The evidence
38 Apart from the admitted allegations of fact in the statement of claim, the applicant also relies on the evidence provided through the following affidavits, which were read at the hearing:
Affidavit of Eun Ji Shin made 25 February 2022;
Affidavit of Simon James McGahan made 28 February 2022;
Affidavit of Peter Stewart Bickerton made 28 February 2022;
Affidavit of Christopher Thomas Barnes made 28 February 2022;
Affidavit of Gavin White made 28 February 2022;
Affidavit of Brendon John Miller made 4 May 2022;
Affidavit of Brendon John Miller made 30 May 2022.
39 The evidence before the Court was subsequently supplemented by an affidavit of service made by Anushka Pokharel on 21 June 2022.
40 Independently of the admissions taken to have been made, the evidence referred to in [38] above establishes the pleaded facts I have summarised. It also establishes the following additional facts.
41 From 2017 to 2019, the first respondent traded with the applicant regularly. The sizes of the trades were significant. The first respondent was sent margin call notifications on seven occasions between 2017 and 2018. On each occasion, the amount required to be paid by the first respondent was a six-figure sum in USD. The largest sum was USD 380,774. The smallest sum was USD 137,870. On each occasion, the margin call was attended to appropriately by the first respondent reducing its positions.
42 At all times, the second respondent was the only point of contact for the first respondent, and he was the only person authorised to provide instructions to the applicant.
43 When, on previous occasions, the first respondent paid money to the applicant, the second respondent sent a copy of the proof of payment by email.
44 The applicant's trade with the first respondent in relation to the CFDs was a Direct Market Access CFD trade. Under this methodology, the pricing of stocks that the applicant offers to the client is direct from the official exchange live price feeds, reflecting exact, live pricing of the relevant stocks on the exchange. The applicant instantaneously hedges each client trade with its prime broker, who also instantaneously hedges the applicant's trade on the relevant exchange. This is intended to mirror the experience of a client trading the physical stocks on the underlying exchange.
45 In 2019, the applicant's prime broker was Deutsche Bank. The applicant's trades with Deutsche Bank were the institutional equivalent of a CFD. This is called a DMA equity swap in which Deutsche Bank committed to hedging all the applicant's swap trades by executing them in the physical equities market stock exchange. When the first respondent initiated the trade with the applicant described above, the relationship was principal-to-principal. The applicant concurrently initiated a trade with Deutsche Bank, again on a principal-to-principal basis.
46 In light of these arrangements, when a client loses money, the applicant loses exactly the same amount of money with Deutsche Bank. If one of the applicant's clients fails to pay funds in accordance with a margin call, the applicant is required to cover the loss of the trade from its own funds if the client has been left with a negative GLV.
47 On 30 May 2019, the applicant determined that the first respondent did not hold enough equity to maintain its current open positions in relation to the CFDs in HOME.NYS, and that its account was close to, or had fallen into, margin call. This remained the position up to 6 June 2019 (Sydney time).
48 On 6 June 2019 at 5.26 pm (Sydney time), Mr Liu (who held the position of Associate Director - Client Coverage at the applicant) had a telephone conversation with the second respondent in which Mr Liu told the second respondent that he would have to close 232,000 CFDs in HOME.NYS in order to bring his free equity back to positive and no longer be in margin call. The second respondent stated that this meant that he had "lost all his money", and requested that the applicant call him once the market opened. Mr Liu said that he would pass on these instructions to Mr Barnes who, at that time, held the position of Director, Client Coverage with the applicant, and who was working the night shift in Sydney on that day.
49 On 6 June 2019 at 11.18 pm (Sydney time), Mr Barnes sent an email to Prime Services and Client Coverage stating that, unless anything changed, the first respondent was about to become a debtor for about USD 1.5 million based on pre-market prices. This prompted a telephone conversation between Mr Barnes and Mr Briscoe who was, at that time, the applicant's Chief Operating Officer. The upshot of this conversation was that Mr Briscoe contacted Mr White, the applicant's Chief Executive Officer. As Chief Executive Officer, Mr White oversees the daily management, operations, and governance of the applicant. Mr Briscoe informed Mr White of the position with the first respondent's account and said that he would speak to the second respondent about either sending money or agreeing to "cut positions". Mr White told Mr Briscoe that he would prefer to "cut positions" but that, if the second respondent sent money, the applicant could "hold off cutting".
50 Mr White gave this evidence with respect to his conversation with Mr Briscoe:
I recall being nervous. The account was in a bad condition beyond what I was comfortable with and I was keen to close positions. I was content to hold off cutting positions on the basis that the client would send money to substantially cover his position. [The first respondent] was one of [the applicant's] largest trading clients. To my understanding [the first respondent] had had a good credit history with [the applicant], had always acted honourably, and in the past had always made payments to [the applicant] when requested to do so.
