Is the proposed development a "dwelling house"?
16Development for the purpose of a "dwelling house" is permissible with consent in the R1 zone under the LEP. That term is defined as follows:
dwelling house means a building containing only one dwelling.
Note. Dwelling houses are a type of residential accommodation-see the definition of that term in this Dictionary
17A "dwelling" is defined:
dwelling means a room or suite of rooms occupied or used or so constructed or adapted as to be capable of being occupied or used as a separate domicile.
18The Council contends that the proposed development is not a "dwelling house". That contention has two limbs, first, whether the development is capable of being a dwelling house within the LEP definition, and secondly whether the proposed development is in keeping with the character of a dwelling house given its configuration and elements. If the proposed development is not a "dwelling house", the Council contends that it would not fall within any other nominated use which is permissible with, or without, consent, in the R1 zone, and as an innominate use, would not be permissible.
19The Council submits that dwelling houses are development which the LEP, and the common understanding of the term, contemplate consisting of one primary building. Although the existing structure and two proposed new structures are on the amended plans connected in one sense, given the nature, appearance and function of the two glazed links, the development still consists of three separate buildings and therefore cannot be said to consist of "a building containing only one dwelling". The Council submits that given its scale, design and form the development is not in keeping with the character of a "dwelling house": elements not in keeping with a dwelling house include the three separate structures, the glazed links, the layout of the development as a whole, the 12 new bedrooms, including the proportion of space occupied by those bedrooms compared to the size of other elements of the development, and the ensuite bathrooms attached to every one of the 12 new bedrooms.
20The applicant submits that there are two aspects to the definition of "dwelling house": first, requiring a focus on the proposed use of the development, that is, as a domicile for the applicant and his extended family; and secondly, requiring an assessment based on the layout and design reflected in the plans.
21In relation to the intentions for future occupation of the development, Mr Jenkins states in his affidavit that he provides home and community based psychological services from his home office at 29 Mary Street; he resides at 29 Mary Street "part time five to six days a week, including the daytime and some nights overnight"; and his wife resides at 29 Mary Street on a "part time basis". When not at 29 Mary Street he and his wife live at XX Island View Close. His stepdaughter and her husband reside at Island View Close on a full time basis, and his two stepsons (aged 22 and 20) also reside there on a part time basis. He and his wife are registered foster carers with Life Without Borders, and fostered 16 children on a long and short term basis in the five years until 2012. If the proposed development is approved his intention is that 29 Mary Street will be the primary residence of himself and his wife; his stepdaughter and her husband (who are expecting their first child); his two stepsons; his wife's elderly parents; his elderly parents; and foster children in their care.
22In oral evidence Mr Jenkins stated that he has two addresses, 29 Mary Street and XX Island View Close. His wife does not stay overnight at 29 Mary Street, and he regards her as residing there during the day when she is there. One of his stepsons is at Island View Close every few months, and stays for about a week; he is currently living in Brisbane and has worked at Port Hedland. His other stepson also works at Port Hedland. He and his wife do not have any foster children in their care now; when they previously fostered children the maximum number they had in their care at any one time was five.
23The applicant submits that based on this evidence there is an element of permanence and domicile in the intention that the applicant and his family members will reside at 29 Mary Street. That includes any foster children, as a child in long or short term foster care placement does not have any other domicile and will occupy 29 Mary Street in the ordinary family household way.
24The most recent judicial consideration of the term "dwelling house" was undertaken by Pepper J in Dobrohotoff v Bennic [2013] NSWLEC 61. The issue before her Honour was whether the use of a property as a self-contained short term holiday rental fell within the permissible use of a "dwelling house" as defined in the Gosford Planning Scheme Ordinance. That term was defined to mean "a building containing 1, but not more than 1, dwelling". The term "dwelling" was defined in the same terms as in the LEP. Her Honour noted:
[33] The definition of "dwelling" has two limbs. The first concerns the actual occupation or use of a room or rooms as a separate domicile and the second deals with the hypothetical test of whether a room or rooms are "so constructed or adapted as to be capable of being occupied or used" as a separate domicile (Leichhardt Municipal Council v Mansfield (1985) 57 LGRA 214 at 221; Warringah Shire Council v Jennings Group Ltd (1992) 75 LGRA 402 at 407; Wollongong City Council v Vic Vellar Nominees Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 266; (2010) 178 LGERA 445 at [28] and Wollondilly Shire Council v 820 Cawdor Road Pty Ltd [2012] NSWLEC 71 at [19])....
