Cabal v United Mexican States
[2000] FCA 525
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2000-04-20
Before
Goldberg J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (12 paragraphs)
Introduction 1 On 17 December 1999 Ms L A Hannan, a Magistrate in Victoria, determined pursuant to s 19(9) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ("the Act") that the first applicant ("Mr Cabal") and the second applicant ("Mr Pasini") were persons eligible for surrender to the first respondent ("Mexico") in relation to a number of extradition offences. 2 The Magistrate, pursuant to s 19(9) of the Act, by warrant, ordered that the applicants be committed to the Melbourne Assessment Prison or Port Phillip Prison to await, in relation to the offences the subject of her determination, surrender under a surrender warrant or release pursuant to an order under s 22(5) of the Act. 3 On the same day as the Magistrate issued the warrants, the applicants filed an application in the Federal Court pursuant to s 21 of the Act for a review of the Magistrate's decision to commit the applicants to prison. In that application the applicants sought by way of interim relief orders pursuant to s 21(6)(f)(iv) of the Act that they be released on bail pending the review of the Magistrate's decision. I heard that application for interim relief on 22 and 23 December 1999. On 4 January 2000 I published my reasons for dismissing the application for bail by each of the applicants: Cabal v United Mexican States [2000] FCA 7. I also ordered that liberty be reserved to the applicants to apply further for release on bail consistently with my reasons for judgment. In par 112 of my reasons I said: "As I have observed earlier in these reasons I am reserving liberty to the applicants to renew their application for bail if the conditions under which they are kept in Port Phillip Prison deteriorate or if the conditions under which they are transported and detained while outside the prison, whether in shackles or otherwise, are such as to warrant further consideration." Background 4 On 9 February 2000 the applicants filed a notice of motion for orders pursuant to s 21(6)(f)(iv) of the Act that they be released on bail until the review of the Magistrate's decision has been determined. The applicants filed and served a number of affidavits in support of that motion which related, inter alia, to issues other than those in respect of which I had reserved liberty to apply. On 15 March 2000 I ruled (Cabal v United Mexican States (No 2) [2000] FCA 295). that I would not allow into evidence, for the purpose of the application for bail, affidavits which were either sworn, or prepared for the purposes of swearing, prior to the conclusion of the earlier bail hearing or evidence relating to: · The applicants' personal and business circumstances and activities prior to the earlier bail hearing; · Refutation of Mr Kelly's evidence that Sirius East is a safe environment and that the applicants were transferred there for their own protection; · Refutation of the evidence that the decision to place the applicants on the high security transport list was based on the reason that Mr Cabal had offered a prisoner money to assist an escape; · The applicants' state of mind when they determined to remain outside Mexico and the reasons why they sought to avoid arrest by the Mexican authorities; · The contention that the applicants' legal and political status in Mexico is now significantly different than was the position in 1994, which position would be undermined if they chose to abscond; · Australia's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to persons incarcerated for the purpose of extradition proceedings; · The conditions under which the applicants were kept in custody prior to the earlier bail hearing; · The submission that Mr Cabal was not at relevant times a director or employee of Banco Union. 5 The applicants rely upon a number of circumstances which have arisen since 23 December 1999 which they submit constitute special circumstances within s 21(6)(f)(iv) of the Act warranting the Court exercising its discretion to grant bail. Those circumstances, generally, fall into the following categories: · multiple, unnecessary and invasive cavity searches; · painful shackling and manacling; · transport in a van without windows and whose inside walls are smeared with excrement; · being placed with prisoners who are seriously ill with communicable diseases; · constant frustration of, and interruption of, their communications with family and legal advisers; · members of their families have been exposed to unpleasant scenes at the prison; · pointless, petty and cruel implementation of rules designed to deny them the most basic human exchanges with their wives and families during visits; · unexplained and discriminatory cancellation of medical examinations; · being confined constantly, and in close quarters, with prisoners introduced into the Sirius East Unit since 23 December 1999, who have been convicted of serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery and rape. It is alleged that two of these persons have been involved as aggressors in male rape in Sirius West. 6 In the reasons which I published for dismissing the earlier bail applications by the applicants I considered the legislative history of s 21(6)(f)(iv) of the Act and examined a number of the authorities which had considered