Agreed Statement of Facts
7The prosecutor tendered an Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF). Annexed to the ASF was the following documentation:
(a) 40 Colour photographs taken by Inspector Barber on 1 and 2 July 2010;
(b) Factual Inspection Report of Inspector Barber dated 5 July 2010;
(c) WorkCover safety alert titled 'Moving Plant on Construction Sites' dated 10 December 2009;
(d) WorkCover Code of Practice of 2004 titled 'Moving Plant on Construction Sites';
(e) RTA safety alert 'Moving Plant on Construction Sites' dated July 2010;
(f) 'The Red Book - Working around Mobile Plant' released 1 September 2010;
(g) Work method statement for refuelling plant dated 30 March 2010;
(h) Work method statement for refuelling plant, which incorporated the defendant's 4 tier refuelling strategy released 21 July 2010.
8The prosecutor also tendered the defendant's record of prior convictions of which there were seven: the date of the incidents that led to the first two prosecutions is not known, but convictions were recorded on 2 March 1987 and 25 July 1991. Then followed five other convictions relating to offences that occurred on 28 November 1996, 7 October 2000, 12 May 2001, 6 June 2002 and 6 August 2002.
9The ASF indicated that the defendant is a large corporation employing approximately 10,000 people Australia wide, with an annual turnover of approximately 5.5 billion dollars. The construction work on the Tarcutta project was valued at $250 million and involved earthworks, drainage works, bridgeworks and paving works. Approximately 200 workers were employed on the project.
10On 1 July 2010 the main activity being undertaken at cut number 2 at the site was the excavation of material that was being ripped and pushed into stockpiles by bulldozers. The material was then loaded into truck and dog trailer combinations to be hauled away.
11Mr Pulver operated a Hino Rigid Truck owned by All States Truck Commercial Rentals and 'dry hired' (hired without an operator) by the defendant. The vehicle was approximately 9.13 metres long, 2.44 metres wide and 2.8 metres high. There was a large tank containing diesel fitted to the tray of the refuelling truck, with a fuel dispensing system at the rear of the truck consisting of a central pump with two hose reels on either side. The refuelling operator would stand at the rear of the truck in order to refuel items of plant.
12Mr Wickey was a 27-year-old labourer operating the front end loader, and had been employed by the defendant since May 2010. Mr Wickey's duties were to use a front end loader to load soil from a stock pile into tipper and dog, or truck and dog, trailer combinations so it could be hauled away to other locations to be used as construction fill.
13Mr Wickey held a Backhoe Front-End Loader Certificate of Competency. Clause 266 of the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001 defines the operation of a front end loader as scheduled work, requiring operators to hold the relevant certificate of currency or be training on a log book under the supervision of a competent person. A backhoe front end loader is a separate item of plant to a front end loader and at the material time both required individual certification.
14However, Mr Wickey did not hold a certificate of competency to operate a front end loader in accordance with cl 270 of the Regulation, nor at the relevant time was he operating the front end loader on a log book under the supervision of a competent person.
15Mr David Town was the Project Trainer and Assessor/Plant Risk Assessor, employed by the defendant at the construction site. Mr Town held a certificate IV in WorkPlace Training and Assessing. He was not an accredited WorkCover authorised assessor in accordance with cl 284 of the Regulation to undertake competency assessments in relation to the operation of load shifting equipment, including front end loaders. Mr Town, incorrectly interpreted Mr Wickey's certificate of competency to operate a backhoe as certification to operate the front end loader at the site.
16In May and June 2010, Mr Town assessed Mr Wickey's competency on the operation of the front end loader. Initially Mr Town felt Mr Wickey required further training in the operation of the loader. Following the training Mr Town assessed Mr Wickey as competent. The ASF stated:
Subsequently, in June 2010, Mr Wickey underwent further training which involved tasked training to assist Mr Wickey to maximise his bucket loads, shortening travel routes, correct loading of tipping trucks and general quarrying techniques and floor maintenance. There was no training in relation to procedures for refuelling the loader. The training took place in June 2010 culminating in a determination of competency on 12 June 2010.
There was an incident on 28 June 2010, where Mr Wickey was driving the front end loader and came into contact with the offside section of the rear (dog) trailer of a truck, causing a minor dent. There was another incident in June 2010, where Mr Wickey loaded a truck and dog trailer in such a way as the load was off centre, causing the truck to lean. Leighton required Mr Wickey to undertake reassessment as a result of the incident. On 28 June 2010, Mr Wickey was reassessed, deemed competent and put back to work.
