principles
11 It is well settled that there be strict compliance with the requirements of a statutory demand. In Pro-Image Productions (Vic) Pty Ltd v Catalyst Television Productions Pty Ltd (1988) 14 ACLR 303, Marks J said at 305:
"The law requires strict compliance with a statutory provision to meet its purpose. It is not an arid requirement to enforce discipline among lawyers or make examples of persons who make mistakes. In my opinion, the proper test is whether an error of the kind which we are here concerned had the effect of frustrating in some way a purpose of the statutory provisions under consideration, or whether it was capable of depriving a party of a right or opportunity to exercise a right."
12 It is also clear that an error in a statutory demand will not of itself necessarily require the setting aside of a statutory demand. The Act requires that "substantial injustice" is caused or that there is some other reason why the statutory demand should be set aside: s 459J.
13 In the present case the Act requires that the Statutory Demand must specify the debt and its amount. The Statutory Demand served on the applicant identifies the debt as the amount of $161,882.99 being the aggregate of two dishonoured cheques described in the schedule. The schedule which purports to describe the debt, refers to a cheque in the sum of AU$100,000 drawn by the company in favour of the creditor, which was dishonoured upon presentation on 10 September 2002, and a cheque in the sum of AU$61,882.99 drawn by the company in favour of the creditor which was dishonoured upon presentation on 10 September 2002. Accordingly, the debt which is said to exist is a debt arising in relation to two dishonoured cheques.
14 However, it is evident from the copies of the cheques in evidence that the dishonoured cheques were not drawn in favour of Shanghai Jerrys Candle Company Ltd, the creditor, but were drawn in favour of another company, Shanghai Rising Dragon International Trade Co Ltd. In this respect the specification of the debt in the Statutory Demand is clearly erroneous. This is so for two main reasons. First, the cheques were not drawn in favour of the creditor respondent but in favour of another entity. Second, it appears that the cheques given to the respondent were not made payable to any specified payee but that the name of the payee, which appeared on the cheques dishonoured, was later filled in. Furthermore, there is no material before me which would justify the inference that there was a debt in the sum of AU$161,889.22 at the date of dishonour or drawing of the cheques. The asserted debt which appears to be relied on in the Statutory Demand is a debt arising from the dishonour of a cheque and not a debt arising in respect of the supply of goods or services or for any other reason.
15 The position is not corrected by the affidavit of April Chen of 8 November 2002. That affidavit asserts that the respondent carries on a business of the supply of candle products and that the applicant is a customer. It also alleges that the applicant purported to pay the debt due to the company by way of cheques which had been dishonoured upon presentation. The debt in question which appears to be relied on in the affidavit is the amount on the dishonour of the cheques.
16 In addition, the affidavit of April Chen does not comply with the requirements of Form 7 of the Rules in so far as it fails to state, as required by that form:
"I believe there is no genuine dispute about the existence or amount of the *debt/*any of the debts."
17 In relation to the first matter, namely the reference to the wrong payee on the dishonoured cheques, the respondent seeks to rely on a statement by Jerry Chen in his affidavit sworn on 23 January 2002, in which he says:
"3. By way of explanation, to export goods from China my company is required to transact its business through an authorised trading corporation, being Shanghai Rising Dragon International Trade Company Limited. The invoices drawn by that company, Shanghai Rising Dragon International Trade Company Limited are invoices made by that company on behalf of Jerry's Candles and directed to IFA. The payments the subject of these proceedings, being the two dishonoured cheques, were payments made by IFA to my company which were dishonoured upon presentation to my company's bank. The payments the subject of the two dishonoured cheques in the total amount of AU$161,882.99, were payments made by IFA for the two sales contracts being Exhibit 'JS8' to my affidavit sworn 12 December 2002."
18 Apart from the assertion that the invoices drawn by Shanghai Rising Dragon International Trade Company Ltd were made on behalf of the respondent, there is no evidence to support such an assertion and it is not referred to in the Statutory Demand. I do not consider that any such agency has been made out on the evidence before me.
19 The assertion by Mr Chen is that the payments, the subject of the proceedings, are the two dishonoured cheques and that there were payments made by IFA to his company which were dishonoured. This is not so. The cheques were made out as indicated above and then were made payable to a company other than the respondent.
