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[2006] WASC 199
Supreme Court of WA
2006-09-06
Mr P
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : KIM RILEY IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE KER TRUST -v- JUBILEE MINES NL [2006] WASC 199
BETWEEN : KIM RILEY IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE KER TRUST
Corporations law - Damages claim by a former shareholder - Failure to release information to ASX - Allegation of negligence in failure to release information - Claim of breach of ASX Listing Rules
Corporations Law, s 761, s 1001A, s 1001A(1), s 1001A(2), s 1001A(2)(b), s 1001D, s 1005
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 21
Adelaide Petroleum NL v Poseidon Ltd (1990) 98 ALR 431
Boughey v The Queen [1986] HCA 29; (1986) 161 CLR 10
David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1990] FCA 148; (1990) 93 ALR 271
Flavel v Roget 1 ACSR 595
R v Crabbe [1985] HCA 22; (1985) 156 CLR 464
TSC Industries Inc v Northway Inc [1976] USSC 119; (1976) 426 US 438
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp Ltd (No 2) [2003] FCA 1369
Australian Telecommunications Commission v Krieg Enterprises Pty Ltd (1976) 14 SASR 303
Banque Commerciale SA en Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11; (1990) 169 CLR 279
Callaghan v William C Lynch Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 871
Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1
Goldsmith v Sandilands [2002] HCA 31; (2002) 190 ALR 370
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298
Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1967] 3 All ER 686
Loxton v Moir [1914] HCA 89; (1914) 18 CLR 360
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305
Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [1998] HCA 69; (1998) 196 CLR 494
Minister for Health v AS [2004] WASC 286; (2004) 29 WAR 517
Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 3; (2004) 216 CLR 388
Poseidon Ltd & Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL [1994] HCA 4; (1994) 179 CLR 332
Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union [1979] FCA 85; (1979) 42 FLR 331
Wardley Australia Ltd v State of Western Australia [1992] HCA 55; (1992) 175 CLR 514
Western Australia v Watson [1990] WAR 248
1 Over the years, there must have been thousands of speculative small cap (capitalisation) mining companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange ("ASX"). The listing of these companies generally follows a fairly standard procedure. An individual or group of individuals sometimes called the promoters (or "mining entrepreneurs" until that description became tainted by the events of the 1970's and 1980's) put together a parcel of prospective mining tenements. Some early exploration work may have been done on these tenements but, generally speaking, they are greenfield sites which are prospective. The promoters then vend this parcel of tenements into a public company in exchange for a parcel of shares.
2 The next step is to secure an underwriter. The underwriter is generally a broking house or perhaps a small merchant bank. In exchange for a fee, the underwriter ensures that all of the shares to be issued to the public are taken up and that there is a sufficient spread of shareholders to comply with the ASX listing requirements. A prospectus is then prepared and lodged and an initial public offering ("IPO") is made.
3 The reasons why investors take up shares in such companies are many and varied. Perhaps the astute investor sees the tenements the company has as highly prospective. Perhaps the directors of the company have a track record of successful mining operations. Perhaps the commodity which is the focus of the company's activities is one that at the time of the float is attracting market interest. At present, companies which are focused on uranium are enjoying good support in the market. But whatever the reason an investor takes up shares in these speculative mining companies, it is not in anticipation of an income stream from dividends. Any income from mining activities, if it occurs at all, is a long way off.
4 Once funds are raised the company's shares are listed on the ASX. Then the hard work begins. The company must develop its tenements. Quite how it goes about doing that will depend upon the then state of the development of the tenements and the nature of the commodity for which the company is searching. But eventually, when all the preparatory work has been done, drilling will be undertaken. The aim of the drilling is to establish whether minerals are present and if they are at what depth and in what geological structure. When the drilling has been completed, the drill samples are assayed and the results are provided to the company. That is the moment of truth.
5 Drill results are the lifeblood of speculative mining companies. If the news is good the share price may well rise, attracting interest from other investors which might drive the share price even higher. Positive drill results and the market interest they excite might well provide the company with a window of opportunity to raise more cash for its activities. That is important because a lack of capital is the main inhibiting factor on the activities of junior explorers. Of course, poor drill results may have the effect of dragging the market down as disillusioned investors look elsewhere for their profits. Faced with poor drilling results, a company has no option but to re-focus its activities, husband its resources even more carefully, re-think its strategy and undertake further exploration work in the hope that next time the results will be positive.
6 In a circumstance where so much depends on what information is available to the public, it is important that market sensitive information is released by publicly listed companies as soon as reasonably practical after it is received. Of course, that applies to all listed companies not just to junior explorers. But in the case of junior explorers it is particularly important. Rumour plays a big part in share price fluctuations at this end of the market - the old saying is "buy on rumour, sell on fact". In a perfect market all price sensitive information would be released to all investors at the same time. But, of course, the market is not perfect. It is important, however, that information which might be price sensitive is released as soon as practical. The ASX is vigilant in ensuring this is done.
7 Deciding what information is market sensitive and how the information is released, is a matter for each individual company. As this case well illustrates, information which might be market sensitive to a junior explorer would have no effect at all on the share price of a major mining house. So the same information can be treated differently by two publicly listed companies. When in possession of information the company must weigh up whether its release to the market is warranted. The decision is a judgment call which is part and parcel of the responsibility of those running the company. Making the wrong call is one of the hazards of involvement with public companies.
8 This case concerns the alleged negligent failure by the defendant to release certain drill results. The plaintiff says that as a consequence of that failure, he has suffered loss and damage. As will become apparent, the focus in this case is remarkably narrow. Most of the facts are agreed. Before looking at the pleadings and the evidence, I will provide an overview to put the dispute in context.
9 The KER Trust ("the Trust") was established on 28 February 1985 (see exhibit 55). As at that date, the trustee was B M Riley Nominees Pty Ltd ("B M Riley Nominees"). From time to time, the trustee of the Trust has changed and at present Mr Kim Edward Riley ("Mr Riley") is the trustee. Nothing turns on these changes of trustee and that was not an issue in these proceedings.
10 Jubilee Gold Mines NL was listed on the ASX in 1987. In the late 1990's, the company changed its name by eliminating the word "Gold". Henceforth, I will refer to the company simply as the defendant, although, at all material times, it was actually known as Jubilee Gold Mines NL. Around about the same time a company known as Sir Samuel Mines NL ("Sir Samuel Mines") was also listed on the ASX. The defendant took over Sir Samuel Mines in November 1991. Sir Samuel Mines played no real part in these proceedings, although it is mentioned from time to time in the documents. Mr Kerry Harmanis ("Mr Harmanis") was appointed a director of the defendant and of Sir Samuel Mines at the time the two companies were listed. Mr Riley was appointed company secretary of both companies also at the date of listing.
11 In 1988, Mr Harmanis moved to Canada. (In his closing, counsel for the plaintiff pointed out that there was no direct evidence of this fact. Be that as it may, it is not a matter which is controversial or which has any effect on the outcome of this action. I simply mention it to provide background to what follows.) Also in 1988, one Mr Brian Saunders ("Mr Saunders") became managing director of both the defendant and Sir Samuel Mines. As at that date, Mr Saunders and Mr Riley effectively assumed day to day management of both companies.
12 In October 1989, Mr Riley sought an allotment of shares from the defendant as an incentive to his continuing in employment with the company. On 31 May 1991, the Trust was allotted 1,725,000 shares for no consideration.
13 In 1992, Mr Terry Streeter ("Mr Streeter") was appointed a director of the defendant. In September 1993, Mr William John Crossley ("Mr Crossley") was appointed as a director of the defendant and general manager in charge of production. It is clear from the 1992 and 1993 Annual Reports that at this time the defendant's focus was on gold and gold exploration. In particular, it was concentrating on what were known as its Kathleen Valley tenements. There is no suggestion that the defendant was prospecting for, or was interested in, nickel deposits.
14 In October 1993, a tenement known as McFarlanes Find was pegged. It was not pegged by the defendant, but in circumstances not presently relevant, it passed into the defendant's hands soon after the tenement was granted. It is convenient at this point to refer to a map showing the location of the McFarlanes Find prospect which appears as Annexure "1" to these reasons. By reference to the map, it can be seen that the McFarlanes Find prospect is actually in two parts. Running between these two parts is a prospect known as Spinifex Park which, at all material times, was owned by Western Mining Corporation ("WMC"). (The purpose of this map is to do no more than locate the McFarlanes Find tenement and to show where it lies in relation to other nickel deposits which have some significance in this action.)
15 Mr Riley resigned as a director of the defendant on 31 December 1993. As at the date of his resignation, the Trust owned 797,000 fully paid shares in the defendant. It also owned a total of 2,625,000 partly paid shares. Details of the shareholding and the dates upon which the plaintiff disposed of the shares and the price received when they were sold appear as Annexure "2" to these reasons. The disposal of the shares by the plaintiff receives detailed consideration later in these reasons. For present purposes, it is enough to note the fact of the shareholding as at the date of Mr Riley's resignation.
16 In April 1994, Mr Harmanis consented to a Federal Court order requiring him to sell 1,923,111 shares in the defendant. This disposal was to be completed by 2 April 1995. The reasons why the order was made are not relevant to these proceedings. It is of some relevance to note, however, that a significant parcel of shares in the defendant had to be traded between April 1994 and April 1995.
17 Mr John Alexander Cooke ("Mr Cooke") joined the defendant in March 1994. Mr Cooke is a geologist and, along with Mr Crossley, he is a central player in this case. I will examine the evidence given by both Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley in detail below. However, it is worth noting that from the date of his appointment in March 1994 until early in 1995, Mr Crossley and Mr Cooke appear to have had the day to day running of the defendant.
18 In May 1994, Mr Crossley commenced negotiations to purchase the Bellevue Gold Mine ("Bellevue"). The problem with this purchase was funding - the defendant did not have sufficient assets in its own right to purchase Bellevue and it required a cash injection if the purchase was to be completed. In my view, the evidence establishes that throughout 1994 the defendant was preoccupied with the purchase of Bellevue and the challenges the purchase presented. In a very real sense, that purchase was the focus of the defendant's activities.
19 Early in August 1994, the defendant received a letter from WMC notifying that WMC had inadvertently drilled on the eastern portion of the defendant's McFarlanes Find tenement (exhibit 6). This letter lies at the heart of these proceedings and I will quote it in full:
"1 August 1994
Mr J. Cooke
Manager Geology
Jubilee Gold Mines NL
1st Floor, Sir Samuel House
33 Ord Street
WEST PERTH WA 6005
Dear John,
Thank you for making the time and effort to come into Western Mining Corporation's office to discuss your interest within P36/3989. As discussed, a limited exploration programme is in progress which will allow WMC to progress the discussions once the results are available.
Regarding another matter, as a result of WMC instigating a licensed survey of the eastern boundary of E53/24, which has a common boundary with Jubilee's E36/251, it has become apparent the boundary differs to that as marked on the plans held with the Department of Mines and Energy. The boundary discrepancy has originated from ACM lodging (as required under Section 65 of the Act) incompatible plans and descriptions of the areas being retained and relinquished. We have notified DOME of the current position and hopefully they have corrected their plans accordingly. As a result of the lease boundary moving some 200m to the west, WMC has inadvertantly [sic] completed some exploration activities within E36/251. A list of activities and details have been appended for your information. There are analytical results for five drill holes which are not available at the time of writing and will be forwarded to yourself as they become available.
All drill samples are held with WMC on site at Mt Keith but would be made available at the request of Jubilee Gold Mines.
We apologise for this error, however I am sure you will appreciate the issue, realising we do not routinely survey EL boundaries necessitating some reliance on the accuracy of DOME information.
If you would like to discuss any of the above in more detail please give me a ring. I will be back in the office on 17 August.
As per our discussions last week, I will contact you late in August regarding P36/3989.
Yours sincerely,
[Signed]
D.R. Miller
Exploration Manager - Western Region
Attachment"
20 The first paragraph of this letter suggests that discussions had taken place between the defendant and WMC prior to the letter being sent. If such discussions had taken place, it was about other matters and not about the drilling WMC had done on the defendant's tenement. This letter was the first that Mr Cooke or the defendant had heard about that drilling.
21 Accompanying the letter was a number of documents. The first of these documents provided a list of six holes which had been drilled by WMC and the coordinates for each of the holes. There then followed information under a sub-heading "LOGS OF HOLES". Under that sub-heading, there was reference to the six holes that had been drilled and what had been found. Again, because of the importance of this information, I will quote it in full:
Variably weathered, strongly foliated felsic volcanics.
Variably weathered strongly foliated felsic volcanics. Possible intrusive 76-102m.
Strongly foliated talc-carbonate-chlorite altered olivine peridotite.
Serpentine-rich mesocumulate textured olivine peridotite/dunite with variable carbonate alteration. 2-5% interstitial ± blebby sulphides disseminated throughout.
Variably weathered strongly foliated felsic volcanics.
Low MgO weakly weathered ultramafics. Minor ( *RC percussion holes"
22 Thereafter certain further information was provided with the letter. Assay results were provided for hole MKTD-89 and a "sample data sheet" was provided for MKTC-103. A "diamond drill core log" was provided for hole MKTD-101. There then followed a bundle of documents under the rubric "downhole electromagnetic survey data". The bulk of this data comprised figures which, it was common ground, would be meaningless to anyone but a geophysicist. No interpretation of this data was provided.
23 The letter was addressed to Mr Cooke and the evidence is that it was received by him in early August 1994. After the receipt of the letter, Mr Cooke phoned Mr David Miller ("Mr Miller"), the author of the letter. He asked for further information but nothing was forthcoming. On 8 September 1994, WMC wrote again to the defendant, this time enclosing assay data for five of the holes drilled on the defendant's tenement. These holes were MKTD-100, MKTD-101, MKTC-103, MKTC-104 and MKTC-109. The letter made reference to discussions already commencing between WMC and the defendant, but these discussions were in relation to a tenement at Kathleen Valley. After receiving the second letter, Mr Cooke directed Mr Crossley's attention to the information which had been disclosed. What followed from that discussion is a matter of some dispute and I will examine these events later in these reasons.
24 However, it is clear that after the receipt of the two letters, representatives of WMC met with Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley and the prospect of a tenement swap was discussed. What WMC proposed was that in exchange for the defendant giving them the McFarlanes Find tenement, a grab bag of tenements would be provided to the defendant. Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley found such a swap of little interest and took the proposal no further. That was the last discussion the defendant had with WMC concerning the McFarlanes Find tenement until June 1996.
25 These two letters from WMC to the defendant are central to this case. The plaintiff says that the letters contained information of a market sensitive nature which the defendant was obliged to release to the ASX. Further, the plaintiff says that in not releasing the information, the defendant was negligent. As a consequence of that negligence, the plaintiff alleges it has suffered loss and damage. Essentially, what is said by the plaintiff is that if the information contained in the letters had been released, he would not have sold his shares in the defendant when he did but would have retained them. He would then have sold them at a later date at a higher price. The damages claimed by the plaintiff are the difference between the price for which he actually sold the shares and the price he says he would have received had he kept them and sold them at a later date.
26 Clearly, it is necessary to look carefully at the contents of the letters. I will do that below. But first, the narrative should be completed. It is, however, worthy of note that the evidence discloses that at no stage did Mr Cooke or Mr Crossley discuss the WMC letters with other directors of the defendant. It was not until 1996 that the other directors of the defendant became aware of the existence of this correspondence.
27 On 31 October 1994, the defendant issued a prospectus seeking to raise money to allow it to purchase Bellevue (exhibit 48). The issue was underwritten by the broking house, Porter Western Capital Markets Pty Ltd ("Porter Western"). The underwriting agreement allowed Porter Western to withdraw the underwriting if the gold index fell below the 1900 level. By 22 November 1994, the gold index had fallen below 1900 and Porter Western advised the defendant of what it described as a "termination event". The brokers reserved the right to withdraw from the underwriting agreement. In fact, on 5 December 1994, Porter Western did terminate the agreement. An announcement was made by the defendant to the ASX immediately (exhibit 62). The result was the necessary funds to allow for purchase of Bellevue were not secured and the purchase did not proceed. There is no doubt that the failure of the capital raising and the defendant's consequent inability to purchase Bellevue was a significant blow to its prospects. The principal focus of its activities over the previous eight months was cut away.
28 By early 1995, the defendant was in dire straits. Its share price had slumped, it was running short of cash and it had no prospects of becoming a gold producer in the near future. In February 1995, a further prospectus was issued (exhibit 50). Mr Harmanis and Mr Streeter agreed to partially underwrite the February 1995 prospectus and to subscribe for $800,000 worth of shares. There seems little doubt that had the two directors not effectively put their own funds into the company, it would have been in a very difficult position indeed. As it was, it faced an uncertain future.
29 On 25 August 1995, the defendant entered into a joint venture agreement with Anaconda Nickel NL ("Anaconda"). This agreement allowed Anaconda to develop the lateritic nickel potential on one of the defendant's tenements, Yundamindra. The defendant retained the right to the gold and silver on that tenement. As part of this deal, 3,074,000 fully paid ordinary shares at 20 cents each were issued to Anaconda. The funds received by the defendant were used for exploration.
30 On 9 October 1995, Mr Crossley resigned as managing director of the defendant. Mr Harmanis was thereafter appointed managing director and had day to day control of the company's affairs.
31 On 7 February 1996, the defendant entered into an agreement with Forrestania Gold NL ("Forrestania") (exhibit 138). This agreement involved Forrestania taking a significant parcel of shares (11,700,000), all of which were issued at a discount. Further, Forrestania agreed to lend the defendant $1,000,000 for three years. This loan was unsecured, interest free and was convertible into ordinary fully paid shares in the defendant. Mr Kim Robinson ("Mr Robinson") and Mr Barry Eldridge ("Mr Eldridge") of Forrestania joined the board of the defendant. Both Mr Robinson and Mr Eldridge had significant experience in nickel exploration.
32 On 15 April 1996, the ASX wrote to the defendant noting a fluctuation in the defendant's share price and asking if there was any reason for such a fluctuation (exhibit 140). The defendant responded on the same day saying it had no idea why the share price might be fluctuating (exhibit 139).
33 In May 1996, discussions took place between WMC and the defendant. These discussions were between Mr Cooke and Dr Allan Trench ("Dr Trench"), an employee of WMC. WMC expressed an interest in the McFarlanes Find tenement and wanted equity in the tenement and/or a joint venture. On 4 June 1996, WMC wrote to the defendant providing its interpretation of the 1994 drill hole results and undertaking to provide cross sections of those results.
34 On 7 June 1996, a meeting took place between WMC and the defendant. Dr Trench and others from WMC were present and the defendant was represented by Mr Harmanis and Mr Cooke. At the meeting, WMC provided the promised cross sections. This was the first time they had been seen by Mr Harmanis and Mr Cooke. What took place at this meeting will be discussed further when considering the evidence. However, subsequent to the meeting, the defendant made an announcement to the ASX (exhibit 2). The meeting took place on 7 June and the announcement was made on 11 June. (Monday, 10 June was a holiday and the ASX was closed.)
35 This announcement was an important feature of this case and I will quote it in full:
"ANNOUNCEMENT
Significant sulphide nickel mineralisation has been located on Jubilee's McFarlanes Find Project, 8 kms north of the Company's Kathleen Valley Project.
The McFarlanes Find Project, covering 17km² sits adjacent to WMC's Mt Keith tenements and to the north of Dominion's Yakabindie Project (see map).
Following a boundary survey by the Department of Minerals and Energy it has been discovered that four diamond holes drilled by Western Mining in 1994 were collared inadvertently on Jubilee ground and that they intersected the southern extension of the Mt Keith sequence. Significant disseminated nickel mineralisation was encountered on Jubilee's ground including 14.75m @ 0.72% Ni and 15m @ 0.65% Ni within a broad envelope of 42.75m @ 0.55% Ni from 195m depth. The Mt Keith sequence dips eastward on to Jubilee ground and it is considered that significant potential exists for both massive and disseminated nickel sulphides over a five kilometre strike length in the Jubilee tenement. The Company plans to drill test this sequence in June/July.
The host sequence also continues south through Dominions Yakabindie property and subsequently outcrops on Jubilee's Kathleen Valley Project ground for a distance of 3 - 5 km strike length.
At Kathleen Valley the current drilling programme has been suspended due to heavy rain. To date 2800 metres of RC and 3000 metres of RAB have been completed. Assaying results on samples to date have also been delayed due to problems at the assay laboratory although some results have been received and are being assessed. However at Mossbecker West and Ilias South the rig was unable to reach target depth and a diamond rig has been engaged for late June to continue the holes to target.
At Nabberu extensive soil sampling is continuing with mapping to commence shortly in anticipation of commencement of RC/Diamond drilling in late June/early July as planned.
[Signed]
K K Harmanis
MANAGING DIRECTOR"
36 On 14 June 1996, the ASX commenced an investigation looking at why it was that the 1994 drill results had not been announced to the market (exhibit 116). On 17 June 1996, the defendant responded to the ASX enquiry. It would seem that the ASX was satisfied with the response because they took the matter no further.
37 In June and July 1996, the defendant undertook drilling on the McFarlanes Find prospect specifically looking for nickel. On 25 July 1996, after receiving the results from the drilling on the tenement, the defendant made a further announcement to the ASX (exhibit 155). Again, I will quote it in full:
"ANNOUNCEMENT
McFARLANES FIND
The Company advises completion of a stratigraphic diamond drillhole targeted at the nickel-bearing ultramafics at McFarlanes Find, 8km north of Kathleen Valley.
