Denial of procedural fairness
19 The first matter which, logically, requires consideration is whether the applicants were denied procedural fairness by the Minister because they were not invited, or given any opportunity, to make a submission to the Minister in opposition to the application that the Minister personally approve the pharmacy proposed by the second and third respondents as premises for the supply of pharmaceutical benefits.
20 The applicants had become the joint owners of the existing approved pharmacies in Moree on 1 November 2011, before Minister Roxon agreed to consider the request to substitute a more favourable decision. Minister Roxon was provided with submissions by Mr Francis which were sent to the Authority, but it is accepted that no opportunity was extended to the applicants (or Mr Francis) by Minister Roxon or Minister Plibersek to address the application made on 9 September 2011.
21 The National Health Act does not require that such an opportunity be provided, although it does permit the Minister to seek material from an applicant or other persons. Section 90D(1) provides:
90D Provision of further information
(1) For the purpose of deciding whether to consider a request made by a pharmacist under subsection 90B(1) or whether to exercise the power under subsection 90A(2) in relation to such a request:
(a) the Minister may, by notice in writing given to the pharmacist, require the pharmacist to provide such further information, or produce such further documents, to the Minister as the Minister specifies, within the period specified in the notice; and
(b) the Minister may give a notice in writing to any other person:
(i) advising the person of the request; and
(ii) inviting the person to provide comments on, or information or documents relevant to, the request within the period specified in the notice.
22 It was suggested in argument that one consequence of s 90D was to avoid any suggestion of breach of confidentiality or secrecy provisions elsewhere in the National Health Act. Accepting that suggestion as cogent, the existence of a discretion in those terms nevertheless suggests immediately, in my view, that no obligation of the kind proposed by the applicants should be found to exist.
23 Furthermore, there is an established line of authority in this Court to the contrary of the proposition.
24 In Pharmacy Restructuring Authority v Martin (1994) 53 FCR 589 ("Martin"), a Full Court considered an argument that the Authority was obliged to afford procedural fairness to pharmacists who would be affected by approval of another pharmacist in the same area before recommending such approval. The Full Court rejected the argument, saying (at 597):
There are cases where a statutory authority, charged with the duty of considering an application to use premises for a particular purpose, is expressly obliged to publicise the receipt of the application and to consider objections. Liquor legislation is a well known example. There are cases where such an obligation is implied by the scope and purpose of the legislation. But we do not know of any general principle to the effect that a statutory authority charged with the duty of considering an application is obliged by the principles of procedural fairness to notify and hear everybody whose economic interests may be damaged by an approval. To promulgate a general rule imposing such an obligation would be to visit upon statutory decision-makers a potentially massive task of indeterminate reference. In the present case, nothing is to be implied from the scope and purpose of the Act. The relevant provisions are not concerned with minimising competition in the pharmaceutical industry but with reducing the Commonwealth's financial burden in providing pharmaceutical benefits while maintaining an acceptable level of community service. In the absence of authority, we are not prepared to hold that, if it had a discretion about its decision, the Authority had any obligation to notify or hear pharmacists, non-parties to the application for approval, merely because an approval might commercially damage them.
25 Martin was referred to as binding by Whitlam J in Loveridge v Pharmacy Restructuring Authority (1995) 39 ALD 103 at 106 ("Loveridge"), by Branson J in Pharmacy Guild of Australia v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (1996) 70 FCR 462 ("Pharmacy Guild") at 475 and by Siopis J in Wong v Australian Community Pharmacy (2011) 193 FCR 490 ("Wong") at [74]. In Wong, Siopis J observed about Martin, Loveridge and Pharmacy Guild (at [63]) that:
63 The nature of the interest which the affected pharmacists in all three of the abovementioned cases, unsuccessfully asserted as entitling them to be heard in opposition to the competing pharmacist's application for approval, is not, in my view, distinguishable from the interest asserted by Mr Wong, namely, the potential diminution in revenue arising from the introduction of the competing pharmacist.
