(a) The fact that it was a test conducted pursuant to s.55 of the Act, as the respondent stated in evidence, did not establish that it was in fact an approved instrument as would be required for a test under that section to be valid. To infer otherwise would merely be a circular argument whereby the conduct of a test would be treated as proof, by inference, that all pre-requisites which were obliged to be proved under the Act, had been met, including that the instrument complied with s.3; (b) The fact that the machine was operated by a member of the Victoria Police who was duly authorised to conduct breath analyses under the Act was not capable of leading to a conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, drawn by inference, that when he performed this analysis he used a machine which was authorised under the Act. He may well have fully intended to use an authorised machine and did not appreciate that it did not bear the required marking; (c) That the machine was one used at Oakleigh Police Station in a room dedicated to such tests could not lead to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that it was properly authorised; (d) The tender of a certificate pursuant to s.58(2) as a document which purported to be a certificate "produced by a breath analysing instrument" could not, by virtue of the tender, thereby prove that the instrument was duly approved as required by s.3. Section 58(2)(b) expressly provided that the certificate was conclusive proof that the instrument used was "a breath analysing instrument within the meaning of this Act". The very fact that there was such a specific provision serves to emphasise that the certificate did not otherwise have the effect which its mere tender is now suggested to convey. In Furze v Nixon[26] the Court addressed the question whether upon the giving of a notice under s.58(2) the certificate continued to provide some proof, albeit not conclusive, of the matter stated in s.58(2)(e). The Court concluded that upon the giving of notice the certificate provided no evidence at all of the fact stated in s.58(2)(e). By parity of reasoning precisely the same conclusion must be drawn as to s.58(2)(b). Thus, the certificate provides no evidence, at all, that the instrument that produced it was one authorised under the Act, although it otherwise constitutes some evidence of the facts stated within its terms. (e) Evidence from the certificate that the machine was a Drager Alcotest 7110 with a serial number MRFK 0032 was incapable of leading to a conclusion that it also bore the numbers 3530791. Indeed (although it is not necessary for us to go so far), there would be no reason why the conclusion might not more reasonably be drawn (having regard to the question to the respondent which elicited his answer that the machine bore the serial number 0032) that instead of bearing the number 3530791 which was required under s.3 it bore the marking MRFK 0032, and was not compliant with s.3; (f) As Ormiston, J. held in Bogdanovski v. Buckingham[27], proof that the instrument had been operated in accordance with the procedures laid out in the regulations did not establish that it was an authorised instrument, nor, in my opinion, could that evidence support an inference that the machine was duly authorised. The regulations did not purport to provide proof as to the matters in the s.3 definition.