MFD 01 collar was located 105m east of the WMC diamond hole, MKTD 101, at the same initial angle. The hole penetrated ultramafics between 315m and 588m where it was terminated and returned the following intercepts:
Results of the WMC hole MKTD101 have previously been announced and comprised 14m @ 0.72% Ni from 195m and 15m @ 0.65% Ni from 230m within a 42.7m envelope of 0.55% Ni.
The Jubilee drillhole establishes that the Mt Keith nickel sequence dips eastward on to the Jubilee tenement and has enhanced the prospectivity of the Jubilee tenement. The results are being assessed. Further exploration will be targeted at locating higher grade sulphides to the south of MFD 01 where mineralisation is likely to be closer to the surface.
Jubilee is currently completing its rain interrupted drilling programme at Kathleen Valley and will commence drilling at Nabberu in August.
The Company's June quarterly report is due to be released on Monday 29 July 1996.
[Signed]
K K Harmanis
MANAGING DIRECTOR"
38 On 1 September 1997, the defendant announced to the ASX that it had received spectacular results from the drilling of its wholly owned Cosmos deposit (exhibit 32). The market reacted immediately with a dramatic rise in the company's share price. In fact, as it turned out, the Cosmos deposit lived up to its early promise and the defendant is now a significant nickel producer. Its present share price is reflective of that fact.
39 This, then, is an outline of the relevant events. It is appropriate at this point to consider the case as pleaded.
40 The plaintiff's amended statement of claim is dated 26 October 2000. Paragraphs 1 and 2 identify the parties and pleads that at all material times, the defendant was the owner of the McFarlanes Find tenement (exploration licence E36/251). By par 3, the plaintiff pleads that the defendant was subject to ASX listing rule 3A. It is said that the requirements of listing rule 3A(1) were imposed for the purpose of ensuring that market sensitive information was notified to the ASX.
41 In par 4 and par 5, reference is made to the two WMC letters of August and September 1994. Paragraph 6 pleads that at all material times from 5 September 1994 the defendant, through its directors, was aware that the McFarlanes Find tenement was located 12 kilometres to the south of WMC's Mt Keith nickel mine and approximately 2 kilometres from Dominion Mining Co Ltd's Yakabindie nickel project. It is said that both the mine and the project were based on low grade disseminated nickel mineralisation. It is further pleaded that WMC's Mt Keith nickel mine was "a substantial and profitable mine" and was either the largest or one of the largest low grade nickel sulphide ore deposits in the world.
42 Paragraph 7 pleads matters which it says were "included" in the August and September 1994 letters. Because of their importance, I will quote in full the matters referred to in par 7:
"(a) WMC had, while conducting a drilling program on its tenement E53/24, inadvertently drilled a number of holes on JBG's E36/251;
(b) the two tenements share a common boundary;
(c) one of the drillholes (MKTC-101) was drilled to a downhole final depth of 245 metres and a vertical depth of about 229 metres;
(d) the bottom 68.2 metres of that hole assayed 0.47 per cent nickel, with nickel sulphide mineralisation disseminated throughout the final 57.85m;
(e) within the 68 metre length were intercepts of 16.85 metres at 0.61 per cent and 19.0 metres at 0.60 per cent nickel, the latter of which was at the bottom of the drillhole, with the final 12.7 metres averaging 0.67 per cent nickel;
(f) the final 42.7 metres of the drillhole averaged 0.55 per cent nickel;
(g) none of the other drillholes reached or approached the 187 metre downhole depth and 170 metre vertical depth at which the disseminated sulphides were located in drillhole MKTC-101."
43 By par 8, it is pleaded that the defendant was aware of the matters pleaded in par 6 and par 7. Paragraph 9 then defines the "information" in par 7 as "the Information". By par 9(a), it is pleaded that a reasonable person would have expected the Information to have a material effect on the price or value of ordinary shares in the defendant. The reasons for that are set out in three further sub-paragraphs of par 9. They read as follows:
"(b) was evidence that the Mt Keith mineralised nickel sequence, which was the host of all the then known substantial nickel sulphide deposits in the Agnew-Wiluna belt, including those pleaded in paragraph 6(a) above, extended onto JBG's tenement E36/251;
(c) suggested potential for further extensions or repetitions of the Mt Keith mineralised nickel sequence further to the south on tenement E36/251;
(d) suggested that there was potentially commercially viable nickel mineralisation, warranting further exploratory drilling, on tenement E36/251."
44 By par 10, it is said that the defendant failed to notify the ASX of the Information until 10 June 1996. By par 11, it is said that this failure to notify the ASX was a contravention of listing rule 3A(1). By par 12, it is said that as between September 1994 and June 1996, the Information was not generally available and had it been so available it would have influenced persons who commonly invest in securities. It is said that the Information would have had a material effect on the price of the defendant's shares.
45 Paragraph 13 is the plea of negligence. It is said that "a reasonable company" would have known that the Information had the qualities and consequences pleaded in pars 9(b), 9(c) and 9(d) and would also have known that it would have affected the value of shares (as pleaded in par 9(a)) and therefore should have been notified to the ASX. Paragraph 14 is a plea that the defendant contravened the provisions of s 1001A(2) of the Corporations Law.
46 By par 15, it is pleaded that between 22 September 1994 and July 1995 Mrs Helen Christine Riley ("Mrs Riley") (the then trustee of the Trust) sold 3,172,000 shares for a gross consideration of $290,270.00. By par 16, the plaintiff pleads what he says would have happened had the Information been released to the ASX. It is worth quoting par 16 in full:
(a) the price of JBG Shares would thereupon have increased substantially;
(b) Mrs Riley would not have sold the shares in JBG as pleaded in paragraph 15 above;
(i) sold a parcel of 547,000 JBG Shares in or about September 1994 to February 1995 and would, thereby, have obtained a greater price for those shares than was in fact obtained;
(ii) retained the balance of the shares in JBG then owned by her until at least after follow up exploration had been done and the results notified to the ASX; and
(iii) sold those shares in early September 1997, when JBG shares traded at a price between $1.40 and $1.50 per share, and thereby received a total consideration of at least $3,571,425.00 nett [sic] of brokerage and stamp duty."
47 Paragraph 17 particularises the plaintiff's alleged loss. By par 17(a)(i), the plaintiff alleges a loss of $3,281,155.00 being the difference between the price actually received for the shares and the price the plaintiff says would have been received had the shares been sold in line with what is pleaded in par 16(c)(iii). By par 17(a)(ii), an amount is claimed which it is said represents "the extra sum which would have been obtained upon the sale of the shares referred to in para 16(c)(i)" had the Information been released to the ASX. In the pleading it is said that particulars of that amount would be given prior to trial. It would seem no particulars were given.
48 There is an alternative claim pleaded in par 17(b). That is a claim based on an increased share price for all of the shares held by the plaintiff. That too was to be particularised prior to trial, but again it would appear that no particulars were delivered. In any event, this alternative claim was not pursued. Damages were claimed under s 1005 of the Corporations Law.
49 By its amended defence, the defendant admits par 1 of the statement of claim (the identity of the plaintiff) and effectively admits par 2 - that is, its ownership of the McFarlanes Find tenement (despite the plea that is found in par 2(e) of the defence). By par 2(d), the defendant says that on 22 February 1996, the Department of Minerals and Energy approved the survey by WMC which resulted in the common boundary between the defendant's McFarlanes Find tenement and WMC's Spinifex Park tenement moving some 200 metres to the west of the previously recorded position. Doubtless that pleaded fact is true (although irrelevant). However, it is undeniable by virtue of the letter of 1 August 1996 from WMC to the defendant that the defendant became aware of the boundary shift in August 1994.
50 By par 3, the defendant admits the existence of the listing rule but points out that there are circumstances in which information is not to be released. Further consideration of this plea can await discussion of the terms of the listing rule.
51 Paragraph 4 of the amended defence deals with what are defined in the paragraph as the "WMC Letters". It is pleaded that the 1 August 1994 letter informed the defendant that the boundary between the parties' tenements was some 200 metres to the west of the location shown on the plans held by the Department of Minerals and Energy. It further said that the letter advised that six holes had been drilled on the defendant's tenement. As to the later letter, it is said by par 4(b) of the defence that certain data was provided. As to the electromagnetic survey data, it is said in par 4(b)(iii) that the data was "raw, unprocessed readings" with no interpretation.
52 By pars 5, 6 and 7 of its amended defence, the defendant sets out what it says is to be made of the information contained in the two WMC letters. Because of the importance of these paragraphs, I will quote them in full:
"5 With respect to the information ('1994 WMC Information') conveyed by WMC in WMC's letters and the enclosures with them:
(a) only one of the 6 holes drilled, being MKTD101, revealed anomalous nickel sulphide mineralisation on what WMC contended to be part of E36/251;
(b) hole MKTD101 passed through the area which WMC contended was part of E36/251 and into the area which WMC's survey indicated was covered by E53/24;
(c) the distance along the hole MKTD101 from the surface to the point at which it intersected the boundary line of E53/24 as indicated by WMC according to its survey (the down hole depth) was 245 metres and the vertical depth from the surface to that point was between 225 and 237m;
(d) the remaining 5 holes intersected a barren felsic volcanic sequence to the east of the Mt Keith ultramafic rock sequence;
(e) it did not contain or include any information with respect to the area which WMC's survey indicated was covered by E53/24;
(f) it did not contain or include cross sections or other interpretative material.
6 As to paragraph 6 of the amended statement of claim, the defendant:
(a) says that the area the subject of WMC's letters was approximately 12 kilometres south southeast of the centre of WMC's Mt Keith nickel mine;
(b) says that the said area was some 10 to 15 kilometres north northwest of Dominion Co Ltd's Yakabindie nickel project;
(c) says that WMC did not commence production at Mt Keith until September 1994 and that WMC's Mt Keith nickel deposit comprised large reserves of disseminated nickel sulphide ore;
(d) says that the Yakabindie nickel project was not in September 1994 (and still is not) a mine;
(e) otherwise denies the allegations in the said paragraph.
7 As to paragraph 7 of the amended statement of claim, the defendant:
7.1 repeats the matters pleaded in paragraphs 4 and 5 above;
7.2 says, with respect to sub paragraph 7(c), that in the 1994 WMC Information the drill hole was named 'MKTD101', not 'MKTC101' and that information did not disclose either the final vertical depth or final down hole depth of that hole and those depths could not be determined from that information although it disclosed that the down hole depth was well in excess of 245 metres;
7.3 says, with respect to sub paragraphs 7(d), (e) and (f) and the 1994 WMC Information in relation to drill hole MKTD 101:
(a) assay information was only provided in respect of material derived to a down hole depth of 245 metres and that assay information did not disclose what the 68.2 metre interval from and above the point being 245 metres down hole depth assayed;
(b) information as to the mineralogy of the final 57.85m of material derived from the hole was not provided but it could be discerned from the 1994 WMC Information that the 60 metre (not just 57.85m) interval from and above the point being 245 metres down hole depth contained disseminated nickel sulphides;
(c) it could be derived from the 1994 WMC Information that the 67.9 metres from 177.1 metres down hole depth to the end of the assay information provided by WMC at 245 metres down hole depth assayed 0.445 per cent nickel;
(d) it was not disclosed and it could not be derived from that the 1994 WMC Information what percentage of nickel was contained in the 68.2 metres from 177.1 metres down hole depth to the end of the assay information provided by WMC at 245 metres;".
53 By par 9 of the amended defence, the defendant denies that the information in par 7 of the amended statement of claim ought have led a reasonable person to expect its release would have a material effect on the defendant's share price. As an alternative to that plea, it is said that there was no breach of listing rule 3A because disclosure of such "indefinite and incomplete information" could damage the defendant's credibility in the market and adversely affect the share price. It is also said that the information did not suggest that there was "potential for commercially viable nickel operation".
54 By pars 10, 11 and 12 of the amended defence, the defendant admits it did not notify the ASX of the matters referred to in the WMC letters and joins issue with allegations in the amended statement of claim that it should have done so. By par 13 of the amended defence, the defendant denies any negligence in its failure to notify the ASX of the Information. Particulars of why it was not negligent are provided in pars 14, 15, 16 and 17. These again are important paragraphs and I will quote them in full:
"14 Upon receipt by the defendant of WMC's Letters and accompanying documents, they were read by Mr. John Cooke, the defendant's manager of exploration and an experienced geologist in the minerals exploration industry.
15 Mr. Cooke promptly brought both letters and accompanying documents to the attention of Mr. William Crossley, the defendant's managing director and a qualified mining engineer.
16 Soon thereafter Mr. Cooke and Mr. Crossley conferred about the significance of the information conveyed by WMC's Letters and accompanying documents and both reasonably took the view that although the 1994 WMC Information showed anomalous nickel values in respect of one of the holes drilled by WMC (MKTD101), it was not of any interest or significance to the defendant as the mineralisation indicated was too deep and of too low grade to suggest potential for a commercially viable nickel operation and there was no evidence as to whether its width was true or exaggerated.
17 Mr. Crossley, as managing director of the defendant, therefore did not regard the information as being of sufficient significance to warrant it being referred to the Board of the defendant or reported to the ASX."
55 The defendant concludes by denying that the plaintiff has suffered any loss and damage. Nothing specific is pleaded about share price fluctuations and no direct response is given to the allegation that the plaintiff would have held on to the shares and sold at a later date had the information been given to the market. Clearly, the defendant joined issue with the plaintiff on that question and, not surprisingly, quantification of the plaintiff's alleged loss was a substantial issue in the proceedings.
56 The ASX listing rules are a set of rules which govern the relationship between companies listed on the ASX and the ASX itself. At the relevant time, the ASX had adopted listing rules within the meaning of the then prevailing s 761 of the Corporations Law. For the purposes of this case, it is listing rule 3A which is relevant. That rule appears under the heading "NOTICES" and is in the following terms:
"A listed company shall immediately notify the Exchange of -
(1) any information concerning the company of which it is or becomes aware and which a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of securities of the company. This requirement does not apply if each of the following conditions is and remains satisfied:
(i) a reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed; and
(iii) one or more of the following conditions apply:
a. it would be a breach of a law to disclose the information;
b. the information is, or is part of, an incomplete proposal or negotiation;
c. the information comprises matters of supposition or is insufficiently definite to warrant disclosure;
d. the information is generated for the internal management purposes of the company; or
For the purpose of this Listing Rule the company becomes aware of information where a director or executive officer has, or ought reasonably to have, come into possession of the information in the course of the performance of duties as a director or executive officer."
57 At the relevant time, disclosure by listed entities was controlled by s 1001A of the Corporations Law. That section is in the following terms:
"(1) This section applies to a listed disclosing entity if the provisions of the listing rules of a securities exchange:
(b) require the entity to notify the securities exchange of information about specified events or matters as they arise for the purpose of the securities exchange making that information available to a stock market conducted by the securities exchange.
(2) The disclosing entity must not contravene those provisions by intentionally, recklessly or negligently failing to notify the securities exchange of information:
(b) that a reasonable person would expect, if it were generally available, to have a material effect on the price or value of ED securities of the entity.
(3) A contravention of subsection (2) is only an offence if the failure concerned is intentional or reckless.
(4) ..."
58 Some guide is provided to the interpretation of s 1001A by s 1001D. It is in the following terms:
"For the purposes of sections 1001A and 1001B, a reasonable person would be taken to expect information to have a material effect on the price or value of securities if the information would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly invest in securities in deciding whether or not to subscribe for, or buy or sell, the first-mentioned securities."
59 It is worth pausing at this point to consider the statutory provisions in some detail and how those provisions, taken together with the pleadings, define the issues to be determined in this case. The place to begin is with listing rule 3A. The rule requires information to be disclosed to the ASX if a reasonable person would expect the information to have a material effect on the price or value or securities. There are two concepts present in that requirement. The first is that it is from the point of view of a "reasonable person" that it is to be determined whether the information would have an effect on the price. It is not from the point of view of a stockbroker or a geologist or a seasoned trader, but of a reasonable person. Second, the information is only to be released if there is an expectation that it would have a "material effect" on the price or value of securities. So information that might be thought to cause a stock trading at $20 to jump by 1 cent would probably not be "material", whereas information that might cause a stock trading at 10 cents to jump by 1 cent, would be "material". This introduces the concept of relative values of the stock to which I referred earlier when contrasting the defendant with WMC.
60 Rule 3A(1)(i) is a rather strange exception. The primary requirement of the rule is that information should be released if a reasonable person would expect the information to materially affect the stock price. But if that same reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed, even if it would have a material effect on the stock price, then the rule will not operate. Whatever might be the proper interpretation of this exclusion, it is not relevant to this action.
61 The pleadings suggest that the defendant would rely on rule 3A(1)(iii)(c). In other words, it was said that the WMC information was "insufficiently definite". As it turned out, that argument was not really pressed. If anything, it was subsumed in the wider claim that the information was not of such significance that it should have been released.
62 Section 1001A(2)(b) of the Corporations Law picks up almost word for word what is found in rule 3A. But its operation is dependant on the listing rule being contravened "intentionally, recklessly or negligently". The use of the word "intentionally" is somewhat confusing. The defendant's pleaded case is to the effect that the defendant, by its officers, considered the WMC information and decided not to release it to the ASX - in other words, they formed an intention not to so release the information. Both counsel agreed that whatever is meant by "intentionally", it did not apply to this case. The case was run by the plaintiff and defended by the defendant on the basis that it was alleged the defendant was negligent in failing to release the information.
63 Section 1001D deals with when information should be seen as having a material effect on the price of securities. The information must influence persons "who commonly invest in securities" in deciding whether to buy or sell. So it is not relevant to ask what a member of the general public might make of the information. Nor is it relevant to consider the information from the point of view of a stockbroker or a geologist or a mining entrepreneur. What is to be considered is the perspective of the person who "commonly", as opposed to occasionally or rarely, invests in securities. There are, of course, persons who commonly invest in securities but would not dream of investing in speculative mining stocks. Presumably such persons would never be in a position of deciding whether to buy or sell such shares. They simply do not trade in that area. So the notional person to be considered in this case is a person who commonly invests in small speculative miners.
64 Against that background, it is possible to define the issues. They are:
(1) Would a reasonable person expect the material found in the WMC letters to have had a material effect on the defendant's share price as at September or perhaps October 1994?
(2) If the answer to the above question is yes, was the failure of the defendant to notify the ASX negligent?
(3) If the answer to that question is yes, has the plaintiff suffered any loss or damage and, if so, how much?
65 Of course, each of these three issues has bound up in it a number of sub-issues. But, for present purposes, it is enough to state in broad terms what is to be determined in this action.
66 Before dealing with the evidence, I should return again to the WMC letters. They need to be put in context. WMC was at the time one of the largest nickel miners in the world. It was well known as such. It was certainly well known as such by both Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley. WMC had proved up a huge resource of low grade nickel at Mt Keith. As at September 1994, the ore reserve was measured at some 500,000,000 tonnes. It was anticipated that the Mt Keith mine would cost some $450,000,000 to develop and would have a life of anywhere between 20 and 50 years. By any measure, Mt Keith was a substantial undertaking.
67 To the south of McFarlanes Find lay the Yakabindie deposit of Dominion Mining. This too was a substantial deposit of low grade nickel which, as at 1994, was and even today, remains undeveloped. So anyone reasonably familiar with the area around the McFarlanes Find tenement - and certainly Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley - were aware that the tenement was in a nickel province and lay between two substantial and proven nickel resources.
68 The letters themselves indicated that WMC were drilling the Spinifex Park tenement which was a narrow section of land between the two parts of the McFarlanes Find tenement. WMC was not, as at September 1994, exclusively a nickel miner. But it is reasonable to suppose that they were drilling Spinifex Park to see whether it contained nickel. In other words, they were looking to see whether the reserves at Mt Keith extended south through Spinifex Park.
69 It is reasonable to ask why WMC wrote to the defendant at all bringing the fact of the drill holes to their attention. In part, it may be a reflection of WMC as a good corporate citizen. However, WMC had in the past run into difficulties by not disclosing to an adjoining tenement holder, information obtained about that tenement. This is referred to as the Ernest Henry case in mining circles. The facts of that case as set out by counsel for the plaintiff (page 911 of the transcript) are as follows:
"In 1987 WMC geophysicists in northwest Queensland walked over what appeared to be a significant electromagnetic anomaly with 50 per cent of the anomaly lying on an adjacent tenement. WMC approached the owners of the neighbouring tenement Savage Resources, and formed a joint venture for exploration and development.
Savage Resources consisted of three Sydney accountants who invested their time into these exploration tenements in Queensland. Savage were not made aware of the electromagnetic anomaly at the joint venture meetings.
At the signing of the joint venture agreement WMC quickly drilled the anomaly and discovered a $400,000,000 copper and gold deposit now known as Ernest Henry. Despite their junior role in the relationship, Savage quickly became suspicious of WMC's instant success at the boundary of the tenements and took WMC to Court.
The courts for whatever reason leaned in favour of Savage Resources and they were awarded 100 per cent of the whole deposit. WMC had failed to provide an honest and accurate assessment of work completed over the boundary of another company's tenements."
Clearly, WMC did not want a repeat of the events surrounding Ernest Henry.
70 The Ernest Henry case has passed into mining folklore. Perhaps it touches a chord with those involved in mining as the actions of WMC had about them an element of "claim jumping", always an emotive issue in the mining industry. But whatever the reason, in 1994, anyone involved in the mining industry would have at least had some knowledge of the Ernest Henry case and its ramifications. Certainly, the decision was known to both Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley.