25As her Honour noted at [57], Dobrohotoff concerned the actual, and not the intended, use and occupation of the building, and so it was not necessary to address the second limb of the definition of "dwelling". It was not sufficient that the building on the property had the physical characteristics of a dwelling house, it also must be used for that purpose, and that was not demonstrated on the evidence before her Honour. Pepper J applied the reasoning in South Sydney Council v James (1979) 35 LGRA 432, and Ashfield Municipal Council v Australian College of Physical Education Ltd (1992) 76 LGRA 151, and concluded:
44 In the present case, however, the property was not a "dwelling-house" because it could not be fairly said, looking at its use as a whole as short term holiday accommodation, that, as a matter of fact, the property was being occupied in the same way that a family or other household group in the ordinary way of life would occupy it. A tenancy granted to persons who are residing in a group situation for periods of a week or less for the purpose of bucks and hens nights, parties or for the use of escorts or strippers, is, in my opinion, not consistent with a use or occupation by a family or household group in the ordinary way of life, and therefore, not consistent with the use of the property as that of a "dwelling-house" (Blacktown City Council v Haddad [2012] NSWLEC 224 at [35]).
45 Furthermore, when considering the first limb of the definition of "dwelling", regard must be had to the notion of "domicile" contained within it (820 Cawdor Road at [24]), and the critical element of permanence. Inherent within the term "domicile" is, as a long line of authority in this jurisdiction has established, the notion of a permanent home or, at the very least, a significant degree of permanence of habitation or occupancy (Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63; (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 288; North Sydney Municipal Council v Sydney Serviced Apartments Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 532 at 538A-B; KJD York Management Services Pty Ltd v City of Sydney Council [2006] NSWLEC 218; (2006) 148 LGERA 117 at [8]-[18]; City of Sydney Council v Waldorf Apartments Hotel Sydney Pty Ltd [2008] NSWLEC 97; (2008) 158 LGERA 67 at [38]; Warlam Pty Ltd v Marrickville Council [2009] NSWLEC 23; (2009) 165 LGERA 184 at [35]-[36]; Najask Pty Ltd v Palerang Council [2009] NSWLEC 39; (2009) 165 LGERA 171 at [15]; Vic Vellar at [32]; Dooralong Residents Action Group Pty Limited v Wyong Shire Council [2011] NSWLEC 251; (2011) 186 LGERA 274 at [110]; 820 Cawdor Road at [24]; GrainCorp Operations Limited v Liverpool Plains Shire Council [2012] NSWLEC 143 at [20]-[27] and Haddad at [47]).
26The present application is concerned with an intended, and not actual, use and occupation, and thus the second limb of the definition of "dwelling" is relevant.
27The Council relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in South Sydney Council v James (1979) 35 LGRA 432, where the term "dwelling house" was defined in the planning scheme as "a building designed for use as a dwelling for a single family". Reynolds JA held (at 439):
Without attempting to paraphrase the word "designed" in this ordinance, it is my view that the appropriate question which the responsible authority should ask itself in considering a matter related to the alteration or erection of a building claimed to be a dwellinghouse within the meaning of the table to cl. 23 is whether as a matter of fact the plans and other available information show that the layout of the proposed building or the building as altered is such that it is appropriate for a family unit to live in it in the accepted way. On this aspect of the case an inquiry as to whether the person or persons who will or may occupy the building could properly be described as a single family is irrelevant.
28Reynolds JA concluded (at 440):
In my opinion a building is used as a dwellinghouse within the meaning of cl. 23 if its use is such that it can fairly be said as a matter of fact that it is occupied in much the same way as it might be occupied by a family group in the ordinary way of life and that it is not a use and occupation more appropriately described in other categories of residential buildings.
29The definition of "dwelling house" considered in James was more limited than that applicable in the LEP. Samuels JA noted (at 443-4) that having regard to the drafting of the definitions in the planning scheme, there was a difference between the use of "intended" and "designed", and that accordingly the use of the word "designed" in the definition of "dwelling house" meant more than "intended", and meant at least "planned" and probably "constructed":
In my opinion a dwellinghouse for the purposes of the scheme is a building planned or constructed for use as a dwelling for a single family. Or, if I may respectfully borrow from what Lord Parker CJ said in Belmont Farm's case, a dwellinghouse is a building designed for use as a dwelling for a single family "in the sense of its physical appearance and lay out".
30In Burwood Municipal Council v Aboriginal Hostels Ltd (1979) 39 LGRA 150, the Court of Appeal considered a two storey building providing accommodation for students ordinarily living in the country who were attending technical college or apprenticeship courses in Sydney, where they were supervised by house parents, and where an effort had been made to create "a family atmosphere". The issue was whether the building was used as a "dwellinghouse" or a "hostel". The term "dwelling" was defined in the same terms as the LEP. Samuels JA (with whom Hutley and Mahoney JJA agreed) observed (at 153) that the definition considered in James differed markedly, being expressed "not in terms of use, but only of physical character", however his Honour held that the test suggested by Reynolds JA and Glass JA in James disposed of the appeal.
