In the particular circumstance, I find both specific and general deterrence are to be factored into the assessment. The defendant company continues to work in the logging industry and is in the business of tree harvesting. It employs two to three people, depending upon the workload to be undertaken. As the defendant company continues to employ workers in a risky environment, specific deterrence must be a factor in the Court's consideration. Regarding general deterrence, it must be reiterated that in the performance of tasks within this dangerous industry, the highest degree of vigilance and rigor must be exercised in implementing well known risk minimisation procedures within a safe work system. As Hill J observed in WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Egan) v ATCO Controls Pty Limited (1998) 82 IR 80 (at 85):
This case is yet another illustration of the need for employers to exercise abundant caution, maintain constant vigilance and take all practicable precautions to ensure safety in the workplace. It is essential that the approach should be a pro-active and not a re-active one; employers should be on the offensive to search for, detect and eliminate, so far as is reasonably practicable, any possible areas of risk to safety, health and welfare which may exist or occur from time to time in the workplace. I am satisfied that the defendant approaches its duties under the Act on that basis. But it is always possible to achieve greater effectiveness and success as this case demonstrates.
23 In consideration of penalty, a number of subjective features to the offence have been placed before the Court. In Lawrenson Diecasting Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Insp Ch'ng) (1999) 90 IR 464, the Full Bench said cited (at 474) with approval the passage in the judgment of Fisher CJ in Haynes v James Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd (unreported decision of Industrial Court of NSW, Fisher CJ, 20 May 1994, Matter No 772 of 1991,where his Honour said:
While previous good industrial citizenship and the absence of prior convictions are proper considerations, their importance lies well behind the two primary aspects of the matter, namely the nature and quality of the offence and the clear policy of the Act in relation to the establishment of safe standards and the protection of the workforce.
24 I accept the defendant company works in an inherently dangerous industry given the nature of the unpredictable and dynamic forest environment. The defendant company has a fine industrial safety record over the last 25 years and I give appropriate weight in my consideration as to sentence to the absence of prior convictions.
25 The early plea of guilty is another subjective factor in the defendant's favour which can mitigate the seriousness of the offence (see Alcatel v WorkCover Authority (1996) 70 IR 99 (at 106); in R v Winchester (1992) 58 A Crim R 345 (at 350)). I accept the defendant entered an early plea for which there was a situational value. There shall be a 25 percent discount for the utilitarian value of the plea.
26 I also acknowledge the expression of contrition for the breach. This contrition was reiterated by both Mr & Mrs Colebrook. I accept the incident has had a significant effect upon the directors of the defendant company and their family. Mr Colebrook Snr and Mr Colebrook Jnr were personally close to the victim. I accept the guilty plea is both an expression of contrition and the recognition by the defendant as to the seriousness of the offence.
27 Other subjective factors can mitigate the offence. The defendant company is a small family concern, which employs Mr Colebrook Snr, Mrs Colebrook, their son and, when necessary, a tree feller. Financial records provided to the court reveal the company had a total income of $448,946 in the 2005/06 financial year, $434,223 in the 2004/05 financial year and $620,592 in the 2003/04 financial year. A before tax profit of $29,646 was made in 2005/06, $14,379 in 2004/05 and $18,111 in 2003/04. However, after accumulated losses were accounted for, the company made a loss, each of those years being $2,111 in 2005/06, $16,758 in 2004/05 and $31,135 in 2003/04. The defendant is, therefore, not a large company and not one with significant annual turnover or profit. I take the small size, family ownership and relative profitability of the defendant into account as elements in a consideration of penalty but always acknowledging the seriousness of the offence.
28 The issue of the contribution of third parties to the breach of the Act is also relevant to the consideration of the objective seriousness of the offence (see WorkCover Authority of NSW v McDonald's Australia Ltd and Anor (2000) 95 IR 383 per Walton J, Vice President (at 434 and 437) and Workcover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Farrell) v David Carl Schrader [2002] NSWIRComm 25 per Walton J, Vice President at [61].) The defendant has been charged under the Act for a breach which emanated from the same factual scenario for which another defendant has been charged: A Prosecution was brought relevantly against the controller of the worksite, the Department of Forestry t/as Forestry NSW, under s 10 and s 8(2) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000. However, it has not been found that NSW Forests breached the Act as pleaded. Nonetheless, it designed the system of work on site and the facts reveal the SFO had supervisory control over the contractor which required he ensured a rigorous application of the system of work to ensure safe working procedures were followed. State Forest supervisors had to ensure safe work practices were followed. It was not charged with a failure to supervise. However, I accept by its failure to supervise there was a contribution to the risk. The defendant, however, as the employer failed in its duty to ensure its tree feller was working within the safe work system. There was a failure to ensure a safe work system was implemented.
29 An application of s6 of the Fines Act 1996 was made by the defendant. The Full Bench stated in Inspector Green v Camilleri Properties Pty Ltd (2006) 152 IR 156 at [21]:
Her Honour also appeared to take into account the respondents' capacities to pay fines, notwithstanding that there was no evidence placed before her to enable any assessment of their respective financial means. Section 6 of the Fines Act 1996 NSW requires a court, in the exercise of its discretion to fix the amount of any fine, to give consideration to the defendant's means to pay the fine. In doing so, the section requires the court to consider:
(a) such information regarding the means of the accused as is reasonably and practicably available to the court for consideration, and
(b) such other matters as, in the opinion of the court, are relevant to the fixing of that amount.
Plainly, s 6 provides the court with an obligation to consider the defendant's means in a practical and commonsense way. Nevertheless, the consideration must not be, in proceedings under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, ritualistic or token, so that where a defendant relies on the provisions of s 6 of the Fines Act in such proceedings to temper the amount of any fine to be imposed, the defendant bears the onus of placing appropriate evidence before the court to enable it to give proper consideration to the exercise of its sentencing discretion.