71 I mention these matters because they provide the background to the receipt by the defendant of the WMC letters. One might expect that Mr Cooke, on receiving the letters, would have been put on his guard. From the most basic reading of the material accompanying the letter of 1 August 1994, it was apparent that the drill holes had intersected ultramafic rock, a known host for nickel. Further, there was some evidence of nickel sulphides. That is referred to in the logs of holes for MKTD-101 and MKTC-103. The assay results for MKTD-89 which accompanied the first letter did show some heightened nickel, although it may have been necessary to have some expertise in order to interpret the significance of the assay results.
72 The fact that the results of electromagnetic surveys were provided, without more, indicated that electromagnetic field work had been undertaken. That would hardly be surprising, as all the witnesses agreed it was nothing more or less than was to be expected when WMC were undertaking an exploration programme. But one might have thought that it would be worth obtaining some assessment of the electromagnetic data from a consultant geophysicist. In all, one might have expected the first letter to have heightened the awareness of Mr Cooke and the defendant to the possibility that WMC had discovered something of significance on the defendant's ground.
73 It is convenient to deal at this point with an argument over pleadings which erupted during the course of the trial. Counsel for the defendant made the point that there was nothing in the plaintiff's statement of claim which referred to the electromagnetic data. Counsel for the plaintiff insisted that the way the action was pleaded meant that the presence of the electromagnetic data was one factor which should have alerted the defendant to the significance of the WMC information. Counsel for the plaintiff then proposed that he file a reply. A document entitled "Minute of Proposed Reply" was tendered. It was in the following form:
"1 As to paragraphs 4(b)(iii) and 5(f) of the defence the plaintiff says that if, for the purpose of determining whether the Information pleaded in paragraph 7 of the statement of claim was required to be notified to the ASX, the defendant needed to know whether there was an electromagnetic feature or to prepare and draw conclusions from cross sections and the electromagnetic feature then:
1.1 The WMC letters included electromagnetic survey data for the holes drilled on the defendant's tenement and for drill hole MKTD 96 drilled solely on the WMC tenement;
1.2 The electromagnetic survey data contained information that showed for the drill holes drilled on the defendant's tenement and a hole drilled solely on WMC's adjoining tenement hole locations, hole depths, survey instructions to the geophysical staff concerning areas of high anomaly gradient and survey results for the drill holes in areas of high anomaly gradient.
1.3 The information in the electromagnetic survey data enabled the defendant to determine whether an electromagnetic feature was present on the WMC tenement;
1.4 The information to draw cross sections was contained in the WMC letters;
1.5 The defendant was able to determine that the Information pleaded in paragraph 7 of the statement of claim was required to be notified to the ASX notwithstanding that it had not been provided with an interpretation of the electromagnetic data, cross sections or other interpretative material.
2 The plaintiff otherwise joins issue with the defendant upon its defence."
74 Counsel for the defendant took strong objection to the terms of the reply. He made the point that it raised a separate issue upon which none of the defendant's experts had been asked to comment. It was his submission that it was too late in the day to raise what was, in effect, a fresh issue.
75 I refused to allow the plaintiff to amend in terms of the minute. In my view, it does raise a fresh issue about which expert evidence would be necessary. Expert evidence orders had been made back in 2002 and no expert had analysed the electromagnetic data. It was now too late to raise something altogether new.
76 But that is not to say the electromagnetic data is to be ignored. It is the fact that it accompanied the first letter. As I have said, without making any attempt to understand the data or have it analysed, Mr Cooke and the defendant surely should have had some heightened awareness of its significance.
77 The second letter had attached to it the assay results. Some of the results for MKTD-101 leap off the page. For instance, there is a 2 metre intersection which runs at 1.33 per cent nickel and another 2 metre intersection which runs at 1.153 per cent nickel. The Mt Keith deposit was at a grade of 0.5 per cent. These figures are not difficult to spot and, even to the untrained eye, they look significant. Quite how significant is the question at the heart of this case.
78 However, what must be borne in mind is all of the background facts known to Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley and the fact of the two WMC letters and what, even to the uninitiated, they contain. All of the evidence of all of the witnesses needs to be set against that background.
79 Mr Riley was born in Perth and graduated from the University of Western Australia with a bachelor of commerce degree in 1975. He became a member of the Australian Society of Accountants in 1976 but relinquished his membership in 2000. He became an associate member of the Securities Institute of Australia in 1991 and relinquished that membership in 2000. After graduating from university, he worked in a number of different jobs focusing mainly on financial and administration work. This work included company secretarial and accountancy work. He is married to Mrs Riley, who also gave evidence in these proceedings. For a time, Mrs Riley was the trustee of the Trust.
80 On 25 January 1987, Mr Riley was appointed on an interim basis company secretary of Sir Samuel Mines. At the time, the defendant was not listed on the ASX. Mr Riley commenced full-time employment as company secretary of Sir Samuel Mines on 6 July 1987. He was appointed company secretary of the defendant on 5 November 1987. On 13 January 1988, he was appointed a director of both the defendant and Sir Samuel Mines as an alternative to Mr Harmanis. Mr Harmanis was, at the time, a substantial shareholder in both companies. On 4 July 1989, Mr Riley was appointed managing director of Sir Samuel Mines. Somewhere between 1 November 1990 and 4 July 1991, Mr Riley was appointed the managing director of the defendant. On 17 November 1991, the defendant took over Sir Samuel Mines and that company became a wholly owned subsidiary of the defendant. After the takeover, Mr Riley became company secretary and managing director of both the defendant and Sir Samuel Mines.
81 From about March 1993, Mr Riley's relationship with Mr Harmanis began to deteriorate. By September 1993, Mr Riley felt that he could no longer work for the defendant. On 1 December 1993, Mr Riley gave written notice of his resignation as a director of both the defendant and Sir Samuel Mines. This resignation took effect on 31 December 1993. The circumstances in which Mr Riley departed company with the defendant were not relevant to this action.
82 In the period from about 11 June 1987 to 21 September 1993, the Trust acquired fully paid shares in the defendant. Between about 23 June 1988 and 6 December 1989, Mr Riley also acquired a number of shares in both the defendant and Sir Samuel Mines in his own name. Between 1 September 1988 and 4 January 1990, Mr Riley transferred 1,800,000 partly paid shares in Sir Samuel Mines to the Trust. Between about 16 October 1989 and 4 January 1990, Mr Riley transferred 1,725,000 partly paid shares in the defendant to the Trust. As a result of the takeover of Sir Samuel Mines by the defendant on 17 November 1991, Sir Samuel Mines shares were exchanged for shares in the defendant. The Sir Samuel Mines shareholders received three of the defendant's shares for every four Sir Samuel Mines shares they held. As at the date of Mr Riley's resignation from the defendant, the Trust owned 797,000 fully paid shares. It also owned 1,500,000 partly paid shares with 4 cents unpaid on each share and 1,125,000 partly paid shares with 6 cents unpaid on each share.
83 The Trust was established in 1985. The main purpose of the Trust was to hold property and investments on behalf of Mr Riley, his wife and their two children. These four individuals are the beneficiaries of the Trust. From the commencement of the Trust until 28 June 1999, Mr Riley was the appointor under the trust deed. From the commencement of the Trust until 18 August 1985, B M Riley Nominees was the trustee. B M Riley Nominees was controlled by Mr Riley's brother, Bruce Maxwell Riley. By deed of appointment dated 18 August 1985, B M Riley Nominees retired as trustee, and Harnay Pty Ltd ("Harnay") was appointed as trustee. Harnay was controlled by Mr Riley. By deed of appointment dated 28 June 1994, Harnay retired as trustee and Mrs Riley was appointed as trustee. By deed of appointment dated 28 June 1999, Mr Riley retired as appointor and appointed Mr Craig Derel Sproule ("Mr Sproule") as the new appointor of the Trust. By deed of variation dated 15 April 2006, the office of the appointor was abolished. By deed of appointment dated 29 June 1999, Mrs Riley retired as trustee and Mr Sproule appointed Mr Riley as the trustee. He remained as trustee as at the date of trial.
84 Mr Riley said in his evidence that irrespective of the identity of the trustee, it was he who monitored the trust share portfolio. Most days he checked the trading price of the Trust's shares. Occasionally, he would speak with stockbrokers seeking their advice as to which shares the Trust should acquire. Whenever possible he attended functions that gave him the opportunity to speak with different people who worked for or with the companies in which the Trust held shares or in which the Trust was considering investing. Mr Riley also kept abreast of press reports about shares in which the Trust invested. Occasionally, Mr Riley would visit the ASX.
85 The decisions of the trustee to hold, buy or sell shares were made on the basis of, and in accordance with, Mr Riley's advice and recommendations. His strategy for the Trust was to invest in companies primarily in the resource sector that had the potential to return significant capital gains in the longer term, being ever mindful of opportunities to profit through short term trading.
86 After he resigned from the defendant in December 1993, Mr Riley said he decided to take a break from paid employment. Between December 1993 and July 1995, he undertook significant renovations to his family home. In addition, he evaluated a number of business opportunities. However, throughout this period, he was not in any paid employment. In July 1995 Mr Riley took up a position as manager with Polymetals Pty Ltd.
87 During the 18 months when Mr Riley was not in paid employment, he used the proceeds of the sale of shares in the defendant to fund his living expenses. That became apparent from cross-examination: transcript, pages 383 - 384. Mr Riley indicated that while as at the date he left the defendant's employment he intended to take some time off, he did not originally intend to take 18 months. He maintained, and I accept, that had he wished to do so he would have been able to find paid employment. He confirmed that position in re-examination: transcript, page 394.
88 Mr Riley says that when he resigned from the defendant it was his intention that the Trust should sell the 797,000 fully paid shares in the defendant in parcels as and when they were needed to provide income for his family. He said that it was his intention that the 2,625,000 partly paid shares should be retained by the Trust as a long term investment. He said that the accounts for the Trust showed the partly paid shares being treated as capital and the fully paid shares being treated as trading stock. The accounts of the Trust were not in evidence.
89 In June 1994, Mr Riley became aware that on 24 June 1994 the defendant announced to the ASX that it had reached agreement to acquire 100 per cent of the Bellevue Gold Project. The acquisition was to take place on 15 August 1994. The funding for the acquisition was to be a combination of project financing and placement of shares. On or shortly after 15 August 1994, Mr Riley became aware of the defendant's announcement to the ASX that the Bellevue No. 1 deal would not be completed on 15 August 1994. The announcement said that alternative arrangements were being negotiated. Mr Riley became aware on or about 30 September 1994 of the defendant's announcement to the ASX of an amended deal to acquire the Bellevue Gold Project. On or about 5 December 1994, Mr Riley became aware from the defendant's ASX announcement that the Bellevue No. 2 deal had fallen over and the acquisition would not be completed.
90 By February 1995, Mr Riley had formed the view that the defendant's share price would continue to fall (it had been falling since the announcement of the failure of the Bellevue deals) and would stay low for an indefinite period. Mr Riley says that there were five factors which led him to form this view. First, the Bellevue deals had failed in two manifestations, suggesting an inability on the part of the defendant to excite the market sufficiently to raise the necessary capital to complete the deal. Second, the defendant had failed to get its major gold resource project at Kathleen Valley into production. Thirdly, the defendant did not have any other mineral exploration potential including nickel. Fourthly, the defendant had a cash shortage and did not have any disclosed future revenue earning prospects. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the defendant's share price was moving downwards.
91 Having put all these factors together and formed an adverse view of the defendant's prospects, Mr Riley decided in February 1995 that the Trust should forthwith sell all its shares. That is what was done. Annexure "2" shows the sales. As a number of the shares held by the plaintiff were partly paid, it was necessary to make payment of the money outstanding on the shares before the fully paid shares could be sold on the market. Annexure "2" shows payments made to obtain the fully paid shares.
92 Mr Riley said that he has since become aware that in August and September 1994, the defendant received the WMC information. He first became aware of that information when the defendant made its announcement to the ASX in June 1996. (I should say at this point that the defendant disputed that the information available in 1994 was the same as the information available in 1996. This is an issue I will canvass below. However, it is the plaintiff's position - and it was certainly Mr Riley's position - that the information available to the defendant in 1994 was precisely the same as the information available in 1996.)
93 Mr Riley then goes on to say what would have been the effect of his being made aware of the WMC information in September 1994. Because of the importance of this point, I will quote par 84 of Mr Riley's witness statement in full:
"If Jubilee had released the WMC Information to the ASX in or around September 1994 then I would not have advised the Trust to dispose of its Jubilee shares in the way that it did."
94 Mr Riley says that as he read the financial press most days, it was likely that he would have become aware of any announcement to the ASX by the defendant within 24 hours of the announcement being made. As at late 1994, he knew that the defendant's McFarlanes Find project adjoined WMC's Mt Keith tenement and that Mt Keith contained one of the largest low grade nickel sulphide ore reserves in the world. He says that he would have concluded that the WMC information was evidence that the Mt Keith mineralised nickel sequence extended on to the defendant's McFarlanes Find tenement and that the McFarlanes Find tenement might contain commercially viable nickel mineralisation or, at the very least, the tenement required further exploratory drilling to establish whether the tenement contained commercially viable nickel mineralisation.
95 Having said that he would have retained the shares sold in 1995, the question then was when he would have sold. Mr Riley says that in September 1997, he learned that the defendant's share price was approaching $1.50. This was after the June 1996 announcement and before any announcement related to the Cosmos discovery. Mr Riley says that he regarded something around $1.50 as being "a very good price for the defendant's shares" and that he would have sold: see pars 100, 101 and 102 of Mr Riley's witness statement. He also says that he advised others who he knew had shares in the defendant to sell.
96 Two things emerged from the cross-examination of Mr Riley. First, he was well aware that the defendant was in 1994 focused on exploring for gold. The defendant had not mentioned looking for nickel and there was no indication it would reassess its priorities: transcript, pages 361 - 362. Second, Mr Riley clearly regarded the WMC information as significant. Watching him give his evidence, he seemed to me to be a well informed investor with perhaps slightly more knowledge of the mining industry than most. But none of his responses to questions under cross-examination led me to the conclusion that in any circumstances he would have regarded the WMC information as anything other than positive: transcript, pages 366 - 369; 385 - 388.
97 I accept Mr Riley as an honest witness. He gave his evidence in a straightforward manner. He responded directly and, in my view, honestly, to all questions put to him in cross-examination. This can, perhaps, be highlighted by an exchange which took place during the course of cross-examination. As I have mentioned above, it was the defendant's position that had it made an announcement to the ASX in 1994 subsequent to the receipt of the WMC information, it would have had to advise the ASX that it would not be undertaking any more drilling. Watching Mr Riley (and other witnesses to whom this proposition was put), it was clear that they were nonplussed by the idea that the defendant would announce what they regarded as positive results and then by the terms of the announcement undermine the prospect of a favourable market response. The exchange went as follows (transcript, pages 376 - 378):
"Yes, that's what I'm putting to you. If in September 94 they said simply, 'There's the information. It might be significant but we're not doing anything about it. We're sticking with gold. We're not going to do further exploration. We're not going to do further drilling,' surely would you - as a prudent investment adviser you would then say to the trust or the trustee, 'Sell those shares'? --- Yes. I would have had to strongly consider that; yes.
You would more than strongly consider it; you would give that advice, wouldn't you? --- I would have to strongly consider it.
Can you answer the question? Would you have advised the trustee to sell the shares? I appreciate it's an answer against your interest, but that is the reality? --- I am trying to put it into context, please, sir, in the 1994-95 market as well. It has got the WMC information.
The market has got that but it has also ---?--- That's the same information that is in 1996 ---
It has got the WMC information of 1994, which is not the same? --- No, but the relevant aspects of it, sir, in 1996 are disclosed, such as the ---
In 1996, Mr Riley, as you I think more or less pointed out, the company said it was going to do drilling and exploration, which it did? --- Yes.
But I'm putting to you: suppose in 1994, September 94, the company said, 'That's what we've got from WMC. We don't think there is anything in it but there it is and we're not going to do exploration, we're not going to do drilling, we are sticking with gold and we've got limited funds for that.' Would you agree that faced with that, standing back as an independent adviser to the trust, you would be negligent if you didn't say to the trust, 'Sell the Jubilee shares'? --- Yes, I likely would have recommended that if there was going to be no exploration on the nickel and there was no further nickel information available, then yes."
98 What that section of transcript does not show is the care Mr Riley gave to answering the question. He paused, clearly considering what he regarded as an unlikely possibility and then answered the question in an honest and straightforward fashion. That was typical of his evidence and it, among other things, convinced me that he was a witness of truth.
99 Mrs Riley was called to give evidence essentially to confirm the dates on which the defendant's shares were sold by the Trust. She was the trustee during relevant periods. Mrs Riley was not cross-examined and her evidence was uncontroversial.
100 Dr Trench is presently an employee of Woodside Petroleum. He is also a non-executive director of three listed companies - Herron Resources NL, Pioneer Nickel NL and Navigator Resources NL. In 1996, Dr Trench was working for WMC. In May or June 1996, he was working at the Leinster nickel operation as senior exploration geophysicist. Dr Trench has a doctorate in geophysics, an honours degree in geology, a masters of business administration and a masters degree in mineral economics.
101 In mid-1996, Dr Trench came into possession of the WMC information forwarded to the defendant in 1994. In fact, the information was provided to Dr Trench by the defendant. Dr Trench then wrote to the defendant on 4 June 1996. The letter is in the following terms (exhibit 97):
"4 June 1996
Mr. J. Cooke,
Chief Geologist;
Jubilee Gold Mines NL
1st Floor, Sir Samuel House,
33 Ord Street,
WEST PERTH WA 6005
Dear John,
Thank you for forwarding the WMC exploration data from E36/251 as sent to you by Dave Miller in August/September 1994.
I have taken the time to view the dataset and offer the following observations. I also enclose two cross-sections (19300N & 19500N, WMC local grid) depicting the drillhole information and lease boundary. I hope that these serve to clarify the geology - geophysics for you prior to discussions between WMC and Jubilee regarding E36/251.
Drillhole Data: Having viewed all the assay data, the only anomalous nickel values lie within the ultramafic of MKTD 101. These assays are summarised below:
In the light of the assay data from the remaining holes, the suggested 'low MgO ultramafics' referred to within MKTC 103 (82 - 121 m) and MKTC 109 (125 - 168m) most likely represent either sheared felsic volcanic rocks or intermediate intrusive rocks. There are therefore no ultramafic rocks within at least 150 metres of the surface within lease E36/251 on section 19500 mN.
Geophysical Data: Having worked through the geophysical appendix to Dave Miller's letter, I ascertained that WMC have sent you the drillhole electromagnetic data for holes collared within E36/251 and data for holes collared in WMC lease E53/24 (in cases where a transmitter loop for the downhole survey was sited in E36/251). Having looked through these data, the only anomalous response is positioned around MKTD 96 (as shown on the enclosed drill section).
I hope this information assists the discussion between WMC and Jubilee regarding E36/251. I look forward to meeting you on Friday.
Regards,
[Signed]
Allan Trench
Exploration Manager, Leinster - Mt. Keith"
102 Accompanying this letter were two maps which are cross sections. They appear as Annexure "3" to these reasons. Both maps show holes drilled on the defendant's ground. On the first map, there also appears a hole drilled on the WMC Spinifex Park tenement. That is hole MKTD-96. The reason why that hole is shown is that the electromagnetic data which was provided with the letter of 1 August 1994 was derived from that drill hole. This was the first time that a cross section of the drill holes was available to the defendant.
103 There is mention in Dr Trench's letter of a meeting which was to take place with representatives of the defendant on Friday, 7 June. In fact, that meeting did take place. WMC was represented by Mr Jim Reeve ("Mr Reeve") who was, to quote Dr Trench, "the head technical geological person for nickel within the whole of WMC", Mr Peter Langworthy ("Mr Langworthy"), who was the chief geologist at Leinster, and Dr Trench: transcript, page 436. Mr Harmanis was present representing the defendant. Dr Trench was unsure whether Mr Cooke was present. During the course of the discussion, mention was made of the possibility of an announcement to the ASX involving the WMC information. According to Dr Trench, it was agreed between Mr Reeve and Mr Harmanis that any announcement would be jointly vetted by the defendant and WMC. Dr Trench says he specifically remembers that because a few days later an announcement was made by the defendant without any reference to WMC. Dr Trench was then asked about the 1996 announcement. The exchange went as follows:
"Question: What kind of information was revealed in the announcement that you were talking about?
Answer: The only thing they could possibly have put in the announcement was the data from 1994 because there wasn't any new assay data or anything provided in 96."
104 Nothing further of relevance appears to have been discussed at the meeting. Dr Trench did take a note of the meeting and that document appears as exhibit 98.
105 During the course of cross-examination, Dr Trench was asked about the EM conductor which is shown as a solid line crossing the trace of drill hole MKTD 96 and located on WMC's property. The presence of such a conductor was said by the defendant to be significant. It was information about which the defendant became aware only in June 1996. This was one of the factors which the defendant says led to the 1996 announcement. Dr Trench explained the significance of the conductor in the following exchange (transcript, page 443):
"So for the purpose of determining whether there was a conductor - perhaps you could explain to his Honour what a conductor is first, the significance of an EM conductor? ---Nickel sulfides actually just look like metal in a drill core and so like metal you can pass a current through them and you can physically do that by attaching a wire on either end and charging it, if you like, but you can also do it from a distance by induction, through changes in magnetic field around the drill core and eddy currents, if you like, are generated within the sulfides. That's really the gist of the technique of drill hole EM where you're passing a probe down the hole, transmitting great current - sorry, transmitting a current generating a magnetic field into the earth, hoping that that generates an eddy current in a little bit of sulfide somewhere and then trying to measure that secondary magnetic field with your probe down the drill hole.
