background
4 The applicant, who is eighty-seven years of age, was born on 26 June 1913. He emigrated to Australia in 1950 and is an Australian citizen. On 12 December 2000, the first respondent requested that the applicant be returned to it for prosecution for the offences of war crimes and genocide. On 13 December 2000, the Minister for Justice and Customs gave notice pursuant to s 16 of the Act that an extradition request had been received in relation to the applicant from the first respondent. Also on 13 December 2000, a magistrate issued a warrant, pursuant to s 12 of the Act, for the applicant's arrest. He was arrested the same day and subsequently released, pursuant to s 15 of the Act, on bail on his own undertaking subject to conditions.
5 A hearing under s 19 of the Act in relation to the applicant commenced before the second respondent on 14 May 2001. As already noted, the second respondent made her determination that the applicant was a person eligible for surrender on 29 May 2001, and ordered that he be committed to prison as she was required to do by s 19(9) of the Act. The hearing before this court on 29 May 2001 was concerned only with the question whether the applicant should be released on bail pursuant to s 21(6)(f)(iv) until the review has been conducted.
6 It appears that the applicant complied with the conditions of his bail from the date of his release on 13 December 2000 until 29 May 2001, when he again sought bail in this court.
the applicable legal principles
7 Where a magistrate determines under s 19 of the Act that a person is eligible for surrender, the person may make an application for review under s 21(1)(a) of the Act. Section 21(6)(f) provides that the court to which the review application is made may:
(iii) order that the person be kept in such custody as the court directs; or
(iv) if there are special circumstances justifying such a course, order the release on bail of the person on such terms and conditions as the court thinks fit;
until the review has been conducted … .
8 A finding that there are special circumstances justifying the release on bail has been described as a condition precedent to the court exercising its discretion to order release under s 21(6)(f)(iv): see, e.g., Bertran v Vanstone (1999) 94 FCR 404 at 412 and Timar v Republic of Hungary [1999] FCA 1559 at [21]. In the former case, Sundberg and Merkel JJ said at 412-413:
It is a condition precedent in the sense that it is a requirement that must be satisfied, though its satisfaction does not conclude the decision-making process because there is still a discretion to be exercised.
9 In Bertran v Vanstone [1999] FCA 464 (upheld on an appeal reported at (1999) 94 FCR 404), I stated at [16]-[19]:
The Act does not state expressly what are 'special circumstances' for this purpose. In settling upon the relevant criteria by reference to which such a judgment may be made, it is, I think, necessary to consider, first, the objects of the Act, which are set out in s 3, and the purpose of subs 15(2) and subs 15(6). The explanatory memorandum which accompanied the Extradition Bill 1987, set out in Schoenmakers v Director of Public Prosecutions (1991) 30 FCR 70 at 73-4, explained the 'special circumstances' requirement in clause 15(6) in the following terms:
'Subclause (6) provides that a person shall not be granted bail unless there are special circumstances. Such a provision is considered necessary because experience has shown that there is a very high risk of persons sought for extraditable offences absconding. In many cases the person is in Australia to avoid arrest in the country where he is alleged to have committed the offence, ie the person left the jurisdiction to avoid justice'.
In evaluating whether there are special circumstances shown, the first consideration is, therefore, the purpose of the special circumstances requirement, namely, to take account of 'the very high risk of persons sought for extraditable offences absconding': cf Schoenmakers 30 FCR at 74 per French J; Holt v Hogan (No 1) (1993) 44 FCR 572 at 578 per Cooper J; and Kainhoffer 48 FCR at 13 per Spender J.
Plainly enough, the risk of absconding is not the only consideration. In Schoenmakers, French J also referred to the need to evaluate the factors relied on as constituting special circumstances (in that case, for the purpose of s 21(6)(f)(iv)) by reference to 'broad community standards', including the 'presumption in favour of liberty and against deprivation of liberty without just cause': 30 FCR at 75. Cooper J adopted the same approach in Holt v Hogan (No 1) 44 FCR at 579. His Honour added in that case:
'In considering the circumstances of a particular applicant for bail one does not exclude those circumstances which ordinarily would fall for consideration on an application for bail where a person is charged domestically for the commission of a crime in this country. All personal circumstances are taken into consideration, notwithstanding that some or all of them will again fall for consideration if special circumstances are established as a condition precedent to the exercise of a jurisdiction to grant bail.'
