Sections 588FL and 588FM of the Act
16 Section 588FL of the Act specifies circumstances in which a "PPSA security interest" (as defined in s 51 of the Act) of a company which is being wound up, or is subject to administration or a deed of company arrangement or restructuring or a restructuring plan, will vest in the company for the benefit of creditors, with the result that the secured creditor will lose the benefit of the security.
17 Section 588FL(1)(b) provides that s 588FL will apply if a PPSA security interest granted by the company in collateral is covered by s 588FL(2).
18 Central to the operation of s 588FL(2) is the definition of "critical time": Cubic Interiors at [8]. Section 588FL(7) defines "critical time". In this case, the "critical time" is the date on which the Liquidator was appointed to the Companies: 25 July 2022.
19 A security interest will be covered by s 588FL(2) if the requirements of paras (a) and (b) are satisfied. The effect of s 588FL(2)(a) is that "a security interest will be covered if it is enforceable against third parties, and perfected by registration (and by no other means), at the critical time, or, if it arises after the critical time, then when it arises": Re Antqip Pty Ltd (in liq) [2021] NSWSC 1122 (Re Antqip) at [42] (per Brereton JA). Section 588FL(2)(a) addresses the timeliness of registration of a security interest. It requires that the "registration time" be after the latest of the following times:
(i) 6 months before the critical time;
(ii) the time that is the end of 20 business days after the security agreement that gave rise to the security interest came into force, or the time that is the critical time, whichever time is earlier;
(iii) if the security agreement giving rise to the security interest came into force under the law of a foreign jurisdiction, but the security interest first became enforceable against third parties under the law of Australia after the time that is 6 months before the critical time - the time that is the end of 56 days after the security interest became so enforceable, or the time that is the critical time, whichever time is earlier;
(iv) a later time ordered by the Court under section 588FM.
20 Section 588FM(1) provides that "A company, or any person interested, may apply to the Court (within the meaning of section 58AA) for an order fixing a later time for the purposes of subparagraph 588FL(2)(b)(iv)."
21 In this case, the relevant security interests were granted on 19 June 2023, being the date of the Companies' entry into the Receivership General Security Deed. Registration on the PPSR of those security interests occurred on 26 June 2023. This was within 20 business days of the day on which the security interests were granted. However, the security interests were granted after the Liquidator was appointed to the Companies on 25 July 2022. It follows that the security interests were granted after the "critical time".
22 There is uncertainty about the operation of s 588FL in the above circumstances. In Cubic Interiors, Cheeseman J described the alternative approaches to this issue as follows:
The divergence in the authorities which is presently relevant is whether, for the purpose of s 588FL(1)(b) a PPSA security interest that is granted after the "critical time" is covered by s 588FL(2). As between the two lines of authority, it is common ground that s 588FL(2) may cover a security interest that arises after the critical time. The point of difference is as to whether s 588FL(2) can cover a security interest that is granted after the critical time. The first and earlier line of authority is to the effect that s 588FL(2) does cover securities granted after the critical time. No distinction is drawn between a security interest being "granted" and a security "arising". The second and more recent line of authority is that security interests that are granted after the critical time are not covered by s 588FL(2) because there is a distinction between the use of "granted" in s 588FL(1)(b) and "arises" in s 588FL(2)(a). Accordingly, a security interest which "arises" after the critical time will only be covered by s 588FL(2) if it was granted at or before the critical time.
23 If the "more recent line of authority" is correct, the primary relief sought by the Receivers in this proceeding is not strictly required, as the security interests arising under the Receivership General Security Deed were not granted at or before the "critical time" (ie, 25 July 2022). Both Cheeseman J in Cubic Interiors and Jackman J in Revroof have proceeded on the basis that the more recent line of authority is to be preferred.
24 As to the "earlier line of authority", in Cubic Interiors, Cheeseman J identified a series of Federal Court cases, commencing with K J Renfrey Nominees Pty Ltd (Trustee), in the matter of OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 325 (K J Renfrey), which were determined on the basis that s 588FL(2) of the Act covers PPSA security interests which were "granted" after the critical time. The cases following K J Renfrey include Korda, in the matter of Ten Network Holdings Ltd (admins apptd)(recs and mgrs apptd) [2017] FCA 1144; Hill (admin) in the matter of Flow Systems Pty Ltd (admins apptd) [2019] FCA 35; Dickerson, in the matter of McWilliam's Wines Group Ltd (admins apptd) (No 2) [2020] FCA 417; Park (Administrator), in the matter of Ellume Administrators Appointed) v Evangayle Pty Ltd (Trustee) [2022] FCA 1102; Birch, in the matter of Geelong Fire Services Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2022] FCA 963.
25 As Cheeseman J observed in Cubic Interiors at [10], the practical effect of this construction of s 588FL is as follows:
…where a PPSA security interest is granted after the critical time, it will in every case be necessary to apply to the Court for an order extending the date by which registration must occur under s 588FM in order for the security holder to enjoy the benefit of the security (and to prevent it vesting in the company). That is because it is not possible for the security to be registered at the critical time (that is, at a time before it is granted).