What is the significance of finding a conductor? --- It's sort of good. If you're looking for nickel sulfide expression, that's good.
That's what I'm saying. In relation to nickel sulfide you say finding a conductor is good? --- Correct.
It's better than not finding one? --- That's right.
Yes, and if you don't find a conductor, what does that mean? ---It may mean that you - probably at best within the vicinity of the drill hole you'll only have what's called disseminated sulfides. That means the sulfides aren't sufficiently connected together to get a nice big current going and so you may only find - you can have disseminated sulfides perhaps up to certainly mineable grades plus 1 per cent but you may not get the great 10 per cent, sort of the mother lode."
106 Two other matters emerged from the cross-examination of Dr Trench. First, so far as he was concerned, no work had been done on the Spinifex Park tenement between 1994 and 1996. Second, it was WMC who approached the defendant with a view to discussing whether or not they could come to some arrangement with respect to McFarlanes Find. WMC thought a joint venture was a possibility. Dr Trench made it plain that WMC's enthusiasm for the ground would have been apparent to the defendant's representatives at the meeting: transcript, pages 449 - 450.
107 Counsel for the defendant in cross-examination took Dr Trench through the assay results. This produced the following exchange (transcript, page 455):
"In one hole, which was 101, MKTD101, there was a grade found of .55 I think, .55? --- That's right. I think actually 1761 was my attempt to synthesise the grade information.
Yes? --- It looks like I've said 14.75 metres at .62, and again you can't see it in the photocopy which drill hole - here we go; MKTD101. I would be interested to see - obviously, you can slightly change the numbers by playing with which metres you include and which ones you exclude and, obviously, we could have a look at a comparison of my calculation with the Jubilee calculation and if you wanted to make it look particularly good, and I suspect that Jubilee were probably trying to do that in the 1996 announcement, you might leave out some of the slightly lower numbers (indistinct) about the metreage, highlight some of the higher numbers, and obviously report a slightly thinner but higher grade intersection. I think I noticed earlier on today when I was looking at the assay sheets there was a plus 1 per cent. I think it was 1.33 per cent nickel sulfide assays in the data, so excuse me being an optimistic explorationist, they are fantastic; they are great results. They were good results, you know. WMC had lots and lots of this sort of stuff. Most small exploration companies of the likes of Jubilee at the time and the likes that I'm involved with sometimes now would kill for results like this. [my underlining]
Now? --- Now.
Yes, but the nickel price in 1994 was not such as you would necessarily kill for? --- Well, you've got to excuse me; an explorationist geologist would always kill for it because they are just so optimistic. They always want to discover things even though I'm also a mineral economist but, no, they are great data. They are a fantastic opportunity for --- "
108 This exchange clearly caught the defendant (and I suspect everyone else in the Court) by surprise. Counsel for the defendant spent the rest of cross-examination attempting to explain away Dr Trench's enthusiasm and to establish that it was unjustified. But Dr Trench would not be moved. He was clearly of the view that the results were highly significant in exploration terms. He accepted that they did not indicate an economic resource, but that is not really to the point. What they showed was that the WMC information was, in exploration terms, of real significance.
109 Dr Trench's views were further confirmed in re-examination. The following exchange took place (transcript, pages 468 - 469):
"You mentioned in answer to a question asked by Mr McCusker that there was a figure of 1.33 per cent in the data and you went to it and pointed it out and then you talked about 'fantastic and great results'. What link if any would there be between the 1.33 per cent in the data and what you called as fantastic, great results? --- The 1.33 is a fantastic, great result.
Why is it fantastic? --- It may not be economic at that depth but there are - it's a classic signal from lots and lots of nickel deposits round the world that you get these sort of disseminated nickel sulfides around the really good massive stuff.
It indicated that something big might be nearby? --- Correct, exactly that. That's the name of the game.
That is what Jubilee, the defendant, had in 1994, that 1.33 per cent figure? --- Yes.
At what level would you still be talking of that fantastic result, conclusion, as a percentage of nickel? --- In a prospect where you haven't previously found any nickel, round about .4, so obviously if you're in a tired old prospect that's been drilled many, many times and you know that you can get 1 per cent here and there, it's not that exciting but if you're in new virgin territory and you get drill intercepts going .4 per cent nickel, that's a great result; you know, you're off and running."
110 (There was one further sentence in what was said by Dr Trench which appears in the transcript but which I have not quoted. An objection was voiced immediately after the sentence was uttered and it was clearly inadmissible.)
111 Dr Trench was a very impressive witness. Apart from being highly qualified, he has had years of practical experience. It is clear that he is an enthusiast for nickel. But from the way he gave his evidence, I concluded he was a realist rather than some wide-eyed, naïve optimist. I was satisfied, based upon his evidence, that an experienced nickel geologist would regard the results contained in the WMC information as highly significant.
112 Mr Armstrong is presently the editor of the West Australian Newspaper. In June 1996, he was a business reporter for that same paper. He wrote an article at the time of the 11 June 1996 release by the defendant to the ASX. In that article he quoted what was told to him by Mr Harmanis. Objection was taken to the article itself being admitted into evidence. I upheld that objection, but did allow into evidence the parts of the article which were direct quotes from Mr Harmanis. Mr Armstrong's evidence was to the effect that it was his habit to include in quotation marks those words which were actually uttered by the person being quoted. Of course, the evidence only went to the fact that the words were said by Mr Harmanis, it did not go to their truth.
113 There was very limited cross-examination of Mr Armstrong and in the end his evidence had no bearing on the outcome of this case.
114 Mr Tonzing is Mr Riley's brother-in-law. Some time in the early 1990's, Mr Tonzing purchased between 10,000 and 12,000 shares in the defendant. At the time, the share price was between 12 and 18 cents. This investment was made on the advice of his brother-in-law. It proved to be a good investment. Some time later the shares were sold for around 54 cents.
115 In 1994 after the sale of the first tranche of shares, Mr Tonzing purchased a further 7000 shares in the defendant. He paid around 30 cents. Unlike his brother-in-law, Mr Tonzing held on to his shares. He watched the share price fluctuate over time and by late August 1997, he was aware that the defendant's share price was rising.
116 On 4 September 1997, he received a phone call from Mr Riley. Mr Riley mentioned that the shares in the defendant had hit $1.50 and advised Mr Tonzing to sell. He did so straight away. He received $1.40 per share. Clearly, Mr Tonzing could have no complaints about his investment in the defendant.
117 Mr Tonzing was cross-examined about his knowledge of announcements made by the defendant. He did not recall being aware of any. In particular, he was not aware of the announcement by the defendant in June 1996.
118 Mr Tonzing's evidence was of some relevance. I accept that he was contacted by Mr Riley and advised to sell his shares in the defendant when they reached $1.50. I also accept that this was evidence of Mr Riley's view that at $1.50 it was appropriate to quit a holding in the defendant.
119 Mr Le Page was an expert called by the plaintiff. At present, he is a director of R M Capital Pty Ltd. R M Capital Pty Ltd is a Perth based investment bank and corporate finance group which provides retail research and share trading services. Mr Le Page graduated with a bachelor of science degree (geology) in 1985, a bachelor of arts degree in 1985 and a masters of business administration in 1994. He also has a bachelor of applied science (honours) degree. In addition, he has a graduate diploma in applied finance and investment from the Securities Institute of Australia.
120 Mr Le Page commenced employment as a mine geologist in 1986 and continued in that post until late 1989. He then joined a geological services company in Canada. He remained in Canada until late 1991. From March 1992 until November 1992, he was equities adviser in Adelaide. From January 1993 until January 1994 he was a contract geologist. Between January 1994 and November 1996 he was the senior project geologist with North Flinders Mines Ltd. From November 1996 until July 1998 he was head of research at Morgan Stockbroking Ltd. From July 1998 until May 2002, he was a corporate adviser with Tolhurst Noall Ltd. In that position, he had supervision of all corporate finance activities in Perth, reporting to the head office in Melbourne. He joined R M Capital Pty Ltd in May 2002.
121 Mr Le Page prepared three reports dated respectively 21 March 2003 (exhibit 104), 24 March 2003 (exhibit 105) and 11 August 2003 (exhibit 106). A number of objections were taken to parts of these reports. I dealt with these objections during the course of the trial and struck out certain parts of each of the reports. I overruled other of the objections. I will not go through the objections in detail. The objections made and the reasons for allowing or disallowing the objections are to be found in the transcript. But I should make this overall comment. Many of the objections were raised on the basis that underlying facts upon which an opinion was expressed had not been proved. In some cases the position was clear and there was no alternative but to strike out the offending passage. In other instances it was clear that the witness might well be able to refer to documents or evidence which formed the basis of his opinion. In those instances I allowed part of the report complained of to stand pending the witness giving his evidence. But in dealing with the evidence of Mr Le Page and all of the other expert witnesses, I have only relied on those parts of the evidence where I am satisfied that the underlying facts upon which the opinion was based have been established by admissible evidence.
122 Mr Le Page's main report was dated 21 March 2003. The plaintiff's instructing solicitors posed a series of questions. The first question was in the following form:
"Was the information provided by Western Mining Corporation to JBM [the defendant] in August and September 1994, information which a reasonable person would have expected to have a material impact on the price or value of JBM stocks?"
123 Mr Le Page first outlined the data and then sited the tenement. He noted that the only nickel values of any real significance were found in hole MKTD-101. He noted that the nickel values contained in MKTD-101 were significant when regarded in the context of nickel resources in Australia that were known during 1994. Table 4 of Mr Le Page's report lists 10 nickel deposits and the resource as it was understood in 1994 (page 15). In my view, that table needs to be treated with some caution. WMC is mentioned twice and Normandy Poseidon Ltd once. At the time, these two companies were large well developed mining houses. Outokumpu Mining Australia Pty Ltd is mentioned once. That company was a subsidiary of a large Finnish mining house. However, Mr Le Page does make the perfectly valid point that the McFarlanes Find tenement is within 12 kilometres of the Mt Keith deposit and the results from MKTD-101 were in some parts at a higher grade than the overall Mt Keith deposit.
124 Having concluded that the WMC information was significant, Mr Le Page embarked upon an analysis of what release of the information might have meant to the defendant's share price. He referred to this exercise as an "Empirical Study of Share Prices". He described the scope of the study in the following way (see 6.3):
"To determine the likelihood that the timely public disclosure of The Information transmitted to JBG by WMC during 1994 would have materially affected the JBG share price, an empirical event study of Australian public listed companies that were partly or wholly involved in nickel exploration or development has been conducted.
The study involves a cross section of data ranging from 1-July-1994 to 01-Sept-1995. The assertion that a company's share price is affected by the disclosure of price sensitive information by that company is supported by the literature on financial markets. One of the fundamentals of modern financial market theory is the Efficient Market Hypothesis ('EMH').
The EMH states that the price of a security (such as a share) accurately reflects the information available.
The market is said to be efficient if all information is fully reflected in the price of the share. Empirical studies generally show that prices tend to fluctuate around an intrinsic or base value in an unbiased fashion, and that market prices respond promptly to publicly available information.
There is evidence to suggest that Australian financial markets are efficient."
125 Mr Le Page then went on to outline the study design. He said that the study involved testing the hypothesis that "Public disclosure of information, by a disclosing entity, that relates to nickel exploration or development activities conducted by that entity has a material effect on the share price of that disclosing entity". The difficulty with this approach generally is that it is difficult to find a company which, in late 1994, was in an equivalent position to the defendant. It is also difficult to find a company who announced very limited results similar to those available to the defendant.
126 The difficulty can be highlighted by referring to table 7 in Mr Le Page's report. He has selected four companies plus the defendant which between them, made 23 announcements between 14 July 1994 and 24 August 1995. The four companies other than the defendant were Defiance Mining NL, Centaur Mining & Exploration Ltd, Dragon Mining NL and Anaconda. Anaconda can be put to one side almost immediately. The company was attempting to develop a new and unique laterite nickel procedure. It was in no way involved in looking for or developing disseminated or massive nickel sulphide deposits. For one reason or another, it was also what might be described as a "market darling". The fluctuations in its share price probably had as much to do with its capacity to self-publicise as anything else.
127 Of the other announcements, three were made by Defiance Mining NL. Three of these announcements had to do with actual development of a mine - one was an announcement of a nickel sales off-take agreement with WMC. So far as Centaur Mining is concerned, they too were involved in laterite nickel projects and, in particular, the Cawse prospect. One of their announcements included the results of metallurgical test work and the appointment of engineers for a scoping study. Really, it was only Dragon Mining NL's announcement of 16 January 1995 of an option to Denehurst to joint venture some prospects that can be regarded as an exploration announcement.
128 While I would accept that the study undertaken by Mr Le Page is of interest and that it does offer some support for the view that if an announcement had been made in September or October 1994 by the defendant the price of its shares would have risen, I would regard it as of no more than peripheral interest. I would accept that Mr Le Page, as a well qualified expert, was of the opinion that the WMC information was significant and would affect the price of the defendant's shares. I would also accept that insofar as it is possible to bring any mathematical analysis to what the increase in share price might be, his work might provide some guide. His evidence has helped to confirm my overall conclusions. But it has not played a central part in the reasoning that has led to the eventual outcome in this case.
129 The second question put to Mr Le Page was as follows:
"How significant would the Western Mining Corporation data have been on share prices or values in light of the fact that at the time of its release, nickel exploration was active?"
130 To put the question in that way assumes that nickel exploration was in fact "active". In fact, no evidence was led to establish just how active nickel exploration was at the time. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how such evidence could be led. What can be said is that there was considerable interest in the development of laterite nickel deposits. WMC were obviously still looking for nickel despite the fact that they had a substantial deposit at Mt Keith. Dominion Mining had a substantial deposit at Yakabindie south of the McFarlanes Find tenement. It may be that on this basis it can be said that nickel exploration was "active".
131 In attempting to answer the question, Mr Le Page says:
" ...
To determine the significance of the data with respect value of JBG and thence the value of JBG shares requires a valuation to be performed. The valuation would be performed on the asset to which the data applies, in this case Exploration Licence 36/251 ('Kathleen Valley'). As Kathleen Valley already has a gold resource and existing valuations would have been based on the value of that gold resource, the change in the value of Kathleen Valley would be by an increment equal to the value of the data. The data consist of nickel exploration data and could be valued using methodology in the Valmin Code."
132 (The reference to Kathleen Valley above is clearly a mistake. The reference should be to the McFarlanes Find tenement.)
133 Mr Le Page goes on to say that the Valmin Code sets out three methods for valuating exploration assets. The first is the Prospectivity Enhancement Multiplier ("PEM"). Essentially, this method involves assigning a multiplier to the value of exploration done on the tenement. The multiplier ranges between 0 and perhaps 5. Thus, if $500,000 was spent on a tenement and the valuer decided on a multiplier of 2, the tenement would have a valuation of $1,000,000. That valuation method can hardly be used here because there was no indication of what amount WMC had spent on the tenements.
134 The second option is the Transaction Methods. This is a valuation by reference to either actual transactions for the property in question or recent transactions in the same general geological environment. Here, there was no comparable tenement that had changed hands in the recent past. The third valuation method is the "Rule of Thumb" or "Yard Stick-Methods". This method was applicable where a resource had been quantified. That was not the case here and so the valuation method was not applicable.
135 The inevitable conclusion from all of this is that it was simply impossible to say to what extent the McFarlanes Find tenement's value had been increased as a consequence of the WMC drilling. There could then be no suggestion that the share price of the defendant would have jumped based upon an increase in the underlying value of its assets.
136 The third question asked of Mr Le Page was as follows:
"What effect would the Western Mining Corporation data have had on the JBM share price or value had it been released to the market upon its receipt in August and September of 1994?"
137 In answering this question, Mr Le Page effectively referred back to his earlier event study analysis. I have already dealt with that evidence and I need say no more.
"Why was the Western Mining Corporation data significant in relation to the JBM share price?"
139 Mr Le Page gave three reasons why he thought the WMC information was significant. (In fact, in his report, four reasons are set out but one I ruled inadmissible.) They are:
"(i) The close spatial relationship of the drill hole containing nickel mineralisation with the Mt Keith nickel project.
(ii) The similarity of the tenor of nickel mineralisation in the drillhole to the tenor of nickel mineralisation at known deposits.
(iii) The fact that other companies were actively engaged in nickel exploration or development."
140 In my view, it was open to Mr Le Page to express that opinion and I accept that these three matters are significant. They are to be weighed in the mix along with a number of other factors.
141 The fifth question put to Mr Le Page was as follows:
"What effect did the Western Mining Corporation data have on the JBM share price when it was released to the market in June 1996? Please provide your opinion with regard to the rise in the JBM share price from August 1997 that coincided with the Cosmos nickel discovery near Leinster Western Australia."
142 In answering this question, Mr Le Page referred again to the Efficient Market Hypothesis he had discussed earlier in his report. He used the EMH only to confirm that an examination of the change in the share price as a response to a media release was appropriate. He then said:
"To determine if the media release on 11 June 1996 was the cause of any share price movement, the following criteria for causation need to be established:
(i) Concomitant variation - the two variables (the event and the share price) must covary;
(ii) Time order of the occurrence - the causal factor (the event) must proceed the dependent variable (the share price), and
(iii) Absence of other causal factors - that no other variables could cause the change in the dependent value."
143 It is worth dealing with the last of these criteria first. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that between say 1 April 1996 and 11 June 1996, there was any factor which could have influenced the share price of the defendant. The defendant made no announcements and there was nothing to suggest a change in market sentiment towards junior gold explorers generally or the defendant in particular. So the last of the criteria is satisfied.
144 And it is also the case that the other two criteria are satisfied. Exhibit 89 is effectively a running sheet for the share price of the defendant between 10 June 1994 and 11 December 1997. It shows the opening price, the intraday high and low and the share price at close. It also lists the volume. What the document shows is a gradual slide in the share price from 10 June 1994 through to early August 1995. The closing price on 10 June 1994 was 50 cents. On 29 July 1994, it was 48 cents. On 31 October 1994, it was 30 cents. Thereafter it declined steadily, if gradually, until on 1 August 1995, it closed at 6 cents. Throughout this period, the volume traded was thin. Some days the volume was well under 100,000. Rarely did the volume exceed 500,000. Even for a small listed miner, that is a modest trading record.
145 Between August 1995 and February 1996, the price hovered around 8 cents. It then started to creep up. By 8 February 1996, it had reached 15 cents. Moreover, there was some significant buying interest. On 5 February 1996, over 1,000,000 shares changed hands, with the volume gradually increasing until on 9 February just under 5,000,000 shares changed hands. This heightened activity might be explained by the agreement that was reached between the defendant and Forrestania on 7 February 1996. It is reasonable to assume that the market viewed this deal as positive, investors moved in and the share price reacted accordingly.
146 By 19 February 1996, the share price had settled at 14 cents and it hovered around that mark through until 15 April 1996. On that date, just over 3,600,000 shares changed hands and the price jumped to 19 cents. The price continued to climb through May 1996, reaching 28 cents on 21 May 1996, albeit on relatively modest turnover. There is nothing in the evidence to explain why the share price should have increased.
147 On 7 June 1996, the share price closed at 19.5 cents. That was the day the meeting took place between WMC and the defendant. The announcement to the market was made on 11 June 1996 and the share price jumped to 27 cents. That was on turnover of 1,484,500 shares - up considerably on the turnover for the previous two months, but still nothing like the turnover that occurred when the investment of Forrestania was announced. The following day, 12 June 1996, the price was back to 24 cents and thereafter it increased to 28 cents before sliding back to 18 cents on 2 August 1996. The price hovered around that level until 1 September 1997. On that date, 13,879,901 shares changed hands and the price jumped from 19 cents on 29 August 1997 to 36 cents on 1 September 1997. The share price peaked on 5 September 1997 at $1.44 per share. On the six trading days between 1 September 1997 and 8 September 1997, 95,000,000 shares were traded.
148 Even to the uninitiated, it is clear from this analysis of the trading data that announcements had an effect on the defendant's share price. The announcement of the Forrestania investment in the defendant had a positive effect, the announcement of 11 June 1996 had a positive effect and the announcement of the Cosmos find had a spectacular effect on the share price.
149 Mr Le Page brought a rather more scientific and measured approach to his analysis of the price fluctuations. He used a weighted average of the share price for the 10 days preceding the media release (of 11 June 1996) and the 10 days following the media release. He found that the 10 day weighted average before the media release was 22.5 cents and the 10 day weighted average after the media release was 24.5 cents. This is a difference of 9 per cent.
150 This relatively simple assessment of share price fluctuations over time demonstrated two things. First, it demonstrated that positive announcements by the defendant had a positive effect on its share price. Second, it provided some indication that the WMC information was significant and the consequences which might have followed had it been released in September or October 1994.
151 Question 6 put to Mr Le Page was in the following terms:
"What level of experience would be needed to determine that the Western Mining Corporation data was significant? In addition to geologists, would any other person be aware of the likely significance of the WMC data or at least expect it to be examined in greater detail, for example engineers, metallurgists and experienced mining and exploration directors."
152 Before detailing Mr Le Page's answer to this question, it is worth bearing in mind just who saw the WMC information. WMC directed their letters to Mr Cooke and they were received by him. He showed some parts, but probably not all, of the letters to Mr Crossley. Neither of these two men brought the letters to the attention of any other officer or director of the defendant. Mr Cooke is a geologist; Mr Crossley is a mining engineer. There was no evidence as to the qualification and experience of other directors of the defendant as at September or October 1994. The evidence of Mr Riley suggests that Mr Harmanis had a fairly close involvement with the day to day affairs of the defendant, at least during the time when Mr Riley was managing director. But there is nothing in the evidence about Mr Harmanis' technical expertise.
