" In the context of the treaty with which we are concerned and
of the Australian Extradition Act, I have some difficulty
with the proposition that the words 'accompanied by' in Art
XI may be so loosely construed as to be satisfied by a
document, received however late, as long as it arrives in
time to be presented to the magistrate before he makes his
decision whether or not to commit the fugitive to prison to
await the warrant of the Attorney-General for his
extradition. Although, by virtue of s 10 of the Extradition
Act, the Act must be construed subject to the treaty, the
treaty itself should not be read in isolation; it was
concluded after the passing of the Act, and the Act forms
part of the context in which it should be read. There are a
number of duties owed by the Attorney-General in relation to
a requisition, the due discharge of which would require him
to have regard to the terms of the requisition: see
Schlieske (No 2) v. The Federal Republic of Germany 76 ALR
417 at 424, 426. I do not think it would be consonant with
the scheme of the Act to read the words 'accompanied by' in
a sense which would include documents received after the
date of the Attorney-General's notice. Such documents could
not have been taken into account by the Attorney-General
when deciding to issue his notice. The fact that Art XIII
of the treaty, like the article referred to by Lloyd LJ,
permits Australia to request additional evidence or
information, within a period to be specified by Australia,
does not seem to me to require any different conclusion. It
may be that, in cases where Art XIII is utilised, there will
by necessary implication be a variation of the effect of Art
XI, but that conclusion does not require a general loosening
of the language of the Article.
However, for the same reason, there is no need to construe
Art XI as requiring all the documents to be in the one
package. If the purpose is to ensure that certain material
is available to the Attorney-General when he considers the
issue of his notice, that purpose will be equally well
served where the documents have come to him within a
reasonable time prior to his making that decision. I do not
see any reason to reject, as accompanying documents,
documents received shortly before the requisition, while
accepting documents received shortly afterwards. In both
cases, I think it is a question of fact whether the
documents are documents which, in the relevant sense,
accompanied the requisition. In the present case, where a
mere 10 days elapsed between the requisitions of 8 March and
18 March, I think it is also permissible to regard those two
documents as constituting one requisition. For myself, I am
unable to regard all three of the requisitions received in
this case over a period of nearly five months as one
requisition, except in the sense that the earlier document
may be incorporated by reference in the later documents.
The view I have taken, however, is sufficient to dispose of
the appellant's contention on this point. "
(my underlining)