51 In a telephone conversation on 6 June 2019 at 11.28 pm (Sydney time), the second respondent informed Mr Barnes that he had spoken to Mr Briscoe. The second respondent told Mr Barnes that: he wished to send funds instead of reducing his positions; he would send USD 1.5 million; he would send these funds within 30 minutes; and he would also send proof of this funding.
52 Mr Barnes telephoned Mr Briscoe. Mr Briscoe said that he had spoken to the second respondent in an earlier telephone conversation and that the second respondent told Mr Briscoe that he would send USD 1,500,000. Mr Briscoe informed Mr Barnes that he (Mr Briscoe) had given the second respondent "a deadline of 30 minutes … midnight Sydney time, to send a receipt".
53 The market opened at 9.30 am New York time (11.30 pm Sydney time).
54 On 6 June 2019 at 11.35 pm (Sydney time) Mr Barnes sent an email to Prime Services and Client Coverage that both he and Mr Briscoe had spoken with the second respondent and that the second respondent would "fund in next 30 minutes (proof of funding/ receipt expected in that time)".
55 At around this time, Mr White and Mr Briscoe had a further telephone conversation concerning the first respondent's position. In that conversation, Mr White enquired as to why only USD 1,500,000 was being sent when, in fact, more funds were needed (about another USD 800,000) to get the first respondent out of margin and to hold its position. Mr Briscoe informed Mr White that he had spoken to the second respondent and that the second respondent had said that he only had USD 1,500,000 in his trading account and could not transfer more money to that account because of a bank holiday in the UAE.
56 Mr White gave this evidence with respect to this conversation with Mr Briscoe:
My understanding at this time was that the client has agreed that he would send USD 1.5 million and would send proof of payment to [the applicant]. I also understood that the client had indicated to Mr Briscoe that all he had available and the relevant account at that time was USD 1.5 million and that the client had offered an explanation as to why that was the case, to the best of my knowledge, it was a bank holiday in the UAE which prevented him from immediately adding further funds into that account. I had also understood that additional funds in the order of about USD 800,000 would be paid by the client later once the banks had reopened. I also had understood based on the client's good history that the client had plenty of money and would be able to meet a large obligation. Having been informed of the account GLV, the fact that the client had agreed that he would send USD 1.5 million immediately together with proof of payment, and that there was an explanation for why it was that the client could only make a payment of USD 1.5 million at that time due to the bank holiday, and taking into account the client's good standing with [the applicant], I decided not to close out [the first respondent's] position in HOME.NYS at the open of the New York Stock Exchange.
57 Mr White also gave this evidence:
Had I appreciated at that time that [the second respondent], and [the first respondent], would not be sending USD 1.5 million to [the applicant], contrary to what [the second respondent] had represented, then my decision would have been to immediately close out [the first respondent's] trading position in HOME.NYS, and sell all of [the first respondent's] position in that stock, to minimise any losses to be suffered by [the applicant].
58 If instructions had been given to close out the first respondent's trading position in HOME.NYS then, based on Mr White's evidence, I accept that it would have taken approximately 10 minutes for all 250,000 shares to be sold. This estimate is based on Mr White's opinion as an investment banker and the fact that large volumes of HOME.NYS were sold by the first applicant later that day in a very short time - Mr White said "almost instantly".
59 After the NYSE opened, the price of HOME.NYS fell, and continued to fall throughout the day.
60 At around 11.43 pm on 6 June 2019 (Sydney time), Mr Briscoe and Mr Barnes discussed the first respondent's trading position and estimated that, by that time, the first respondent had a negative equity of approximately USD 1.8 million.
61 By 11.54 pm, the applicant had not heard from the second respondent. However, on 7 June 2019 at 12.05 am (Sydney time) - that is, 11 minutes later - the second respondent sent an email to Mr Barnes (and others at the applicant) with a screenshot of an "International Wire Transfer" confirmation as purported proof that the first respondent had sent USD 1.5 million to the applicant. Mr Barnes reviewed the screenshot and, in an email to Mr Briscoe sent on 7 June 2019 at 12.10 am (Sydney time) said "receipt looks ok". However, Mr Barnes also said: "Ideally we could use another 500K+ though". (The applicant later appreciated that there are some anomalies with the screenshot. Later investigation revealed that, in fact, no funds had been sent by the first respondent to the applicant.)
