Prosecutor's evidence
14Mr AC Casselden appeared with Mr T Hickey of counsel for the prosecutor. Mr Casselden provided an agreed statement of facts in the sentencing proceedings which read as follows:
1. At all material times the Prosecutor was an Inspector duly appointed under Division 1 of Part 5 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 ("The Act") and empowered under Section 106(1)(c) of the said Act to institute proceedings in this matter.
2. At all material times CORCORAN'S THE METAL FABRICATORS PTY LTD [ACN 112 967 610] was a corporation whose registered office is situated at 44 Reilly Lane Sydenham in the State of New South Wales ("Corcoran's").
3. At all material times JAMES CORCORAN (date of birth 16 November 1979) of 136b King Street Mascot NSW ("Mr James Corcoran") was and continues to be a director of Corcoran's.
Background
4. In or around February 2005 James Corcoran was engaged by Toffy Pty Ltd trading as ABC Tyrepower to manufacture and install a metal frame to support a mezzanine floor at the premises of ABC Tyrepower, 577 Botany Road, Rosebery in the State of New South Wales ("the premises"). This work was carried out by James Corcoran as a sole trader (ABN: 48 305 691 033, 2 Ellen Street Randwick NSW 2031). The mezzanine floor was to be used by ABC Tyrepower for the storage of car tyres as part of its tyre fitting business.
5. Both the timber floor and the steel support structure of the mezzanine had a cut out section designed and fabricated into them.
6. On 16 February 2005 Corcoran's was incorporated as a limited company.
7. On 16 February 2005 James Corcoran was appointed as a director of Corcoran's. James Corcoran continues to be a director of Corcoran's.
8. Following the incorporation of Corcoran's ABC Tyrepower requested that Corcoran's install a Hoist to travel between the ground floor and the mezzanine floor at the premises.
9. Between 30 April 2005 and 14 May 2005 Corcoran's designed, manufactured and installed a Hoist for ABC Tyrepower to provide access to the mezzanine floor at the premises. The Hoist was plant within the meaning of the Act.
The Hoist
10. The Hoist was built into the cut out section of the previously fabricated steel frame that supported the mezzanine floor.
11. The Hoist consisted of a guided fabricated metal cage within a metal perimeter enclosure powered by an overhead Hitachi electric chain hoist.
12. The purpose of the Hoist was to provide access to the mezzanine floor at the premises. The Hoist was designed, manufactured and installed to carry both personnel and materials to and from the mezzanine floor of the premises. From in or around May 2005 there was no other means of access to the mezzanine floor.
13. The Hoist was raised and lowered by the pendant control unit of the Hitachi electric chain hoist, which was attached to the inside of the lifting cage. To access the mezzanine the operator would enter the hoist cage via the fabricated gates, and then press the "up" button on the pendant control to raise the lifting cage. The Operator would then inch the cage to the correct height of the mezzanine level to enable egress from the hoist cage.
14. The Hoist was used on a daily basis (often multiple times a day) by employees of ABC Tyrepower to transport both people and materials between the workshop floor of the premises and the mezzanine floor until 5 October 2010, the date of the incident. It was not uncommon for two employees of ABC Tyrepower to ride in the hoist cage.
The Incident
15. At all material times Goran Aralica and Paul O'Keefe were employees of ABC Tyre Power.
16. At approximately 7:30am on 5 October 2010, Mr O'Keefe commenced his daily duties as Store Manager at the premises. Mr Aralica commenced his daily duties as a Tyre Fitter at approximately 8:00am.
17. Mr Aralica was working, changing tyres on a car. He was attempting to locate the replacement tyres required. He travelled up in the Hoist to the mezzanine storage area by himself. Being unable to find the tyres required, he then travelled down to the workshop floor in the Hoist.
