Islam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

the tribunal's reasons 6 At an early point in its reasons the Tribunal stated its concern about his "overall veracity and credibility". It then went on to state that: "During the course of the Tribunal hearing it became obvious that the applicant was willing to exaggerate and fabricate answers". 7 It identified three areas of his evidence in this connexion. That pertaining to the discussion about the documents appears to have assumed the greatest significance. The Tribunal found that the appellant, "…quite obviously made up a story to explain why they had the same date …". It did not accept that he was merely speculating about how the two documents could have come to bear the same dates, or to use the appellant's terminology, that he was "just using his imagination to explain these matters." 8 The Tribunal also concluded that the appellant had fabricated a story to explain the spelling mistakes in the documents, errors which it considered to be unlikely to occur in official documents and, in particular, in their stamp and seal. There was also independent evidence before the Tribunal, which it accepted, as to the extent of the trade in forged documents in Bangladesh. This added to its concerns about the genuineness of the documents. 9 The appellant's story about his four colleagues having been beaten and tortured when taken into custody was also considered to be exaggerated or fabricated. In the Tribunal's view he could not have known what occurred to them and his explanations that this is what usually occurred, or that his sister had told him, were not considered credible. He did not appear to know what charges had been laid and had not made enquiries. 10 These three areas of the appellant's evidence led the Tribunal to conclude that he was wiling to make up stories and that he was not a credible witness. It then went on to consider other aspects of his claims and his evidence, which also adversely affected his credibility. The Tribunal viewed it as unlikely that a person wanted by the police would travel on their own passport or that they would pass through immigration in Dhaka without difficulty, as the appellant had. The document from the BNP, which was in any event not considered to be genuine, said no more than that he was a member of that organisation and did not refer to the difficult position he claimed to be in, as might have been expected from such a document. The Tribunal did not accept that the appellant's business had closed in February 1999, finding that it was likely that he had continued to conduct the business until April 1999, when he left Bangladesh. The Tribunal appears to have been influenced to this view by findings it otherwise made as to his credit. This finding had a further effect upon his claims and his credit, since the Tribunal went on to observe that a person fearful of their life and wanted by the police was not likely to have returned to their business. 11 The Tribunal concluded that "taking all of these matters into account", the appellant was not a credible witness, and that he had "fabricated his testimony and evidence in an attempt to substantiate his claims for a protection visa". Since he was not a credible witness his claim to a fear of persecution in Bangladesh could not be accepted.

THE DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE 12 Section 476(1)(g) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides as a ground of review: "that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision." 13 Section 476(4) limits the operation of this provision: (a) the person who made the decision was required by law to reach that decision only if a particular matter was established, and there was no evidence or other material (including facts of which the person was entitled to take notice) from which the person could reasonably be satisfied that the matter was established; or (b) the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact, and that fact did not exist. 14 The focus here is upon s 476(4)(b). 15 His Honour the primary Judge accepted that a "particular fact" is to be distinguished from the ultimate fact in issue or a conclusion based upon a series of particular facts: Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 34 [34]. His Honour also considered that there was no reason in principle why a finding of fact upon which a conclusion of lack of credibility is based could not constitute a particular fact within s 476(4)(b), depending on the circumstances of the particular case. In this regard his Honour referred to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam [2000] FCA 1023 [21]. 16 His Honour held that "the conclusion that the applicant had fabricated reasons concerning problems in the two documents was a particular fact which did not exist". In doing so his Honour also accepted the submission that the applicant could not have known that the documents bore the same date. He was therefore necessarily speculating about how such a coincidence might have occurred. This could not amount to a lie. His Honour did not however, consider that a ground for review was thereby established. The view the Tribunal reached concerning the documents was based also upon the independent evidence. Accordingly, it could not be said that there was no evidence to support this aspect of its decision. 17 In relation to the issue concerning the closure of his business, his Honour held that there were two particular facts involved: that the applicant closed his business in February 1999 and that he conducted the business until April 1999. His Honour considered that neither of those facts had been shown not to exist, as s 476(4)(b) required. 18 His Honour dismissed the application

the appeal 19 The appellant relied upon his Honour's holding that the Tribunal's finding, that the appellant had fabricated explanations for perceived difficulties about the documents, amounted to a particular fact which did not exist. According to Mr Cox, who appeared for the appellant, this concluded the matter in the appellant's favour. The respondent gave notice of his contention that the decision in Rajamanikkam has no application to the facts of this case. In the respondent's submission what was here involved was a conclusion, not a finding as to a fact. We consider that contention to be correct. 20 Consistent with the reasoning in Chen, it was held in Lia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 65, that the making of a finding of fact is to be distinguished from a process of reasoning by inference or deduction from a fact or a combination of facts. That the appellant had made up a story about the dates on the documents was a conclusion reached having regard to other facts and by a process of reasoning. It was one of three instances identified by the Tribunal as showing that he exaggerated and fabricated answers. The Tribunal's conclusion reflected its assessment of a number of factors commonly associated with findings as to credit, including the alacrity with which the appellant volunteered an explanation of a perceived difficulty and the manner in which he proffered that explanation. In the latter respect, the Tribunal considered that he had not put the story forward as mere speculation, but as an explanation based in fact. 21 In our view, the appellant has not shown that the Tribunal based its decision on the existence of a particular fact. In substance, the appellant seeks to challenge a finding as to credit, not by disproving an objective fact, which is the circumstance to which Rajamanikkam had regard, but by contending that another view should have been taken of the appellant's evidence. We add, in that regard, that the submission that the Tribunal must have known that the appellant was merely speculating about the coincidence of the dates is not borne out by those parts of the record put before this Court. 22 It might be said that the time when the appellant closed his business was a fact capable of objective proof. In the present case the evidence suggested two possible dates for the business closure: February and April 1999. Neither of them had been disproved, as the primary Judge found. It was therefore a matter for the Tribunal to determine which of them was more likely to be correct. This is what it did, by reference, in part, to the view it had otherwise formed of the appellant's credit-worthiness. 23 It needs also to be borne in mind, in our view, that even were the matters pointed to by the appellant facts which could be shown not to exist, the ground in s 476(1)(g) is not thereby made out. As the Full Court pointed out in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2000] FCA 181, [26]-[27] it is not sufficient to establish the two matters in s 476(4)(b). That paragraph qualifies 476(1)(g), but it does not constitute a definition of what will amount to there being no evidence or other material to justify the making of the relevant decision. In the present case the two findings relating to the appellant's credit-worthiness were added to others and to the Tribunal's view of aspects of the documentary and other evidence. There were a number of bases from the evidence for its conclusion that the appellant was not a credible witness and for the ultimate conclusion that his claims could not therefore be accepted.

24 The appeal should be dismissed with costs. I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Sackville, Kiefel and Hely.

Associate: Dated: 8 November 2001 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M D Cox

Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor