Analysis
49 The business which the appellant claimed she was carrying on through Anqi Investments was the buying and selling of goods. In relation to D J Batchen, the business was the buying and selling of machinery for export to China, or import into Australia through D J Batchen, or possibly some form of joint venture with D J Batchen. In relation to Malesco, the business was the buying of wine in Australia from Malesco and then selling the wine to purchasers in China with the wine then being exported to China through Malesco.
50 The concept of carrying on a business has been considered in a number of cases, including in the decision of the High Court in Hope and the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Puzey.
51 In Puzey, Hill and Carr JJ (with whom French J (as his Honour then was) agreed) said (at [46]-[48]):
The question whether a person is carrying on a business is a conclusion to be drawn from all relevant facts and circumstances. There are some relevant propositions which can, however, be stated. First, as was said by Barwick CJ, in Fairway Estates Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1970) 123 CLR 153 and it is self-evident, every business must have a first transaction. And there may be a business, even if that business is small in scope: cf Thomas v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1972) 46 ALJR 397 at 401 with Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1 at 10. A person may carry on a business, notwithstanding that the person had some other activity, such as full time employment. It is not necessary in concluding that a business is carried on that the acts to be undertaken are acts of the person seeking to establish he or she is carrying on a business. So a person may appoint another to take the steps which constitute the business activity: Ferguson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1979) 26 ALR 307 at 319 and, at least if the facts in Commissioner of Taxation v Lau at 218 involved a business, that case is another example.
It will be relevant in deciding whether a business is carried on that there is some repetition of acts and that the activities in question have "something of a permanent character"; Hope per Mason J at 8. What is required is that activities be engaged upon "on a continuous and repetitive basis"; Hope at 9. However, perhaps not too much attention should be given to the concept of repetition where the activity is one, such as plantation operation, where the activity will continue over a relatively long period of time but where there will be significant periods of what may be referred to as inactivity. Business does not mean being busy.
In deciding whether or not a business is carried on, courts have pointed to what have been called in the United Kingdom the "badges of trade," indicia which, while no one of them will be determinative of whether a business is carried on, collectively will demonstrate a business. These include the profit motive (although a non-profit company may still carry on a business), acting in a business-like way, (although many businesses may be found which operate in a non business-like way), the keeping of books of account and records (although the fact that there are none will not necessitate the conclusion that a business is not carried on), and repetition (although a fixed term project may still be a business).
A number of points are made in this passage. First, a business may be carried on even though it is small in scope or, as the Court in Hope said (at 10 per Mason J (as his Honour then was)) a person may carry on a business though in a small way. Secondly, carrying on a business will generally involve activities carried on on a continuous and repetitive basis, although obviously there will be a first act. Thirdly, in considering whether a business is being carried on, all the circumstances must be considered. In the case of a person said to be carrying on the business of buying and selling goods, the regular sale of goods, or the absence of sales, may be significant, perhaps highly significant, but the absence of regular sales is not necessarily decisive. As Hill and Carr JJ said in Puzey (at [47]), business does not mean being busy and (at [48]), it is the profit motive rather than the actuality of profit which is significant.
52 In this case, the Tribunal addressed the issue through the requirements of regs 1.11(1)(b) and (d). In addressing reg 1.11(1)(b), the Tribunal seems to have assumed that there was a business, although not necessarily for the whole of the relevant period. The Tribunal did not err in proceeding in that way. The Tribunal was required to address reg 1.11(1)(b) and it did so.
53 In [106] of its reasons, the Tribunal referred to the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Lobo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168; (2003) 200 ALR 359 (Lobo) in which the Full Court said (at [63]):
It was not disputed that the departmental policy to which the Tribunal adverted was narrower than the criterion for a subclass 845 visa set out in cl 845.216 of the Second Schedule to the Migration Regulations. The criterion requires satisfaction on the part of the Minister that the applicant for the visa as the owner of an interest in a main business '… maintained direct and continuous involvement in the management of that business or those businesses from day to day and in making decisions that affected the overall direction and performance of that business or those businesses'. This did not import a requirement that could only be satisfied by demonstrating the exercise of responsibility within the business in terms of decision-making authority, responsibility for employees and/or responsibility for expenditure. There is a variety of ways in which a person might maintain direct and continuous involvement in the management of a business and in making decisions affecting its overall direction and performance.
54 Before the Federal Circuit Court, counsel for the appellant accepted that the Tribunal had identified the correct test in [106] of its reasons in identifying Lobo and directing itself that it must have regard to all the circumstances and requirements of the individual business. In a case where the appellant's argument is that the Tribunal misconstrued the Regulations, this means that the appellant must establish that, despite stating the test correctly, the Tribunal then misapplied it to the facts. The conclusion that the appellant's complaint is in reality about the merits of the decision is supported by the fact that the appellant submitted that the Tribunal over-emphasised, or unduly focused, on the absence of sales which suggests a complaint about the weight which was placed on an undoubtedly relevant factor.
55 The Tribunal referred to and took into account the matters the appellant identified as indicating it misconstrued the Regulations: the correspondence during the non-sales period between the appellant and D J Batchen and, to a lesser extent (in terms of the non-sales period), between the appellant and Malesco; and the reason for some of the appellant's travel to China. I should say as to the last matter it would appear that the evidence before the Tribunal did not permit the Tribunal to make precise findings about the matter.
56 As I understood the argument, the appellant submits that the Tribunal's failure to put more weight on these matters, or even decisive weight, indicates that it misconstrued the Regulations and, in particular, what constituted business activities.
57 I do not accept this argument. It does not recognise the particular issue the Tribunal was required to address which is whether the appellant had maintained direct and continuous involvement in the management of the business from day to day and in making decisions affecting the overall direction and performance of the business. I accept that to some extent this requirement may take its colour from the nature of the business, but the definition proceeds on the basis that there is a business which requires management and that the appellant is directly and continuously involved in the management of the business. The appellant was absent from Australia for five months of the first year of the relevant period. The business is to be a business carried out in Australia. Although it may be assumed that that does not necessarily mean that the appellant need be in Australia, the Tribunal rejected the accountant's evidence that when the appellant was overseas, she gave instructions "by emails and telephone calls on a daily basis". The Tribunal was entitled to reach that conclusion. The absence of any documentary evidence of communications between the appellant and the accountants, and any documentary evidence of the accountant's "liaising with suppliers, placing orders and co-ordinating shipments during the relevant 2 year period" was potent support for the Tribunal's finding.
58 In my opinion, the Tribunal did not misconstrue the requirements of reg 1.11(1)(b). Nor did the Tribunal commit a jurisdictional error in applying the Regulation to the facts.
59 Strictly, I do not need to address the other basis for the Tribunal's decision, being that the business did not satisfy the definition of "qualifying business". The Tribunal based its conclusion on the absence of sales in five out of the eight quarters. I consider that that conclusion was reasonably open to the Tribunal. It is correct to proceed on the basis that the definition, in referring to an enterprise that is operated for the purpose of making profit through the provision of goods (emphasis added) and excluding passive investment, is referring to an active business of providing goods which it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that this business was not throughout the relevant period.