181 It was pointed out by Hungerford J that, in State Rail Authority (NSW) v Dawson (1990) 37 IR 110, it was necessary that a causal nexus be shown between a breach and the fact of detriment to safety. The Court went on to remark as follows:
Although s 15(1) creates an absolute liability on the employer, it is still nevertheless necessary for the informant to prove, according to the criminal standard beyond reasonable doubt, that the employer failed to meet the obligation cast on him by the section. In other words, the mere fact that an accident occurs involving an employee, without more, does not establish any liability in the employer; and that is so unless some causal nexus is established between the breach of statutory duty and the detriment occasioned to the employee.
His Honour then referred to the judgment of the Full Court in Haynes v C.I. & D. Manufacturing Pty Ltd (1994) 60 IR 149, and the discussion of the breadth of liability created by s 15, s 16 and s 17 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, noting the view expressed that the trial Judge had emphasised too much the accident itself as the relevant detriment to safety. The Full Court stated (at 157):
Sections 15 and 16 of the OHS Act are both concerned with failures to ensure the health and safety of persons at workplaces in terms inter alia of 'risks' thereto; thus, the sections, even absent any actual accident causing death or bodily injury, nevertheless comprehend the commission of an offence where the relevant 'detriment to safety' (as spoken of in Dawson and McMartin) is but a risk, or, in other words, where the circumstances are such that an employer's act or omission has created a situation of potential danger to the health and safety of persons at his workplace. The OHS Act, as its long title indicates, has the prime purpose '(t)o secure the health, safety and welfare of persons at work' and that stated purpose may only reasonably be achieved, it seems to us, by construing the general duties or obligations cast on employers by Division 1 of Part 3 thereof (which contains ss 15 and 16) as both preventive and remedial in nature, that is, both before and after the occurrence of an actual accident.
Hungerford J went on to state:
16. A Full Bench (Wright J, President and Walton J, Vice-President and with whom Peterson J agreed) of the Court in Drake Personnel Ltd, t/as Drake Industrial v WorkCover Authority (NSW) (Inspector Ch'ng) (1999) 90 IR 432 at 453 adopted as a correct statement of law and principle in relation to s 15 the reasoning as above stated in McMartin, Dawson and Haynes. In doing so, their Honours added (at 453) 'the observation that an offence under s 15(1) is constituted by the failure to ensure that employees are not exposed to risk, rather than the failure to prevent a particular accident.
In referring to Haynes, their Honours directly put the position in the following way (at 452):
The general duties created by the OH&S Act are directed at obviating 'risks' to the health, safety and welfare of persons in the workplace … The occurrence of an accident and the sustaining of injuries by an employee will certainly represent relevant evidence of the existence of a risk to health and safety of employees and the seriousness of that risk. However, it is not the accident itself which constitutes the offence, but rather the failure of the employer to ensure that its employees are not exposed to risks while at work.
17. To similar effect, in WorkCover Authority (NSW) (Inspector Ankucic) v McDonald's Australia Ltd (2000) 95 IR 383 a person was electrocuted while cleaning kitchen equipment and his Honour said as to the causal nexus with the relevant detriment to safety the subject of the charges (at 439-430):
Section 17, like ss 15 and 16, requires that the liability of the employer be established by an examination as to whether there is a causal nexus between the breach of statutory duty and the detriment occasioned to the employer and not, as appears to be at least implicit in the defendant's submissions, by attention being given to the relationship between the conduct of the defendants and the actual accident or hazard that caused the fatality … the break in time between the movement of the grill and the cleaning operations and electrocution does not break the causal nexus in relation to the event. The detriment to safety was occasioned by the failure to ensure that disconnection of power before the cleaning operation commenced or steps necessary to be taken in preparation thereof.
18. Having in mind the defendant's approach in the present case by arguing the lack of a causal connection by reference to the incident affecting Mr Newton, that is the explosion (or fireball), I think it both timely and appropriate to refer to what I see to be the rationale for the approach to the vice to which s 15, and hence s 16, of the Occupational Health and Safety Act is directed. That was done by me in Kirby v A & M I Hanson Pty Ltd (1994) 55 IR 40 at 49-50 and I repeat it as follows:
I think it notorious that workplaces have the potential to be unsafe and building sites, by their inherent nature, are certainly no exception. It may be undoubted, it seems to me, that the legislature had that in mind in enacting the Occupational Health and Safety Act which, as its long title states, has the purpose 'to secure the health, safety and welfare of persons at work'; the objects of that Act in s 15(1) emphasise the point. And, so, Div 1-General Duties of Pt 3, which includes s 16(1), of the Occupational Health and Safety Act was passed to effect the apparent purpose by creating absolute obligations on the relevant persons to remedy and protect against the perceived mischief of risks to health, safety and welfare in the workplace. Section 16(1) forms part of that statutory purpose and, I think, represents an instance of the legislature's concern to improve safety in the working environment. The High Court (Mason, Wilson Brennan, and Dawson JJ, with whom Gibbs CJ agreed ) observed in McLean v Tedman (1985) 155 CLR 306 at 313: 'Accident prevention is unquestionably one of the modern responsibilities of an employer'. The approach was furthered by Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ when their Honours said in Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina (1986) 160 CLR 301 at 309: 'Insofar as legislative requirements touching industrial safety have become more demanding upon employers, this must have its impact on community expectations of the reasonably prudent employer'.
It is my view that the nature of the duties, and hence the question of whether an employer has offended against s 16(1), are to be construed in that context. As was stated by Lord Shaw in Butler v Fife Coal Co [1912] AC 149 at 178-179:
The commanding principle in the construction of a statute passed to remedy evils and to protect against the dangers which confront or threaten persons or classes of His Majesty's subjects is that, consistently with the actual language employed, the Act shall be interpreted in the sense favourable to making the remedy effective and the protection secure. This principle is sound and undeniable.
Again, and to similar effect, Isaacs J commented in Rice v Henley (1914) 19 CLR 19 at 22:
In interpreting an Act which is directed to guarding against accidents and to the preservation of human life I think one should endeavour to carry out the objects of the legislature as far as the language of the Act will reasonably permit.