17The front end loader operated by Mr Wickey on 1 July 2010 was articulated and had an overall weight of 22.5 tonnes, was approximately 9.1 metres long, 2.95 metres wide and 3.8 metres high. The driver's cabin was located in the centre of the loader, with a single driver's seat located approximately 2.68 metres above the ground. The cabin had large glass windows, and two rear vision mirrors on either side of the cabin.
18According to the ASF the fill point for the fuel tank of the front end loader was located at the rear of the engine, behind the cabin. On 1 July 2010, the reversing beeper of the front end loader was operational and the loader was fitted with a bucket attachment.
19The circumstances of the incident in which Mr Pulver was fatally crushed and the incident itself was described in the ASF:
At approximately 7:00am on Thursday 1 July 2010, there was a 'Daily Pre Start Meeting' at cut number 2 at the site conducted by Wayne Meredith, Leading Hand for cut number 2, under the direction of Neville Sharwood, Foreman for cut number 2. Mr Wickey attended the meeting. One of the issues raised at the meeting was to keep clear of the reversing front end loader.
Mr Wickey's duties for the day were to load truck and dog trailers using the front end loader, from a stockpile of soil at cut number 2.
On 1 July 2010, a daily pre start meeting was conducted for 'workshop' employees in the 'crib room' at the workshop compound at the site. The daily pre-start meeting was conducted by Plant Superintendent Greg Doyle. Mr Pulver attended the daily pre-start meeting.
On 1 July 2010, Mr Pulver was to perform his usual duties as refuelling operator at the site. On the day prior to the incident Mr Pulver had refuelled a total of 53 items of plant, 43 of which were mobile plant.
On 1 July 2010, at approximately 12:40pm, Mr Pulver had finished refuelling a 47 tonne excavator at the site. Mr Pulver then drove the refuelling truck in a northerly direction toward the front end loader being operated by Mr Wickey which was operating in the vicinity of the stockpile of soil at cut number 2. Mr Wickey had just finished loading a truck with soil and saw that Mr Pulver was approaching him. Mr Wickey assumed that Mr Pulver was there to refuel the front end loader, and so Mr Wickey reversed the front end loader, turned the motor off and stood on the nearside rear mudguard of the front end loader.
Mr Paul Williams ("Mr Williams") was driving a tip truck and dog trailer ("the tip truck") in a northerly direction in the vicinity of the stockpile of soil at cut number 2, and called on the UHF radio to allow Mr Pulver to cross in front of him. Mr Williams was waiting to be loaded with soil by the front end loader driven by Mr Wickey, once the refuelling process was finished.
During the refuelling process, the front end loader was facing in a westerly direction, and the refuelling truck was facing in an easterly direction. The rear of each vehicle was facing the other, and the vehicles were approximately 3 metres apart.
Mr Pulver went to the rear of the refuelling truck, opened the cowling on the motor at the rear of the front end loader and removed the fuel cap. Mr Pulver then removed the offside refuelling hose on his truck and refuelled the front end loader. During the refuelling process Mr Wickey remained standing on the nearside mudguard of the front end loader and Mr Williams remained seated in the cabin of his tip truck, waiting to be loaded.
After refuelling the front end loader, Mr Pulver replaced the fuel cap and closed the cowling on the rear of the loader. Mr Pulver rewound the refuelling hose onto the reel at the back of his truck.
Mr Williams saw Mr Pulver completing his 'paperwork' at the rear of the refuelling truck, with his back to the front end loader. Mr Pulver completed refuelling receipt No. 93, which indicated information such as the date, as well as the engine hours of the front end loader as provided by Mr Wickey, and the barcode identification number 10158 located on the rear of the loader, that Mr Pulver would have scanned.
After the refuelling was completed Mr Wickey recommenced operation of the front end loader. He drove forward into the stockpile, collected a bucket of soil, reversed the loader and then placed the load of soil into Mr Williams' tip truck.
Mr Wickey states that he then checked his mirrors and reversed the front end loader, with the intention of then driving back to the stock pile to collect another bucket of soil. Mr Wickey states that while he reversed his vision was impaired by the angle of the articulated loader.