"A geologist, with tertiary qualifications from a recognised institution, with at least two years relevant industry experience (where relevant industry experience in this case would involve exploration for nickel-sulphide mineralisation) would normally be capable of determining the significance of the Information."
154 I accept that evidence from Mr Le Page. It was not inconsistent with evidence led by the defendant. It was the defendant's position that the information, properly understood, was of no significance. But there was no suggestion that a trained geologist with relevant industry experience would not understand what the WMC information, and the assay results in particular, meant.
"In Jubilee's response dated 18 June 1996 to the ASX, query letter dated of same date, Jubilee says 'Jubilee's geologist visited the property following this (ie receipt of the WMC data) and concluded the potential mineralisation dipped into the Jubilee tenement at a depth and scale of little if any significance'. Based upon the WMC information, is the description 'potential mineralisation' valid? What techniques would the geologist have used to determine the dip, depth and scale? Is this a difficult procedure and what information is gained from it?"
156 As it turned out, the evidence did not establish that the defendant's geologist (who must have been Mr Cooke) visited the property after receipt of the WMC data and reached any conclusion. Leaving that to one side, the rest of the question does not raise issues which are relevant to this claim. I need say nothing further about Mr Le Page's answer.
157 Question 8 put a rather complex issue to do with the 1996 annual report of the defendant to Mr Le Page. He did not feel able to venture an opinion and nothing more need be said about this question.
"Had the Western Mining Corporation data been released to the market at the time of its receipt in August and September 1994, what would have been the continual effect on the JBG share price or value?"
159 In part, this is re-asking, in a slightly different form, questions which had been put earlier. The response given by Mr Le Page really repeated what he had said earlier in his report and added nothing to his evidence.
160 Question 10 deals with certain reports of the defendant to the ASX. Objection was taken to it and it was deleted from the report.
161 In Mr Le Page's further report dated 24 March 2003, he was asked two further questions. The first of these questions was as follows:
"If the KER Trust sold a parcel of 547,000 shares in or about September 1994 or February 1995 what would the return on those shares likely to have been. Please divide your answer into 2 parts (1) on the basis that 'The Information' had been disclosed to the market in August 1994; and (2) on the basis 'The Information' was disclosed to the market when it actually was (ie: June 1996)."
162 It must be said, with respect, that this question is poorly framed. It seeks to address a central issue in the case, but does so in an unfortunate fashion. It begins by assuming that 547,000 shares in the defendant would have been sold by the plaintiff in or about September 1994. In fact, the evidence shows that by 16 June 1994, the Trust had sold 276,000 shares. So as at September 1994, there were only 521,000 shares left to sell. But it is certainly legitimate to ask what price might have been received for those shares.
163 Mr Le Page assumes that an announcement would have been made to the market on 7 September 1994. That is the actual date of the letter from WMC, so the announcement may have been delayed a day or two. But, for present purposes, given the imprecise nature of this calculation, a day or two does not make much difference. Mr Le Page found that the weighted average for the share price for the 10 days before September 1994 was 37 cents. Given that after the announcement in June 1996 the 10 day weighted average for the share price increased by 9 per cent, he calculates the likely weighted average share price for the 10 days after 7 September 1994 as 40 cents. He then provides an adjusted weighted average for the share price for the month of September at 38 cents.
164 In my view, this is a reasonable calculation based on the available evidence and I accept it is a guide to the price that would have been obtained for the fully paid shares. Insofar as Mr Le Page answered the rest of this question, it is irrelevant to these proceedings and need be discussed no further.
165 The final question put to Mr Le Page was as follows:
"What would be the profit on the remainder of the shares if they had been sold at $1.40 per share? $1.50 per share?"
166 With respect, this is a mathematical calculation. It does not need to be answered by someone with Mr Le Page's qualifications.
167 Mr Le Page was subjected to a pointed, lengthy and entirely fair cross-examination by Senior Counsel for the defendant. Much of that cross-examination was directed at undermining the use of announcements by other companies in predicting how the market may have responded to an announcement by the defendant. Considerable attention was also directed at the use of the EMH to predict share price. Given that I have not made use of any of that information to any significant extent, I will not deal with the cross-examination on these matters. But there are a number of matters which arose out of cross-examination that warrant comment.
168 First, it was put to Mr Le Page, as it was put to other witnesses for the plaintiff, that if a decision had been made to announce the WMC information in 1994, the announcement would have had to include a statement to the effect that no follow up work would be undertaken. As with each of the other witnesses to whom this was put, Mr Le Page was nonplussed by the idea. He did not think any negative statement would have been necessary. In the course of cross-examination, the following exchange took place (transcript, page 648):
"But you have agreed with me - you say it's a sensible course of action, but you have agreed with me I think, but I just repeat it, that if the company, despite your views of what would be a sensible course of action, decided it would not be a sensible course of action to expend its limited funds in this way but to confine them all to its main objective, goldmining, would it not be obliged, do you think, to announce to the ASX, 'There are the results. There's a debate about they're significant or not. There are the results and we're not going to expend any money on further drilling or exploration'? It would be obliged to say that if that was the fact, wouldn't it? --- I think it's a very unusual statement because to you ---
Leave that aside. We don't want commentary. It would be obliged to say that if that were the fact, if the company did not intend to expend any money, any of its little money, on further drilling and exploration for nickel? --- I don't agree because ---
You don't agree that it would be obliged to tell the shareholders that? --- No I don't; no.
Why not? --- Because the market conditions change and to say that they will not in the future spend any money is saying that the future events of the company - ie, to the south of the tenement - or the nickel market conditions are going to remain static and 'we will never spend any money'. It's sort of nonsensical because you're making a statement about the future; you know, its absolute. I don't think any company could say that an intersection will never be followed up because that implies that market conditions don't change."
169 I will have more to say about this argument put by the defendant after considering all the evidence. But I should say at this stage that I was satisfied that Mr Le Page was right on this point. What he said made perfect sense. I accept that it would not have been misleading for the defendant to have announced the WMC information and made no comment at all upon what steps it would take thereafter: see further transcript, page 692.
170 Second, Mr Le Page acknowledged that the effect of a positive announcement to the ASX is not always a rise in the share price: transcript, pages 655 - 656. Be that as it may, it is not to the point. Here, it is possible to demonstrate by looking at the turnover in the defendant's shares and the price rise around an announcement that a positive statement could - not necessarily must, but could - have a positive effect on the share price. That was effectively what Mr Le Page was saying. Nothing he said in cross-examination altered his evidence on that point.
171 Thirdly, Mr Le Page explained the reason for his use of a weighted average: transcript, pages 656 - 657. That explanation is cogent and reasonable. It presents a fair picture of the effect of the announcement on the share price.
172 Fourthly, Mr Le Page was questioned as to the extent that the rise and fall in the nickel price was a factor in whether or not the value of the defendant's shares might have risen if the WMC information was announced. The price of spot nickel did clearly play some part in Mr Le Page's conclusions. But a reading of his reports and a reading of the evidence he gave while being cross-examined, indicates that the nickel price was not a significant factor in his conclusions. In determining whether or not the WMC information ought to have been released to the market, the nickel price is not a factor I have taken into account. I therefore need say nothing more about this aspect of Mr Le Page's evidence.
173 Fifthly, Mr Le Page agreed that the WMC information did not indicate a commercially significant resource. All it indicated in his view was the potential for further exploration: see for instance, page 680 of the transcript. As I have indicated above, this was the consistent position of all witnesses for both the plaintiff and the defendant.
174 Sixthly, Mr Le Page was questioned about the significance of the defendant being, as at September 1994, a gold exploration company - or put another way - an exploration company focused on gold. It needs to be borne in mind that when a small mining company is listed on the ASX, it is not categorised by the ASX as a "gold explorer" or a "nickel explorer". That is how it may be perceived by the market and it may be that it is well understood by investors that the company is exploring for a particular commodity. But there is no reason why, if, in the course of exploration activities it comes across an interesting result for nickel when it is looking for gold, it cannot then go off and look for nickel. Clearly, there would be a negative impact on market sentiment if investors felt that the company was schizophrenic - it could not make up its mind whether it was a gold explorer or a nickel explorer. But the approach taken by the defendant appeared to be that because the expressed intent of the defendant was to look for gold, that an announcement of nickel results would be a negative. When that was put to Mr Le Page, the following exchange took place (transcript, pages 686 - 687):
"Sorry? The decline in the share price of Jubilee in September 94? --- I think what I was trying to say was there was negative sentiment towards the company.
That was one factor. Wasn't another factor of negativity that this was a company that wasn't even engaged in nickel exploration, unlike the other companies you referred to? --- I don't necessarily agree with the statement because there are many companies that find deposits in the course of other activities and the general public or the reasonable investor, however you want to term them - it's not unexpected that the company starts out on the exchange as a goldmining company, finds a nickel deposit, in particular when you are in a terrain that hosts - Bellevue goldmine, Emu goldmine - nickel deposits - it's not unexpected that you would actually find something.
All I'm putting to you is that a negative factor is that this company was not engaged in nickel exploration. Isn't that a negative factor? --- No. No, I don't ---
Wouldn't it diminish the importance of the drill hole results compared with the company that was engaged in exploration?
--- I can't understand the rationale for the argument.
You say no then? --- No.
I have to put it to you. Wouldn't it be a negative factor that the market was aware that Jubilee had hitherto no interest in nickel and was trying to go for gold? --- I think that's too broad a statement to say companies in a nickel terrain and to say that there is no interest in nickel ---
It wasn't exploring for nickel, was it? --- No, but that doesn't say ---
It had never announced that it was going to explore for nickel, had it? --- No.
It hadn't said anything at all to indicate it was interested in nickel, had it? --- Not that I'm aware of, no.
And all its investors had invested in what they thought was a purely gold company? --- Yes.
Wouldn't that all be a negative factor? --- No, not at all."
175 I accept Mr Le Page's evidence on this point. I see no reason at all to suppose that the defendant making an announcement of the WMC information would have a negative impact on the share price. It may not have had the same sort of impact on the share price as if the avowed intention of the defendant was to look for nickel and it had come up with the WMC information. But, nonetheless, I am not satisfied that the evidence indicates that an announcement would have been a negative.
176 Finally, it was put to Mr Le Page by counsel for the defendant that in looking at the question of whether the price of the shares in the defendant may have risen if the WMC information was announced, he looked only at the positive factors and not at the negative factors. For instance, it was put to him that the fact the company was short of funds would have been a negative factor which, when coupled with an announcement of the WMC information in 1994, might have meant that the share price did not move or declined: transcript, page 689. Mr Le Page indicated that he had taken into account all factors both positive and negative. I am satisfied that he did so. What he did was look at the defendant as a struggling junior explorer. In keeping with most junior explorers, any realistic look at the defendant and its prospects would have produced a long list of negatives. At the time, perhaps the only positive in the defendant's favour was that it still had the prospect of securing Bellevue. But even there it had not been able to make good on the original deal. In my view, Mr Le Page took a reasonable and careful view of the defendant's position, weighing up all factors both positive and negative. I would certainly not discount his evidence on the basis that he failed to consider factors which might have weighed upon the share price in September 1994.
177 Dr Victor Rudenno ("Dr Rudenno") gave expert evidence in this matter. He has a bachelor of mining engineering degree and a masters of commerce degree, as well as a doctorate with a thesis in mining economics. He is a member of the Australian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, a Fellow of the Securities Institute of Australia and principal lecturer in mining investment analysis for the Securities Institute of Australia. He is the author of a work entitled "The Mining Valuation Handbook 1998". He has 10 years' experience as a rated resource stockbroking analyst and five years' experience as an associate director and director in the corporate finance departments of several major investment banks / stockbroking firms.
178 Dr Rudenno was asked three questions. The first of these questions was as follows (see exhibit 111): Would a reasonable person expect certain information (the WMC information) to have a material effect on the price or value of JBG shares?
179 In answering this question, Dr Rudenno drew attention to the proximity of the Yakabindie nickel sulphide deposit to the south and the Mt Keith deposit to the north. He made the point that the McFarlanes Find tenement was located in what he described as "a nickel province" and that the WMC drilling showed an extension of the host mineralisation on to the defendant's ground. He also suggested that there was favourable market sentiment towards nickel related stocks during 1994, although he acknowledged that it was not until late 1995 that interest accelerated with the likely development of large laterite nickel deposits. He made the point that the technology associated with sulphide deposits was in 1994 proven and tested and the discovery of a nickel sulphide deposit would therefore be viewed as positive by the stock market. He also saw as significant the fact that the nickel price was by mid-1993 off its long term low and was moving higher, although it did not peak for some time after 1994.
180 The second question put to Dr Rudenno was as follows: If an announcement was made in September 1994 (of the WMC information) what if any effect would you consider it would have upon the share price of JBG shares with reference to the immediate effect and the effect on the share price from September 1994 through to the end of 1997?
181 The answer to at least part of this question can be discounted. The case put by the plaintiff is that the fully paid shares which had not already been sold by September 1994 would have been sold soon after the making of an announcement in September or October 1994. It was the plaintiff's case that the partly paid shares would have been retained and sold in 1997. So the effect of any announcement in September / October 1994 on the price of the shares beyond October 1994 is irrelevant.
182 Dr Rudenno concluded that, on the balance of probabilities, the release of the WMC information would have had a favourable effect on the defendant's share price. He goes on to say:
"The grade of the mineral intersections was low and the depth of the intercept relatively deep which, even allowing for the improvement in nickel prices, would have suggested that the mineralisation at that early stage, was of marginal economic value. However, there was now evidence of host mineralisation extending on to JBG's ground and the potential for further extensions of the mineralisation further to the south on the Kathleen Valley tenements."
183 Dr Rudenno goes on to suggest that the announcement of the WMC information may have led to an increase in the share price of "about 10 cents per share". He does say, however, that making any prediction is difficult. He refers back to the increase in the share price in June 1996, contrasting the price on 7 June at 19.5 cents with the price on 11 June of 27 cents. He says that the increase of 38 per cent represented $7,000,000 in market capitalisation terms. The calculation of the increase in price to 10 cents per share is based on an assumption of an increase in market capitalisation of around $6,000,000.
184 I would accept that as an expert Dr Rudenno is of the opinion that the share price of the defendant would have increased if the WMC information had been released in September / October 1994. In my view, he has the experience and the expertise to offer such an opinion. But I am not satisfied that his calculation of an increase of 10 cents per share is supported by the evidence. He has simply assumed an increase in the share price of 38 per cent going forward. In my view, the use of some weighted average calculation is more appropriate and produces a more likely outcome.
185 The third question put to Dr Rudenno was as follows: What if any effect do you consider the company release 10 June 1996 would have had on the JBG share price had the release been made in September of 1994 and on the share price from September 1994 through to the end of 1997?
186 As with question 2, the effect any announcement may have had on the share price after September / October 1994 is irrelevant. Otherwise, question 3 appears to be question 2 asked in a slightly different way. Perhaps of importance, Dr Rudenno says that he saw no significant difference between the company release in 1996 and the WMC information available in September 1994. He goes on to say:
"The important information for the market was the intersection of disseminated nickel mineralisation at McFarlanes Find over an interval of 42.7 metres with an average grade of 0.55 % ... Of perhaps equal importance are the higher-grade intercepts within this interval. The figures quoted (in the WMC information) do vary from those in the announcement but the gist of the information is basically the same showing that there are intervals of some 15 metres with grades of around 0.7 %. From an economic point of view sufficient width is required for mining, which is suggested by the intervals of 15 metres while the higher grade improves the chance of economic return although the grades quoted at best would be marginal given the depths below the surface."
187 Dr Rudenno prepared a further report on 11 August 2003 (exhibit 112). The purpose of this report was to have him comment on a number of expert reports disclosed by the defendant. In the event, only two of the five experts upon whose evidence Dr Rudenno commented were called to give evidence. The first of these was a report by Mr Michael Allen ("Mr Allen") (exhibit 200). Mr Allen is a stockbroker. Mr Allen was, in summary, of the view that any announcement made in September / October 1994 would have had no effect on the defendant's share price. Without detailing Dr Rudenno's comments, he essentially joins issue with Mr Allen and repeats what he had to say in his main report.
188 He also comments on a report of Dr Julian Fraser Harvey Barnes ("Dr Barnes") (exhibit 172). He notes that he and Dr Barnes were in agreement that the nickel intercepts at the early stage were, at best, of marginal economic value. He then goes on to say:
"However, it would still (be) reasonable to expect a material effect on the share price. The vast majority of exploration results released to the market by listed companies don't result in economic discoveries. It is more difficult to say that the majority result in significant share price movements as each case has to be considered on its merits in the context of the financial and physical environment. Given the location of JBG's tenement I am still of the opinion on the balance of probabilities that there would have been a material change in the share price in 1994 had the information been released."
189 Dr Rudenno does re-visit his opinion that an announcement in September / October 1994 would have resulted in a 10 cent increase in the share price. Without going into his rationale and reasoning, he suggests that in fact the increase was more likely to be in the region of 6 cents. Having concluded that Dr Rudenno's method of evaluating any price increase is not to be accepted, I need take this issue no further.
190 In the course of cross-examination, it was put to Dr Rudenno that the WMC information did not indicate a resource that was commercially viable. He agreed with that assessment, but it is interesting to see how he equated that fact with the significance of the WMC information. His position is highlighted by the following exchange (transcript, page 588):
"Yes, but as it stood, the information was to the contrary as it stood; that is, there was nothing economically viable in the mineralisation so far discovered? --- That's irrelevant because the market now knows that there is mineralisation there and it may prove to be economic because many deposits are often discovered where the first hole is not a high-grade economic hole, so from the market's perspective the most important part was that there was potential for a viable economic deposit there."
191 With respect, the answer to that question really encapsulates what both of the plaintiff's expert witnesses had to say about the WMC information. It is the indication of further exploration potential which is important. That is the positive on which the market was likely to focus.
192 Also put to Dr Rudenno in cross-examination was the claim by the defendant that it would have been necessary in any announcement in September / October 1994 to say that no follow up work, either by way of drilling or otherwise, would be undertaken. It has to be acknowledged that Dr Rudenno indicated that if an announcement in the terms proposed by counsel had been made, then there was a real prospect that the announcement would have had no effect upon the shares. As I have indicated above, I do not accept that such an announcement would have been made and I have not taken this aspect of Dr Rudenno's evidence into account in reaching my decision.
193 It is also to be noted that Dr Rudenno agreed that there were some factors at play when the 1996 announcement was made that were not present in September / October 1994. These included improved market sentiment, the presence of Forrestania's directors on the board and the defendant's improved cash position. Dr Rudenno agreed that all of these factors could mean that an announcement made in September / October 1994 would not have had the same effect as the 1996 announcement. I accept that when looking at the relative effect of announcements on the two dates, all of these matters need to be taken into account.
194 As with Mr Le Page, I was impressed with Dr Rudenno. He too answered all questions put to him in a straightforward, reasonable fashion. In the end, his evidence is, in my view, of only marginal relevance in determining the outcome of this case. But I do accept his evidence that the WMC information was material and should have been released to the market.
195 At all relevant times, Mr Cooke was a geologist employed by the defendant. He commenced employment with the defendant in March 1994 and he resigned in April 1997. His title was manager geology. He had day to day responsibility for dealing with the defendant's exploration interests, focusing on design, coordination and implementation of all exploration programmes. At the time Mr Cooke commenced employment with the defendant, Mr Crossley was the defendant's managing director. Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley had worked together previously at the Blue Funnel Gold Mine near Kalgoorlie. When Mr Cooke was employed he was told by Mr Crossley that the reason he had been engaged was to assist him in bringing the Kathleen Valley gold deposits into production. It is to be remembered that Mr Crossley is a mining engineer.
196 Mr Cooke was in 1994 a very experienced geologist. He graduated with a major in geology from the Australian National University in 1976. Thereafter, he worked continuously as a geologist in the minerals exploration industry. He had been involved in exploration for base metals including nickel in a variety of geological environments. By 1984 / 1985, he was the manager of Golden Deeps Ltd in Kalgoorlie and he was responsible for bringing the Blue Funnel gold deposit into production. In 1989, he was employed by the Amalg syndicate as their sole geologist. He was responsible for all of Amalg's geological interests from exploration through to mining Australia-wide. In the course of his engagement by the Amalg syndicate, he was responsible for exploration for, among other things, nickel. In fact, Amalg developed a nickel ore body at Spargoville with the ore being treated to produce a concentrate which was sold to WMC. Without going through the rest of Mr Cooke's employment in detail, it is clear that he has had considerable experience in nickel exploration, including exposure to nickel sulphides found within ultramafics - that is, the type of mineralisation indicated by the WMC information.
197 As at 1994, Mr Cooke was also well versed in the geology of the Norseman-Wiluna belt generally and the ultramafic belt running through Mt Keith down to Yakabindie, in particular. He was well aware of the nature of the Mt Keith mineralisation and of the Yakabindie deposit. In fact, the material contained in Mr Cooke's statement suggests that he had a very thorough knowledge of the reserves held by WMC and Dominion Mining north and south of the McFarlanes Find tenement.
198 The McFarlanes Find tenement came into the defendant's possession as a consequence of an agreement with a local prospector. The arrangement was that any vacant ground which became available in the area of the defendant's tenements would be pegged by the prospector and acquired by the defendant. The McFarlanes Find tenement did not abut any existing tenements held by the defendant. The tenement was not acquired because the defendant thought it contained geology of particular interest, rather because of the arrangement with the prospector. However, Mr Cooke thought it may be of interest for gold exploration. He did not think it covered any part of the ultramafic belt leading south from Mt Keith. He was of the view that this was covered by WMC's Spinifex Park tenement.
