CONSIDERATION OF INCONSISTENCY
29 The principles applicable to s 109 are relatively well settled: see Telstra Corporations Ltd v Worthing (1999) 197 CLR 61 at [27]-[28]. Relevantly for the purposes of this appeal, a law of a State will be inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth where -
(a) the State law would alter, impair or detract from the operation of a Commonwealth law or the exercise of a power under a Commonwealth law; or
(c) the State law enters a field that the law of the Commonwealth was intended to cover exclusively or exhaustively.
30 We do not take the reference by Mason J (as he then was) in New South Wales v Commonwealth (Health Fund Levy/Hospital Benefits case) (1983) 151 CLR 302, at p 330, to the 'object or purpose' sought to be achieved by the Commonwealth law in considering inconsistency as suggesting a different test than that adopted in Worthing (1999) 197 CLR 61 at [28] where reference was made to 'the operation of a law of the Commonwealth Parliament'. So much was accepted by Senior Counsel for the Jemena companies.
31 Sections 170LZ(1) and 152 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ('the WR Act'), as they stood before 27 March 2006, and s 17(1) of the WR Act, as it stood from 27 March 2006, sought to ensure that an award, certified agreement or workplace agreement would prevail over inconsistent State laws, even though the relevant award, workplace agreement or certified agreement is not a 'law of the Commonwealth' within s 109 of the Constitution. The inconsistency would be between the relevant statutory provision and the State law.
32 In Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Bartram (2007) FCAFC 26; 161 IR 307, Jessup J (with whom Lander J agreed and Marshall J in a separate judgment reached the same conclusion) after describing the matter at issue in that case (which also concerned an alleged inconsistency between State long service leave legislation and a Federal certified agreement) formulated the test as follows at [22]:
Where a question of that kind arises, the test of inconsistency is whether the State law, if valid, would alter, impair or detract from the operation of the certified agreement and therefore the WR Act itself: Metal Trades Industry Association of Australia v The Amalgamated Metalworkers' and Shipwrights' Union (1983) 152 CLR 632, 643 and 648.
33 We first consider the question of whether the State Act and the State Scheme would alter, impair or detract from the operation of the Federal Scheme Instruments.
34 It is sufficient to engage s 109 if the State law authorises a State tribunal or body to make an order or implement a scheme which alters, impairs or detracts from the Commonwealth law. In P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583, the majority of the High Court of Australia (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) said (at p 601):
Subject to that question, s 109 of the Constitution will, in such a case, invalidate any State Law to the extent that it would directly or indirectly (e.g. by conferring authority on a State court, instrumentality or officer) preclude, override or render ineffective the exercise by the federal court of the jurisdiction so conferred.
35 In Worthing (1999) 197 CLR 61, the High Court observed at p 76 that a State law would not qualify, impair or negate the essential legislative scheme established by Commonwealth law if:
… the Commonwealth law operates within the setting of other laws so that it is supplementary to or cumulative upon the State law in question.
36 Undoubtedly, when considering whether there is the relevant alteration, impairment or detraction, a characterisation of the laws is not required, nor indeed to be undertaken. As the High Court said in Worthing(1999) 197 CLR 61 at p 78:
It would be no answer that the subject-matters of the two laws are not co-incident. Rather, the State law, by granting certain rights, would deny or vary a right, power or privilege conferred by the federal law.
37 In our view this appeal does not concern the direct collision between the two pieces of legislation, where obedience to one is disobedience to the other: see eg Blackley v Devondale Cream (Vic) Pty Ltd (1968) 117 CLR 253, at p 258 (per Barwick CJ). Here, there is an imposition of an additional duty on particular employers under the State Act, but no inconsistent duty or conflicting duty to that imposed by the Federal Scheme Instruments: see eg Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v Whybrow & Co (1910) 10 CLR 266. In no way does the State Act or State Scheme deny or vary any right, power or privilege conferred by the Federal Scheme Instruments. There is no negating of the essential Federal legislative scheme set up by the Federal Scheme Instruments.
38 As the trial judge observed the State Act and the Federal Scheme Instruments 'co-exist in harmony such that each of them may be considered supplementary to or cumulative upon the other' (at [40]). We agree.