Mr Wickey heard the rear of his loader collide with something and assumed it was the rear of the refuelling tanker. Mr Williams saw Mr Pulver standing at the back left hand corner of the refuelling truck and being crushed between the loader and the refuelling truck.
Mr Wickey heard the hit between the machines and moved the front end loader forward and jumped out to tell Mr Pulver he'd hit his machine and saw Mr Pulver lying on the ground.
Mr Wickey went to Mr Pulver's assistance. Mr Wickey then returned to his loader to call on the UHF for medical assistance. Mr Williams then went to assist Mr Pulver. Mr Williams checked his breathing and pulse, but could not find either. Mr Williams noted that Mr Pulver's eyes were glassy and his pupils dilated. Mr Williams commenced CPR with a negative result.
Other workers came to the scene and recommenced CPR for 40 minutes until the ambulance officers arrived.
Upon examination of Mr Pulver the ambulance officers found nil vital signs and pronounced life extinct. Mr Pulver had been fatally crushed between the loader and the refuelling truck.
20The ASF addressed the systems of work in the project prior to the incident. These included:
(a) a requirement that all workers received a site specific induction lasting approximately 6 hours prior to commencing work at the site. The site-specific induction included training in OHS, environmental, quality and community issues;
(b) pre-start meetings to be held every day. Workers on the project were obliged to attend a pre-start meeting prior to commencing work at the site. The meetings outlined daily duties as well as hazards and control measures;
(c) a 'Vehicle Movement Plan' whereby all construction vehicles working on cut number 2 were required to enter via gate 45 on the Hume Highway and change to UHF radio channel 25. The speed limit at the site was 40kph on haul roads, and 'walking pace' when passing ground crew. Vehicle operators communicated with each other via the UHF. Plant operators were required to stop and lower all tools prior to a vehicle passing or crossing within 30 metres. The Vehicle Movement Plan did address a number of hazards relating to the interaction of various items of moving plant at the Site and put in place a number of control measures to eliminate or minimise the risk of injury arising from vehicle interaction. However, it did not address the risk from vehicle movements during the refuelling process or establish control measures to address this risk;
(d) a Safety Health & Environment ("SH&E") Work Method Statement for the work activity of 'Load, Haul, Place and Compact with Truck and Dogs, or Dump Trucks using the Loader', which was applicable to the work being undertaken by Mr Wickey at the date of the incident. However, the Loader SH&E WMS did not address the safe method for refuelling the Loader and the requirements on the Loader operator during this process.
21The ASF described the system for loading trucks with the front end loader. This involved the truck driver pulling up to a location in the vicinity of the stockpile when instructed by Mr Wickey over the UHF or via the horn of the loader being sounded. Mr Wickey would place two buckets of material in the rear of the truck. Mr Wickey would then sound the horn of the loader, or use the UHF radio to indicate the truck and dog should move forward to allow further loading. Mr Wickey would then place two further bucket loads of material into the rear trailer. The driver of the truck and dog would remain in the cabin of the vehicle while the loading operations took place. Once the truck and dog were loaded, the driver would move the vehicle forward out of the area so that the next truck could come in. The driver of the loaded truck would then stop the truck and roll the tarps back over the load.
22The ASF described the system of refuelling. The defendant had a SH&E Work Method Statement for Refuelling Plant on Site. The Statement listed as one of the hazards of the task 'Servicemen being hit by machines leaving the area'. The control measure for this hazard was 'Serviceman to ensure area is clear and move away from plant in forward direction, maintaining clear communication with plant in the area at all times'. However, the ASF stated this control measure did not reflect the work practices in place at cut number 2 prior to the incident, nor did it adequately address the risk to the operator of the refuelling truck. A number of informal practices were adopted for refuelling of plant and the control measures to prevent persons being struck outlined in the SH&E Work Method Statement for Refuelling Plant were regularly not implemented.
23In relation to the failure to observe safe refuelling practices, the ASF stated:
The safe work method statement and/or the system of work in place at the site at the time of the accident provided no designated times or areas for refuelling plant, did not require exclusion zones or barriers, or ensure that work was not recommenced before the refuelling operator had given a direction that it was appropriate to do so.
The system for refuelling of plant at the site did not include designated times or places for refuelling, although some items of larger plant such as scrapers or dozers were often, but not always, refuelled during designated breaks, such as tea break or lunch.