199 Mr Cooke provided a snapshot of the defendant in 1994. Clearly, it was a modest operation. The company had offices in Ord Street, West Perth, but apart from himself and Mr Crossley, it had only two other employees, one of whom was a secretary. When technical assistance was required, outsider consultants were engaged. The main focus of the company was gold. In particular, the company was attempting to get gold production out of the Kathleen Valley tenements. Money was tight with the company effectively living a hand to mouth existence.
200 In July 1994, Mr Cooke approached WMC about a particular prospecting licence (P36/3989) that WMC held in the midst of the defendant's Kathleen Valley tenements. Mr Cooke regarded this WMC tenement as something of a "thorn in the side" of the defendant. It interrupted the logical exploration along the strike of what was considered to be prospective geology for gold in the Kathleen Valley group of tenements. Mr Cooke knew that the WMC tenement lay over some ultramafic rock that he thought had potential for gold mineralisation. He approached WMC to see whether the defendant could acquire their tenement. He was met with a polite but firm refusal.
201 Some time after 1 August 1994, Mr Cooke received the first of the two WMC letters. In his witness statement (exhibit 162) at par 42 and par 43, Mr Cooke recounts what was contained in the letter of 1 August 1994. He does not say in either of those two paragraphs that he actually read the letter, but that seems at least to be implied from what follows. Mr Cooke said that the letter immediately brought to mind the Ernest Henry case with which he was familiar. He then goes on to say (at par 46):
"On the day I saw the first letter from WMC, I showed it and the enclosed information to Bill Crossley. I told Bill that I had reviewed the data and pointed out the letter stated that assay results were to follow."
202 Subsequent to the receipt of the letter, Mr Cooke says that he attempted to obtain magnetic data for the Spinifex Park tenement from WMC. He telephoned Mr Miller (the author of the letter) requesting the information. He told Mr Miller that portions of the magnetic data that the defendant had been given were inadequate to allow any conclusions to be drawn because the data provided did not include that which pertained to the WMC tenement. Mr Cooke was aware that as the excluded data related to WMC's tenement, WMC were not obliged to provide it to the defendant. In the event, WMC declined to provide any further information.
203 Mr Cooke says that the second letter from WMC dated 6 September 1994 was received by him on 8 September. On receipt of the second letter, he considered all of the data - that is, all of the data provided in both letters. He says that the electromagnetic data was "difficult to interpret". The defendant did not have the necessary technology to allow the significance, if any, of the data to be ascertained. Mr Cooke formed the view that considerable work would be required to interpret the data and the expense of undertaking such work was unjustified, given that he anticipated it would be of no benefit to the defendant. Mr Cooke's approach to the WMC information can best be conveyed by quoting directly from his witness statement. It reads as follows (pars 51 to 58):
(a) stated that there was a shift of the boundary common to the Jubilee and WMC Tenement on the western side of the eastern portion of McFarlanes Find;
(b) disclosed that WMC had completed some exploration activities on McFarlanes Find, including collaring 6 holes;
(c) showed, in respect of one hole (MKTD101) anomalous nickel values on McFarlanes Find. I determined there was a mineralised intercept of about 42.75 metres (from 202.25 to 245 metres down hole) at 0.52% nickel (the Intercept). I selected the Intercept bounds to capture the interval of elevated nickel grade, but not to include waste that would be left behind in any notional mining scenario;
(d) none of the other 5 holes intersected any anomalous nickel values.
52. On my analysis in 1994 of the Intercept disclosed by the 1994 Data:
(a) I observed that the grade of nickel in the Intercept was low - comparable to Yakabindie; and
(b) I interpreted the depth to top of the mineralisation to be approximately 200m, whereas Yakabindie sat at the surface;
(c) I interpreted the true width of the Intercept to be ~15 metres which was very narrow relative to comparable material proposed for mining at Mt Keith;
(d) the mineralisation occurred very close to McFarlanes Find's boundary and I interpreted the mineralisation to dip steeply to the east (contrary to the industry accepted view that the ultramafic unit in the area dipped steeply to the west). Obviously, any extension to the mineralisation in Jubilee's tenement would be at even greater depth.
53. In 1994, I assessed the significance (both to Jubilee and generally) of the 1994 Data, in the context of my knowledge at that time and Jubilee's position. I drew the following conclusions:
(a) anomalous nickel values were confined to one of six holes (suggesting that the body of mineralisation within McFarlanes Find was very thin relative to proposed operations with similar grades);
(b) for the mineralisation the subject of the Intercept to sustain an economic mine, an ore width of about 180m wide was necessary, as at Mt Keith;
(c) at 200m depth on Jubilee's side of the fence it was neither here nor there;
(d) the mineralisation was unlikely to ever prove up to be an economic deposit within McFarlanes Find;
(e) the width, grade and depth of the mineralisation would not encourage any contemplation of extraction. The depth of the mineralisation was an important matter because the cost and delay in stripping the waste material above the mineralised body would be very significant, and well beyond Jubilee's capacity to fund and, in any event, prohibitively expensive for any company to bear having regard to all the prevailing circumstances;
(f) to be able to dig a pit to get to the mineralisation, I believed it would be necessary for McFarlanes Find and the WMC Tenement to be the subject of a single operation if it was to have any prospect of being exploitable.
54. In the result, I ranked the Intercept near the very bottom of the list of possible exploration areas of interest that I would have recommended Jubilee spend its limited exploration budget on, having regard to:
(a) Jubilee's other projects and the relative merit of expending dollars testing a very narrow low grade disseminated nickel occurrence at great depth and so near to the tenement boundary that it would, in my view, never yield an economic deposit without a WMC joint venture;
(b) the views expounded to me by Crossley were that if further ounces of gold could be discovered at Kathleen Valley it would enable Jubilee to become a gold miner - the inference was that the 'best bang for Jubilee's buck' was finding more gold at Kathleen Valley not chasing what would be an exorbitantly expensive (millions of dollars) target at great depth where I believed there was no prospect of a mine being developed;
(c) the fact that there was nothing Jubilee could do at McFarlanes Find without WMC's co-operation as the mineralisation straddled the tenement boundary. So even if there was an open pittable ore body (the scale of Mt Keith) at McFarlanes Find/WMC's Tenement:
(i) the strip ratio and angle of the pit walls would have meant that the ore body could only be open pit mined if the pit was sited, in part at least (as it had to be), within WMC's Tenement;
(ii) the identified mineralisation in McFarlanes Find was interpreted as dipping steeply to greater depth.
55. In summary, my assessment of the 1994 Data (in 1994) was that the intersected mineralisation was very deep and going deeper. And given the proximity to the boundary and the fact that the other five holes did not contain nickel values there was no scope to find mineralisation nearer the surface - 200m was as shallow as it got on Jubilee's side of the border. It was just too deep, too low grade and too small to be of interest.
56. The 1994 Data did not cause me to think that I should advise Jubilee to change its focus from a gold explorer to a nickel explorer.
57. Geologically, the 1994 Data was of potential interest in terms of future exploration but that, in my opinion, was the sum total of its value. It was anomalous, it had potential relevance to future exploration but that was all I thought of it.
58. I took the view that all Jubilee could do was to sit and wait for WMC to approach Jubilee with a proposal for McFarlanes Find."
204 Mr Cooke said that it was his practice to bring exploration results to the attention of management promptly. He said that he "directed the attention" of Mr Crossley to the two WMC letters. However, as he had concluded that the WMC information was of no significance to the defendant, it would seem there was no detailed discussion with Mr Crossley.
205 It is worth pausing at this point to note just how the WMC information was treated. Mr Cooke says he had a meeting with Mr Crossley the day he saw the first letter from WMC. That first letter, while identifying the drill holes providing the electromagnetic data and providing some assay results, did not contain the crucial assay results for MKTD-101. It has not been suggested by anyone that the first WMC letter, by itself, contained information which warranted an announcement to the ASX. That was particularly so, given that the first letter indicated that there would be a subsequent letter containing assay results. According to Mr Cooke, when the second letter was received, he drew it to the attention of Mr Crossley. That implies that there were two meetings between Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley at which the WMC information was discussed. There is nothing in Mr Cooke's statement to suggest that Mr Crossley actually took possession of the two letters and read them for himself. The implication is that what Mr Crossley knew about the WMC information was derived from what he was told by Mr Cooke.
206 Following receipt of the WMC information, WMC proposed to the defendant that the defendant consider exchanging the McFarlanes Find tenement for a package of what Mr Cooke describes as "isolated and solitary tenements" that lay in the general Leinster-Kathleen Valley region, as well as the prospecting licence (P36/3989) referred to earlier. A meeting took place between representatives of the defendant and WMC. The swap was discussed. The defendant decided not to proceed. It would seem, although it is not expressly said by Mr Cooke, that he told none of the defendant's directors, apart from Mr Crossley, about the WMC information. Nor did he mention the meeting with WMC. Nothing further happened in relation to the McFarlanes Find tenement until 1996.
207 Mr Cooke remembers attending a meeting between WMC and the defendant in 1996. His recollection of the meeting is poor. He is prepared to accept that it took place on 7 June 1996. He agreed that Mr Harmanis attended the meeting on behalf of the defendant, but does not recall discussing the WMC information with Mr Harmanis before the meeting. He confirms that Mr Langworthy, Mr Reeve and Dr Trench attended the meeting on behalf of WMC.
208 At that meeting, and Mr Cooke says for the first time, WMC representatives produced a cross section that showed an EM conductor well inside WMC's tenement and about 100 metres west of the common boundary between Spinifex Park and McFarlanes Find. A general discussion took place about the geology of the area. WMC representatives also tabled two cross sections showing portions of the drill hole traces WMC had drilled in 1994 and which lay inside McFarlanes Find. This is the first time Mr Cooke had seen these cross sections.
209 At the meeting, the WMC representatives made it plain that they were interested in entering into a commercial arrangement with the defendant by purchasing the McFarlanes Find tenement. Mr Harmanis suggested a joint venture. Mr Reeve said that WMC did not do joint ventures with small companies like the defendant. The meeting broke up without any resolution as to what was to be done with the tenement. Mr Cooke, in his statement, makes no reference to the agreement referred to by Dr Trench that any announcement to the ASX would be made only after it was considered by both WMC and the defendant.
210 Following the meeting with WMC, Mr Cooke discussed with Mr Harmanis the significance of all of the information obtained from WMC - that is, the WMC information and the additional material provided at the meeting. Mr Cooke advised Mr Harmanis that the presence of an EM conductor on WMC's ground could, among other possible interpretations, represent massive nickel sulphide mineralisation at depth on WMC's ground. He also pointed out that the conductor could equally be sulphidic black shale in the sequence and have no significance at all so far as nickel was concerned. As history shows, the defendant made the announcement to the ASX about McFarlanes Find on 11 June 1996. Mr Cooke was not involved in drafting the announcement. Nor it seems was he, the defendant's geologist, consulted to ensure that the geological information contained in the announcement was correct and accurate.
211 During June 1996, the board of the defendant approved further drilling on the McFarlanes Find tenement. This led to the drilling of a hole identified as MFD-1. The hole was drilled to a length of 588 metres. (This does not represent a depth of 588 metres - the hole was drilled on an angle.) No massive sulphides were intersected. Two very thin sections of disseminated sulphides were visually identified as having been intersected between 500 and 520 metres. The hole returned assays including 5 metres at 0.63 per cent from 501 to 506 metres, 5 metres at 0.56 per cent from 515 metres to 520 metres and 19 metres at 0.5 per cent from 549 metres to 568 metres. The width of these intercepts were greatly exaggerated compared to the true thickness of mineralisation due to the orientation of the hole relative to the dip of the sequence. It was this drilling that led to the announcement to the ASX in July 1994.
212 A number of matters emerged from cross-examination of Mr Cooke. First, he confirmed that he took the view when he considered the WMC information that it indicated the potential for further exploration for nickel: transcript, page 792. He also confirmed that he saw the WMC information as no more than an indicator of potential and that he did not believe a company in the defendant's position could do anything more than sit and wait for WMC to take action. He also confirmed that given the known nickel deposits in the area, there was potential for any tenement in the vicinity of WMC's tenements to have potential for nickel mineralisation: transcript, page 800.
213 Second, Mr Cooke confirmed that in his discussions with Mr Crossley, reference was made to the Ernest Henry case: transcript, page 913. This was a matter not mentioned in Mr Cooke's witness statement, but was mentioned in Mr Crossley's witness statement. It would seem to confirm that whatever else was discussed, both Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley were aware of the Ernest Henry case and of its significance.
214 Thirdly, the meeting with WMC subsequent to the receipt of the WMC information probably took place on 24 October 1994: transcript, page 935. Mr Cooke was uncertain who was at that meeting - it may have been both he and Mr Crossley or he may have been there alone. Although it is not entirely clear, it would seem that at that meeting, Mr Cooke informed WMC representatives that the defendant needed more time to explore the McFarlanes Find tenement before reaching any agreement with WMC: transcript, page 936.
215 Fourthly, Mr Cooke says he probably did go out to the McFarlanes Find tenement to look for the drill holes after the receipt of the WMC information. However, he does not recollect being instructed by Mr Crossley to undertake a survey of the tenement. He says that the survey had already been done. He agrees he may have told Mr Crossley that a survey had been completed, but if he did so, he was not referring to a survey undertaken at the instigation of the defendant: transcript, pages 936 - 937.
216 Fifthly, the electromagnetic conductor which was revealed for the first time at the meeting with WMC in June 1996 did not, in Mr Crossley's view, indicate the presence of massive nickel sulphides on the defendant's ground. It may have indicated something on WMC's ground, but that was the extent of its significance: transcript, pages 954 - 955. Further, in re-examination, Mr Cooke suggested that the extra information available to the defendant in 1996 made no difference to the status of the McFarlanes Find tenement as it was understood in 1994: transcript, page 963.
217 There were two further matters which emerged during cross-examination. The first has to do with Mr Cooke's understanding of the position of the McFarlanes Find boundary. As I have mentioned above, the letter from WMC of 1 August 1994 had much to say about the shift in the boundary. Mr Cooke was cross-examined about his understanding of the shift in the boundary and that led to this exchange (transcript, pages 951 - 952):
"HANCY, MR: You have agreed you didn't tell Mr Sheppy about the shift of the boundary 200 metres and didn't tell him about the data, did you? --- I don't believe so.
But after August 1995 Mr Sheppy has spoken to you about this visit out to the McFarlanes Find tenement, hasn't he? --- He may have. He was - he compiled report for us.
After the ASX announcement and after the press release in June 1996, on 29 August 1996 Mr Sheppy spoke to you by telephone and in the course of that conversation you talked about that visit. Isn't that right? --- I don't recall.
Is it the case despite the evidence you have given so far that in 1995 you didn't appreciate that the boundary of the tenement had shifted 200 metres to the west? --- Sorry? I can't see where you're going with that. I knew it had shifted.
That's the evidence you have given but I'm putting to you, I'm asking you, is it the true position that you didn't appreciate that the boundary had shifted 200 metres to the west? --- But I'd been and visited the drill hole collars and I knew they were in our ground because of the boundary shift.
Did you tell Mr Sheppy something different when you spoke to him on 29 August 1996? --- I can't recall.
You recall telling Mr Sheppy, in effect, that you did not know about the 200-metre westward shift of the property boundary when you and he went there in August 1995? --- I must have known. I got the information in 94. I don't believe I would've said that.
Isn't that what you told Mr Sheppy; that you did not know about the 200-metre westward shift when you went there with Mr Sheppy in August 1995? --- No, I don't recall that.
Is it your evidence that you understood the significance of disseminated nickel sulfides of low grade at 195 metres depth? Is that your evidence? --- I believe so.
Is it the case that you told Mr Sheppy in the course of a telephone conversation on or about 29 August 1996 that you were not technically equipped to understand the significance of disseminated nickel sulfides of low grade at 195 meters depth?
--- No, that might've been his conclusion. I don't think I said it."
218 The significance of this exchange will become apparent later in these reasons. However, for present purposes, it is to be noted that Mr Noel Ripley Sheppy ("Mr Sheppy") is a geologist who was on two occasions commissioned to prepare reports dealing with the McFarlanes Find tenement. These reports were prepared during 1995. It was common ground between the parties that Mr Sheppy was never advised that consequent upon the receipt of the WMC information, the boundary of McFarlanes Find had shifted some 200 metres to the west.
219 During the course of cross-examination, the following exchange took place (transcript, page 961):
"THE MASTER: Just before you leave that statement to the exchange, Mr Cooke, would you agree that that is a fair assessment of the results of the drilling that was undertaken? ---I believe so. Under today's rulings it should actually have the collar coordinates, but nonetheless it says 105 metres east of the Western Mining hole and then it calculates the plus point 5 per cent nickel grades that were encountered in the hole.
Right, and those results enhanced the prospectivity of the tenement? --- I didn't believe so, no.
That's what the release says, isn't it? --- Correct, but I didn't write the release."
220 This exchange related to the 11 June 1996 release to the ASX. It is not entirely clear whether Mr Cooke agrees with the terms of the announcement. It would seem that he has doubts as to whether or not the WMC information actually enhanced the prospectivity of the tenement. But he does not appear to dispute otherwise the terms of the announcement.
221 I formed a generally favourable impression of Mr Cooke. However, it did seem to me that he struggled to recall the events of 1994. He was vague and hesitant about what had happened as between himself and Mr Crossley after the receipt of the WMC information. That may have been nothing more than a failing memory - the events took place almost 12 years ago. In the end, I would place very little reliance on Mr Cooke's recollection of these events.
222 Mr Crossley is a mining engineer with 30 years' experience in open-cut and underground mining. He has been involved with mining tungsten, tin, tantalite, copper, gold and diamonds throughout various mines in Australasia. It would not appear that he has had any experience mining or prospecting for nickel. While not a geologist, he is familiar with what are the numerous variables important in prospecting work. He has been involved in the preparation of a number of feasibility studies to determine the viability of commercially exploiting mineralisation. From 1990 to 1993, he served on the board of Macraes Mining NL, a significant mining company with a market capitalisation of $120,000,000. He was the technical director. However, his role as a director rendered him familiar with the legal requirements to disclose material matters to the market.
223 Mr Crossley joined the defendant in late 1993 as general manager. In December 1993, he was appointed to the board to fill the vacancy left by Mr Riley. He was immediately appointed managing director.
224 Mr Crossley was, as at the date of trial, familiar with the two letters from WMC. He recalls seeing one of these letters "in John Cooke's hand in 1994". Mr Crossley's recollection of his discussions with Mr Cooke are set out in par 10 and par 11 of his witness statement. They read as follows:
"10. I recall John coming to tell me one day that he had received a letter from WMC and that they had 'done it again'. I said 'What have they done again?' to which he replied words to the effect 'Ernest Henry - they have drilled McFarlanes Find'. I immediately understood what John meant as I was familiar with the Ernest Henry incident when WMC had drilled on a tenement held by another party. I recall that John had a letter in his hand and that he pointed out particular results showing nickel values at various depths. I asked John whether those results were of interest to Jubilee and I recall him saying that WMC had got low anomalous nickel values at a depth of 200 metres. I do not recall exactly when this conversation was.
11. I do not now recall if I had more than one discussion with John about the WMC letters."
225 Mr Crossley was familiar with WMC's underground nickel operation at Kambalda. That was a deposit grading between 7 and 9 per cent nickel with a cut off grade of 3 or 4 per cent. It would seem that Mr Crossley was not familiar with low grade disseminated nickel sulphides of the type disclosed by the WMC information. Mr Crossley instructed Mr Cooke to go and look at the WMC holes in the defendant's ground to attempt to identify where the boundary lay between WMC's ground and the defendant's ground to ascertain whether the WMC holes were in fact within the defendant's ground. Some four to six weeks later, Mr Crossley says Mr Cooke reported back to him. Mr Cooke advised that it was difficult to know just where the boundary was between the two tenements. Mr Cooke also advised he had had difficulty finding the WMC holes. As a consequence of this report, Mr Crossley instructed Mr Cooke to cause the boundary to be surveyed as well as the WMC holes to be located and their positions plotted relative to the tenement boundary. Mr Crossley says that some time later - perhaps in late November or more probably early December 1994 - Mr Cooke advised that the boundary survey had been completed. So far as Mr Crossley recalls, Mr Cooke's advice in respect of the survey was that he was able to verify that one or two of the WMC holes had been drilled on the defendant's tenement.
226 Based on this information, Mr Crossley says that he concluded that the WMC information was of no commercial significance to the defendant and that no announcement needed to be made to the ASX. Influencing his decision was the fact that the defendant had not drilled the holes, the location of the holes was not clear and the defendant had no way of verifying the data. He also says he concluded that the mineralisation identified in the WMC information was low grade and at great depth. As the defendant had no information as to the orientation of the mineralisation, there was no basis upon which further follow up exploration could be justified. In any event, the defendant did not have the funds to expend on a drilling programme at McFarlanes Find. At the time, the defendant's focus was towards gold exploration and to begin drilling for nickel would, in Mr Crossley's view, have been an unnecessary distraction.
227 This, it appears, was the end of Mr Crossley's interest in the WMC information. He does not recall discussing it further with Mr Cooke. He did not mention the WMC information to any of his co-directors. He never actually sited the boundary survey which Mr Cooke told him had been completed. That boundary survey, if indeed it was completed, was not tendered in evidence and did not form part of the defendant's discovered documents.
