The defendant, as director of the corporation, in particular:
(b) . . . failed to ensure that penetrations at the construction site and, in particular the covers to penetrations in Fan Room No 1, were secured in a manner that ensured that people working near the penetrations were not at risk of falling through the penetrations;
(c) . . . failed to ensure that there was a proper and appropriate inspection of the area in which persons were working, known as Fan Room No 1, so as to identify and rectify any risks associated with inadequately guarded or secured penetrations;
(d) . . . failed to adequately identify the risks to persons working in the area known as Fan Room No 1 and to warn persons working in that area about the risk created by inadequately guarded or secured penetrations;
(e) . . . As a result of the corporation's failures Louay Sadik and other persons working at the construction site were placed at risk of injury.
4 Each defendant pleaded guilty to the charge.
5 Mr R. Reitano of counsel appeared for the prosecution. The prosecution relied upon an Agreed Statement of Facts, Photographs, a Factual Inspection Report, a Statement of Prior Convictions and Record of Interview between Inspector Mulder and Mr M.J. Griffith dated 1 September 2004. The prosecution called two witnesses, Messrs Martin Fahey and Peter Smits.
6 The defendant tendered in evidence Arenco Daily Diaries (extracts), Affidavit of Mark Joseph Griffith sworn 18 January 2008 with attachments. The defendant, Mr Griffith, was required for cross-examination.
7 The Agreed Statement of Facts relevantly read:
2. At all material times Process Engineering Group Pty Ltd [ABN: 90 103 607 610] a corporation whose registered office is situated at 49 Hudson Parade, Clareville, in the State of New South Wales ("Process Engineering").
3. At all material times Mark Joseph Griffith, whose address is Unit 1/17 Old Barrenjoey Road, Avalon in the State of New South Wales was the sole director and employee of Process Engineering ("Mr Griffith").
4. In October 2002 Waste Services NSW entered into a public/private partnership with Global Renewables Ltd to construct the UR-3R Facility at Eastern Creek, New South Wales. Global Renewables Ltd is jointly owned by GRD Ltd (GRD Minproc's parent company) and Hastings Funds Management Ltd. Global Renewables Ltd developed, owns and operates the Eastern Creek UR-3R Facility under contract to Waste Service NSW.
5. At all material times GRD Minproc Ltd ("GRD Minproc") was contracted to design and construct the UR-3R facility at a construction site located at the Waste Management Centre, Wallgrove Road, Eastern Creek, in the state of New South Wales ("the site").
6. On 30 January 2004 GRD Minproc, as the main contractor, entered into a contract with Axis Metal Roofing Pty Ltd ("Axis"), as a subcontractor, to install and erect wall & roof cladding at the site. The contract between GRD Minproc and Axis was a written contract no. 50766-3008.
7. Axis commenced work at the construction site in March 2004.
8. GRD Minproc, at the site established a Health Safety & Environment (HSE) Plan. A requirement by GRD Minproc was for all of its contractors to comply with this system of work. Each contractor at the site also needed to submit a copy of their own HSE plan to GRD Minproc for review once awarded the contract to undertake works.
9. The Construction Manager had overall responsibility to implement the HSE plan on site, ensure that contractors complied and adhered to HSE requirements and monitor and report on OHS issues that were raised.
10. Mr Griffith was a director at Process Engineering. Mr Griffith was an employee of Process Engineering.
11. James Wright ("Wright") was the director of JR Wright Consulting Pty Ltd. Wright was required to report to the defendant up to mid-June 2004.
12. At all material times Axis employed Louay Sadik ("Sadik") as a 1st year apprentice roof plumber. Sadik was 16 years of age on 12 July 2004. Sadik commenced employment with Axis in February 2004.
13. At all material times Axis employed Shayne Riley ("Riley") as a labourer. Riley had been employed by Axis for approximately six years at the time of the incident on 12 July 2004.
14. At all material times Axis employed Peter Smits ("Smits") as the on site leading hand at the site. Smits was responsible for the supervision of Sadik and Riley on 12 July 2004.
15. Axis commenced work in an area at the site known as Fan Room No 1 a couple of days prior to 12 July 2004. The area was on the ground floor with an underground room below it. This was known as the plenum. There were a number of penetrations in the floor of the fan room which opened to the plenum below.
