17 The primary consideration in proceedings relating to penalty under the Occupational Health and Safety Act is the objective seriousness of the offence, which involves an objective assessment of the nature and quality of the offence. Subjective factors, that is, factors peculiar to the offender, play a subsidiary role in the determination of penalty: Lawrenson Diecasting Pty Limited v WorkCover (1999) 90 IR 464 at 474. Apart from the well-settled principles applicable to sentencing in this jurisdiction, regard must also be had to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ("CSP Act" - see sections 3A, 21A, 22, 22A and 23): Morrison v Powercoal Pty Ltd & Anor. (No. 3) [2005] NSWIRComm 61 at [13].
18 In considering the objective seriousness of the offence the Court will usually consider, amongst other relevant matters peculiar to the facts of the particular offence, three questions:
1 Whether the risk to health and safety that has been proven against the defendant was known to the defendant or was obvious or reasonably foreseeable and, if so, whether the defendant took steps to either eliminate the risk, prevent persons being exposed to the risk or mitigate the risk. If the risk was known, obvious or foreseeable and no steps were taken to eliminate or ameliorate the risk or to ensure that employees were not exposed to the risk to safety, the offence may be considered to be more serious than otherwise might be the case: Capral Aluminium Limited v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (2000) 49 NSWLR 610; 99 IR 29 at [81]-[82]; Inspector Gregory Maddaford v Graham Gerard Coleman & Anor [2004] NSWIRComm 317 at [87]; Morrison v Powercoal Pty Ltd & Anor [2004] NSWIRComm 297 at [104].
2 Whether there were feasible measures available to eliminate or prevent exposure to the risk and, if so, whether the defendant implemented such measures. Failure to implement available measures may, again, support a conclusion that the offence is to be judged more serious than it otherwise might have been: Inspector Hannah v Wonar Pty Ltd (unreported, Fisher CJ, CT90/1214, 30 June 1992) at 9; Lawrenson Diecasting at 476, ( Inspector Ankucic) v McDonalds Australia Ltd (2000) 95 IR 383 at 450.
3 Whilst the consequence of an accident will not, of itself dictate the seriousness of the offence or the amount of penalty, whether the occurrence of death or serious injury manifests the degree of seriousness of the risk to health and safety to which persons may have been subjected: Rodney Morrison v Powercoal Pty Ltd (2003) 130 IR 364 at [31]-[33] and the cases referred to therein.
19 Particular aggravating factors that may be taken into account include: that the offender has a record of previous convictions (s 21A(2)(d) of CSP Act); and, the offence was committed without regard for public safety(s 21A(2)(i) of CSP Act).
20 In addition to the factors relating to the offence the Court is required, in fixing penalty, to consider the need to deter others from committing the same crime and to deter the offender from re-offending. In Capral Aluminium Limited v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (2000) 49 NSWLR 610; 99 IR 29 at [71] to [80] the Full Bench recognised that in the industrial context, it would be rare that a sentencing court need not impose a sentence that includes an element of general deterrence. In relation to specific deterrence, the attitude of the defendant to questions of workplace safety and any steps taken to improve safety following an accident may be relevant. The propensity to re-offend must be considered when determining the weight, if any, to be attached to specific deterrence.
21 Relevant subjective factors prescribed by s 21A(3) of the CSP Act may include: (a) the injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was not substantial; (e) the offender does not have any record (or any significant record) of previous convictions; (f) the offender was a person of good character (see also McDonalds v (Inspector Ankucic) (2000) 95 IR 383 at 454); (h) the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation; (i) the offender has shown remorse for the offence by making reparation for any injury, loss or damage or in any other manner (see also McDonalds at 429); (k) a plea of guilty by the offender (see also R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383 at 418); and, (n) assistance by the offender to law enforcement authorities (see also McDonalds at 429).
22 In addition, the Court may consider the means of the defendant and the nature of the corporate defendant (e.g., whether it is a large corporation operating in an inherently dangerous industry or a small "one man" company: see, for example, Capral Aluminium at [77]; Haynes & Callaghan v C I & D Manufacturing Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 60 IR 455 at 457.
23 A fundamental consideration in assessing penalty will be the maximum penalty for the relevant offence. The penalty to be imposed is that which approximately correlates upon the penalty scale of penalty set by the legislature from zero to the maximum: Camilleri's Stock Feeds Pty Limited v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 32 NSWLR 683 at 698 - 699.
