The stay application
20 Flagging their intention to appeal, the respondents applied for a stay of the injunctions, the ancillary orders, and the orders for delivery-up/destruction and costs. In support of their application they rely on two affidavits, one from Mr Saliba filed on 6 May 2020 and sworn on 13 May 2020, and another from Victoria-Jane Otavski, the respondents' solicitor, filed on 5 May 2020 and sworn on 15 May 2020.
21 The application is strenuously opposed. The applicant relies on a 365-page affidavit filed on 15 May 2020 and sworn on 28 May 2020 by Elizabeth Jane White, a partner of Baker McKenzie, the applicant's solicitors.
22 Two affidavits were filed in reply, one from Mr Saliba, which was filed on 22 May 2020 and sworn on 2 June 2020, and one from Ms Otavski, which was filed on 22 May 2020 and sworn on 26 May 2020.
23 All of the affidavits were read at the hearing. None of the deponents was required for cross-examination.
24 The relevant principles are well-established and not in dispute. I set out those principles below. They are drawn from the following authorities: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (receivers appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 (CA) at 693-695; Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corp (1996) 67 FCR 65 (FC) at 66; Phillip Morris (Australia) Pty Ltd v Nixon [1999] FCA 1281 (FC) at [17]; Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd v Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Sydneywide Bottlers Australia [2001] FCA 1750 at [6] (Hely J); Wooldridge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCA 349; 106 ACSR 551 at [8]-[18] (Middleton J); and Maher v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2008] VSCA 122 at [17]-[27] (Dodds-Streeton JA, Redlich JA agreeing).
25 The Court has a broad discretion and special circumstances are not required. But the judgment is not to be treated as provisional. The successful party is entitled to its benefit and the presumption that it is correct. Consequently, the applicant for a stay carries the burden of demonstrating that a stay is appropriate. A stay should not be granted unless the appeal is at least arguable, although speculation as to its prospects of success is usually inappropriate. Without more, however, an arguable case is not sufficient justification for a stay. In the exercise of the discretion, the court will weigh up such factors as the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties, including, in particular, any prejudice to the parties that would be caused by granting or refusing a stay. A substantial factor in favour of a stay is the risk that, without a stay, the appeal would be rendered nugatory.
26 The respondents argued that the stay should be granted because otherwise an appeal would be rendered nugatory; there is a real risk that the respondents would not be restored to their position; the appeal is genuine and based on arguable grounds with reasonable prospects; appropriate undertakings are offered, namely to prosecute the appeal, to maintain accounts and not to destroy records; the applicant would retain the benefit of the judgment in the declarations; and the balance of convenience favours the grant of a stay.
27 No specific argument was advanced in support of a stay of the costs order and I see no reason why that order should be stayed, no matter what results from the balancing process. There is no reason to think that the applicant would not be able to repay the respondents if that becomes necessary: Powerflex at 66G. Although the applicant is a foreign company, no application for security for costs was ever made.
28 But what of the other orders? Have the respondents made out an appropriate case that they should be stayed?
29 It is convenient to begin with the appeal point. No notice of appeal has yet been filed. Annexed to Ms Otavski's first affidavit is a draft notice of appeal, which she described as a "working draft" subject to further revision and refinement, including by senior counsel. As she put it, the focus of "an" appeal would be the Court's finding of deceptive similarity between the competing marks.
30 Ms Otavski was not the solicitor for the respondents at the time of trial. She only took instructions in late 2019. In her affidavit she deposed to having since read, "amongst other things, the evidence filed and served in the proceedings, the parties' statement of agreed facts, the parties' written submissions and the Court's reasons for judgment". Having read this material, Ms Otavski said that she was satisfied that an appeal would have reasonable prospects of success.
31 Ms Otavski's first affidavit also annexed a copy of an email to Baker McKenzie dated 16 April 2020 in which the stay application was first raised. In that email she proposed that the parties agree to a stay pending the filing of an application for leave to appeal and, if leave were granted, the disposition of the appeal, on the undertaking of the respondents by their counsel, that during the period of the stay they will:
a. prosecute any application for leave to appeal, and any subsequent appeal, expeditiously;
b. continue to make and maintain proper and complete records and will not destroy any records in relation to its or their business.