18. Mr Aralica then discussed the location of the tyres on the mezzanine with Mr O'Keefe. At approximately 1:20pm, Mr Aralica and Mr O'Keefe entered the Hoist cage and shut the gates. Mr O'Keefe operated the Hoist pendant control to take Mr Aralica and himself from the workshop floor to the mezzanine level.
19. Mr Aralica and Mr O'Keefe were inside the hoist cage, at approximately mezzanine floor level, when the hoist cage disengaged from the lifting hook of the electric chain hoist, pulling through the lifting hook safety latch, resulting in the hoist cage falling approximately 3.3 metres to the workshop floor below.
20. Mr O'Keefe sustained injuries to his lower left leg, right leg, left hand and back. The injuries included: fractured left ankle; fractured heel (taylus dome left ankle); cartilage damage left ankle; lacerations left ring finger; soft tissue bruising under right foot; and bruising thoracic spinal area.
21. Mr Aralica sustained injuries to both right and left legs. Injuries included fractured left fibia and fibula, fractured right calcaneus. Mr Aralica has had 4 operations on left leg including insertion of metal plates, and has not returned to pre-incident duties.
Investigation
22. On 5 October 2010 Inspector John Whatman attended the premises and conducted an inspection of the Hoist.
The Hoist was not safe and without risks to health
23. The Hoist was not safe and without risks to health when properly used in that:
a. In designing and manufacturing the Hoist Corcoran's failed to identify and assess the risks associated with using the Hoist to lift both personnel and tyres, in particular the risk of the hoist cage detaching from the hook of the electric chain hoist.
b. Corcoran's failed to include in its design or in its manufacture any device to prevent the hoist cage from falling in the event of the eyelet of the hoist cage detaching from the hook of the electric chain hoist, in particular a secondary (or emergency) braking mechanism.
c. Corcoran's failed to ensure that the Hoist was designed to include the safety features required for hoists or lifts designed to lift personnel and materials. In particular:
i. The hoist cage was not designed in accordance with Australian Standard 1418.17 - 1996 (Design and construction of workboxes). The hoist installation was not designed in accordance with the AS 1418.7 Standard. Note 1 in Section 1.2.2 of the Standard provided "workboxes should not be used as transportation for personnel or bulk materials". Contrary to the Standard the primary purpose of the hoist was the transportation of people and materials.
Other Sections of the standard require that in a conforming workbox design, such items as handrails, attachments for safety harnesses, load testing and stamped metal data plates need to be provided. None of these items were present in the Hoist designed and manufactured by Corcoran's.
In addition, Section 1.4.7 defines "a workbox" as a device designed to provide a working area for persons working from the box. This was clearly not the mode of use adopted by Corcoran's.
ii. The Hoist was not classified in accordance with the requirements of Australian Standard 1418.1 - 2002 (Crane, hoists and winches - General Requirements) as required by Clause 2.1.4 of Australian Standard 1418.8 - 2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches, Part 8: Special purpose applications).
Classification is a process specified in the Australian Standard as being required to be undertaken by the designer of any crane or hoist system so as to anticipate the whole-of-life use of the particular device and to cover matters such as metal fatigue, wear and tear and the like.
Post the design process, the classification given to a particular crane or hoist by the designer is normally discoverable from the nameplate on the machine or from the manufacturer's literature.
Section 3.6 (d) of AS 1418.8-2002 requires that a prominent notice be displayed on the platform hoist to indicate the classification of the platform hoist. No such notice was present on the installed hoist.
iii. The drive mechanism of the Hoist did not incorporate an approved brake to safely control the vertical movement of the load and to bring it to rest as required by Clause 2.1.7 of Australian Standard 1418.8 - 2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches, Part 8: Special purpose applications).
The second paragraph of Section 2.1.7 states that "Where failure of a coupling would render the braking system (including safety brake) ineffective, the brake should be located on the load side of the coupling.
Corcoran's failed to adhere to clause 2.1.7 of Australian Standard 1418.8-2002 as no braking means were provided on the load side of the coupling.
iv. The Hoist was not rated in terms of safe working load as required by Section 3 of Australian Standard 1418.8 - 2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches, Part 8: Special purpose applications).