26 The "second line of authority" commenced with the decision of Brereton JA in Re Antqip, which concluded that there was no need for, nor utility in, an order under s 588FM fixing a later time for the purpose of s 588FL(2)(b)(iv) of the Act in respect of security interests granted after the "critical time". In both Revroof and Cubic Interiors, the analysis in Re Antqip was described as "compelling": Revroof at [17]; Cubic Interiors at [55]. In Re Antqip, Brereton JA drew a distinction between a scenario where security interests were granted after the critical time and a scenario in which security interests were granted before the critical time but arose after the critical time. On the basis of a detailed analysis set out at [41]-[63] in Re Antqip, Brereton JA concluded that s 588FL applied to the latter but not the former scenario. The present case is an instance of the former scenario - that is, the security interests in this case were granted after the "critical time".
27 The Receivers contend that the reasoning of Brereton JA in Re Antqip, as endorsed in Revroof and Cubic Interiors, is to be preferred over the "earlier line of authority". On that contention, it would follow that, strictly, there is no need for an order under s 588FM fixing a later time for the purpose of s 588FL(2)(b)(iv) of the Act in respect of security interests granted after the "critical time". Notwithstanding this, because of the uncertainty that exists on the state of the authorities at present, the Receivers nevertheless sought an order under s 588FM of the Act, expressed to be made "to the extent necessary". That approach reflects the approach adopted by Jackman J in Revroof and Cheeseman J in Cubic Interiors, where an order in those terms was said to have utility where there is no intermediate appellate authority that serves to resolve the competing lines of authority: Revroof at [18]; Cubic Interiors at [86].
28 In the present case, it is not necessary for me to express a concluded view as to whether I agree with the earlier or later line of authority. It is sufficient for me to state that I also consider Brereton JA's detailed analysis and conclusion in Re Antqip compelling. I agree with Jackman J in Revroof and Cheeseman J in Cubic Interiors that, in the absence of intermediate appellate authority on the point, there is utility in making an order under s 588FM of the Act which is expressed to be made "to the extent necessary". In this case, such an order has further utility because it is required as a condition precedent to the financing arrangements, as referred to at [15] above.
29 The principles that govern the making of a remedial order under s 588FM were expressed by Davies J in K J Renfrey at [28] as follows:
To make an order under s 588FM(2)(b), the Court must be satisfied that it is just and equitable to grant relief. The circumstances that would justify an order extending the time for registration on the just and equitable ground to avoid the operation of s 588FL(4) will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. Some general observations can be made though. As the purpose and effect of an order under s 588FM is to avoid the vesting of the security interest in the company and preserve the secured creditor's security, it is relevant in determining whether it is just and equitable to fix a later time to consider the interests of the creditors: Re Appleyard Capital Pty Ltd (2014) 101 ACSR 629; [2014] NSWSC 782 (Re Appleyard Capital) at [29]-[30]. As Brereton J observed in Re Appleyard Capital at [30] whilst "the presence or absence of prejudice to unsecured creditors is a relevant discretionary consideration, relevant prejudice is not necessarily established merely by showing that the dividend to unsecured creditors will be less if the security interest does not vest in the company; the unsecured creditors may well have been in no different a position if the security interest had been timely registered". His Honour stated that the type of prejudice that is of particular relevance is prejudice attributable to the failure to effect registration earlier where the delay in the registration of the security interest causes prejudice to creditors who have transacted with the company to their detriment, being unaware of the creation of a security interest. In the present case, there was no delay in registration.
30 In the present case, no creditor of the Companies will be prejudiced by the preservation of the security interests granted by the Receivership General Security Deed. As explained above, that security was granted almost a year after the winding up of the Companies and less than a month ago. It follows that the security interests were granted at a time when no creditors could have transacted with the Companies to their detriment because of a lack of awareness of the Receivership General Security Deed.
31 Further, the evidence of Mr Hutton is to the following effect:
(a) Provision of the Receivership General Security Deed is in the best interests of the Companies and the Caydon Group as a whole.
(b) The Receivership General Security Deed was executed as part of entry into the New RSF Facility Agreement, which provided various benefits to the Companies and, by extension, the Companies' creditors. Secured creditors of the Companies are content with the arrangements that include the entry into the Receivership General Security Deed, including as the "Existing RSF Lenders" will have their debt repaid. Unsecured creditors will not be prejudiced where those creditors can only have been dealing with the Companies on the basis that they are insolvent and being wound up.
(c) The property of the Companies over which security has been granted under the Receivership General Security Deed is, in all material respects, the same property over which security was granted under the previous financing arrangements. As Mr Hutton deposed, "the security interests effectively replace certain of the security interests currently registered on the PPSR…in respect of facilities that will be on terms more favourable to the Receivership Entities [being the Companies]".
32 In light of the above, it is my opinion that an order in the terms sought by the Receivers is just and equitable. Further, for the reasons articulated by Jackman J in Revroof and Cheeseman J in Cubic Interiors, which I have identified above, it is my opinion that it is appropriate to make the orders sought by the Receivers to the extent necessary under s 588FM(1) of the Act.