32 The respondents did not try to persuade me of the strength of their foreshadowed appeal. With one exception, as the notice of appeal is currently drafted, their case is apparently based on the arguments that were put at trial and which I ultimately found unpersuasive. The exception relates to the second of the two grounds of appeal and, more particularly, the contention that, with respect to the applicant's passing-off case, I erred by applying the Full Court's judgment in ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 302 and, since the United Kingdom has taken a different approach, ConAgra should now be overruled. Whatever may be the merits of that contention, the point was not pursued at trial since I was bound to follow ConAgra.
33 The applicant did not suggest that the appeal was not genuine and I am prepared to accept that the respondents intend to appeal. In his first affidavit Mr Saliba said that he wants to "pursue the opportunity of an appeal" and that Mr Kagan told him that he does, too.
34 With respect to Ms Otavski, I would give little weight to her opinion on the prospects of success of an appeal. That is because, although she said that she had been admitted as a solicitor for some 12 years and had "consistently worked in the area of litigation and dispute resolution" in both this Court and various State courts, she said nothing about her experience or expertise in this kind of litigation.
35 Be that as it may, I accept that the proposed grounds are arguable. The applicant did not argue otherwise and, by consent, I granted leave to appeal on the day the stay application was argued.
36 I turn now to the argument that, without a stay, the appeal would be nugatory and that, if the appeal were to succeed, there is a real risk the respondents would not be restored to their former position.
37 Mr Saliba's evidence was that, absent a stay, the name of the business will have to be changed and that that will be a costly exercise.
38 He deposed that the task of changing the name will require him and Mr Kagan to dedicate a significant period of time to at least the following tasks:
reviewing and considering potential new names and logos;
instructing external consultants to generate and modify any graphics in respect of new marks and logos;
selecting and ordering new internal and external signage for the business premises;
designing new merchandise such as food-packaging to ensure that any new mark and logo is adequately depicted and/or represented;
redesigning the DNO website and social media pages, including obtaining new addresses for those electronic pages and cancelling existing ones if it is not possible to change or amend them;
engaging with staff and suppliers to explain the name and mark change;
updating various governmental authorities in relation to the name and mark change, including implementing any necessary changes to corporate or business name registrations;
engaging with suppliers and partners in connection with the change of name and marks and requesting that the records (bills, invoices and the like) are amended to reflect the change;
designing and deploying advertising and marketing schemes to existing or loyal customers and new customers;
deleting all publications from the social media accounts that depict the DNO marks and logos;
devising and implementing new marketing and advertising strategies; and
seeking legal advice to ensure that any new name and marks do not infringe any existing intellectual property rights.
39 While he was not able to be precise about the time this would take, he estimated it would be in the order of at least eight weeks. He postulated that it could be even longer because of the COVID-19 pandemic. He estimated that changing the name and destroying or delivering up the relevant material would result in a loss of stock worth at least $11,000 to $12,000 and an external IT consultant may have to be engaged in order to ensure the destruction of the electronic copies. He said the stock comprised interior and exterior signage depicting DNO trade marks; merchandise such as clothing worn by staff and available for purchase; food packaging, "serve-ware", and menus; and flyers and other promotional and decorative materials used during in-store promotions. Based on his experience and "knowledge of existing third party suppliers", Mr Saliba predicted that the costs incurred "in connection with a new name, logo and marks for that new name to achieve a basic level of market recognition and reputation" would amount to $39,000 to $61,000.
40 Mr Saliba expressed the opinion that, once the name change was complete and on the assumption that an appeal were to succeed, it would not be "financially or commercially practicable, if possible at all" to revert to the DNO name, although that would be his and Mr Kagan's preference. He gave three reasons:
(1) the amount of money that would be wasted in the delivery-up and/or destruction of the DNO material, and the loss resulting from "lost search engine optimisation and Google ranking activities undertaken and costs incurred to date";
(2) the waste of management time invested in designing, developing, producing, installing, and rolling out a new brand; and
(3) the mixed messages that would be sent to customers by changing names twice, which would cause commercial uncertainty in what he expected "will be difficult economic and operating conditions in the fast-food and beverage industry".