228 Mr Crossley provided some information on the defendant's position when he joined it in late 1993 and its fortunes throughout 1994 and 1995. In 1993, the defendant raised some $1,347,000 by the placement of 4,250,000 shares at 20 cents each. In that same period, the company expended $1,100,000 on exploration activities. The company was focused on exploring for gold with the intention of fast-tracking its Kathleen Valley project into production.
229 During 1994, the defendant was busy undertaking work on its tenements and carrying out studies to allow it to develop the Kathleen Valley project. At this stage, a feasibility study had been prepared, which indicated that the Kathleen Valley project could not operate on a stand-alone basis. To make the project more robust, the defendant required more ounces of gold to be found and for further technical matters, such as metallurgical studies, to be undertaken. This eventually led on to discussions with the owners of Bellevue.
230 Eventually an agreement was reached which allowed the defendant to buy Bellevue. It was thought that the combination of the mine and the Kathleen Valley project would produce a viable gold operation. As has been noted, the purchase of Bellevue did not proceed. The prospectus issued in October 1994 was withdrawn after Porter Western terminated the underwriting agreement.
231 With the failure of the purchase of Bellevue and the withdrawal of the prospectus, the company's share price began to slide. By January 1995, the defendant was in dire financial straits. In fact, it was only rescued by the efforts of two of its directors, Mr Harmanis and Mr Streeter, who effectively put their money into the defendant via a prospectus issued in February 1995. Mr Crossley resigned from the defendant in October 1995. He was, of course, not involved in any way with the ASX announcement made in June 1996.
232 Mr Crossley also made it plain that had the WMC information been released to the market in September / October 1994, he would not have anticipated any follow up drilling or investigation work on the McFarlanes Find tenement and he would have made that clear in the statement to the ASX. Essentially, the reasons why he would not have anticipated any follow up work were the same as the reasons why he did not regard the WMC information as significant. At the forefront of these reasons was the defendant's focus on gold and its lack of funds. Not surprisingly, in cross-examination, counsel for the plaintiff focused on the meeting or meetings between Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley subsequent to the receipt of the WMC information. As with Mr Cooke, it seems that Mr Crossley's recollection of these meetings is limited: transcript, pages 976, 980. Cross-examination did not shed any light on whether or not the first meeting took place after the receipt of the first WMC letter or after the receipt of the second letter. Mr Crossley did not know that the defendant had been supplied with electromagnetic data: transcript, page 982. Nor did Mr Cooke advise Mr Crossley, according to Mr Crossley, of the boundary shift: transcript, page 988.
233 Perhaps most importantly, it appears that Mr Crossley was under the impression that at its best, the WMC information showed mineralisation at 0.2 per cent nickel. That is evidenced by the following exchange (transcript, pages 976 - 978):
"So he said they had done it again and he referred to Ernest Henry. You thought you immediately knew what that meant. Do you have any clear recollection of what, if anything else he said? --- Well, he actually opened the back and drew my attention to what appeared to be a multi-element analysis and in that there were some numbers and he drew my attention to those. He said, 'That's .2 of a per cent nickel at 220 metres,' and I said to him, 'Was that significant?' It wasn't in his opinion and it wasn't in my opinion.
Point 2 per cent nickel? --- Yes.
Did you take the letter off him and read it yourself? --- I don't think I did. I think he sort of flipped it open, showed me the letter on the back and I gave it back to him, I'm pretty sure. I don't even know if I actually held it. I might have done.
But you thought he pointed out .2 per cent nickel which you didn't think was very important? --- Correct.
Do you have a clear recollection of him saying anything else on that occasion? --- I mean, we must have discussed it. I must have said, you know, 'Where are the holes? What does it mean?' type of thing. I think at that stage we didn't know where the holes were or what to make of it all, so I suggested that on his next visit to Kathleen Valley he calls in to McFarlanes Find which is to the north of Kathleen Valley and see if he can actually identify the holes because normally a drill hole has a peg next to it with a record number on it of some description and also normally you can actually pick out tenement boundaries. They are marked in a certain way. I thought at that stage he would be able to come back and report to me that he had been successful in finding the holes and finding the boundary."
234 It is very difficult to see how the WMC information could have been put to Mr Crossley in that way. It certainly was not suggested by Mr Cooke that that is the way he explained it to Mr Crossley. Further, Mr Crossley was at the time under the impression that the Mt Keith deposit graded 1.8 per cent nickel: transcript, page 981. In fact, it graded about 0.5 per cent nickel. So it is perhaps understandable that Mr Crossley did not think the WMC information was of any significance.
235 The importance of Mr Crossley properly understanding the WMC information can be demonstrated by the following exchange (transcript, page 994):
"THE MASTER: That is perhaps a convenient time. Just one question before we conclude for the day, Mr Crossley. If you go to page 764 - you might have it open there. It's the results that were contained I think in the second letter, which was contained with the second letter. Have you got those there? ---764, yes.
You can see down on the right-hand side there is a reference to a hole 101. It's a bit faint on my photocopy. See the hole number MKTD101, I think it is? --- Down the very bottom corner.
Yes? --- Yes.
And then you have a look at those results for the nickel assays, parts per million, running down virtually the centre of the page. I think Mr Hancy drew your attention to them, 1.33 per cent. Do you see those? --- Yes, I see that.
1.33 per cent, down right at the bottom .7 per cent. If you had known that those results were contained in that information, would you have announced them to the stock exchange? ---They are certainly more fundamental and the answer is yes, if we could have known for sure that they were on our property. If they weren't on, then there was nothing to report."
236 It also emerged in cross-examination that it was for Mr Crossley to determine whether any announcement ought be made to the ASX: transcript, page 990. This might perhaps appear rather strange. After all, it might be thought that significant announcements - and announcements to the ASX are by definition significant - would be a matter for the board. But Mr Crossley's evidence on this point stands by itself. There was no evidence from any other quarter as to the way in which the internal administration of the defendant worked.
237 As with Mr Cooke, I formed a generally favourable impression of Mr Crossley. But again, as with Mr Cooke, it was apparent that he had no detailed recollection of discussions he had with Mr Cooke about the WMC information. But two things are clear. Mr Crossley was the officer of the defendant who bore the responsibility for deciding whether or not the WMC information ought be released to the market. Second, Mr Crossley simply did not know, and did not make any real effort to find out, what was in the WMC information. In relation to both of these matters, the evidence is quite clear.
238 Dr Barnes graduated from the University College Swansea United Kingdom with an honours degree in science in 1976. He completed his PHD at the University of Leeds in 1981. He has 25 years' experience throughout the world in a wide variety of environments. From 1981 to 1986, he worked as a field geologist. He is the principal and founder of the Resource Services Group. He is presently executive vice-president of Dundee Precious Metals Inc, a company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and capitalised at around CAD $800,000,000. His expertise covers not only geological matters and project management, but extends to mergers and acquisitions and company and project assessments.
239 Dr Barnes notes that it is only one hole MKTD-101 that intercepted anomalous levels of nickel. That anomaly commenced at 195 metres and continued for 50 metres to the end of the hole. That showed some 50 metres of intercept at an average grade of 0.51 per cent nickel. Dr Barnes then looked at the possible methods for deriving a valuation of the McFarlanes Find tenement based on the one drill hole and concluded that it would not be possible. As I have indicated above, it seems to me that there is no prospect of putting a valuation on the McFarlanes Find tenement consequent upon one drill hole and I need say nothing further about this matter.
240 Dr Barnes concluded that the WMC information was of no importance to the defendant. In reaching that view, he considered a number of factors. First, there was only one drill hole with low grade nickel mineralisation. The mineralisation was encountered 190 metres down the hole, meaning that there was some 180 metres of overburden above the intercept. Dr Barnes points out that the geology suggests a maximum strike length of approximately 200 metres within the McFarlanes Find tenement at a depth of 150 metres. He further suggests that the intercept is of no strategic importance to the defendant because the neighbouring tenement holder has at least 20 years of mine life at Mt Keith, meaning that WMC has no need to promptly acquire the defendant's ground.
241 Dr Barnes says that in 1994 the principal focus of the market was directed towards the new technology laterite nickel projects of which Anaconda's Murrin Murrin project was perhaps the best known. The traditional massive nickel sulphide projects were owned by WMC and were typified by the Kambalda and Leinster operations. Dr Barnes says that disseminated nickel sulphide deposits such as Mt Keith attracted little direct market interest as investment in these assets was available through WMC. In short, Dr Barnes is not of the view that the market was interested in information such as the WMC information.
" ... it is my opinion, to have issued a notice to the ASX upon receipt of the WMC exploration results in 1994 ('the Information') would have been ill advised and misleading, if it had been either in terms similar to the notice issued on 11 June 1996, or otherwise suggesting any significance in the Information."
243 During the course of his cross-examination, Dr Barnes did comment further upon the announcement made by the defendant on 11 June 1996 (transcript, page 898):
"THE MASTER: Just one question before Mr McCusker starts, Dr Barnes: if you have a look at page 1773 which I think is in volume 4 - do you have that page? --- I do indeed.
--- that's the announcement that Jubilee Gold Mines made to the stock exchange in 1996. You can see the third paragraph there beginning with the words, 'Following a boundary survey'? ---Yes.
What's your view on that announcement - that paragraph in the announcement, given what you now know about what Jubilee knew in 1996? --- My impression of that is that it's a quite bullish statement. I maintain this throughout this process. I wouldn't have made that statement. To counter that, in my current employment we make this decision on a daily basis. We're doing approximately $45 million worth of exploration a year. We have 20 rigs going continuously and at all times we make calls on whether to release data. If you want my opinion, it's quite bullish."
244 Dr Barnes had something further to say on this issue in re-examination. The tenor of his evidence was that the decision as to whether or not information ought be released was a question of judgment for each company depending on its circumstances. He would not have made the 1996 ASX announcement: or at least he would not have made the 1996 announcement in the same terms as it was made by the defendant. But, as I understand his evidence, if that announcement had been made, he would certainly have eliminated the reference to "significant" potential for both massive and disseminated nickel sulphides. He would have simply said "potential": transcript, page 904.
245 Overall, Dr Barnes was an impressive expert witness. He was eminently qualified and very experienced. However, in concluding as he did that the WMC information ought not to have been the subject of an ASX announcement, I am not satisfied he gave enough consideration to factors other than the grade of the intercept. In particular, he does not seem to me to have looked at the position from the point of view of a cash strapped junior explorer whose prospects in September / October 1994 were poor. Even when interpreting the significance of the WMC information, I am not satisfied he looked at the position with the practised eye of someone like Dr Trench. I am not prepared to accept Dr Barnes' view that the WMC information was of no significance and should not have been released.
246 Mr Allen is a stockbroker. He commenced employment in 1970 with the ANZ Bank and in 1973 he moved to Dunn & Bradstreet as a business analyst. Between 1980 and 1985, he was funds manager for WA Trustees responsible for a money market portfolio exceeding $100,000,000. In 1985, he took up employment with Paterson Ord Minnett, a leading Perth stockbroker, where he was a money market / share market adviser. In 1988, he commenced working for the stockbroker Intersuisse as a client adviser but left soon after to become a consultant with two local merchant banks. In 1989, he joined the stockbrokers Eyres Reed as money market manager and credit adviser. He was promoted to manager (retail brokerage) in 1992 and was appointed to the board of directors in 1993. With the takeover of Eyres Reed in 1997, he resigned from the board but remained with the firm until 1999. In November 2001, he commenced employment with Paterson Ord Minnett as a senior client adviser. He has completed a postgraduate diploma course with the Securities Institute of Australia and is an associate of the Securities Institute of Australia and a member of the Securities & Derivatives Association.
247 During the course of cross-examination, counsel for the plaintiff appeared to suggest that Mr Allen was not qualified to offer an opinion as to whether or not the WMC information ought to have been the subject of an ASX announcement. As I understand counsel's cross-examination (there was no application to reject Mr Allen's evidence on the basis that he was not qualified as an expert), it was suggested that lack of academic qualifications resulted in a lack of understanding of the economic theory of stock markets, which in turn had the effect of lessening the value of Mr Allen's opinion. In fact, it is clear that Mr Allen is a very experienced stockbroker. In my view, he was eminently qualified to offer an opinion as to the likely effect of the release of the WMC information to the ASX.
248 Mr Allen made the point that stock markets are influenced by macro factors and micro factors. He looked at five components in each of these factors. In macro factors he listed market / investor sentiment, market trends (up trends / down trends), market outlook, time of the year and junior mining stock perceptions. He said the months of August, September and October were historically downward trending periods on the stock market, and interest in junior mining and speculative stocks was normally subdued. Further, there had been a boom in share prices in 1993, peaking in mid-1994. By a reference to a graph of the all resources index, he demonstrated that investor sentiment was declining. He was of the view that the improved sentiment in 1996 meant that the influence of the June 1996 announcement was far greater than the effect a release in 1994 would have had.
249 Dealing with micro factors, Mr Allen said that the defendant's prime focus was gold and, in particular, its Kathleen Valley reserves. The market would not have seen nickel as of any interest. Further, the market was aware that the company was struggling for funds. In these circumstances, the announcement of low grade nickel deposits at depth would, in Mr Allen's opinion, have had no effect on the defendant's share price.
250 Mr Allen also points to the fact that in April 1994, Mr Harmanis consented to an order that he dispose of a significant shareholding. Those shares provided a considerable "overhang" of shares in the market. The fact of the forced sale by Mr Harmanis was a factor which was likely to depress the share price.
251 Mr Allen was asked a series of questions which he answered in his report. Some of these questions he had effectively answered in providing his overview of the significance of the WMC information. But there are some questions which were relevant. Question 49 was in the following terms:
"As at September 1994 would the release of the information set out in paragraph 7 of the Amended Statement of Claim ('the Pleaded Information') have been likely to influence persons who commonly invest in shares in deciding whether or not to buy or sell shares in Jubilee, and if so what impact the release of Information would have had on the market price of shares in Jubilee?"
252 Mr Allen concluded that the impact on the share price would have been "negligible". He based his opinion on matters he had already outlined in his report. He was also asked whether the release of the WMC information would have been likely in his opinion to have influenced persons to buy and sell shares. His opinion was that it would not.
253 Mr Allen was asked two questions about the effect of the sale of the plaintiff's shares. They were as follows (59):
"If the Plaintiff had sold 547,000 Jubilee shares between September 1994 and February 1995, what would have been the effect on the market price of Jubilee's shares?"
254 The first point to note is that there would not have been 547,000 shares sold on the plaintiff's case. The total number of shares sold would have been 521,000. Mr Allen comments that if the shares (and he is referring to 547,000 shares) were sold in one parcel over a few days, the market price would have weakened for a short period but may have recovered. He goes on to comment about the effect of the sale over a longer period of time. However, those comments are not relevant to this decision.
255 He was then asked a further question in relation to the partly paid shares held by the plaintiff (60):
"If the Plaintiff had sold 2,625,000 Jubilee shares in early September 1997, what would have been the effect on the market price of Jubilee's shares?"
256 Mr Allen points out that over 81,000,000 shares were traded in the week the Cosmos discovery was announced in early September 1997. He also notes that the share price fluctuated between 23 cents and $1.52 over this period. He says that given the possible permutations a firm opinion is not possible. He goes on to say:
"To say you would have received between $1.40 and $1.50 when the price was fluctuating wildly would have been an extremely timely and fortuitous sale, a very rare event in share trading."
257 Mr Allen goes on to comment upon the reports of Mr Le Page and Dr Rudenno. However, none of his comments are relevant for present purposes.
258 In the overall, Mr Allen's evidence indicated just how difficult it was to work out in retrospect what effect a particular announcement might have on the market. Mr Allen was of the view that the release of the WMC information would have had no effect on the defendant's share price in September / October 1994. But he acknowledged that there was a possibility that it might have had some effect. During cross-examination, this exchange took place (transcript, page 1055):
"If somebody had become despondent about Jubilee shares and decided it was going nowhere with gold but was then informed that they had found nickel of a similar grade to known disseminated nickel deposits in the vicinity, and that this opened up the prospect of exploration potential for nickel, those persons might have decided to hold onto their shares; that is, not buy or sell but just hold on, to await further developments. Do you agree with that? --- Possibly, but we're talking of thousands of shareholders so I can't give a specific detail as to what an individual would do, but they may possibly. They may hold on, but then again a lot of investors may own shares in Jubilee thinking it was a gold explorer, so if they went into nickel they may have sold."
259 I accept that as an experienced stockbroker, Mr Allen was in a position to give an expert opinion as to what effect on the share price an announcement in September / October 1994 may have had. But I do not accept his conclusion that it would have had no influence. In my view, the evidence of Mr Le Page and Dr Rudenno on this point is to be preferred. In reaching this conclusion, I have been persuaded by what actually did occur when the announcement was made in 1996. While I accept that prevailing circumstances and perhaps the market sentiment were different, I am still satisfied that an announcement, if made in 1994, would have resulted in a movement in the stock price.
260 During the course of his evidence, Mr Allen gave his opinion as to who would invest in a company like the defendant as it was in 1994. He said (transcript, pages 1060 - 1061):
"THE MASTER: Mr Allan, who are the sorts of people who invest in a stock like Jubilee or a stock that Jubilee was in 1994? Well, let me qualify that. You wouldn't expect fund managers to be interested nor self-managed super funds? We need this for the transcript? --- Beg your pardon?
So you wouldn't expect either fund managers or self-managed super funds to invest in this type of stock? --- Not particularly. They would be classified as aggressive investors. You basically have three types of investors. You have conservative, balanced and aggressive, and you would question why you would be putting super fund money into a very speculative junior explorer, unless it was a very small percentage.
So that would be conservative, the super fund --- ? --- No. A super fund would normally be a conservative - or a balanced investor.
So they wouldn't go into a stock like this? --- Very speculative.
No? --- They're very - a risk that you could lose your money for whatever reason.
And in 94 the so-called day traders weren't around in the sense of sitting on computers, were they? --- Correct - not to the extent they exist today.
So who in 94 would have - can you give me a profile of an investor that would be interested in a stock like Jubilee in 94?---Speculators, people that would possibly trade it for a few cents, even though day traders don't exist as much - didn't exist as much then as they do now, but there certainly would be people who would be buying shares because they're cheap. So they're not based on any fundamentals. People who are prepared to lose money but make big gains if there was anything ---
So they are looking for leverage. They are buying in at 15 cents. If they buy in at 15 cents and it goes up five cents, they would make a 30 per cent profit? --- Exactly.
So they are looking for leverage on the share price? --- For trading purposes, irrespective of what the company does. I have a person that - a client that buys shares and he has no idea what they do, but because they're under 20 cents, they're cheap shares. He's just trading them. That's what he wants to do. So they would be some of the investors that would be a shareholder in Jubilee at this time.
Yes, but the stock has been described from time to time as a speculative junior miner. So really what you're looking at is speculators? --- Definitely. Definitely, yes. The fund managers certainly wouldn't look at these shares because they're just too small, and they want to get set a cheap price, they want to see volumes to be able to trade in and out, but it's not on the horizon at this time."
261 Mr Sheppy was, in fact, called by the plaintiff. The circumstances in which he came to give evidence were slightly unusual. During the course of presenting his client's case, counsel for the plaintiff indicated he would call Mr Sheppy. A statement of Mr Sheppy had been prepared and provided to the defendant's solicitors. Counsel for the defendant objected to Mr Sheppy giving evidence. He maintained that the evidence was irrelevant. Without going into detail, Mr Sheppy had undertaken certain work for the defendant on some of its tenements, including McFarlanes Find, in 1995. He had prepared two reports. As I have mentioned above, it was common ground between the parties that when Mr Sheppy undertook this work he had not been told about the boundary shift. But, apart from that, his evidence seemed to me to be irrelevant.
262 The plaintiff's case is, as I have explained, that an announcement should have been made in September / October 1994. That being so, what exploration work was done in 1995 is of no real interest. It may have been, if it was said that the work done in 1995 provided to the defendant more information which then led to the June 1996 announcement. If that had been the case, doubtless the defendant would have called Mr Sheppy. But there was no suggestion that the reports of Mr Sheppy were relevant to this issue. In my view, then, his evidence was irrelevant and I refused the plaintiff leave to call him as a witness.
263 I did take the precaution of marking for identification Mr Sheppy's statements, reports and other material (also some exhibits). I did that for this reason. Were it to become an issue in an appeal as to whether or not leave should have been given to Mr Sheppy and were the Court of Appeal to decide that leave should have been given, then it might be possible to take into account Mr Sheppy's evidence without the need for a re-trial. Whatever the merits of such a course, I thought it appropriate to at least identify the statement and the reports.
264 At the conclusion of Mr Cooke's evidence, counsel for the plaintiff indicated he intended to call Mr Sheppy under the provisions of s 21 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). That section is in the following terms:
"Every witness under cross-examination in any proceeding, civil or criminal, may be asked whether he has made any former statement relative to the subject-matter of the proceeding, and inconsistent with his present testimony, the circumstances of the supposed statement being referred to sufficiently to designate the particular occasion, and if he does not distinctly admit that he made such statement, proof may be given that he did in fact make it.
The same course may be taken with a witness upon his examination in chief or re-examination, if the judge is of opinion that the witness is hostile to the party by whom he was called and permits the question."