39 The High Court in Worthing(1999) 197 CLR 61 at p 76 did refer to the Barwick CJ in Blackley (1968) 117 CLR 253, p 258 to a 'direct collision' occurring where the State law, if allowed to operate, would impose an 'obligation greater' than that for which the Federal law provided. However, this was in the situation where the statute of the State required payment of a larger sum by way of wages than the amount prescribed by the federal award. This was not just a case of a greater obligation, but payment by the employer of wages conforming to the federal award involving the employer in disobedience to the State provisions: see Blackley (1968) 117 CLR 253 at p 258-9. This is not the situation confronting the employer under the State Act and State Scheme.
40 We turn then to the question of whether the law of the Commonwealth covers the field entered into by the State Act and State Scheme.
41 For the purposes of determining whether the Federal Scheme Instruments cover the field, it is important to characterise and identify the field of the contending two legislative schemes. The purpose and end to be achieved by each legislative scheme is an important matter to consider in this context.
42 This was made clear in Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) (1965) 113 CLR 54, where the High Court of Australia rejected a challenge to the Air Transport Act 1964 (NSW) which, it was claimed, was inconsistent with the Air Navigation Regulations (Cth).
43 The Commonwealth regulations prohibited (regs 198 and 199) commercial air operations, including operations within any State, unless licensed by the Director General of Civil Aviation, who was directed to consider only 'safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation' when deciding an application for a licence. The State legislation prohibited commercial air operations inside New South Wales, unless licensed by the Commissioner of Motor Transport, who was directed to consider public transport needs, the encouragement of competition and the suitability of the applicant, when deciding an application for a licence.
44 Justice Kitto (at 113 CLR 121-2) dealt with the argument that the Air Navigation Regulations covered the field of the licensing of commercial air operations in the following way:
The topic and the only topic to which regs 198 and 199 direct their attention, so far as they apply to intra-State operations, is the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation. Regulation 199(4) makes that clear. The State Act, on the other hand, does not concern itself with that topic in any way. The fact that each piece of legislation sets up a licensing system operating independently of the licensing system established by the other may from time to time lead to a situation in which A, though holding a licence under the State Act for a proposed service, may be unable to obtain a licence for that service under reg 199, while B, though holding a licence for the service under reg 199, may be unable to obtain a licence for it under the State Act. But any ground for suggesting inconsistency disappears if the situation is more fully described, as by saying that consideration of matters concerning the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation has led the Federal Director-General of Civil Aviation to conclude that A, though not B, should be debarred from conducting the service, while consideration of matters concerning public needs in relation to air transport services or concerning other topics mentioned in s 6(3) of the Sate Act has led the State Commissioner for Motor Transport to conclude that B, though not A, should be debarred from conducting the service. The Federal Regulations and the State Act each employ a licensing system to serve a particular end; but the ends are different, and that means that the two sets of provisions are directed to different subjects of legislative attention. In my opinion there is no mutual inconsistency in any relevant sense.
45 It may be accepted that the Federal Scheme Instruments deal with, and intend to deal with, exhaustively, long service leave entitlements of employees in relation to their particular employers. It can also be accepted that the provisions of the State Act impact upon long service leave entitlements of employees, in that the provisions enhance the entitlement of workers by virtue of the creation and administration of the fund. However, this is not to say that the State Act or the State Scheme pertains to the industrial relationship between employers and employees in the context of the Federal Scheme Instruments and their enforcement: see CoINVEST Limited v Visionstream Pty Ltd (2005) AIRC 399; 144 IR 137 and Re Amalgamated Metal Workers Union, Ex parte Shell Co. of Australia (1992) 174 CLR 345.
46 The proper characterisation of the field or subject matter of the Federal Scheme Instruments is that they relate to the industrial relationship between employee and particular employer, and the obligations and liabilities created through and by that relationship. The field does not extend to the complete subject matter of rights and liabilities of the employees and employers sourced otherwise than through that relationship.
47 The field of the State Act and State Scheme is the provision of a portable scheme for the benefit of workers to access a fund set up by and under the State Act. That field does not intrude into the field of the industrial relationship between employer and employee in a way that the Federal Scheme Instruments expressly or impliedly exclude.