41 Mr Saliba said that much of the commercial success and reputation the business had built up would be "significantly diminished or even lost". In this respect he pointed to the fact that in September and October 2019 respectively (while judgment was reserved) the DNO premises at Liverpool Street in the City of Sydney (the CBD restaurant) had won the NSW award for "Best Burger Bar" and the national award in the same category presented by the Restaurant and Catering Association of Australia. He also reported that the awards were announced on the Association's website and that the Association had tweeted its congratulations on its Twitter account.
42 The preference Messrs Saliba and Kagan may have for the current name is no justification for a stay.
43 There is no doubt that the name of the business will have to be changed if a stay is not granted. And I accept that refusing the stay will be inconvenient for the respondents and will come at some cost, both in time and money. But I am not persuaded that the respondents would suffer any great hardship in the absence of a stay. Nor am I satisfied that, without a stay, the appeal would be rendered nugatory.
44 First, like Red Bull, this is not a case in which the subject-matter of the appeal will be extinguished unless a stay is granted. Nothing would prevent the respondents resuming the use of the DNO name if an appeal were to succeed (cf. Melbourne Chinese Press Pty Ltd v Australian Chinese Newspapers Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 997 at [12] (Moore J)). Whether or not it would be financially or commercially feasible to do so would depend on how much the respondents invested in a new name. As the applicant submitted, they could always use the Hashtag Burgers name, which is already associated with the business, and website, either as a temporary measure or permanently.
45 Second, no factual foundation was laid for the opinions Mr Saliba expressed about the potential costs. Ms White's evidence indicates that it is most unlikely that the costs are anywhere near the amounts he quoted. Indeed, I conclude that they are likely to be considerably less than the lower figure of $39,000 provided by Mr Saliba.
46 For a start, although there was no indication of this in Mr Saliba's affidavit in chief, all but one of the DNO restaurants are already operating under a new name. Hashtag Burgers now has only one restaurant, the CBD restaurant, and a pop-up in Marrickville run out of a van, which was launched after the principal judgment was published and while the stay application was pending. Ms White's evidence reveals that the two other DNO restaurants that were operating at the time of the hearing (in Ryde and Crows Nest) and a third that was opened after the hearing (in Castle Hill) are in new hands and their name has changed to "Plan B Works". A post on the DNO Sydney Facebook page in mid-April 2020 informed a customer that "the other stores aren't affiliated with us anymore [but were] just using our name and apparently copying our specials". A post on the DNO Instagram account informed customers that "the only official Down N Out is in the CBD for now". That same day there was an announcement on Facebook that DNO "are looking at popping up in Marrickville for COVID season". It seems from posts on the DNO Facebook page and Instagram accounts that the Marrickville pop-up was launched on 7 May 2020, although in his affidavit in reply Mr Saliba said that it commenced operations the previous day.
47 An investigation conducted at the behest of the applicant disclosed that the Ryde, Crows Nest and Castle Hill restaurants had not been operated by any of the respondents in the period between 20 and 22 March 2020. As at 22 April 2020 the Facebook pages for DNO Ryde, Crows Nest and Castle Hill were no longer accessible.
48 But for Ms White's evidence, there is every reason to think that the Court would have been kept in the dark about these matters although they were plainly relevant to the extent of the harm the respondents might suffer if a stay were not granted.
49 The evidence given by Ms White indicates that most of the figures Mr Saliba gave are inflated, in some cases considerably so. The figures given by Mr Saliba were as follows:
Description Amount or range
- New business name registration $500 - $1,000
- New website domain registration $500 - $1,000
- External consultant designs for creation of new logos, marks and associated social media $5,000 - $10,000
- External signage $4,000 - $6,000
- Internal decorations and fit-out $2,000
- Branded food packaging and serve-ware items $3,000 - $4,000
- Other promotional material $5,000 - $6,000
- Legal and accounting costs $4,000 - $5,000
- Facebook marketing advertisement spend $5,000 - $8,000
- Instagram marketing advertisement spend $5,000 - $8,000
- Search engine optimisation charges $5,000 - $10,000
TOTAL $39,000 - $61,000