Alternatively, it was contended that the effect of s. 43A was such as to enable Denton to assert that its interest in the subject land should be held to prevail over that of Courtenays. That section is in the following terms: "(1) For the purpose only of protection against notice, the estate or interest in land under the provisions of this Act, taken by a person under an instrument registrable, or which when appropriately signed by or on behalf of that person would be registrable under this Act shall, before registration of that instrument, be deemed to be a legal estate. (2) No person contracting or dealing in respect of an estate or interest in land under the provisions of this Act shall be affected by notice of any instrument, fact, or thing merely by omission to search in a register not kept under this Act. (3) Registration under the Registration of Deeds Act, 1897, shall not of itself affect the rights of any person contracting or dealing in respect of estates or interests in land under the provisions of this Act." Clearly enough, the section was designed to deal with the position of the holder of a registrable instrument between the time of its receipt and the time of its registration. But its effect is by no means clear. No doubt it proceeds on the basis that under the law as settled at the date of its enactment s. 43 did not afford any degree of protection to a purchaser prior to registration and that any conflict between competing equitable interests prior to registration fell to be determined according to ordinary equitable principles. That is to say, that the earlier of two competing equitable interests must, in the ordinary course, be taken to prevail over the later. Of course, in any particular case, circumstances may be shown to have existed which will result in the earlier equitable interest being postponed. However, in the case where no such circumstances are shown to have existed, the question whether the second interest was acquired with notice of the earlier interest is completely irrelevant; the prior interest will prevail whether the later interest was acquired with or without notice of it. What use was it then for the section to stipulate "For the purpose only of protection against notice, the estate or interest in land taken by a person under an instrument registrable under this Act shall be deemed to be a legal estate"? The section has been the subject of much professional discussion (see e.g. Baalman - A Commentary on The Torrens System in New South Wales, (1951) pp. 176, 177; Kerr - Australian Land Titles (Torrens) System, (1927) p. 28; and (1932) 6 Aust. Law Journal 85). Various possibilities have been discussed but no really satisfactory answer appears as to the meaning of the section. Read literally is accomplishes nothing. If an intended transferee has paid his purchase money his position will not be worsened by notice, subsequently, of a prior equitable interest. It is, of course, true that his interest may be entirely defeated, in the absence of fraud, by prior registration of the earlier interest but if this occurs he will be defeated, not because he had notice of that interest at any stage, but by the transformation of that interest into the interest of a registered proprietor. On the other hand, if he secures registration first his interest will be likewise transformed into the estate of a registered proprietor and, in the absence of fraud, he will secure an indefeasible estate. Accordingly, a person who has paid his purchase money and who has secured a registrable memorandum of transfer needs no protection against notice received thereafter and a provision which purports, merely, to protect him against the effects of notice will not confirm his title. It is, however, not unreasonable to assume that the section was intended to achieve some object. And that object, it seems, was to make some appropriate provision for "filling" what has been called the "gap" left in s. 43 by the "settled law" concerning that section (Baalman - supra, at p. 177). Does the section, then go further than merely to afford a so-called protection against notice and operate to give to the holder of a registrable memorandum of transfer priority over an earlier equitable interest where he has, without notice thereof, paid his purchase money and obtained his registrable instrument? The suggestion that it does is based upon the contention that the holder of a registrable instrument in such circumstances is enabled to assert, as against the prior equitable interest, that he has by virtue of the section a legal estate in the land acquired without notice of the earlier interest and that he is, therefore, entitled to perfect his title by registration. Such a construction, it is said, does some violence to the terms of the section but it is, it seems to me, the result, which notwithstanding its "ungainly approach" to the subject (See Baalman, supra, at p. 177), the section was intended to produce.