Similar to the situation of classification above the failure to comply with this requirement lies in the failure to indicate via a public notice what the safe working load rating of the system is intended to be.
Thus by failing to comply with Section 3.6 (d) of the Code, the as-installed hoist system fails to comply with the more general requirements of Section 3 of AS 1418.8-2002.
v. The Hoist, which was raised and lowered by the chain of the Hitachi electric chain hoist, was not fitted with a device that sustained the Hoist in the event of a broken chain as required by Clause 3.5.4 of Australian Standard 1418.8 - 2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches, Part 8: Special purpose applications).
The system that was installed at the premises failed to comply with Clause 3.5.4 of the Standard as no mechanical stops or brakes were present on the hoist system at the time of the incident that would have fully, or even partially, addressed this specific engineering design requirement.
vi. No means were provided to sustain the Hoist at the top of its lift independent of the Hitachi chain electric hoist medium, as required by Clause 3.5.4 of Australian Standard 1418.8 - 2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches, Part 8: Special purpose applications).
The system that was installed at the premises failed to comply with Clause 3.5.4 of the Standard as no mechanical stops or brakes were present on the hoist system at the time of the incident that would have fully, or even partially, addressed this specific engineering design requirement.
vii. The controls of the Hoist were not fitted with a device to prevent the chain of the Hitachi electric chain hoist overrunning as required by Clause 3.5.5 of Australian Standard 1418.8 - 2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches, Part 8: Special purpose applications).
The system that was installed at the premises failed to adhere to Clause 3.5.5 of the Standard as no functional systems on the hoist would have fully or even partially addressed this specific engineering design requirement in relation to either the chain (per se) or to the platform.
viii. The gates of the hoist cage and hoist enclosure were not mechanically or electrically interlocked and were able to be opened when the hoist cage was not positioned at the corresponding floor level (Clause 3.5.9.2 of Australian Standard 1418.8 - 2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches, Part 8: Special purpose applications).
ix. No safe means of access were provided to allow inspection or maintenance of the Hoist as required by Clause 3.7.2 of Australian Standard 1418.8 - 2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches, Part 8: Special purpose applications).
x. The Hoist did not have a mechanism to prevent inadvertent detachment of the hoist cage from the hook of the electric chain hoist (Clause 2.7 of Australian Standard 4991 - 2004 (Lifting devices)).
Clause 2.7 of AS 4991, states that "Where there is a risk of the lifting devices becoming detached during operation, the lifting devices shall be provided with a mechanism to prevent inadvertent detachment."
The safety latch mechanism, as designed and installed, proved to be inadequate to prevent inadvertent detachment under the circumstances.
xi. The Hoist did not have an additional brake fitted to the hoist drum as required by Clause 7.12.8.5 of Australian Standard 1418.1 - 2002 (Crane, hoists and winches - General Requirements).
xii. The Hoist did not have a safety gear as required by Clause 2.9 of AS1735.2 - 2001 (Lifts, escalators and moving walkways (Part 2: Passenger and Goods Lifts, electric) or Clause 2.9 of AS1418.7 - 1999 (Cranes (including hoists and winches) Part 7: Builder's Hoists and Associated equipment).
The term "safety gear" refers to those systems set out and discussed in detail in Section 33 of AS 1735.2-2001 whose aim is to arrest or retard the fall of a moving lift or hoist cage.
In relation to Section 2.9 of AS 1418.7-1999 the system that was installed at the premises failed to comply with this provision of the Standard as no functional systems were present on the hoist system that resemble "safety gear" and which were designed to slow the fall rate of a descending cage.
xiii. The Hoist did not have a notice exhibited to it prohibiting persons from riding within the Hoist as required by Clause 3.6(f) of Australian Standard 1418.8 - 2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches, Part 8: Special purpose applications).
