Particulars (d) and (e) were not relied upon by the prosecutor.
8 The defendant pleaded guilty to the offence charged. I am satisfied, on the evidence, that the defendant is guilty of the offence as charged, and that it was appropriate for the plea of guilty to be entered. It follows, therefore, that this judgment is concerned only with the question of penalty.
Prosecutor's evidence
9 Ms L McManus of counsel, who appeared for the prosecutor, tendered an agreed statement of facts, which provided:
...
2. Sebastian Builders and Developers Pty Ltd [ACN 080 563 435] is an incorporated entity whose registered office is situated at C/- Barnett & Cachia Accountants, Level 1, 13 Victoria Street, Wollongong in the State of New South Wales ("defendant"). The defendant carried on the business of the construction and building of residential and commercial projects.
3. MJ Baker Constructions Pty Limited [ACN 104836482] ("MJ Baker") is an incorporated entity whose registered office is at 118 Kembla Street Wollongong in the State of New South Wales.
4. At all material times the defendant carried on the business of the construction and building of residential and commercial projects. At all material times the defendant was undertaking the construction of a residential duplex at Lot 24 DP 33901 known as 34 Kaleula Crescent, Kiama ("the site").
5. The site was owned by Mr M. Bellamy.
6. At all material times the defendant employed Mr Gregory Keith Smith as a project manager at the site.
7. At all material times MJ Baker contracted with the defendant to perform carpentry and joinery services at the site including the flooring and construction of timber sections of brick veneer. The residential duplex consisted of Unit 1 and Unit 2.
8. MJ Baker employed approximately 8 persons at the site, and employed Mr Michael Errington as site manager and supervisor at the site at the time of the incident. At all material times Mr Michael Errington was also a director of MJ Baker. At all material times MJ Baker sub-contracted Mr Dean Blachnig as a carpenter at the site.
9. The undertaking conducted by the defendant at the site was the construction of a residential duplex.
10. At all material times, the defendant employed Mr Gregory Keith Smith as a project manager at the site.
11. At all material times, Master Builders Association of New South Wales Pty Ltd (MBA) [ACN 074 397 532] ("MBA") employed Daniel Allen as a fourth year apprentice carpenter. Mr Allen had been indentured to the MBA for about 3 ½ years prior to the incident, including the period he was working with MJ Baker. Mr Allen had commenced working with MJ Baker on 27 March 2007. Previously he had worked with another building company for about 2 years.
12. Mr Allen commenced working on the site on 5 April 2007 and also worked there on three other days during April 2007, being Thursday 26 April, Friday 27 April 2007 and Monday 30 April 2007.
13. On 30 April 2007, Mr Allen was injured when he fell approximately 3.56 metres through an open penetration at the site in Unit 2.
14. Unit 2 of the duplex was on the south side of the site, being constructed in an east-west direction, with timber frame and curved roof trusses to the roof.
15. The ground floor of Unit 2 was split-level with the split occurring at approximately half way. The rear half of the floor area was 740 millimetres lower than the front half. The floor was constructed of particleboard.
16. There were two open penetrations on the ground floor, one at each level. The first penetration, on the higher level, was rectangular and measured approximately 2 metres by 1.025 metres. The second penetration on the lower level was L shaped with the longer sides measuring approximately 2.95 metres by 2.3 metres and an area of about 4.48 square metres.
17. There were no handrails around either open penetration but there were two timber wall frames around two sides of the open penetration on the higher level of the ground floor.
18. There was a manufactured timber I-beam measuring 300mm by 3.5 metres long lying on its side and over the open penetration on the higher level. This I-beam passed from the higher level to the lower level and was nailed to the floor on both levels. There were no handrails around this beam.
19. There was a concrete floor directly below both open penetrations. The height from the concrete floor to the floor level at the higher open penetration was approximately 3.56 metres. The height from the concrete floor to the floor level of the lower open penetration was approximately 2.82 metres.
20. It was the higher open penetration through which Mr Allen fell. The concrete area on which he landed also comprised a partially constructed brick wall as shown in photograph 7 taken by Inspector Cobbin on 30 April 2007.
21. Running along the northern brick wall was a trestle and single plank scaffold system comprising two steel trestles and a 300 mm wide timber I-beam lying on its side used as a plank ("trestle scaffold"). The scaffold was approximately 1.2 metres high off the floor level. The trestle scaffold passed over the open penetration on the lower level and the height from the concrete floor below to the plank was 4.02 metres. There were no handrails on the trestle scaffold.
THE INCIDENT
22. At approximately 7:00am on 30 April 2007, Mr Errington, Mr Blachnig and Mr Allen arrived at the site. At this time there were no other subcontractors on the site. Mr Errington and Mr Blachnig installed roof battens and eaves soft linings to the raised roof area of the unit. Mr Allen cut fibro and timber on the floor of Unit 2 and passed up the materials to Mr Errington and Mr Blachnig on the roof. This work was completed at approximately 9.00 am.