16. Prior to Axis commencing work on the wall and roof cladding for Fan Room No 1 the civil works in this area were to be completed. The civil works contractor at the site was Arenco Pty Ltd ("Arenco"). Initially Arenco used plywood to cover the penetrations within Fan Room No 1. The plywood covers were replaced with 200 x 200 mm square mesh to allow both light and ventilation to the plenum below.
17. The penetration through which Sadik fell had been covered with reinforcing bars tied at right angles into a mesh configuration ("mesh configuration") of approximately 100mm x 100 mm squares using tie wire.
18. During a Site Safety Committee inspection on 2 June 2004 members of the Safety Committee expressed concerns that someone could get their boot caught within the gap of the 200 x 200mm mesh. It was then decided to upgrade the penetration covers with smaller 100 x 100mm squares. Some of penetrations were covered with 100 x 100 mm square mesh ("mesh"). The penetration through which Sadik fell had been covered with reinforcing bars connected at right angles into a mesh configuration ("mesh configuration") of approximately 100 x 100 mm squares.
19. The covers of each penetration were secured by reinforced steel bars and double ties. A standard type of tie wire was used to secure the mesh or mesh configuration to the reinforcing bars placed under the steel flanges around each penetration.
20. The upgrade of the penetrations was completed prior to the next Safety Committee inspection on 8 June 2004.
21. On 7 July 2004 GRD Minproc issued a letter to Arenco approving completion for the area of the Compost Building (which included Fan Room No 1). Upon the certificate of substantial completion being issued, the work area was handed back to GRD Minproc. Under the procedure that was applied at the site the contractor remained responsible for works associated with repairing defects but was not otherwise responsible for the general maintenance of the area.
22. Prior to commencing work, Axis requested the fans installed within Fan Room No 1 be removed to allow less clutter and better access to the site. Wright was responsible for the removal of the fans, which was carried out prior to Axis commencing work in Fan Room No 1 area.
23. Upon completion of civil works, mechanical works commenced in the Fan Room No 1 area. There was no formal handover undertaken by GRD Minproc between construction stages (i.e from civil works completion to mechanical works commencement).
24. After Arenco's hand over of the Fan Room No 1 area and prior to Axis commencing work in Fan Room No 1, Axis's director Hugh Tabone undertook an inspection of the work area. He checked the penetrations and considered them to be securely covered. Prior to commencing work, Axis requested that other trades not undertake work in the fan room area whilst they were working there to avoid congestion.
25. On 12 July 2004 Smits instructed Sadik and Riley to work in Fan Room No 1 at the site. They were instructed to undertake the task of bolting brackets to a 'V' shaped Colorbond Aramax roof sheet and to attach winch cables to the brackets.
26. On 12 July 2004 at approximately 1.45pm Sadik and Riley were attempting to move a 12m Colorbond Aramax roof sheet to place it upon timber provided to make room for the next roof sheet which required brackets to be fixed. They proceeded to slide the sheet along with Riley pulling the sheet and Sadik pushing it from the other side. Whilst pushing the sheet Sadik placed one foot on the steel mesh configuration covering a penetration. As he attempted to move the 12m Colorbond Aramax sheet, the mesh configuration slipped and tipped beneath Sadik's foot exposing the penetration. Sadik lost his balance and fell through the penetration down to the concrete plenum floor approximately 4.4 metres below. The penetration was approximately 820mm in width.
27. The incident was witnessed by Riley. Riley attempted to grab Sadik as he fell but was unable to reach Sadik in time. Following the incident Riley looked into the penetration through which Sadik had fallen. It was dark but he could see that Sadik was lying still. Riley called out but received no response. He then sought assistance from co-workers working in a boom lift at the western end of the fan room. A ladder was obtained to access Sadik and first aid was notified.
28. As a result of the incident on 12 July 2004 Sadik suffered from a broken left forearm with medium nerve injury and bruising to the head. Sadik was off work from 12 July 2004 to 9 September 2004. Sadik returned to work under suitable duties from 9 September 2004.
29. On 12 July 2004 shortly after the incident, Martin Fahey an employee of Arenco was asked by Mike McKenzie and Charlie Katancamp on behalf of GRD Minproc, to undertake rectification work by resecuring all penetration covers in the fan rooms. Three or four of the penetration covers in the area were not properly secured as the wire ties that were supposed to be attached to the reinforcing bars under the steel flange appeared to be cut at one end. The covers were sitting over the penetrations but were not securely tied down which would allow the covers to slide off the penetrations.