The absence of a notice indicates a failure to abide by the provisions of AS 1418.8 Clause 3.6 (f).
xiv. The Hoist did not have an isolation switch on or adjacent to the Hoist.
No adequate information provided about the Hoist to ensure its safe use
24. Corcoran's failed to provide, or arrange for the provision of, any or any adequate information to ABC Tyrepower about the Hoist to ensure its safe use at work. In particular:
a. Corcoran's failed to provide any or any adequate information to identify the hazards associated with the Hoist or assess the risks arising from those hazards, in particular the hazard of the hoist cage detaching from the hook of the electric chain hoist.
b. Corcoran's failed to provide any or any adequate information concerning the means for controlling the risks associated with using the Hoist to lift both personnel and tyres, in particular whether any modifications were required to the Hoist to make it safe.
c. Corcoran's failed to provide any or any adequate information on:
i. Testing or inspection to be carried out on the Hoist.
ii. Installation, commissioning, registration, operation, maintenance, inspection and cleaning of the Hoist.
iii. Systems of work necessary for the safe use of the Hoist.
iv. Emergency procedures for the Hoist.
25. Corcoran's provided no information regarding testing or inspection or safe use of the Hoist to ABC Tyrepower. Corcoran's provided no written instructions for commissioning the Hoist to ABC Tyrepower.
26. Corcoran's did not provide a maintenance manual for the Hoist to ABC Tyrepower. In particular, Corcoran's did not provide any information regarding inspection and maintenance required to ensure the integrity of the key components of the Hoist.
After the Incident
27. Following the incident on 5 October the Hoist was removed by ABC Tyrepower from the premises.
Co-Operation with Workcover
28. Corcoran's and James Corcoran co-operated with Workcover during the investigation.
The Defendant's Prior Convictions:
29. Corcoran's and James Corcoran do not have any prior convictions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000.
15Mr Casselden also tendered the following material:
(1)Factual Inspection Report of Inspector Scott Rand dated 10 December 2010.
(2)Factual Inspection Report of Inspector Whatman dated 12 October 2010.
(3)Technical Report of Principal Inspector David Shoobert Engineering Team dated 7 March 2011.
(4)22 colour photographs taken by Inspector John Whatman and Alice Cheng on 5 October 2010; 12 October 2010; 12 November 2010 and 24 November 2010 showing the location of the hoist in the premises; the mezzanine floor, a front and side view of the hoist and cage; electric chain hoist; hook position at the time of the incident, showing hook and damaged safety latch; the welded Lifting eye on the hoist and damage to the hoist caused by the fall.
(5)5 colour photographs taken by Inspector Rand dated 22 March 2011 showing removal of hoist and installation of a stair ladder access to mezzanine level; installation of chain mesh on mezzanine level over office.
(6)Expert Report of Dr Jonathan O'Brien, Consulting Engineer dated 4 June 2012.
(7)Supplementary Report by Dr Jonathan O'Brien dated 6 December 2012.
(8)Addendum to Supplementary Report of Dr Jonathan O'Brien dated 15 January 2013.
(9)Invoices from James Corcoran Metal Fabrications to ABC re installation of the hoist.
(10)Extracts of relevant Australian Standard as referred to in the application for order:
(a)Australian Standard 1418.17-1996 (Design and construction of workboxes).
(b)Australian Standard 1418.1-2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches-General Requirements.
(c)Australian Standard 1418.8-2002 (Cranes, hoists and winches, Part 8: Special purposes applications).
(d)Australian Standard 4991-2004 (Lifting Devices).
(e)Australian Standard 1735.2-2001 (Lifts, escalators and moving walks-Part 2: Passenger and goods lifts-Electric clause 2.2).
(f)Australian Standard 1418.7-1999 (Cranes, including Hoists and Winches-Part 7: Builders, Hoists and Associated Equipment clause 2.9).
(g)Record of Prior Convictions showing no prior convictions.