20 The specification of the debt in a statutory demand is a fundamental requirement and in the present case it is evident that the statement in the Statutory Demand is inaccurate. The cheques on the basis of which the debt is asserted were not made payable to the alleged creditor-respondent.
21 For this reason alone, I am satisfied that there is a substantial defect in the Statutory Demand and that it the defect is of such a nature that substantial injustice would be caused unless the demand is set aside.
22 Independently, and in addition to this conclusion, April Chen, in her affidavit of 8 November 2002 in support of the Statutory Demand, does not swear that there is a belief that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of amount of debt. This is a material failure of significance. The assertion that the proponent believes there is no genuine dispute about the existence or amount of the debt provides an important protection to the recipient of such a notice given the dire consequences which can ensue where there is no compliance. It would in my view be unfair to the recipient not to insist upon observance of this statutory requirement.
23 It has been pointed out that although a creditor's view that there is no genuine dispute about a debt may be subjective, it is not for the Court to put words into the mouth of a deponent or ignore the omission of such a requirement for a sworn statement to that effect.
24 The legislature has specifically provided for a commitment to the position and an expression of a belief that there is no genuine dispute. This is a valuable safeguard against possible abuse of statutory demands in circumstances where there may be a genuine dispute known to the creditor or the creditor's authorised representative yet it is sought to exert pressure for payment. In the present case, where there is a total omission to insert such a paragraph, it cannot be suggested that there has been any substantial compliance with this requirement. Nor can it be described in the minimalist language used in the Act as "a mere defect". The express requirement of a statement that there is a belief as to the absence of any genuine dispute is additional to the requirement that the debt is due and payable. A simple assertion that a debt is due and payable does not necessarily entail the consequence that there is no genuine dispute about the existence or amount of the debt or any belief as to the absence of a genuine dispute: see Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council v Four Seasons Construction Pty Ltd (2002) 20 ACLC 352 at [32]; Wildtown Holdings Pty Ltd v Rural Traders Co Ltd [2002] WASCA 196 at [68]-[71]. The matter was also the subject of consideration by McLelland CJ in Eq in B & M Quality Constructions Pty Ltd v Buyrite Steel Supplies Pty Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 433 at 435-436 where his Honour pointed out:
"… the departure from the relevant rule in respect of the affidavit accompanying the statutory demand is a matter of substance. … It is important in this regard to bear in mind that the relevant matters include not only a belief as to the existence and amount of the debt, but also a belief as to the absence of any genuine dispute about the existence or amount of the debt. The express requirement in the rule that the person making the affidavit depose to his or her belief that there is no genuine dispute is a significant mechanism for filtering out cases where there is in fact such a dispute, so as to prevent such cases from reaching the court on such an application as the present, with a consequent waste of time and resources. This mechanism would be substantially weakened unless a person likely to have personal knowledge of the existence of a dispute if there is one makes the affidavit. A statement of a belief that there is no genuine dispute based solely on hearsay is unlikely to have anything like the same degree of reliability. I therefore do not regard what has occurred in the present case as merely a technical breach."
25 In that case the affidavit did not omit the statement but included an assertion that the deponent believed that there was no genuine dispute about the existence or amount of the debt. Nevertheless, in view of the hearsay nature of the statement, his Honour considered that the omission was more than a mere defect. His Honour expressed the view that he did not regard what had occurred in that case as a mere technical breach of the relevant rules, but rather that it went to the heart of what the legislative requirement was intended to achieve.
26 I consider that the total omission of any statement in the present case provides an additional and independent ground on which to set aside the Statutory Demand: see Technitrade Pty Ltd v Compucon Computers (SA) Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 309.
27 Accordingly, in view of the conclusion which I have reached with respect to the defective Statutory Demand, the application should be granted and the respondent should pay the applicant's costs of this application.
28 In view of the conclusion which I have reached on the first ground advanced for the applicant it is not necessary to consider the question as to whether there is a genuine dispute in the present case.
29 I should add that in this case counsel indicated to me that the parties were continuing to engage in commercial relations and there is clearly much to be said for a close consideration of the possibility of reaching mutual agreement in relation to any outstanding dispute between the parties.
I certify that the preceding twenty-nine (29) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Tamberlin.