31James was applied in Ashfield Municipal Council v Australian College of Physical Education Ltd (1992) 76 LGRA 151 by Pearlman CJ in considering whether residential accommodation offered by an educational institution for students constituted a boarding house rather than a dwelling house. Her Honour held (at 155):
What has to be considered is the use and occupation of the premises on the facts adduced in evidence. When one considers the evidence that the premises are owned by the respondent,
(which, of course, is not itself an occupant) whose students apply to it for an agreement to occupy a numbered room, for rent, with services provided, and with a sharing of common facilities in each house, it seems to me inescapable that what is more appropriately described here is letting the houses as lodgings and not using them in the same way as a family group in the ordinary way of life.
32In Blacktown City Council v Haddad [2012] NSWLEC 224 Pepper J considered whether a two storey building comprising 29 bedrooms was properly characterised as a "permanent group home" pursuant to the State Environmental Planning Policy (Affordable Rental Housing) 2009 (the Affordable Housing SEPP), which required that it be a "dwelling", that is "occupied by persons as a single household". The term "dwelling" was defined in the same terms as in the LEP. Her Honour applied the James test, and held that the development did not constitute a "dwelling":
42 I have reached this conclusion while nevertheless accepting the respondents' submission that the concept of a "dwelling" is mutable, and presently accommodates a changing conception of what comprises "a family group in the ordinary way of life".
43 I agree that the definition of a "dwelling" in the Standard Instrument expressly recognises that the members comprising a 'family group' need not be related to each other. A building accommodating, for example, friends living together in a share house arrangement, will readily constitute a "dwelling". It may even encompass persons living together who, while initially strangers, ultimately live together as a household unit under the rubric of flat-mates or house-mates. Modern 'families' reflect modern times and modern mores.
44 I also agree that bedrooms in modern dwellings often have ensuite bathrooms or toilets, their own televisions, telephones and other forms of entertainment and communication. This is no more than, as Biscoe J pithily described in Warlam Pty Ltd v Marrickville Council [2009] NSWLEC 23; (2009) 165 LGERA 184 (at [30]) "the evolution of the bedroom". These features do not mean, by themselves, that the proposed development does not constitute a "dwelling" as defined.
45 Similarly, I do not consider that, of itself, the number of proposed bedrooms in the development is necessarily fatal to its characterisation as a "dwelling" contained in the definition of "a permanent group home" for the purposes of the SEPP. As the respondents submitted, the SEPP is silent on the number of permissible bedrooms in this regard and the definition of "dwelling" contemplates the occupation of either a single or multiple rooms (see also cl 43(1) of the SEPP).
46 Having said this, and as elaborated below, the large number of proposed bedrooms - 29 - particularly when viewed in the context of other features of the development, is suggestive of a living arrangement that is inconsistent with any modern 'family' life in the ordinary way, that is to say, a dwelling.
47 This inconsistency is amplified when regard is had to the notion of "domicile", implying, as it does, a degree of permanence (North Sydney Municipal Council v Sydney Serviced Apartments Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 532 at 538A-B, GrainCorp Operations at [20] and Dooralong at [110], albeit in the context of residential accommodation). The tenancy arrangement for the proposed development is for a minimum of three months. Given the anticipated nature of the occupation, a potential turnover of tenants of three months is antithetical, in my view, with the type of permanence reasonably characteristic of ordinary family life, even in the 21st century.
33The applicant relied on the decision of McClelland CJ in Church of England Children's Homes Burwood v Burwood Municipal Council (1981) 43 LGRA 165, which concerned a proposal for the erection of a large single storey house to provide accommodation for eight to ten young people progressing from an existing home after they reached the age of 16, supervised by house parents. The term "dwelling" was defined in the same terms as the LEP. In concluding that the proposed building was for a dwellinghouse and did not require development consent, McClelland CJ considered the degree of permanence attaching to the technical legal sense of domicile, and noted (at 173) that the purpose of the proposal was "that the residents in the Burwood home will be able to stay there, within reasonable limits, so long as they have nowhere else to go until they become 'self sufficient adults'". The applicant submits that the present proposal is more like a family home than the proposal in Church of England Children's Homes in that the dwelling house will accommodate a family consisting of the applicant's blood and marriage related family members and foster children, and does not involve organisational staff members employed to provide services.