23. Mr Blachnig and Mr Errington then started work on the roof trusses on the lower level of the ground floor at the rear of Unit 2, approximately ten metres from Mr Allen but they did not have him in sight. Mr Allen was working alone at the entry of Unit 2.
24. Mr Blachnig stated that he instructed Mr Allen to nail joist-hangers near the entry of Unit 2. He instructed Mr Allen to use a nail airgun and a stepladder. The stepladder was on the higher level of the ground floor, near the entry by the front door. Mr Blachnig stated that he saw Mr Allen working at that location about 10 to 15 minutes before the incident.
25. Mr Allen stated that he was standing on the plank of the trestle scaffold prior to the fall, nailing triple grips (metal brackets that prevent ceiling joints from twisting).
26. At approximately 9.20am Mr Errington and Mr Blachnig heard a noise. They turned around and they saw the air gun hose that Mr Allen had been using leading into the open penetration on the higher level. Mr Errington and Mr Blachnig immediately made their way to the open penetration and saw Mr Allen lying on the concrete below. Mr Allen had apparently fallen through the upper level penetration to the concrete floor below. Mr Allen was unconscious.
27. Although Mr Blachnig and Mr Errington were working close to where the incident occurred, they did not observe the incident. Mr Allen stated that he could not recall falling. He said that prior to the incident he had been standing on the trestle scaffold to nail joist hangers.
28. Mr Errington and Mr Blachnig got down to Mr Allen to assist him. First aid was applied immediately after the incident and ambulance officers were called to the scene. Mr Allen was taken by helicopter to Wollongong Hospital.
29. As a result of the incident Mr Allen sustained severe head injuries. The initial CT scan of his head showed fractures to the skull and contusion on the right side of the brain. Mr Allen was taken to surgery for a right temporal craniotomy. Other injuries included a right pneumothorax, dislocated right ring finger and right ear injury. 30. On 24 May 2007 Mr Allen was transferred from Wollongong Hospital to the Brain Injury Rehabilitation Unit, Liverpool Health Service for inpatient rehabilitation. Mr Allen was in hospital for approximately four weeks. Seven months after the incident Mr Allen was still unable to return to work.
30. In approximately March or April 2009 Mr Allen resumed work in the building industry. He began working six hours per week with building contractor Lawrence Francis Bulmer, where he was gradually increased to full time work in August-September 2009. Mr Allen has continued to work with Mr Bulmer and is currently still doing so at the present time.
31. At about 11.05 am on 30 April 2007 Inspector John Patton of WorkCover attended the site and later prepared a Factual Inspection report dated 3 May 2007. At about 11.18am on 30 April 2007 Inspector Wayne Cobbin of WorkCover attended the site with Inspector Brett Jurmann. Inspector Cobbin and Inspector Jurmann took a number of photographs.
32. Inspector John Gjaltema attended the site at about 2pm on 30 April 2007.
RISKS TO HEALTH AND SAFETY PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT:
33. The particleboard flooring on both the upper and lower levels comprising the ground floor in Unit 2 had been laid by MJ Baker approximately two weeks prior to the incident on 30 April 2007. The two penetrations remained open for about two weeks prior to the incident. When MJ Baker returned to the site no handrails had been erected around the penetrations and the penetrations had not been covered over in any way.
34. Mr Errington stated that the open penetrations were not guarded or covered because to do so would limit access for the movement of materials onto the site and onto the lower level of the ground floor of the site.
35. Mr Errington stated that MJ Baker's contract of work did not include the installation of temporary handrails.
36. Before the incident, the defendant's project manager Mr Gregory Smith was aware that there was a risk to health and safety from unsecured open penetrations in unit 2. He stated that Mr Errington had told him that MJ Baker did not put fall protection in around the penetrations because MJ Baker intended to drag large timber frames for the windows through the area.
37. Mr Smith stated that it was MJ Baker's responsibility to install fall protection around the penetrations as per their safe work method statement.
38. Mr Errington constructed the I-beam across the open penetration on the higher level when the floor was completed. This is shown in photographs 4 and 30 taken by Inspector Jurmann. The I-beam was used for access and egress from the higher level to the lower level of the site. No handrail around this beam was provided.
39. The trestle scaffold running along the northern brick wall was erected by Mr Errington. This is seen in photographs 4,5,8,9,13 and 14. No fall protection was provided even though there was a risk of falling 4.020 metres from the plank to the concrete floor below. Danger tags or warning signs were not used to prevent unauthorized access to the scaffold.
40. Mr Allen was not advised to wear or required to wear fall protection.
41. Both MJ Baker and the defendant had various policies and procedures in place to cover the work being carried out at the site on the day of the incident.