62 At around this time, Mr White and Mr Briscoe were considering the levels at which the applicant would need to begin to "trim" the first respondent's position in HOME.NYS. Mr White gave this evidence:
I was concerned by the fact that 1.5 million was not enough and was concerned that [the second respondent] might not send any additional funds if we moved too aggressively and I wanted to ensure [the applicant] acted at certain price levels to minimise losses as the price levels continued to move.
63 On 7 June 2019 at 12.30 am (Sydney time), Mr Barnes informed Mr White and Mr Briscoe that the first respondent was running a large loss of approximately USD 2,000,000. By 12.33 am, the first respondent's account had a negative GLV of approximately USD 2,090,000 million. At this time, Mr White was considering what to do. He was acting on the understanding that the second respondent had sent USD 1,500,000 which was "good money" and that the first respondent owed the applicant approximately USD 500,000. At 12.54 am, Mr White instructed Mr Barnes to prepare to begin liquidating the first respondent's positions once the price of HOME.NYS reached USD 8.50.
64 On 7 June 2019 at 2.09 am (Sydney time), Mr White instructed Mr Barnes to sell 100,000 HOME.NYS shares once they began trading at USD 8.50. At this time, the applicant (through Mr Briscoe) was endeavouring to contact the second respondent by telephone, but the second respondent was not answering Mr Briscoe's calls. Mr White wanted the second respondent to make his own decision about the first respondent liquidating its position.
65 On 7 June 2019 at 2.24 am (Sydney time), Mr Briscoe instructed Mr Barnes to sell 50,000 HOME.NYS shares at USD 8.71. The instruction to sell appears to have originated from the second respondent.
66 On 7 June 2019 at approximately 2.49 am (Sydney time), Mr Briscoe instructed Mr Barnes to sell another 50,000 HOME.NYS shares at USD 8.50. Once again, the instruction to sell appears to have originated from the second respondent.
67 Throughout the early hours of 7 June 2019 (Sydney time), the applicant continued liquidating the first respondent's position in HOME.NYS shares. At the end of trading on that day, 200,000 HOME.NYS shares had been sold on the first respondent's account, leaving 50,000 HOME.NYS remaining.
68 On 7 June 2019 at 3.57 am (Sydney time), Mr Briscoe sent an email to the second respondent, stating:
Hello Musa
Following on from our conversation, your current gross liquidation value on the account is negative USD2.265mio.
You have sent USD1.5mio so we will require approximately USD800k in additional funds at this point to bring the account back to a positive liquidating value.
Please note you have 50t HOME remaining as a position so this required transfer amount may change.
If you would like to place a stop on the remaining 50t position, please respond to this email with an instruction and the client coverage team will place this order for you.
Best
Nick
69 The applicant sent a follow-up email to the second respondent at 4.28 am noting that the price of HOME.NYS shares had dropped past USD 7.50. The second respondent did not answer these emails.
70 On 8 June 2019, Mr Briscoe sent an email to the second respondent requesting that funds be transferred to bring the first respondent's account back to a positive GLV and to provide a margin for the 50,000 HOME.NYS shares that were still owned. The email stated:
Hello Musa
Following Friday's close, your gross liquidation value is negative USD2.290mio.
You have sent USD1.5mio so to bring your account back to a positive GLV and provide margin for the +50t HOME positions you still have, we will require USD847k as a transfer.
As I am sure you are aware, HOME had a relatively stable session on Friday and closed little changed from Thursday so the transfer amount is also little changed.
Once you have made the transfer today, please forward a receipt through.
Many thanks
Nick Briscoe
71 By 12 June 2019, no funds had been received from the first respondent. Mr Briscoe issued an instruction that the first respondent's remaining 50,000 shares in HOME.NYS be sold when the market in the United States opened. The shares were sold accordingly at an average price of USD $7.729, leaving the first respondent's account with a negative GLV of USD 2,285,213.
72 As at 17 June 2019, the first respondent's account with the applicant had a negative balance of USD $2,286,383.37.
73 On 10 July 2019, NAB sent a letter to the applicant confirming that the first respondent had not transferred the sum of USD 1.5 million into the applicant's account, as represented.
74 I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the first respondent did not transfer funds of USD 1,500,000 to the applicant on or after 6 June 2019 and that the first respondent remains indebted to the applicant in respect of the liabilities it had assumed under the CFDs it held with the applicant in respect of HOME.NYS shares.
75 I am also satisfied that the applicant was induced not to close out the first respondent's position in the CFDs for HOME.NYS by the representation that funds of USD 1,500,000 would be, and had been, sent to it. I am satisfied that, but for the making of that representation, the applicant would have closed out the first respondent's positions when the United States market opened on 6 June 2019, and that the shares the subject of the CFDs would have been sold on market in the first 10 minutes of market opening.