Ultimately, whether any factor or group of factors will amount to 'special circumstances' (when account is taken of the statutory purpose and the circumstances of the case, measured in part at least by broad community standards) will depend upon whether the relevant magistrate is satisfied that that factor or those factors justify departing from the position in the ordinary case where bail will not be granted: cf Holt v Hogan (No 1) 44 FCR at 579. As Burchett J said in Wu v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (1997) 79 FCR 303 at 307 the expression 'special circumstances' 'refers to circumstances different, in some way that provides a ground for considering a grant of bail more favourably, from those of the ordinary case of a fugitive remanded in custody'. See too McDade v United Kingdom (unreported, R D Nicholson J, 15 February 1999).
I accept, as the applicant's counsel submitted, that 'special circumstances' may be demonstrated by a single factor or by a combination of factors: cf Wu 79 FCR at 307. It is unnecessary, if not impossible, to compile an exhaustive list of those circumstances which are relevantly special. The Act, in s 15(2) and s 15(6), requires the magistrate, who is charged with making the decision as to bail, to consider all the facts pertaining to any bail application, before determining whether there are special circumstances which take the case out of the ordinary and justify remand on bail: cf R v Giordano (1982) 31 SASR 241 at 243 per King CJ (with whom Zelling and Matheson JJ agreed) and Forest v Kelly (unreported, Lockhart, Ryan and Heerey JJ, 20 December 1991). A similar approach is taken in determining whether 'exceptional circumstances' exist justifying a grant of bail for the purposes of ss 4 and 13 of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic): see Application of Michael Kanfouche (unreported, Smith J, 4 April 1991); Application of Matthew Thomas (unreported, Hampel J, 2 October 1996) and Application of John Moloney (unreported, Vincent J, 31 October 1990). If the relevant magistrate decides that there are such special circumstances, then it falls to him to consider whether to remand the applicant on bail and, if so, upon what terms and conditions: see Schoenmakers 30 FCR 74 per French J and Holt v Hogan (No 1) 44 FCR at 580 per Cooper J.
10 Goldberg J (with whom Branson and Dowsett JJ agreed) adopted these remarks in Timar v Republic of Hungary [1999] FCA 1559 at [21] in considering "special circumstances" for the purpose of s 21(6)(f)(iv) of the Act.
11 In Timar v Republic of Hungary [1999] FCA 1559, Goldberg J concluded, at [22]-[23], that the applicant's health, the low risk of his absconding because of his lack of convictions, his Australian citizenship, his Australian home, his employment and the fact that he did not flee Hungary, as well as the nature and gravity of the alleged offences were matters which were properly taken into account in considering the grant of bail. But Goldberg J said, at [23], that:
[A]bsent the circumstance in relation to the applicant's health, I would not have been satisfied that in this case, taken either singly or together they would have amounted to 'special circumstances' for the purposes of s 21(6)(f)(iv) of the Act. There is nothing particularly unusual or different about a person who has no convictions being charged with an offence or the fact that he is in employment in a senior position. Although the applicant is an Australian citizen and his home is in Australia it does not follow that he will not abscond within Australia.
As appears below, these observations are relevant to the present application.
12 If special circumstances exist for the purposes of s 21(6)(f)(iv) of the Act, then the court must determine whether, as an exercise of discretion, bail should be granted: see, e.g., Bertran v Vanstone (1999) 94 FCR 404 at 412; Cabal v United Mexican States (No 5) [2000] FCA 525 at [8] considered in Cabal v United Mexican States [2001] FCA 97. As Cooper J pointed out in Holt v Hogan (No 1) (1993) 44 FCR 572 at 580:
If special circumstances are identified, then the next question is whether as a matter of discretion bail ought to be granted. The primary consideration in the exercise of this discretion is whether the circumstances of the applicant and the appropriate conditions of bail are such as to satisfy the Court with a reasonable level of certainty that the applicant will remain available for extradition in the event that any appeal be unsuccessful.