42. The defendant's policies and procedures included a Site Specific Occupational Health and Safety Management Plan for the site. This plan covered all aspects of work to be carried out on the site.
43. The Site Specific OHS Management Plan included the roles and responsibilities for the project manager and site foreman. Among other duties, the project manager was to ensure that all reasonable and practicable steps were taken to ensure inductions were carried out to develop, implement and monitor the Site Specific OHS Management Plan and to conduct regular inspections of the areas and work practices under the control of the project manager. Among other roles, the site foreman was to ensure that all employees and trades/subcontractors were appropriately inducted prior to commencing work on the project; to ensure the implementation of and compliance with the Site Specific OHS Management Plan and to ensure that hazards were identified, using work methods that will eliminate, minimize or control hazards.
44. The Site Specific OHS Management Plan incorporated a Risk Assessment - Safe Work Method Statement. Under the heading "Part 1 Task Activity", item 4 detailed the requirement to "conduct site specific inductions". Under the heading "Part 4 Risk Control" was stated "Site Specific inductions are carried out for all personnel prior to the commencement of works". Mr Smith stated that the defendant had a policy that on small projects they did not do safety inductions but relied on subcontractors to induct their staff through a tool box talk relating to the relevant subcontractor's safe work method statement.
45. Mr Allen was not provided with a site-specific safety induction or risk identification by the defendant. He did not complete the defendant's Site Induction Registration Form. He did not sign the Site Specific Induction Employee Register.
46. A requirement for weekly documented site inspections was contained in the Site Specific Occupational Health and Safety Management Plan. Mr Smith stated that only one safety inspection had been carried out and this was "visual only of unit 1" and that no person had carried out a safety inspection of Unit 2 since the floor had been laid. Mr Smith stated that, despite the Site Specific Occupational Health and Safety Management Plan, whether site inspections were held on a weekly basis was up to the Project Manager's discretion.
47. There was no discussion between MJ Baker and the Defendant regarding the identification of the risks of the inadequately guarded or secured penetrations in Unit 2 and controls to eliminate or minimize this risk.
48. Mr Allen was at risk of falling more than 2 metres through the open penetrations on the ground floor in Unit 2.
EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT:
49. Arising out of the same incident, MJ Baker has been convicted by this Court of a breach of Section 8(2) of the Act. Mr Errington has also been convicted of a breach of section 8(2) of the Act by the operation of section 26.
50. Following the incident MJ Baker engaged the South Coast Contractors Association to upgrade its occupational health and safety procedures. An Occupational Health Safety and Rehabilitation Policy has been produced which explicitly outlines the role of the site foreman to include site inspections using a checklist.
51. The following measures regarding securing the open penetrations in Unit 2 of the site were taken:
a. Handrails were constructed to secure the open penetration on the lower level.
b. A ramp was constructed to completely secure the open penetration on the higher level and allow safe access and egress on the site.
c. Handrails were installed to the open rear doorways of the first floor.
52. After the incident, the defendant conducted an investigation into the circumstances of the incident.
53. After the incident the defendant revised and changed its Occupational Health and Safety Management Plan. Subcontractors are now required to provide documented evidence that all the relevant subcontractor's employees have been inducted and signed the relevant Safe Work Method Statements.
54. On the day of the incident, the defendant was issued with a Prohibition Notice requiring installation of handrails or other measures to address the risk of falls from height of approximately 3.5 metres at the site. A second prohibition notice was issued the same day to the defendant requiring the defendant to address risks of falls while trying to access scaffolding due to insufficient ladders or stairs. Again, on the day of the incident the defendant was issued with four improvement notices, one of which related to lack of safe access and egress to all levels of work. The defendant complied with the aforementioned two Prohibition Notices and four Improvement Notices issued by WorkCover inspectors on the date of the incident.
55. Prior to the incident the defendant had been, since 2003, issued with four improvement notices, one prohibition notice and a penalty notice relating to risks of falls from heights.
RISK ASSESSMENT:
56. Prior to the incident the defendant failed to carry out, or ensure that there was carried out, a proper and appropriate inspection of the area in which persons were working so as to identify and rectify any risks including inadequately guarded or secured penetrations.
57. Prior to the incident Mr Smith met with Mr Errington about the progress of work at the site but did not discuss or identify the risk created by inadequately guarded or secured penetrations, did not warn persons working in that area about the risk and did not implement or ensure the implementation of controls to minimize or eliminate the risk.
58. After the incident, the defendant closed the site and all other sites on which it was operating and conducted site inspections to rectify any risks to health and safety.
10 The prosecutor also tendered the following documentation:
(i) a Factual Inspection Report dated 3 May 2007 signed by Inspector John Patton;