In other words, the reason why the Court did not consider those particular arguments of Mr Knaggs was because it assumed them in his favour.
12 The judgment went on to give reasons why a CAN was valid even if section 175(3)(b) was not complied with. The passage in para [48] of the judgment that is set out earlier is part of those reasons. The first sentence of the passage set out from para [48] recognises a possibility that there might be deficiencies in a CAN so gross that section 16(2)(a) could not cure them. Having recognised that possibility, it was not gone into as a general proposition, because it was not the full range of possible deficiencies in a CAN that the instant case was concerned with. Rather, the instant case was concerned with a CAN that identified all the elements of the offence, and where the alleged source of invalidity was a failure to provide the particulars required by section 175(3)(b).
13 The precise argument that Mr Knaggs complains was not dealt with, was in fact dealt with explicitly in para [49] of the judgment:
"The claimant argued that section 16(2) had no application in the present circumstances, because it applies only to "any indictment" (including in that expression the extended meaning of "any CAN" ) and, because section 175(3) sets out what a CAN "must" do, any CAN that fails to comply with section 175(3) was not the type of entity to which section 16(2) could apply. I do not accept the correctness of that process of reasoning. The exercise I am presently engaged in is one of deciding whether a failure to comply with one or other of the requirements of section 175(3) renders void the CAN and any resultant proceedings. The argument that the claimant advances already presumes the answer to that question by asserting that section 16(2) applies only to valid CANs, and hence not to a CAN that breaches any of the requirements of section 175(3). Rather, the task of construction that should be performed is one that involves construing the whole statute."
14 The portion of the judgment from paras [28]-[83] gave detailed reasons why, as a matter of construction of the statute, and its legislative purpose and history, a failure to provide particulars as required by section 175(3)(b) did not render the CAN void. Conclusions to that effect were stated at [60] and [83] of the judgment.
15 Mr Knaggs' submission that his argument was not dealt with is incorrect.
16 A subsidiary ground of complaint of Mr Knaggs is that his written submissions had included the statement "The same result (that s 16(2) doesn't apply) is reached via generalia specialibus non derogant CS [Claimant's Submissions] 9.4 and Smith v The Queen", and that that argument was not dealt with.
17 The obligation of a court is to consider the arguments put, and give its reasons for judgment. There is no requirement, when a court gives reasons for judgment, to deal with every detail of argument that has been presented, or to discuss or refer to every case to which the Court has been referred. Rather, the obligation is for the reasons for judgment to expose the essentials of its own reasoning process. In the present case, the Court has engaged in a detailed construction of the particular statutory provisions, their history and policy. Failure to mention explicitly a four-word Latin maxim that the Court did not find helpful in the present case, in no way vitiates that reasoning process, or calls for any further hearing of the matter.
18 The maxim was not helpful in the present case because it is not an invariable rule that a particular provision in an enactment always overrides a general one. Rather, treating a particular provision as being subject to a more general one, sometimes (but not always) provides a way in which a statute can be read as a whole, if it contains two provisions that appear to be in conflict with each other. But always, the fundamental task in statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of the particular provision that is in dispute, in light of the statute as a whole, its history and purpose. It is precisely that task that the judgment carried out.
19 In his submissions on the present motion, Mr Knaggs also placed reliance on the High Court decision in Johnson v Miller (1937) 59 CLR 467. That decision had also been referred to in his submissions that led to the judgment of 11 April 2007. The judgment of 11 April 2007 referred to it (at [70] and [71]), though not as authority for the proposition Mr Knaggs sought (both then and now) to draw from it, namely that an information must include particulars of the offence. That was because it was not in doubt that a CAN must include particulars - section 175(3)(b) said as much. The question with which the judgment of 11 April 2007 was concerned was whether the consequence of failure to comply with that "must" was that the CAN and the proceedings it began were nullities.
20 Johnson v Miller related to South Australian legislation derived from, but not identical to, Jervis' Act 1848. It concerned an information that laid an ambiguous complaint (486, 502) concerning which the prosecutor refused to provide particulars. The particulars related to a topic concerning which the alleged offender needed to know what the prosecutor's case would be if the alleged offender was to be in a position to seek to make out certain statutory defences. The Magistrate thereupon dismissed the information. The question at issue was whether the Magistrate had acted correctly in so doing.
21 A majority of the High Court held that the Magistrate had acted correctly. The particulars concerned were ones that the alleged offender had requested, and that the court regarded as necessary to be provided if a fair trial was to occur. Further, the South Australian statute in question gave a Magistrate power to dismiss an information if the information did not disclose the matter of complaint (485-486). In those circumstances, the result that the High Court came to is, with respect, hardly surprising. However, the case simply does not deal with the question of whether the proceedings before the Magistrate were a nullity, prior to their dismissal, or would have been a nullity if no application for particulars had been made. There is a fundamental difference between an information (or a CAN) being deficient in a way that would lead a court, if asked, to order that further particulars be provided (and perhaps stay or dismiss the proceedings if the particulars are not provided), and an information (or a CAN) being a total nullity. The decision of 11 April 2007 is one that has taken Johnson v Miller into account, and is not contrary to it.
22 No fundamental argument of Mr Knaggs has been overlooked by the decision of 11 April 2007. There is no occasion for further argument concerning it.