26 Those observations seem to me to apply directly to the present case also. Each of Martin, Loveridge, Pharmacy Guild and Wong concerned deliberations by the Authority (or its predecessor) rather than the Minister, but I see no relevant point of difference in that circumstance so far as the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness are concerned (see also Pharmacy Guild at 475 B-C).
27 The applicants sought to meet this line of authority by arguing first that Martin concerned earlier regulatory arrangements subscribed to by the Government and the Pharmacy Guild. However, Wong did not. In Wong, Siopis J said (at [64]-[66]):
64 Secondly, Mr Wong contended that the statutory scheme in operation at the time of the decision in Martin, was different to the current statutory scheme. In particular, Mr Wong said that the previous scheme directed attention to the restructuring of pharmacies and was not concerned with competition. However, the current scheme, said Mr Wong, is concerned with competition. It was said that an object of the fourth Pharmacy Guild agreement is to improve efficiency through increased competition between pharmacies.
65 In my view, this contention does not assist Mr Wong, because his claim to be entitled to be heard is founded on a claim that his economic interest will be adversely affected by increased competition from a pharmacy operated by Mr Pearson. The Full Court in Martin found that, even under the previous statutory scheme, this interest was not a sufficient interest to afford an affected existing pharmacist, a right to be heard in opposition to the approval of an application to provide pharmaceutical benefits by an applicant who is likely to compete with the business operated by the existing pharmacist.
66 As Wilcox J (with whom Foster and Whitlam JJ agreed) observed in Martin, the "relevant provisions were not concerned with minimising competition". The position would be a fortiori under the existing statutory regime which is said to be intended to give effect to a policy of increasing competition.
28 The references by Siopis J to "the existing statutory regime" may be understood as a reference to the regime which applied for the purposes of the present proceedings.
29 The applicants also rely on more recent judgments of Jessup J and Jagot J, which are discussed below, to argue that in the present case the Minister was bound to accord them procedural fairness and failed to do so.
30 In Yu v Minister for Health [2013] FCA 261 ("Yu"), Jessup J dealt with a case which also concerned a request to the Minister to substitute a more favourable decision in relation to approval of a pharmacy to supply pharmaceutical benefits. The request had not been notified to an existing approved pharmacy, which had been given no opportunity to respond to it. Jessup J held that the rules of natural justice applied in the case with which he was dealing. However, his Honour's conclusion in that regard was based on circumstances which provided a reason to distinguish the authorities in this Court to a contrary effect to which I have referred.
31 Mr Yu had applied to relocate his pharmacy premises. In the interregnum between finalisation of the relocation application and conclusion of the existing approval, he was regarded as holding two "approvals". That technical position came into existence at the very time that it became possible to have two, not one, pharmacies in the area. The fourth respondent to the proceedings was rejected as the second pharmacy because of Mr Yu's two "approvals", even though he was only applying for relocation of a single approval.
32 Then Mr Yu withdrew his application to relocate and applied for a substantive second approval. Meanwhile, the fourth respondent had sought, and obtained, the Minister's personal approval. The Minister did not notify Mr Yu of that request or give him any opportunity to be heard. Jessup J found Mr Yu's interest in his own, pending application to be one which gave him a statutory, not merely an economic, interest.
33 Jessup J said (at [34]-[36]):
34 With respect to the sufficiency of the applicant's interest, one commences with the judgment of Mason J in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584:
The law has now developed to a point where it may be accepted that there is a common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according procedural fairness, in the making of administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary statutory intention.
Subject to the excision of the reference to "legitimate expectations" by the judgment of Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ in Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 290 ALR 616, 633 [65], this remains the accepted statement of the law with respect to the interest required to give rise to an obligation to accord procedural fairness in the making of an administrative decision. On the facts of the present case, it is not difficult to see how the interests of the applicant were affected by the Minister's decision under s 90A in favour of the fourth respondents.