30. Smits said that he did a site inspection on 12 July 2004 and that a pre start meeting took place. No records were produced by Axis for the site inspection on 12 July 2004. No records were produced by Axis or GRD Minproc for the pre-start meeting being held on 12 July 2004.
30(sic) Axis as a subcontractor was required to comply with the Health Safety & Environment (HSE) Plan adopted by GRD Minproc. Axis was also required to submit their own HSE Plan to GRD Minproc for review.
31. Axis indicated that it was using two OHS management systems to cover the UR-3R Facility project. A Site Specific Safety Plan dated 9 August 2004 and OHS&R management system dated 10 August 2004. The documents provided to WorkCover are dated post the incident date of 12 July 2004. Hugh Tabone director of Axis indicated that similar documents were in place at the time of the incident.
32. Part of GRD Minproc's HSE plan was for subcontractors to conduct daily documented inspections of subcontractor work areas, pre-start meetings and the development of Job Safety Analysis (JSA) for work to be carried out. Up to June 2004, JSA's were to be submitted to Griffith or an HSE supervisor for review.
33. The purpose of the Pre-Start meeting included informing employees of any changes to the Job Safety Analysis through a review, and any changes to the worksite. Each employee in attendance was required to sign off on this activity. Other general safety issues were also to be discussed i.e hardhat requirements, safety harnesses, PPE. Nothing specific for the work undertaken by Sadik and Riley on 12 July 2004 was discussed at the pre-start meeting which took place on that day.
34. Axis apprentices are given supervision by the site supervisor and/or the tradesmen on site. At the time of the incident on 12 July 2004, Sadik and Riley's supervisor, Smits, was undertaking work at the site office.
35. Sadik and Riley were trained in installing of brackets on roof sheeting approx 4 to 6 weeks prior to commencing work in Fan Room No 1. The training provided was verbal and "on the job" training. Both Sadik and Riley had been inducted for work at the site.
36. Prior to Axis being given access to the site of Fan Room No 1 GRD Minproc's supervisor was to hand over the area safe. Wright stated that an inspection of the site was done and all penetrations appeared to be securely covered and the deck clear. No records were kept of the supervisor's inspection or handover to the subcontractor. Wright was unaware that daily supervisor checklists were required to be completed. No risk assessment was undertaken in respect of the penetrations prior to work commencing in the area other than to visually check that the penetration covers were over the penetrations.
37. GRD Minproc's HSE plan provides that supervisors were required to attend Site Specific HSE training. Wright had not received induction training from GRD Minproc in the responsibilities of supervisors. Wright conducted informal safety inspections of the work areas randomly. Wright said that he would have completed a safety walk the afternoon before the incident. He stated that he noticed the penetration covers, but did not kick them or push them or touch them.
38. Prior to Axis recommencing work at the site following the incident on 12 July 2004 the mesh and mesh configuration were welded down to prevent them from being untied, or moved or otherwise interfered with so that they remained securely in position or serve the purpose of securely covering the penetrations in such a way as to prevent someone falling through them. A procedure was also implemented that no new work area was to be opened without an inspection being carried out by an appointed GRD Minproc's Safety Supervisor.
8 A number of further factual issues were pressed by the prosecution and remained in dispute between the parties. They included the role and duties of Mr Griffith on the day of the incident, whether the contractor previously on site, Arenco, was working beneath Fan Room No.1 on the day of the incident and the role Mr James Wright, director of JR Wright Consulting Pty Ltd, had on the site. The outstanding issues between the parties were the subject of evidence.
9 When factual matters are in dispute in a hearing as to penalty, the onus of proof in such a circumstance has been considered by Staunton J in Inspector Templeton v Haddon Rig Pty Ltd [2005] NSWIRComm 284 who stated at [8]:
The pleas of guilty were entered in circumstances where some of the factual matters relied upon by the prosecutor remained in dispute. These matters were addressed by the parties on the hearing of submissions on penalty. The prosecutor bears the onus of establishing such disputed facts, adverse to the defendants, to the criminal standard and the defendants bear the onus to the extent that facts may be taken into account in favour of the accused if they are proved on the balance of probabilities: R v Oldbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270.
10 As to the criminal responsibility of the individual defendant, Starke J in Millner v Raith (1942) 66 CLR 1 said of a provision similar to s8(2) and s26(1) (at 5):
They make a director or person concerned in the management of a body corporate responsible as a principal for any act or fact specified in those sections merely because of his relation to the body corporate.