44 Maronis has been followed more recently in Shipley v Masu Financial Management [2008] NSWSC 1187; (2008) 68 ACSR 412, where White J dismissed an application by a defendant and three of its officers to restrain the plaintiffs in those proceedings from having access to transcript of an examination before ASIC and other items of correspondence between ASIC and the defendant or the particular examinees, which were produced on subpoena by ASIC. The said transcript and items of correspondence had arisen in connection with ASIC's execution of its coercive investigative powers.
45 White J accepted there was no question but that the documents and the information were provided in the confidence imposed by the provisions of the ASIC Act.
46 The applicants there contended that ASIC was obliged under s 127(1)(a) to protect the confidentiality of the examinations and the documents produced to it. His Honour considered (at [21]) there to be fundamental difficulties with that submission, the first of which was that, while ASIC was required under s 127(1)(a) to take all reasonable measures to protect information given to it in confidence in connection with the exercise of its powers from an unauthorised use or disclosure, in producing documents to a court pursuant to a subpoena ASIC was not making disclosure of such information (citing Maronis). His Honour said (at [21]):
…nor would any use or disclosure of information resulting from its compliance with the subpoena be unauthorised. The command of the subpoena and the order of the Court permitting inspection, authorises disclosure to those to whom inspect is given and authorises use of the information for the purposes of the proceedings.
47 No reason was advanced by Mr Lloyd for the proposition contended for by the GCSL Applicants that Bryson and White JJ were incorrect in holding as they did in Maronis and Shipley respectively. Mr Lloyd simply urged me to form a view that the proper construction of s 127 was otherwise than had been held by their Honours.
48 It seems to me that an obligation to take reasonable precautions to protect from unauthorised disclosure is not in its terms (nor is it as a matter of plain English language usage) a prohibition on disclosure as such. It contemplates a distinction between authorised and unauthorised disclosure and does no more than require ASIC to use reasonable endeavours to protect against unauthorised disclosure. The fact that certain kinds of disclosure are then deemed to be authorised does not mean that any other kind of disclosure is not. Indeed, s 127(6), to which I was not taken by Mr Lloyd, provides that nothing in various of the preceding sub-sections limits what may otherwise constitute, for the purposes of sub-section (1), authorised use or disclosure of information.
49 The position of ASIC, adopting the submissions in this regard of Mr Parker, is that compliance with a subpoena or order for production can never be unauthorised disclosure for the purposes of s 127 of the ASIC Act. Certainly, on the face of the section, it is hard to see how any disclosure made in compliance with a court order could be said to be unauthorised.
50 In any event, in both Maronis and Shipley their Honours recognised that production to the court in compliance with an order for production is not disclosure. Disclosure of material produced to the court under a subpoena occurs only once there is an order granting access to the subpoenaed material, a matter which is within the control of the court.
51 In my opinion, s 127 does not prevent production by ASIC of documents in compliance with the Order for Production nor does it require that I restrain the production by ASIC of material the subject of the Order. Accordingly, the first basis on which the GCSL Applicants make their application fails.
(ii) Public interest immunity
52 As to the second basis, Mr Lloyd says that ASIC should have claimed public interest immunity and did not do so but that its "nonchalance" in that regard does not preclude the court from maintaining an objection based on public interest immunity. Mr Lloyd cites what was said by Gibbs ACJ in Sankey v Whitlam [1978] HCA 43; (1978) 142 CLR 1, to the effect that it is in all cases the duty of the court (and not the privilege of the executive government) to decide whether a document will be produced or may be withheld.
53 His Honour there said:
the Court must decide … whether the public interest which requires that the document should not be produced outweighs the public interest that a court of justice in performing its functions should not be denied access to relevant evidence.
54 I was also referred to the decision of Northrop J in Somerville v ASIC [1995] FCA 1102, and to the authorities referred to by his Honour therein. Mr Lloyd relies upon the fundamental principle that documents may be withheld from disclosure if the public interest renders this necessary.
55 Mr Lloyd places emphasis on what was said in Johns, by Brennan J (as his Honour then was) when his Honour noted that the purposes for which a power to require disclosure of information is conferred limit the purpose for which the information so disclosed can lawfully be disseminated or used, referring to Marcel v Commissioner of Police (1992) Ch 225. In Katsuno v R [1999] HCA 50; 199 CLR 40; 166 ALR 159, Kirby J considered (at [112]) and applied the principles stated in Johns.
56 Mr Lloyd referred to the SFO secrecy provisions governing the production to the SFC of documents by the GCSL Applicants and the interviews given by those applicants. He submitted that s 378(2)(e) either expressly or implicitly conditions the provision of that material with a duty on the recipient to maintain the secrecy or confidentiality of the material provided. Mr Lloyd submitted that there was an intention disclosed in the Hong Kong legislation that confidentiality of material provided to the SFC should be maintained (though as noted above s 378 itself contemplates that there might be disclosure under compulsion of a court order) and that the intention discernible from the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding was to maintain confidentiality of information provided as between regulatory bodies of both countries.
