (1987) NSWJB 147 per Kirby P and McHugh JA. If the Court were to determine that there was not that measure of unfitness as warrants permanent, or at least indefinite removal from the ranks of the legal profession, the proper course to adopted, misconduct being found, is to suspend the practitioner from practice for a specified time.
7. The Commissioner's representative, in reply, questioned the level of his remorse, and reiterated that the misconduct only came to light after receipt of the client's complaint and noted the risk of repetition of the misconduct because of the Chinese client expectations to which he had referred in his evidence (esp para [41] of his second affidavit).
8. There was considerable debate about the appropriate protective order reflected in legal professional discipline cases where there has been a finding of professional misconduct involving one of more of the following - forgery of a signature, false attestation or the misleading of a court through filing of process affected in those ways. The Commissioner provided the Tribunal with a Table listing ten cases of professional misconduct involving forgery, with the majority resulting in a strike-off order. We will not deal in this decision with the array of decisions to which we were taken. We have mentioned several of them already in connection with the professional misconduct finding. The other cases discussed included: Kalaf, see above; and Law Society of NSW v Byrnes [2000] NSWADT 20 (forgery of signature on application for worker's compensation, which the practitioner self-reported). In our view, no fixed rule that the practitioner must be struck off emerges from the authorities, and the Commissioner's representative ultimately acknowledged that point.
9. Most of the cases to which our attention was drawn involved very experienced practitioners. There were none involving a young practitioner in his or her first years in practice in an environment (as we see it) of little or no supervision. Moreover this was a case where the practitioner had commenced the work required in the correct way (preparing drafts, submitting them to the client for consideration) and, it seemed to us, panicked and then made grave errors.
10. We acknowledge the Commissioner's submission that in the cases where a lesser order than striking off was imposed there was more compelling extenuating material of a personal kind than was presented in this case, for example, health, family circumstances, commencement of rehabilitative programs, courses of further education, and (as an experienced practitioner in difficulty will often be able to achieve) impressive testimonials from respected members of the profession.
11. A recent example of such a case is Council of NSW Bar Association v Quinlivan [2015] NSWCATOD 54. There a barrister of almost 40 years' standing was found guilty of professional misconduct in respect of several matters, among which were the making of false statements in relation to his taxation affairs to the relevant authority. The Tribunal nonetheless concluded, having regard to the body of material placed before it, that he remained fit to practise on a restricted basis as an employee solicitor.
12. We accept that there was little compensating material in this case of the kind often seen in cases involving experienced practitioners. We attribute that to the respondent's personal circumstances - his relative youth, his inexperience and his newness both to Australia and to Sydney.
13. We think that he has absorbed the lessons of his errors. We think that cultural factors played a part in his behaviour, as well as the pressures that applied to him at the time, ranging from the wish to impress a new employer, and to do what he saw (wrongly) as the right thing by his client.
14. Accordingly, despite the seriousness of the offence, we have concluded that an order of striking off should not be made. In summary, the following factors favour such an approach in this case: (a) the practitioner's youth and inexperience; (b) the problematic nature of the supervision and direction provided to him in his work environment; (c) his shame and remorse for what he did, which was unconditional once he was confronted with the complaint; (d) the isolated nature of the misconduct, serious as it was; (e) acceptance of his evidence that he acted as he did out of a misguided notion of loyalty to the client; (f) the efforts he has made since migrating from China as young man to qualify in law in Australia, and enter practice; and (g) his good prospects of not reoffending.
15. Against these considerations, we acknowledge the force of much that was said on behalf of the Commissioner. We acknowledge in particular: (a) the importance of signifying to the profession the seriousness of misconduct of this kind, with an appropriate penalty; (b) the fundamental violation of the duty to the court that conduct of this kind on the part of officers of the court, as all practitioners are; (c) that there must be some concern at the level of sophistication of the respondent's training in ethics and his ability to recognise problem situations; and (d) the need for him to develop skills that will enable to handle client situations in a resilient and principled way where he is being pressured to take inappropriate steps.
16. Present fitness to practise is the ultimate issue: A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of NSW (2003) 216 CLR 253. We are satisfied that this is a case of gross failure to observe professional standards, confined to one occasion, and does not reflect the respondent's basic character. It is not sufficient to justify a conclusion that he is no longer fit to continue in practise as an employed solicitor.
17. We think the respondent has good prospects of a successful career in the law, and he should be given the opportunity to put this error of judgement behind him.
18. We think that the appropriate order is one of suspension for a short period (three months) accompanied by the placement of a condition on his practising certificate requiring him to undertake a course in Legal Ethics, preferably a face-to-face course and not an on-line course, but we will not be stipulative in this regard in the terms of our order. There is provision in the LPA, s 562(4), for the making of an order that a practitioner undertake a specified period of practice under supervision. We gave some consideration to making an order of this kind to take effect on resumption from suspension. While the option was raised by counsel for the respondent, we were not given any specific proposal to consider. This is an issue that could be revisited if necessary on renewal of the practising certificate by means of a discretionary condition. We do think that the respondent would benefit from working in a better environment of supervision and assistance than he would appear to have experienced so far.
19. There is an application for costs by the Commissioner. The application was not opposed. We will make the usual order.

Orders 1. The Tribunal finds the respondent guilty of professional misconduct. The Tribunal orders that:

1. The respondent's practising certificate is suspended for a period of 3 months, the suspension to take effect not later than seven days from the date of these orders.
2. The respondent's further practising certificate is to be endorsed with a condition that within a period of 6 months from the date of these orders he is required to undertake a course in legal ethics that is approved by the Manager of Professional Standards of the Law Society of New South Wales.
3. Upon completion of that course, the Respondent is required to submit a certificate of completion to the Manager of Professional Standards of the Law Society of New South Wales.
4. If the respondent fails, without a reasonable excuse, to complete that course his practising certificate shall be suspended and the suspension shall remain in place until such time as he completes the course and provides a certificate of completion to the Law Society. 1. The respondent to pay the applicant's costs, as agreed or assessed. I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 04 April 2016