24 Turning to the offence in this case, I am unable to come to the view that it was objectively serious to the degree that I should impose a heavy penalty. The circumstances in which the offence occurred, and which the defendant relied upon, included the following:
1 The defendant was a large corporation and obviously one that took its responsibilities for the health and safety of workers, seriously. Its pre-accident policies and practices and systems of work support that conclusion: see Department of Mineral Resources of NSW (McKensey) v Kembla Coal & v Coke (1999) 92 IR 8 at 25; Warman International Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (1998) IR 326 ; WorkCover Authority (Inspector Riley) v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd ( 1998) 83 IR 427 at 429; and WorkCover Authority (Inspector Penfold) v Fernz Construction Materials Ltd (No 2) (2000) 100 IR 23 at 34.
2 The offence with which the defendant was charged was a relatively narrow one in that it was alleged the defendant "failed to provide a workplace that was safe and without risk to employees in that Mr Ingram was able to gain access to an area where an automated device known as a 'manipulator' operated." The charge did not relate to the defendant's system of work, which, in the main, was sound.
3 At the time of the accident, Mr Ingram had more than 18 years experience working in the Cast House.
4 Mr Ingram was employed in a position of responsibility and possessed good literary skills.
5 Mr Ingram had been provided with extensive competency and safety based training by the defendant including in relation to:
(a) the proper procedure for entry into stacking areas;
(b) the fact that the stacking equipment works automatically;
(c) isolation procedures, in particular the use of danger tags and the assumption that all equipment must be regarded as "live" until proven "dead"; and
(d) the requirement to follow Standard Operating Procedures.
6 There were in place extensive measures aimed at eliminating risks to Mr Ingram when working in the area including the following:
(a) the operations within the loading area were fully automated, removing the need for employees to be near or in the vicinity of the stacking process;
(b) the stacking area was surrounded by perimeter fencing and boom gates;
(c) each of the three stacking areas has a boom gate at its entrance and a warning light which is red when the boom gate is down and green when the boom gate is raised. The purpose of the light and the boom gate is to warn employees against entering a stacking bay when the warning light is red and the boom gate is down. Employees are permitted to enter a stacking bay only when the warning light is green and the boom gate is in the upright position, during which time the manipulator is programmed so that it cannot enter that stacking bay;
(d) employees in the Cast House were aware of these procedures from their training;
(e) the boom gate remains down and the warning light remains red in a particular bay when the manipulator is moving ingot stacks in that bay. The manipulator is fitted with interlocking systems so that it will shut down if a boom gate to the bay in which it is operating is raised. Once the manipulator has filled the bay in which it has been working, the boom gate to the entrance to that bay is able to be raised up and, when it does so the light for that bay turns green;
(f) the manipulator is programmed so that it cannot enter a bay when the light for that bay is green and the boom gate is in the upright position. Accordingly, employees can safely drive a forklift into a bay for which the light is green and the boom gate is in the upright position, even though the manipulator may be moving stacks of ingots in an adjoining fenced-off stacking area of the same ingot chain at that time;
(g) the manipulator would shut down if a boom gate to the bay in which it was operating was raised;
(h) there were numerous warning signs around the perimeter fencing of the stacking area prohibiting entry;
(i) there was a warning sign on the gate through which Mr Ingram gained access to the stacking area warning against entry without prior isolation;
(j) the defendant had developed a written SOP which specifically addressed the requirement not to enter the stacking area "until the green light is on for the bay to be emptied" (SOP 40);
(k) employees (including Mr Ingram) were provided with extensive safety and competency based training in a wide range of areas, including:
(i) SOP 40;
(ii) isolation procedures, in particular the use of danger tags and the assumption that all equipment must be regarded as "live" until proven "dead";
(iii) the fact that the stacking equipment works automatically; and
(iv) the system described above.
25 I accept the evidence that there was no operational need for Mr Ingram to be in the fenced off area and that doing so for the purpose of recording numbers located on ingots was contrary to instruction and his training. This is a matter that must mitigate the seriousness of the offence. After the accident Mr Ingram admitted to the defendant that if he had stopped and thought about the matter and complied with the training that he had been given, he would not have entered the area as he did.