57 It was submitted by Mr Lloyd that it is in the public interest to maintain the confidentiality of material provided from an overseas regulator to ASIC (where that material had been provided in a situation of express or implied confidence/secrecy) so as to enable ASIC to go about its investigative work in private and so that foreign governments would know that when material (acquired from individuals and companies under compulsion) was provided confidentially to Australian regulators that information would remain confidential in the hands of Australian regulators. It was submitted that if this were not to occur, then foreign regulatory agencies would be less likely to assist, as would those persons assisting overseas regulators (including whistleblowers, though here, as pointed out by Mr Parker, there is no suggestion that any of the information in question was provided by whistleblowers - rather, as Mr Lloyd was at pains to note, the information was provided by the GCSL Applicants under a process of compulsion).
58 Mr Lloyd submitted that if secrecy provisions were to be easily circumvented then the flow of information (provided in confidence by overseas regulators in the assurance that this would be without risk that it would find the way into the public domain) may well 'dry up' and that this would be to the detriment of ASIC's performance of its regulatory role. It was submitted that ASIC was akin to a police investigator and not an agent for company administrators.
59 Mr Parker, in response, noted that s 130 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which permits the exclusion of evidence relating to matters of state where the public interest in preserving its secrecy or confidentiality outweighs the public interest in its admission, sets out various circumstances in which information is taken to relate to matters of state and that those matters are all to be tested having regard to Australian governmental interests. (Mr Parker conceded the possibility, far-fetched though he suggested it was, that the production by Australian regulators of documents provided to those Australian regulators by overseas regulators might give rise to such a privilege if such disclosure would damage Australian governmental interests but submitted that the mere fact that a document related to events overseas or activities in Hong Kong was not of itself a matter of state.
60 Mr Parker submitted that there is no evidence that any of the documents the subject of the Order for Production is a document relating to matters of state and there is no reason to draw such a conclusion. I agree. That would seem to me to be an end to the application, since the balancing exercise between competing public interests does not arise unless there is evidence that would give rise to a claim for public interest immunity in the first place.
61 Mr Parker further submitted that (rather than evidence that there is or is likely to be information falling within the Order for Production that relates to matters of state) all that has been put forward by the GCSL Applicants is a suggestion that production of this material to the Court in answer to the order for production will deter or interfere in some way with the ability of Hong Kong regulators in the future to conduct investigations of this kind or to comply with requests of this kind. Not only is there no evidence to suggest that this would be so, the SFC seems to have been put squarely on notice of the present application and has taken no steps to raise any objection to production by ASIC of any of the material in question.
62 It seems to me that a fundamental difficulty with Mr Lloyd's submission in this regard is that article 11 of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding itself contemplates that documents produced in answer to a request for assistance may later be subject to the possibility of release. As adverted to above, I was informed that by consent an application was made last week for ASIC to have liberty to provide the SFC in Hong Kong with notification of the present GCSL application (including the submissions of Mr Lloyd, the notice of motion and affidavit in support), and that the SFC was thereafter put on notice of the application. It has raised no objection itself to the production by ASIC of the documents to this Court nor has it suggested that to do so would harm the prospects of future inter-regulatory cooperation.
63 ASIC has not sought, and Mr Halley confirms it does not wish, to assert any public interest immunity. Mr Halley submits that ASIC has no obligation to do so unless disclosure would in its view be injurious to the public interest. While Mr Parker concedes that the court could conceivably conclude there was nevertheless a public interest attached to the documents (notwithstanding ASIC's decision not to claim privilege), he submits that the court should be slow to reach that conclusion. I agree. In that regard, reliance was placed on what was said by Gibbs ACJ in Sankey v Whitlam, at 44-45:
the court must then intervene if it appears that the public interest requires the document to be protected from disclosure. However, it is very different if a Minister has considered the question and decided that no objection should be taken. In those circumstances it would be most exceptional for the court to intervene.
64 Not only am I not satisfied that it has been shown that documents the subject of the Order for Production are documents in respect of which public interest immunity is likely to attach, this is a case where neither ASIC nor the foreign regulatory body which produced those documents to ASIC raises any objection to production of the documents (thus seemingly forestalling any argument based on the perceived hindrance to future inter-regulatory cooperation between those regulatory bodies). The Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding itself contemplates that (subject to compliance with the contemplated procedure, which I am informed by Mr Halley was duly undertaken in this case) information produced to the SFC under the secrecy provisions of the applicable Hong Kong legislation may nevertheless ultimately be disclosed or publicly released in some fashion.
65 For those reasons, the second basis on which an order restraining production is brought must also fail.
Conclusion
66 In conclusion, therefore, I am not satisfied that production by ASIC of the documents the subject of the Order for Production should be restrained. I dismiss the GCSL's Amended (or, if it has been filed, Further Amended) Notice of Motion.