35 The respondents rely, however, on the judgment of the Full Court in Pharmacy Restructuring Authority v Martin (1994) 53 FCR 589. That case also involved a recommendation under s 90 of the NH Act with respect to pharmacy premises, and it was claimed by pharmacists who operated nearby that they should have been accorded procedural fairness before the recommendation was made. Their Honours said (53 FCR at 597):
There are cases where such an obligation is implied by the scope and purpose of the legislation. But we do not know of any general principle to the effect that a statutory authority charged with the duty of considering an application is obliged by the principles of procedural fairness to notify and hear everybody whose economic interests may be damaged by an approval. To promulgate a general rule imposing such an obligation would be to visit upon statutory decision-makers a potentially massive task of indeterminate reference. In the present case, nothing is to be implied from the scope and purpose of the Act. The relevant provisions are not concerned with minimising competition in the pharmaceutical industry but with reducing the Commonwealth's financial burden in providing pharmaceutical benefits while maintaining an acceptable level of community service. In the absence of authority, we are not prepared to hold that, if it had a discretion about its decision, the Authority had any obligation to notify or hear pharmacists, non-parties to the application for approval, merely because an approval might commercially damage them.
Martin was treated as binding, and applied on corresponding facts, in Loveridge v Pharmacy Restructuring Authority (1995) 39 ALD 103, 106, Pharmacy Guild of Australia v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (1996) 70 FCR 462, 474 and Wong v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority [2011] FCA 52 at [63].
36 In my opinion, the judgment of the Full Court in Martin is distinguishable, and does not govern the disposition of the present case, because here the applicant had an interest greater than the economic one of a competing pharmacist to which their Honours referred in the passage extracted from that case above. In the unusual circumstances brought about by the commencement of the 2011 Rules, there was to be one, and one only, additional pharmacy approved for the town of Kilmore. As someone who had applied to be that approved pharmacist, the applicant had an interest which was defeated upon the Minister giving approval to the fourth respondents' application under s 90A of the NH Act. That interest had a statutory, and not merely an economic, source. It was an interest which existed whether or not the Minister was aware of the applicant's application at the time of making her decision, but, as it happened, she was so aware, as she had been notified of that application in the departmental minute to which I have referred. In my view, the applicant had a direct interest in the disposition of the matter which came before the Minister under s 90A and had, therefore, a prima facie right to be accorded procedural fairness in relation to that decision.
(emphasis added)
34 The 2011 Rules to which his Honour referred did not apply to the application made by the second and third respondents on 9 September 2011; the 2011 Rules applied to consideration by the Authority of an application made on or after 18 October 2011. More importantly, the special interest which Jessup J identified does not exist in the present case. There is no circumstance in the present case analogous to that identified by his Honour in the passage in the extract which I emphasised.
35 Accordingly, there is no foundation in Yu for distinguishing earlier, binding authority in the present case.
36 In Hanna v Minister for Health [2013] FCA 303 ("Hanna"), Jagot J (at [49]) appeared to regard Yu as:
49 … authority for the proposition that the power in s 90A(2) is conditioned on the observance of procedural fairness. …
37 Her Honour went on, however, to find that a case of denial of procedural fairness was not made out on the facts. Her Honour did not refer to the line of cases identified by Jessup J in Yu as authority for the contrary proposition in the ordinary case and, in light of her Honour's findings on the facts, there was no need to pursue the matter further.
38 I consider that I am bound to follow and apply the view of the Full Court in Martin unless compelled by some relevant distinguishing feature of the present case to take a different view. In particular, I am bound to respect and apply the observations of the Full Court to the effect that the statutory provisions under which the Minister made her decision are not directed, as such, to minimising competition or protecting the commercial interests of other pharmacists.
39 I am also obliged, by considerations of comity, to approach the issue conformably with the approach taken by Siopis J in Wong, unless satisfied that his Honour made an error of sufficient magnitude to justify departure from that approach. I am not satisfied that there was such an error. On the contrary, my views about the matter appear to coincide with those of Siopis J.
40 The Minister was not obliged to notify the applicants that she had received a request to substitute a more favourable decision for that of the delegate. The Minister was not obliged to afford the applicants an opportunity to be heard. The applicants were not denied procedural fairness.