34The applicant's evidence is that it is his intention that the persons residing at the subject property would be himself and his wife; his two stepsons; his parents and parents in law; his stepdaughter and her husband and baby; and any foster children that he and his wife might have in their care in the future. There is no difficulty in accepting that the concept of what comprises a family group could include young adult children whose employment takes them away from the family home for a period, elderly parents, and foster children formally placed in care. As noted by Pepper J in Haddad, modern families reflect modern times and modern mores. If considered solely by reference to the intentions of the applicant as to future occupation, the proposed development could potentially be regarded as intended for use "by a family group in the ordinary way of life", in the terms used by Reynolds JA in James and adopted by Pearlman CJ in Ashfield Municipal Council v Australian College of Physical Education.
35However, the definition of "dwelling" does not include subjective intention, and in the absence of evidence as to actual use and occupation, for the proposed development to fall within the definition of "dwelling" it would have to be regarded as a "suite of rooms...so constructed or adapted as to be capable of being occupied or used as a separate domicile". The focus of that part of the definition on the design, or in the terms used by Samuels JA in James (at 444), the "character or structure" of the building, requires consideration of the plans for the proposed development.
36The planning experts agreed that the amended plans show one kitchen and one laundry; a single carport; a driveway on the southern side of the existing dwelling; and a glazed link between the existing dwelling and the two new pavilions. They disagreed as to whether the proposed development is for a "dwelling house". Ms Sissons was of the opinion that the proposal is not "a building", but rather three separate building pavilions each containing separate elements of residential use. In her opinion, by virtue of its design and scale the proposed development does not exhibit the characteristics of a dwelling house: the bedroom accommodation is the dominant component of the development, and displays the characteristics of a boarding house, group home or similar accommodation where residents live in the one complex but independently care for themselves, rather than being consistent with a single household with a mixture of adult persons and children who need adult care. Mr Nash's evidence was that the existing dwelling and two linked pavilions form a complete dwelling, and that the layout and size of the proposed development reflects the purpose outlined by the applicant to provide a domicile for his family, elderly parents and foster children, so that from a planning perspective the proposal clearly falls within the definition of a "dwelling" under the LEP.
37The amended plans (exhibit A) show that all of the proposed additional 12 bedrooms are located in the larger of the two proposed new structures, at the rear of the property behind the structure proposed for a new kitchen and dining area. All the new bedrooms are the same size, 3 x 3.5m (excluding the ensuite bathroom), and at 10.5 sqm, each is smaller than the standard specified in cl 29(2)(f) of the Affordable Housing SEPP for a boarding house room for a single lodger. Including the ensuite, the bedrooms range in size from 9 - 11.5 sqm. All the bedrooms are depicted on the plans as double rooms, however Mr Nash's oral evidence was that given their size, they are all single bedrooms. There is no indication on the plans of any storage areas in this proposed building other than the wardrobe in each bedroom. Each bedroom has two full height glazed panels approximately 1.8m wide on the external façade, incorporating two awning windows at approximately 2.1m above floor level. All the bedrooms open internally on to a single central corridor, with a centrally located space approximately 30 sqm which, if circulation area requirements are considered, would not be large enough to provide sufficient living space for the up to 24 occupants of this part of the proposed development. The only other living space (apart from the kitchen and dining area in the middle building) is the media room and the 9 sqm living area proposed for the existing dwelling. The only external open space area available for children or for other outdoor activities are the 1.5m and 3.5m grassed strips along the sides of the building, and the area adjoining the existing dwelling at the front of the block.
38As was the case in Haddad, neither the number of proposed new bedrooms, nor the arrangement where each has an ensuite, would necessarily lead to the conclusion that what is proposed is not a "dwelling". However, the uniformity of room size, the small room size, and the absence of separate living space, make it difficult to envisage the number of residents, of the mixed range of ages and consequent different needs that would be expected, for example, for elderly parents or for a young couple with a baby, living there as intended by the applicant. When regard is had to the design and layout of the proposed buildings, I am not persuaded that what is proposed can be regarded as consistent with occupation or use by "a family group in the ordinary way of life".
39On that basis, the proposed development is not a "dwelling" as defined in the LEP, and could not be a "dwelling house" as defined in the LEP even if it could be said that the three buildings connected by demountable glazed links are "a building" for the purposes of that definition.
40The applicant accepts that if the proposed development is not for the purpose of a "dwelling house", and cannot be assessed as a Class 1(a) building under the BCA, consent cannot be granted, and this conclusion accordingly means that the appeal must be dismissed. If I am wrong, and the proposed development can properly be characterised as being for the purpose of "a dwelling house", for the reasons below I am not satisfied that it should be approved on the merits.