Consideration
26 For the following reasons, I consider a common fund order as sought by the applicant to be appropriate and in the interests of justice.
27 First, in general terms, the interests of justice in representative proceedings favour the burden of costs incurred for the benefit of all group members being shared equally among them: see Caason Investments Pty Limited v Cao (No 2) [2018] FCA 527 (Caason) at [161].
28 Secondly, the funding terms provide for a funding commission of "an amount less than 18% of the Gross Recovery". Under the proposed terms, the actual funding amount will be set by the Court at a later stage in the proceeding, when it will have the advantage of more complete information about the quantum or likely quantum of any settlement or judgment, most likely at the point of settlement approval or the distribution of damages: see Money Max at [79]. This gives group members certainty about the maximum total costs of participating in the action, so that they can make an informed decision before opting out, while also providing for continued judicial oversight of those costs so that the Court may prevent 'windfalls' or a disproportionate return to the funder: see Money Max at [85]-[89]. While the cap is expressed as a percentage of the Gross Recovery, it may be that the actual funding amount will be calculated in some other way, provided that it is less than the dollar amount that equals 18% of the Gross Recovery.
29 As noted above, the respondent did not oppose the application. The respondent helpfully provided written submissions to assist the Court, outlining various relevant matters. One of the observations contained in the respondent's written submissions was that the 18% maximum commission proposed by the applicant "will, once embodied in an order, become the inevitable reference point for the selection of the final funding rate". The applicant, in his reply submissions, rejected this observation and stated that it failed to acknowledge the advantage to group members of providing certainty about the maximum costs of the proceeding prior to opt out. I accept the applicant's submission that the 18% figure is a maximum and should not be seen as the inevitable reference point for the selection of the actual funding amount.
30 Thirdly, apart from the costs and commission terms, the funding terms proposed by the applicant are unexceptional and are substantively the same as those previously approved by Beach J in McKay Super Solutions Pty Ltd v Bellamy's Australia Ltd (VID163/2017), by order dated 3 April 2018.
31 Fourthly, the proposed funding terms have been agreed to by a funder with extensive international experience in conducting securities class actions and assessing class action risk. The application follows a lengthy and thorough investigation of group members' claims by lawyers with extensive experience in conducting representative proceedings and in negotiating funding terms in the interests of group members.
32 Fifthly, a commission rate of less than 18% of gross recoveries compares favourably with funding commissions approved by the Court in other Pt IVA proceedings, in particular as it is inclusive of reimbursement for expenses paid by the funder. In Blairgowrie Trading Ltd v Allco Finance Group Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) (No 3) (2017) 343 ALR 476, Beach J noted (at [125]) that a commission rate of 30% of net recoveries (equal to 22.1% of gross recoveries) compared favourably with the usual range of commission rates in Australian funded proceedings: see also Earglow at [166]-[177] (Murphy J). More recently, Murphy J in Kuterba v Sirtex Medical Ltd (VID1375/2017) approved a funding commission rate of "no more than 28%" of net recoveries, and Lee J in Webb v GetSwift Limited (NSD580/2018) approved a percentage-based commission of 20% of net recoveries (in the alternative to a commission based on a multiple of expenses). In Kuterba and Webb, the commission rate was separate from and in addition to reimbursement for expenses.
33 Sixthly, the information pack provided to prospective group members included the proposal to seek a common fund order on the same terms as are now sought by the applicant in the proceeding. Notwithstanding this, funded group members entered into the Funding Agreement, and in doing so, indicated their agreement to the proposed funding terms. A substantial number of group members (2,938) have entered into Funding Agreements, including 161 institutional investors. This implies widespread approval of the proposed funding terms, including by astute and experienced institutional investors: see Money Max at 80. Further, no group member has approached the lawyers to express any dissatisfaction with the funding terms.
34 Seventhly, assessed objectively, the proposed funding terms are in the interests of funded group members. Under the Funding Agreement, the Funder is entitled to be reimbursed for its expenses of funding the litigation from funded group members' recoveries, in addition to the commission. Under the proposed funding terms, however, the funding commission is in consideration for funding the litigation and is inclusive of reimbursement for expenses.
35 Eighthly, under the common fund order, unfunded group members will be required to pay a commission to the funder from any recoveries in circumstances where they have not expressly agreed to do so and would have otherwise received a 'free ride' at the expense of funded group members (subject to the making of a funding equalisation order: see Caason at [161]). This may be seen to be against the interests of unfunded group members. However, in circumstances where litigation funding charges have become a standard cost in class actions, where unfunded group members are exposed to no adverse costs risk, and where the interests of justice dictate that group members should share the costs of litigation from which they all benefit, I do not consider it appropriate to refuse to make the order sought on this basis: see Pearson v State of Queensland [2017] FCA 1096 (Pearson) at [25]. To the extent that unfunded group members may wish to bring separate proceedings against the respondent, or not bring proceedings against the respondent at all, their right to do so is protected by the opportunity to opt out of the proceeding. If a common fund order is to be made, it is in the interests of unfunded group members that the order be made at an early stage and prior to the time for opting out.
36 Further, in my view, the order sought by the applicant is in accordance with the broad policy aims of Pt IVA discussed by the Full Court in Money Max at [176]-[205].
37 I note that group members have not been notified of the present application prior to it being heard. However, I do not consider this to be necessary in the circumstances of this case: see Pearson at [34]-[47]; Webb v GetSwift Limited (No 3) [2018] FCA 1133 at [7]-[9].
38 I note that on 27 July 2018, the respondent filed an interlocutory application seeking a stay of the proceeding on the basis of pending criminal proceedings in Brazil. That application has not yet been heard. I do not consider the stay application to provide a reason to defer making a common fund order. The stay application will be determined on the merits of that application. Whether or not a common fund order has been made will not affect the disposition of the stay application.
39 It appears likely that another shareholder class action relating to the same subject matter will be commenced. At the hearing of the application, leave to appear was sought on behalf of Klemweb Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the Klemweb Superannuation Fund (Klemweb). I gave Klemweb leave to appear. Klemweb relied on an affidavit of Brooke Dellavedova, a principal of the firm of solicitors, Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd (Maurice Blackburn), dated 2 August 2018. This indicated that, for the past several months, Maurice Blackburn has been instructed by shareholders of BHP Billiton Limited to conduct an investigation into a proposed action. At the time of the hearing of the application, no proceeding had been commenced. However, it appeared likely that such a proceeding would be commenced within four weeks of the hearing of the application. If such a proceeding is commenced, it will be necessary to deal with issues associated with there being a multiplicity of proceedings. However, it was not suggested that the making of a common fund order as sought by the applicant would limit the ability of the Court to deal with such issues. If appropriate, the interlocutory order for a common fund in this proceeding can be varied or vacated. Accordingly, I do not consider the prospect of Klemweb commencing a proceeding to provide a reason to defer making a common fund order.