the content of the expression "special circumstances" found in s 21(6)(f)(iv). I do not propose to repeat those observations and I incorporate them by reference in these reasons. As I noted in those earlier reasons, I approach the question whether special circumstances exist for the purposes of s 21(6)(f)(iv) by asking, consistently with the authorities referred to in those reasons, whether the circumstances relied upon by the applicants are different from the circumstances which ordinarily apply where a person is in custody pending extradition proceedings and which by their nature warrant a more favourable view in relation to the grant of bail. It is also important to emphasise, having regard to the issues presently before me and as I observed in my earlier reasons, that the determination whether "special circumstances" exist must be considered by reference, not only to circumstances which are "special" in the sense to which I referred in my earlier reasons, but which also must take into account broad community standards. 7 I also repeat that a court should take an overall view of the circumstances which attend upon an application for bail when considering whether there are relevant special circumstances. As I observed earlier, individual or special circumstances may not, of themselves, be special in any relevant way but an accumulation of non‑special circumstances may well build up into a special circumstance or into special circumstances. There may also be an inter‑relationship between different circumstances which will heighten the significance of each individual circumstance. 8 If special circumstances be found, it is then necessary to determine whether, as an exercise of discretion, bail should be granted: Bertran v Minister for Justice (1999) 165 ALR 155 at 163. As Cooper J pointed out in Holt v Hogan (No 1) (1993) 44 FCR 572 at 580: "If special circumstances are identified, then the next question is whether as a matter of discretion bail ought to be granted. The primary consideration in the exercise of this discretion is whether the circumstances of the applicant and the appropriate conditions of bail are such as to satisfy the Court with a reasonable level of certainty that the applicant will remain available for extradition in the event that any appeal by unsuccessful." 9 It is necessary to consider, in some detail, the factual basis underpinning the applicants' further application for bail as some of the matters relied upon represent a continuum of circumstances which existed and were operative on 23 December 1999. 10 But before doing so, it is important to note that I am not considering an application for bail at large, but rather an application which requires a consideration of what has occurred since 23 December 1999 and whether any circumstance which has arisen since that date is an exacerbation of a circumstance which existed prior to that date. I am not considering de novo, or afresh, matters which were canvassed before me on the earlier bail application or matters which had arisen before the earlier bail application and could have been the subject of submissions on that application. Some of the applicants' submissions fall into these categories. For example, the applicants submitted that as they had not been convicted of any crime it was inappropriate that they should be housed with convicted criminals and that they should not be detained in a prison environment. That issue was canvassed at the earlier hearing as was the nature of the general conditions existing in the Sirius East Unit of Port Phillip Prison. The issue to be addressed is whether there have been any changes in circumstances since 23 December 1999 or deterioration in conditions which existed at that time which qualify as "special circumstances" for the purposes of s 21(6)(f)(iv) of the Act. 11 The applicants filed affidavits by themselves, their wives, their solicitors, an inmate of Sirius East and Mr Cummins, a psychologist. Mexico filed affidavits by Mr Dennis Roach, the Manager of the Security and Emergency Service Group ("SESG") of CORE the Public Correctional Enterprise and Mr Shane Kelly, the Head of Operations at Port Phillip Prison. In relation to a number of incidents deposed to by the applicants and their witnesses, Mr Roach and Mr Kelly responded on the basis of information and belief, the information being based on what they had been told by prison officers and SESG officers. The applicants submitted that wherever there was conflict between the evidence of the applicants and evidence on behalf of Mexico I should accept the evidence of the applicants as it was direct evidence and not given on the basis of information and belief. Although a number of matters are controversial between the parties I do not consider that any issue of credit or credibility of witnesses arises. The applicants submitted that Mr Kelly did not take a fair approach to questions put to him in cross‑examination, but that criticism was not warranted. In a number of respects Mr Kelly gave evidence about matters which were later shown to be incorrect but I do not consider that any issue of credit arises as a result of these inconsistencies. I do not consider that he exhibited any bias or animus against the applicants. Insofar as it is necessary to consider competing versions of incidents which have occurred, I undertake that consideration when considering the specific incidents.