In Department of Mineral Resources of NSW (Chief Inspector Terrey ) v A M Hoipo & Sons Pty Ltd (2000) 99 IR 137, Walton J, Vice President said:
48. . . . it was submitted that as a matter of discretion the Court should take into account the financial circumstances of the defendant and the fact that its corporate structure was in reality a vehicle for Mr Hoipo's personal activities. In this regard, I note the judgment in Inspector Gordon v MIJO (NSW) Pty Limited ( unreported, Cullen J, CT1002 of 1993, 2 December 1993), in which his Honour commented (at p 5):
"The Court does not have a discretion to consider the maximum penalty at some level other than that provided by the Statute. Where a corporation is involved, the appropriate maximum penalty is that applicable to a corporation and not to an individual regardless of how or why the corporation was established. The three judgments of the Chief Judge in Inspector Robins v CT Plumbing Pty Limited (unreported, Fisher CJ, No 522 of 1991, 16 December 1991), Mauger v Krcmar Engineering Pty Limited (1993) 47 IR 359 and Inspector Young v Hidane Pty Limited (unreported, Fisher CJ, CT 1113 of 1993, 30 September 1993), do not support this submission. Individual factors going to capacity to pay are not relevant in the determination of penalty. They may be relevant at a later time in terms of any application the defendant may make as to consideration of payment, but they are not relevant as to the determination of penalty."
49 I respectfully agree that the Court has no discretion to apply a maximum penalty other than that prescribed by the legislation: see also WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ankucic) v Lyndhurst Trading Co Pty Limited (2000) 95 IR 462.
50 It is proper, nonetheless, to have regard to the financial position and means of the defendant when considering the question of penalty: see Ferguson v Nelmac Pty Limited (1999) 92 IR 188. The purpose of a fine is primarily to punish the offender. The burden which will be imposed by virtue of a fine at a particular level will, to some extent, depend upon the financial circumstances and resources of that offender. As a result, the amount and method of payment of a fine will need to take into account, as far as practicable, the financial resources and income of the defendant: see Sgroi v The Queen (1989) 40 A Crim R 197 at 200 - 201.
and in Ferguson v Nelmac Pty Limited (1999) 92 IR 188, Wright J said (at 209) commented:
. . . The financial position and more particularly the means of the defendant should be taken into account in relation to the question of penalty. Otherwise it is inappropriate to consider the fact or amount of legal costs, consulting and other fees. In any event, it was not submitted that I should. I should, as submitted by counsel for the informant, consider not only the financial information included in the correspondence from the accountants, but also the defendant's asset position. Whilst I accept that the imposition of heavy fines would be a burden on the defendant and its financial resources and that consideration should be given appropriate weight on the question of penalty, it does not necessarily result in the Court not imposing a heavy penalty. The penalty imposed will reflect the consideration given to this aspect as discussed above. I have also had regard to the submissions filed by the informant in respect of the additional affidavit and issues arising from it. Further, I have considered and applied the authorities referred to therein, particularly Haynes v C I & D Manufacturing at 457-458; Sgroi v R (1989) 40 A Crim R 197 and Rahme v R (1989) 43 A Crim R 81. Finally on this aspect, I indicate that I do not consider that the penalties imposed are beyond the means of the defendant. . . .
38 Even though the defendant is incorporated I accept it is an individually run business incorporated purely for the convenience of book-keeping and taxation arrangements. However, the defendant receives a financial benefit from that arrangement. The financial status of the defendant has been tendered. Ms Thomson submitted neither Mr Hewitt nor the defendant possess assets that would allow the payment of a substantial penalty without Mr Hewitt personally incurring great personal hardship. The Profit and Loss statement for the period ending 30 June 2005 reveals the defendant posted a profit of approximately $100,000, but that it also had a turnover of $5 million. I do not accept the defendant cannot meet any penalty imposed.
39 The defendant has no prior convictions, therefore, the maximum penalty is $550,000.
40 The defendant further submitted, in mitigation as to penalty, it entered an early plea of guilty to the charge. In the guideline judgment of Thomson, the Court of Criminal Appeal held the full benefit and discounts for the utilitarian value of an early plea of guilty should be restricted to pleas entered at the earliest opportunity and should rarely be given after a matter has been set down for trial. The effect of Cameron v the Queen (2002) 187 ALR 65, on the guideline judgment in Thomson was considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Sharma (2002) 54 NSWLR 300. The Court of Appeal held that the reasoning in Cameron was not applicable in New South Wales because of the common law principles enunciated which have been modified by Statute, namely, s22 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, which renders it mandatory that a sentencing judge take into account both "the fact" of the plea of guilty and "when" it was made.