265 The evidence of Mr Sheppy had to do with whether Mr Cooke was aware of the boundary shift of the McFarlanes Find tenement and whether he had understood the significance of the assay results in the WMC information. From the witness statement tendered by counsel for the plaintiff (exhibit 202), it was clear that Mr Sheppy was in a position to establish, through his evidence, that Mr Cooke had made a prior inconsistent statement. After hearing argument, I concluded that I was obliged by the terms of the statute to give leave to the plaintiff to call Mr Sheppy for the limited purpose of establishing the prior inconsistent statement.
266 Mr Sheppy is an experienced geologist. He graduated with a geology degree from the University of Cape Town in 1969. He has been a member of the Australian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy for 34 years. He is currently employed by CSA Australia Pty Ltd as a consulting geologist.
267 In his evidence, he says that on 29 August 1996 he received a telephone call from Mr Harmanis, then managing director of the defendant. That conversation dealt in part with a trip Mr Sheppy had made to the McFarlanes Find tenement in August 1995 with Mr Cooke. Mr Sheppy had provided a report dated 26 August 1995 after that trip.
268 As a result of his conversation with Mr Harmanis, Mr Sheppy phoned Mr Cooke later the same afternoon. Mr Sheppy told Mr Cooke that he was now aware that WMC had given the defendant the drilling information in 1994 which showed that the western boundary of the eastern portion of the McFarlanes Find tenement had shifted some 200 metres westwards in 1994. Mr Sheppy asked Mr Cooke why he had not been told about the boundary shift when the two visited the McFarlanes Find tenement in 1995. Mr Sheppy says Mr Cooke told him that at the time of the trip in 1995, he was not aware of the boundary shift. He also said that in 1994 he had not understood the significance of the WMC drill results.
269 Mr Sheppy says Mr Cooke told him that the assay data came to him (Mr Cooke) from WMC as a loose-leaf bundle and he had found it difficult to understand and did not realise the importance of the information. Mr Sheppy said that Mr Cooke further advised him that WMC had recently supplied the defendant with cross sections of the drill holes that had been drilled in 1994 and that the cross sections had provided an explanation of the electromagnetic data. Mr Cooke said that the cross sections had led him to appreciate for the first time the significance of the nickel intercepts. Mr Sheppy made a note of this conversation. That note appears as exhibit 205.
270 Mr Sheppy was cross-examined by counsel for the defendant. But he did not resile from anything he said. Mr Sheppy impressed me as an entirely honest and straightforward individual. There can be no suggestion that the note he made of his conversation with Mr Cooke was not a contemporaneous note. There is no reason at all why he should have been mistaken in his evidence. He appeared to have a very clear recollection independent of the notes he made of what occurred. In my view, there is no reason whatsoever to doubt what he says.
271 It was only reasonable that Mr Cooke should be given the opportunity to comment upon Mr Sheppy's evidence. In an ideal world, Mr Cooke would have been given the opportunity to hear what Mr Sheppy said and then give evidence in response. In fact, Mr Cooke had to be called before Mr Sheppy because of other commitments. In the end, this made no real difference to the flow of the evidence.
272 Mr Cooke said that he did not recall any discussion with Mr Sheppy in August 1996. He confirmed that he was aware of the boundary shift because of what was contained in the first letter from WMC. He maintained that he was not technically equipped to appreciate the significance of low grade nickel sulphides and he did not believe that he would have said anything to Mr Sheppy to the opposite effect. Mr Cooke did concede that he may not have appreciated the significance of the electromagnetic data enclosed with the first WMC letter.
273 Mr Cooke, too, was cross-examined about his recollection. He simply did not recall a discussion in August 1996 with Mr Sheppy. On that basis, he could do no more than maintain that he would not have made the statements as alleged by Mr Sheppy.
274 In one sense, at least, it is not necessary to determine precisely what happened as between Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley when the WMC information was received by them on behalf of the defendant in August and September 1994. But it is worth highlighting some aspects of the evidence. First, it is clear that Mr Cooke never showed to Mr Crossley the two letters and their annexures in their entirety. At the most, he showed Mr Crossley some assay results or some parts of the annexures to one of the letters.
275 Second, at no time did Mr Crossley, in his capacity as managing director, read the letters in their entirety or call for a report from Mr Cooke or someone else (perhaps a consultant) as to the significance of the information. Rather, for some unexplained reason, he was left with the impression that the WMC information highlighted only very low grade nickel sulphides at depth. In this he was wrong and even the most cursory reading of the WMC information would have shown that he was wrong.
276 Thirdly, no steps were taken by the defendant to follow up the WMC information. If, as Mr Crossley says, he instructed Mr Cooke to arrange for a survey of the McFarlanes Find tenement to establish precisely where the boundary was, that survey was not carried out. Mr Cooke may have told Mr Crossley that the survey had been carried out, but Mr Crossley did not take any steps to establish what the survey showed and what significance it might have for the defendant.
277 Fourthly, both Mr Cooke and Mr Crossley must have known that WMC had an interest in the McFarlanes Find tenement. That was disclosed by the fact of the meeting with WMC in October 1994. There is a danger about reading too much into this meeting. But it is significant that WMC thought enough of the McFarlanes Find tenement to offer as part of a deal a tenement which they had earlier refused to part with.
278 As I have indicated above, I accept entirely the evidence of Mr Sheppy in relation to his discussions with Mr Cooke. That being so, I am satisfied that Mr Cooke did not appreciate the significance of the assay results contained in the WMC information. I also accept that Mr Cooke told Mr Sheppy that he did not appreciate that there had been a boundary shift in the McFarlanes Find tenement. Why Mr Cooke should have said that is difficult to explain. The first letter from WMC is essentially all about that boundary shift. No one who read that letter, let alone an experienced geologist, could fail to appreciate that the boundary had shifted. Perhaps Mr Cooke had a reason for saying to Mr Sheppy that he did not appreciate the boundary shift and he has now forgotten why he made such a statement. Or perhaps he did not read the WMC letter. In the end, it may not make any difference. In my view, the evidence clearly establishes that Mr Cooke did not appreciate the significance of the WMC information and nor did Mr Crossley.
279 In answering this question, reference must be made back to s 1001D. The information, then, would be expected to have a material effect on the price or value of the securities "if the information would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly invest in securities". The place to start then is to decide who would invest in securities.
280 The answer to that question is straightforward. It was provided by Mr Allen. It is traders, people who are investing to make a capital gain in the short term. They are dealing in stocks where trading volumes are limited and where no value can be ascribed to the stock based upon underlying net assets. In such a market rumour is important and announcements, which for a large corporation would be so insignificant as not to influence the share price, can make a difference.
281 I am satisfied that the WMC information was likely to influence persons who commonly invest in shares such as the defendant's. I have referred above to the background facts, the canvass against which the WMC information was to be considered. I will not repeat what I have already said. It is the assay results and their significance that is, to my mind, important. Dr Trench really said it all in the passage that I have quoted. These were significant results. Of course, they did not establish that there was an economic deposit on the McFarlanes Find tenement. They did no more than provide a basis for further exploration work. But they certainly did that and, on that basis alone, they were results which should have been released to the market.
282 That view is confirmed by the fact of the 11 June 1996 announcement. Mr Harmanis who is not a trained geologist, although he is an experienced mining executive, quickly realised the significance of the WMC information. Doubtless that is why the release of 11 June 1996 was made. It may have been the case the announcement was too "bullish". But that is not the point. The fact is that the defendant saw fit to release the information.
283 I do not accept that the situation in June 1996 was materially different to the situation the defendant found itself in, in 1994. It was true that there was a meeting on 7 June 1996 at which cross sections were provided which showed the existence of an EM conductor on WMC's ground. But as Mr Cooke pointed out, that really said nothing about mineralisation on the defendant's tenements. Otherwise, although the cross sections provided a pictorial representation of the information, there was nothing provided by WMC which went further or enhanced the WMC information.
284 It is true that the situation of the defendant had changed somewhat by June 1996 to what it was in September / October 1994. The company had shifted its focus and expressed an intention to look for nickel. Forrestania had taken an interest in the defendant and provided expertise and working capital. Market sentiment may have been more favourable for a junior explorer looking for nickel in June 1996 than it was in September / October 1994.
285 But even when all of these matters are taken into account as they must be (see Flavel v Roget 1 ACSR 595), I am not satisfied that the conditions were so different as to warrant disclosure in 1996 but not in 1994. The fact is that as at both dates the defendant was a junior explorer with limited cash resources struggling to establish a worthwhile prospect. I am simply not satisfied that the situation had changed so much in 1996 as to make an announcement then appropriate but not in 1994.
286 It is then to be determined whether the WMC information would be "likely" to influence persons who invest in securities. In his written closing submissions, counsel for the defendant submitted that "likely" means "probable" not merely "possible": see R v Crabbe [1985] HCA 22; (1985) 156 CLR 464; Boughey v The Queen [1986] HCA 29; (1986) 161 CLR 10 at 14. That seems to me to be a proper view to adopt when interpreting this section of the Corporations Law.
287 On balance, I am satisfied that release of the WMC information would have been likely to have influenced persons who invested in shares such as the defendant's and consequently the price of the defendant's stock. By far the most important factor in that conclusion is the fact that when the announcement was made in June 1996, the defendant's shares were affected. They rose in value. The announcement and the announcement alone, is the only explanation for the rise in the value of the shares. Of course, there may have been other factors at play including market sentiment and the state of the stock market generally. But it simply cannot be a coincidence that the 1996 announcement led to a considerable jump in the value of the defendant's shares. In one sense, it might be said that release of the information was not "likely" to influence persons who commonly invest in shares but was demonstrated to have done so.
288 Apart from all of that, I place reliance on the opinions of the experts. I have analysed what each of the experts had to say in some detail and I have given careful weight to all of their evidence. As I have indicated, on balance, I prefer the evidence of the plaintiff's experts. It must be acknowledged that when dealing with a hypothetical situation such as this, honest men can reasonably differ in their opinion. But, on balance, I found the evidence of Mr Le Page and Dr Rudenno more convincing than the evidence of Dr Barnes and Mr Allen. In particular, Mr Allen, I think, conceded - and conceded quite properly - in his evidence that there was a prospect that an announcement of the information would affect the share price. That then leads back to an analysis of what happened to the share price after the release on 11 June 1996. That seems to me to confirm that release of the WMC information was likely to influence persons who invest in securities.
289 The further requirement of s 1001D is that the information should have a "material" effect on the share price. Referring again to the defendant's written submissions, counsel referred to the US Supreme Court decision TSC Industries Inc v Northway Inc [1976] USSC 119; (1976) 426 US 438, a case which deals with "materiality". The Court said:
"There must be a substantial likelihood that the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information available."
290 With respect, I would adopt that formulation. Applying that test, I am satisfied that a reasonable person would expect the information to have a material effect. This was good news. It provided a junior explorer with information about a tenement that was sufficient to interest a major mining house. Certainly, the defendant was focused on gold exploration but that was not to the exclusion of everything else. Again, by reference to the effect on the share price of the 11 June 1996 announcement, it can be seen that the expectations of the reasonable person were proved right.
291 This leads on to the issue raised by the defendant as to the nature of the announcement that would have been made by the defendant. Based upon the evidence of Mr Crossley, it was submitted that if an announcement was made in 1994, it would have had to include a statement that the defendant did not intend to follow up these results with further exploration or evaluation work. I do not accept that evidence.
292 First, it is clear that in 1994 Mr Crossley did not appreciate the significance of the WMC information. In fact, he did not even know to any extent what the WMC information contained. Even as at the date of trial, he seemed uncertain as to the significance of the data. If he had become aware of its significance, then he may or may not have determined that no further drilling was warranted. But I am not satisfied that he is in a position now or that he was in a position in 1994, to say that no further exploration work would have been undertaken. Apart from anything else, if an announcement was made, presumably the board of the defendant would have had to consider what the next step might be. It is impossible to know what they might have decided. But I am not satisfied that they would have made an announcement containing negative sentiment.
293 I also do not accept that under the listing rules they would have been obliged to make such a statement. This was covered by Mr Le Page in his evidence. It would have been open to the defendant to make a statement in precisely the terms of the 1996 announcement leaving out the last sentence of the third paragraph. In other words, they could have announced the results in those terms and simply not have given any indication of what the next step might be. That would have been an appropriate course to adopt (assuming always that the bullish statement in 1996 was appropriate).
294 Thirdly, it is simply not the practice of junior explorers to include negative sentiments when announcing positive results. As I have indicated, when the suggestion was made to Mr Riley, Mr Le Page and Dr Rudenno that negative statements about future activity by the defendant would have been included in an announcement made in 1994, they were nonplussed. That is just not the way that junior explorers operate. They make the sort of announcement that the defendant made in 1996.
295 For all of these reasons, I am satisfied that the defendant was required to disclose the WMC information under the provisions of listing rule 3A and s 1001A(1) of the Corporations Law.
296 Under s 1001A(2), the section is only contravened (in the circumstances of this case) if the defendant was negligent in failing to notify the ASX of the WMC information. Clearly, negligence in this context means something more than inadvertence or carelessness. In their written submissions, the defendant (at par 43) assumed that the civil standard applied. That is to say the defendant was obliged to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of injury to persons within the class prescribed by s 1001D. The crucial question, then, is what constitutes reasonable care in all the circumstances.
297 In this case, the circumstances again include all the background facts. They certainly require proper consideration of the WMC information. It is then not necessary to go any further. The fact is that the WMC information did not receive proper consideration. The person who had direct responsibility for announcements to the ASX was Mr Crossley. It was he who had to determine whether the WMC information should have formed the basis for an announcement. In making that decision, he had to bring to bear all of the background knowledge and his own experience. If he did not understand the WMC information, then he could have called for a detailed report from Mr Cooke or he could have engaged the services of an independent consultant.
298 The simple fact is that he did nothing. He did not even bother to read the two letters. In my view, there can be no doubt that he simply did not take sufficient care. It was always foreseeable that if the WMC information was such as to have an effect on the market, then it could lead to investors suffering loss. In my view, Mr Crossley and through him the defendant, were clearly negligent.
299 The claim for damages made is, as indicated above, in two parts. First, there are the fully paid shares. In my view, if an announcement had of been made in September / October 1994, then the shares would have been sold for a price 3 cents higher than the actual sale price. The reason why I have settled on an amount of 3 cents requires some explanation. Mr Le Page, in his evidence, analysed the fluctuation in the defendant's share price after the June 1996 announcement. Applying a 10 day moving average, he found an increase of 9 per cent. As at early October 1994, the defendant's share price was hovering around 30 cents. (It was, in fact, between 33 cents and 35 cents in the first week of October, but it is reasonable to assume that an announcement would not have been made until the end of that week. Thereafter, for the rest of October, the share price was near enough to 30 cents.) Nine per cent then, is near enough to 3 cents.
300 Of a total number of 797,000 fully paid shares 521,000 were sold after September 1994. That means, then, in my view, that the plaintiff would have received an amount of $15,630 more for its shares than it actually did receive. There is the prospect that the plaintiff might not have sold all the shares at the height of the market or that the addition of another 521,000 shares might have had an adverse effect on the overall sale price. However, neither of these two contingencies seem to me to be of great significance. I would, however, apply a discount of 10 per cent to allow for these contingencies and round out this aspect of the claim at $14,000.
301 That then leaves the question of the partly paid shares. The prime question is this - would the plaintiff have retained these shares until September 1997? On this point, I accept the evidence of Mr Riley. As I have indicated, I found him a witness of truth. I acknowledge that Mr Riley did take an extended period of time to effect improvements upon his house suggesting a lifestyle choice which may have led him to dispose of his shares even if the WMC information had been released. But, on balance, I am satisfied that the plaintiff would have retained the shares as alleged.
302 The method of assessing damages when dealing with hypothetical events has been the subject of a number of cases, in particular, David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1990] FCA 148; (1990) 93 ALR 271 and Adelaide Petroleum NL v Poseidon Ltd (1990) 98 ALR 431. (The Adelaide Petroleum decision (supra) to which I have referred is the decision of French J at first instance. His Honour's approach was approved both in the Full Federal Court and in the High Court.) In David Securities (supra), the Full Court of the Federal Court said (at 295):
"... as senior counsel for the third respondents emphasised in his submissions on the present appeal, it was for the appellants to establish at the trial that on the balance of probabilities there was a real chance that if the third respondents had performed their duties to the appellants and had not been guilty of the breach of contract and breach of duty in tort, as was found against them, the appellants would have taken steps to avoid the loss allegedly sustained by them."
303 Applying that reasoning to this case, I am satisfied that on the balance of probabilities, there was a real chance that had the defendant released the WMC information and had they not been guilty of negligence in failing to release that information, then the plaintiff would have held on to the partly paid shares and would have sold them in September 1997.
304 It is then a matter of assessing the contingencies to be taken into account in relation to the loss of benefit that would have accrued to the plaintiff if the shares had been retained. It was after all asking a lot of the plaintiff to retain these shares for a period of three years after the making of the initial announcement. There is no way of knowing just what the defendant would have done if the announcement had been made. As I have indicated, I am not satisfied that it can be said that it would have done nothing - no follow up drilling or no further work attempting to establish whether or not nickel deposits with a commercial value existed on the McFarlanes Find tenement.
305 In opening, counsel for the plaintiff maintained that it could be assumed that further work would have been done. I can see no basis on which that assumption can be made. In my view, it is a matter of looking at the evidence and conducting a discounting exercise that, as French J said in the Adelaide Petroleum case (supra) (at 532), "is fundamentally of a qualitative nature". Taking into account the fact that there was three years between the date I have found the WMC information should have been released and the jump in the share price to $1.40, I would apply a discount of 20 per cent.
306 Before applying that discount, it is necessary to decide on a figure at which the shares might have been sold. I am satisfied that an amount of $1 per share is a reasonable figure to adopt. I have settled on that figure for a number of reasons. First, as Mr Allen said, the plaintiff would have had to have been extremely fortunate to have sold its entire shareholding at $1.40 - around the peak of the market. In fact, that closing price was only achieved on one day, that being 5 September 1997. During that day, the market fluctuated between $1.30 and $1.52. The next day (8 September) it fluctuated between $1.52 and 79 cents. In fact, from 4 September to the end of that month, the closing price was closer to $1 than it was to $1.40. Moreover, the plaintiff was selling 2,625,000 shares, a not inconsiderable number even allowing for the turnover at the relevant time.
307 That would mean, then, that the value of the shares sold I would put at $2,625,000.
308 From this amount certain deductions must be made. It cost the plaintiff $60,000 to convert 1,500,000 partly paid shares into fully paid shares. It would have cost $67,500 to convert 1,125,000 partly paid shares into fully paid shares. (These shares were not actually converted. They were sold by agreement with the defendant without conversion: see par 40 of the witness statement of Mrs Riley and the Deed of Settlement trial bundle page 1361.) That is a total of $127,500. In addition, on the sale of the shares the plaintiff received $195,000. (That amount includes $45,000 received by the plaintiff for the shares disposed of by agreement with the defendant which I have referred to above.) That is a total receipt then by the plaintiff of an amount of $322,500. That is to be deducted from the amount of $2,625,000, leaving a balance of $2,302,500. To that figure is to be applied the 20 per cent discount for contingencies which I have referred to above. That gives an amount of $1,842,000.
309 In reaching that figure, I have not taken into account stamp duty or the brokerage incurred on sale of the shares. Given that I have applied a significant discount for contingencies and that I have adopted a discounted figure for the sale value of each share, I am not satisfied that any further discount is warranted. I am mindful that assessing damages in circumstances such as this is not an exact science and that it is a matter of doing the best with the information available.
310 In total then, I have assessed the plaintiff's damages at $1,856,000. There will be judgment for the plaintiff in that amount. Doubtless the plaintiff will seek interest on the judgment. The question of interest was not the subject of any submissions by the parties and I will hear further argument on that issue.
311 I commenced these reasons by setting out some of the difficulties facing a junior explorer. One of those difficulties is a lack of personnel and resources to undertake the day to day tasks expected of a listed company. But every listed company is subject to the same disclosure requirements. These reporting requirements are one of the obligations imposed in exchange for the benefits of being listed. Particularly in an area of the market where rumour is rife, material information must be disclosed.
312 In reaching the conclusion that I have in this case, I have not been unmindful of the implications of the decision for listed junior explorers. It is one thing for a Master sitting in Court for three weeks with the benefit of numerous expert witnesses and 12 years after the event to make a judgment that certain information should have been disclosed. It is quite another for an under-resourced cash poor junior explorer to reach the same conclusion in the course of its day to day operations. The last thing that junior explorers need is to think that they must spend time and money obtaining expert geological and legal advice on whether or not information ought be released to the market. That is not the thrust of this decision. What is important is that material information should be released. If there is any doubt about whether the information is material, then the company ought to err on the side of caution and make the release.
313 During the course of his submissions, counsel for the defendant suggested that if all companies released information they held even if they thought it was of limited significance, the ASX would be swamped and the whole exercise would be counter-productive. While I doubt there is much chance of that occurring, it remains the case that the present rules aim for full disclosure and that is what should be made. If the ASX comes to the conclusion that irrelevant information is being released by over-cautious corporations, it can take whatever steps are necessary to remedy the position.
Kim Riley In His Capacity As Trustee of The Ker Trust
Jubilee Mines Nl [2006] WASC 199
(1990) 98 ALR 431
(1986) 161 CLR 10
(1990) 93 ALR 271
(1985) 156 CLR 464
(1976) 14 SASR 303
(1990) 169 CLR 279
(1986) 160 CLR 1
(2002) 190 ALR 370
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(1914) 18 CLR 360
(1998) 196 CLR 494
(2004) 29 WAR 517
(2004) 216 CLR 388
(1994) 179 CLR 332
(1979) 42 FLR 331
(1992) 175 CLR 514