Refuelling of vehicles at the site required Mr Pulver to stand at the rear of his truck during the refuelling operation. Mr Pulver would then complete the fuel receipt whilst he was standing at the rear of his truck.
Some workers at the site said that it was normal practice for the loader to recommence operations whilst Mr Pulver stood at the rear of the tank completing the fuel receipt. Other workers said that they would not recommence operations until Mr Pulver had returned to his driver cabin and radioed that the area was clear prior to recommencing their machines.
Some operators at the site, including Mr Wickey, had not received any training or instruction in relation to refuelling procedures, in particular they had not received training in the SH&E Work Method Statement for Refuelling Plant at the site. The contents of this document had not been conveyed to plant operators such as Mr Wickey.
...
The systems of work for refuelling in place at the site prior to the incident failed to require that refuelling of mobile plant took place, prior to or at the end of shifts, or during specified breaks. Further, it did not require that the refuelling of mobile plant should be performed in purpose designed refuelling bays where the refuelling operator was physically protected by a barrier from the risk of being struck or crushed by the mobile plant.
The systems of work for refuelling in place at the site prior to the incident failed to require that operator of the mobile was not to re-commence the operation of the plant until the refuelling operator was in the refuelling truck and had given direction to the plant operator that s/he was permitted to commence to operate the plant.
Supervisors periodically undertook task observations of workers at the site. However, prior to the date of the Incident no documented task observation had been undertaken in relation to Mr Wickey or Mr Pulver's performance of their duties at the site.
24The ASF referred to the fact that on 10 December 2009, WorkCover released a safety alert titled 'Moving Plant on Construction Sites' which highlighted a number of control measures that should be considered and integrated into the system of work. Control measures listed include using barriers, spotters, and maintaining safe working distances. Reference was also made to a Code of Practice issued by WorkCover in 2004 titled 'Moving Plant on Construction Sites'. The Code of Practice listed hazards that have resulted in fatalities, including plant being operated near persons and reversing plant and provided examples of control measures such as using barriers, and planning direction of travel so visibility of operators is not restricted.
25The ASF addressed the systems of work put in place by the defendant following the incident:
(a) all activity at the site ceased until 5 July 2010. The defendant arranged for counselling for workers and the family members of Mr Pulver and Mr Wickey;
(b) Mr Wickey was certified unfit for duties, and returned to the site on suitable duties on 30 August 2010;
(c) Mr Williams, the truck driver who witnessed the incident, received counselling and was certified unfit for duties for one week;
(d) WorkCover issued an Improvement Notice on the defendant to review existing refuelling procedures. All staff on civil construction projects were instructed to carry out refuelling prior to or at the end of shifts, or during smoko and lunch breaks, or in designated and purpose designed refuelling bays;
(e) the defendant undertook an investigation and review of the incident;
(f) on 12 July 2010, the defendant developed a 4 tier refuelling strategy, in consultation with workers. Tier 1 related to the refuelling of light vehicles and mobile plant operating within the compound at the base refuelling station. Tier 2 related to the refuelling of mobile plant before and after shifts, and during designated breaks whilst the vehicle was parked. A 50 metre exclusion zone applies to working plant. Tier 3 related to refuelling on site in designated refuelling zones where the refuelling operator was protected by concrete barriers. Tier 4 applied to semi-static plant, and involved the use of a series of barriers to protect the operator;
(g) on 21 July 2010, the defendant released a work method statement for refuelling plant, which incorporated the 4 tier refuelling strategy;
(h) on 1 September 2010, 'The Red Book - Working around Mobile Plant' was released and implemented;
(i) during July 2010, the RTA issued a safety alert 'Moving Plant on Construction Sites' as a direct result of the incident. The document appears on the Roads and Traffic Authority website and the WorkCover website has a link to this alert;
(j) on 18 March 2011, the defendant, in conjunction with its alliance partners on the project (the Roads and Traffic Authority, Maunsell Australia Pty Limited, SMEC Australia Pty Ltd and Coffey Geotechnics Pty Limited) and the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, held a commemorative service and dedicated the naming of a pass over bridge north of Tarcutta as the 'David Pulver Bridge'. Mr Pulver's family and friends attended the event, and his children officiated in the cutting of the ribbon.