"The terms of s 12A(1)(b) are therefore directed to the situation where subsidence has taken place but damage has not yet arisen therefrom but could reasonably be anticipated to do so if works to prevent or mitigate such anticipated damage are not yet performed."
44 Nor can [37] be divorced from His Honour's "ordinary meaning" point in [46]:
" Finally, and again not without significance, the use of the past tense in the phrase "a subsidence that has taken place" is confirmatory of a construction of s 12A(1)(b) that applies it only to the reimbursement of expense incurred or proposed to be incurred to prevent or mitigate damage which could be reasonably anticipated to arise, but which is yet to do so, from an existing subsidence. The text of the provision is in my opinion unambiguous. Giving the words used their ordinary meaning does not result in any irrationality and that meaning should therefore prevail: Cooper Brookes (Holdings) Pty Ltd [sic] v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981)147 CLR 297 at 304-305."
45 Paragraph [37] of His Honour's judgment cannot be said to be the central point of His Honour's reasoning. I agree with Mr Free's assessment of it both in understanding Wambo and in deciding this case (T21, LL25-43). The comments His Honour made are obiter, the ratio of the decision having been spelled out in [30], [36], etc, and His Honour appears to be speculating in [37] about a hypothetical situation where there is "further continuing subsidence from an event which has already occurred".
46 A particular "incident" of subsidence has to be linked to the damage, real or anticipated, both in temporal and causal terms. Causal connection is a factual question to be answered using commonsense (per Mason CJ in March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, at 515-6), and one need not identify a single cause (Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459). As Mr Free submitted (T22, LL20-24):
"The causal link which - or the causal chain which is set-up by the subsection is between the damage which is anticipated and the subsidence which has taken place. So the preventive works are to address the damage which is anticipated - in order to be relevant, the anticipated damage must arise from that which has taken place."
47 Even if the applicant here can be said to have established the necessary temporal connection, it has not proven the necessary causal link.
48 Nothing in Tobias JA's reasoning, which is authority binding on this court, gives any support to Mr Craig's "subsidence is a process, not an event" submission (see T23, L6), which requires a conclusion that there is a single incident of subsidence, commencing with perhaps the subsidence measurement dated 24 October 2005, which can be said to be causally connected to anticipated damage. Mr Craig relied on (1) the words of the statutory definition, (2) several paragraphs of the agreed facts (pars 36-39), and on (3) the experts' regular reference to the "cumulative" effects of subsidence.
49 However, it cannot be said that subsidence as at October 2005 is part of the subsidence expected from planned later mining, and I note that in his oral submissions in chief (T11, LL21-29 - my emphasis) on the meaning of His Honour's par [37], Mr Craig himself was prepared to describe the giving of an expert's advice, when a measurement was taken at a particular point in time, as "an event ... which engages s 12A(1)(b)". The expert advisors are also clearly able to associate particular stages of ongoing mining activity with particular predicted subsidence, even though they report/advise in terms of cumulative subsidence. Each LW is a "distinct extraction with distinct consequences", and the option to cease mining, at any time, is available to the Miner (T22, L13).
50 In any case the applicant commenced its planning of the substantive works as early as July 2005, reasonably anticipating that the threat of damage would crystallise as the mining of LW 32 progressed. Mr Craig needs the October 2005 incident to be seen in the context of, and as a step in, the Miner's pursuit of a "single mine plan", appropriately approved by the relevant authorities, to facilitate an "essentially continuous mining operation", dating from the date of approval, namely December 2004. That approval predated the planning of the subject works, and the applicant says that it means that subsidence later in the cycle is inevitable.
51 However, just as there is no guarantee that the Board will favourably exercise its discretion to assist under s 13A, if asked, there is no guarantee that a Miner will continuously follow its approved plan, nor that its mining operations would proceed to a stage where the pipeline would be relevantly threatened. As noted above, mining can cease for any reason at any time. Approved programmes do not necessarily proceed. As Mr Free submitted (T19, L49-T20, L3):
"So if you're going to use that to feed back into the Mine Subsidence Compensation Act and somehow deem subsidence to have occurred merely because it would occur if a miner went ahead and mined all the longwalls they got approval for, it would lead to artificial results."
52 The statutory mining approval process does not govern the administration of the MSC Act. The beneficiary of the approval cannot prepare (from a subsidence point of view), in advance for all of the approved mining. Each stage of the planned mining has its own identifiable consequences in terms of subsidence and potential for damage to the improvement. For the MSC Act to apply there must be actual movement caused by actual prospecting or extraction (see definition in [3] above). It cannot work on notional mining activity and notional movement. In this case there is a level of common ground as to what is at least likely to occur, but it is all predicated on extraction work proceeding as planned.
53 The "absurd result" argument succeeded before Lloyd J, but was rejected unanimously by the Court of Appeal in Wambo. It cannot be re-agitated, and I do not accept Mr Craig's submission (T14, LL25-37) that the Court of Appeal came to the wrong conclusion.
54 As Mr Free acknowledged, the owner of the improvement may adopt a "commonsense approach" (T17, LL28-38), and/or do some "good planning" (T18, L39-T19, L15), but that does not necessarily dictate that the statutory scheme will respond with compensation from the fund. Section 12A(1)(b) makes clear that the scheme will respond favourably to "self-help" only in strictly limited circumstances.
55 I agree with Mr Free's submission that the correct avenue for assistance to the applicant in the present case was that provided by s 13A, upon which the owner of the adjacent gas pipeline had recently relied with success. The applicant's claim would then have been considered against the background of expert advice as to the point in the mining continuum at which consequential subsidence would pose some relevant threat to the valuable improvement. The applicant's complaint that there is no right of appeal (c.f. a prerogative writ type challenge) against an unfavourable s 13A decision does not establish a right to rely on s 12A(1)(b) in the circumstances appropriately covered by s 13A.